National Scholar Updates

Sweetness and Light: Thoughts for Parashat Beha'aloteha

Angel for Shabbat, Parashat Beha'aloteha
 

by Rabbi Marc D. Angel

 

For many years, we were regular customers of a local store. The proprietor always greeted us with a smile, called us by name, asked about our family. If our bill amounted to $51.10, he would often just round it off at $50. He genuinely loved his work and had a warm relationship with us and his many other customers.
 

But a few years ago, he retired and another person took over the business. The new proprietor always has a glum expression on his face, rarely greets us when we enter the store, seems to wish he was anywhere else but in the store. If our bill amounts to $51.10, we pay every cent of it, since he never rounds off the total.

We find that we now rarely shop at this store. The merchandise is the same…but the shopping experience has become unpleasant. We’ve found other stores to patronize.
 

What’s true in business is also true in religious life. When a rabbi/synagogue/community is welcoming, approachable and genuinely interested in us, we are more likely to respond positively. If a rabbi/synagogue/community doesn’t really seem to care about us—except for our membership dues and donations—we are likely to look for a more congenial religious setting.

This week’s Torah portion relates the details of the lighting of the menorah by Aaron the High Priest. Aaron’s role was not merely to provide light for the sanctuary, but to symbolically create an atmosphere of holiness, warmth, and enlightenment for the public.

In the Pirkei Avot, we read the words of Hillel: Be among the disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving people and drawing them close to the Torah.  Aaron, who lit the menorah in the sanctuary, was himself a personification of the spirit of kindness; he brought light to others through his warmth, caring, and genuine desire to develop friendships among the community. He was successful in bringing people closer to Torah because they were attracted to his kindness, to his concern for them and their families.

The late Rabbi Shlomo Carlebach founded a synagogue in Berkeley during the 1960s in order to reach out to the many young Jews who had drifted away from Jewish tradition. He named it the House of Love and Prayer. In the summer of 1967, he was asked to explain his vision for this synagogue.

He answered: “Here’s the whole thing, simple as it is. The House of Love and Prayer is a place where, when you walk in, someone loves you, and when you walk out, someone misses you.” (Quoted in “Rabbi Shlomo Carlebach: Life, Mission and Legacy,” by Natan Ophir, Urim Publications, 2014, p.119)

In these few words, Rabbi Carlebach expressed a profound insight worthy of immortality! He offered a vision not just for the House of Love and Prayer…but for all places of Jewish worship. When we enter a synagogue, do we feel welcomed? Does our presence mean anything to those in attendance? When we leave, does anyone miss us? Do the rabbi and synagogue officials take the time to get to know us, our needs, our concerns?

One might attend various synagogues and find the same general liturgy and customs—but in one synagogue one feels ignored or rebuffed, and in another synagogue one feels warmly received and appreciated.  Which would you choose to attend and support?

 

 

Politics, International Justice, and the Responsibility of Jews to Behave Morally and Protect Their Interests

 

The recent Iron Swords War has highlighted many flaws with the political order in general and the international criminal justice system in particular. Attempts to indict Israeli leaders in the International Criminal Court alongside preposterous accusations of genocide have led many to conclude that the politicized system is built on a (anti-Semitic?) bias against Israel. In this article, I hope to show how these well-founded concerns were already raised by rabbinic scholars in the earliest days of the League of Nations. I further argue that these problems have continued to confound many Jews who were otherwise tempted to support a system that promised a new world order.

 

Jewish Internationalists and Dreams of a New World Order

 

On November 12, 1917, while World War I continued to rage, R. Avraham Yitzchak Hakohen Kook sent a letter to his son R. Tzvi Yehuda: God’s light has finally pierced into our dark world. The redemption has begun.[1]

What inspired this proclamation? Ten days earlier, the British foreign minister issued the Balfour Declaration establishing support for the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” The British soon afterward conquered Palestine from the Turks, ending 400 years of Ottoman control of the Holy Land and raising hopes of Zionists around the world. 

R. Kook had been waiting for this moment. Now dwelling in London, he had been delivering Bible-laced sermons praising British patriotism and their fight against Germany.[2] With the declaration of the world’s great power, he wrote to Seidel, the messianic process has begun! The Lord, who is “master of battles and sprouts salvations,” had delivered.[3] It’s true, he conceded, the bloody war had revealed the depravity of modernity and its European delegates. God, however, had now made it possible for people of uplifted spirit to bring about a new era. 

A few years later, the Balfour Declaration was incorporated by the newly established League of Nations into its broad mandate system that would govern territories of collapsed empires. Belgium controlled Rwanda and Burundi; the French oversaw Syria and Lebanon; and the British governed Palestine and Transjordan, to name a few prominent examples. The goal of the mandate system, at least as proclaimed by its founders, was to end the colonialist era of exploitation. At the base level, this would entail protecting the rights of the local inhabitants through a system of international law. More ambitiously, the mandate system would facilitate the founding of new states. Concomitantly, various treaties were enacted to ensure minority rights in all nation-states, new and old. Taken together, a new world order was sought to preserve peace between states and prevent persecution of minorities within them.

Many Jews, including some avowed Zionists, were deeply involved in these movements.[4] One such figure was a rising academic star and legal activist, the Polish-born Hirsch Tzvi Lauterpacht (1897–1960). In the days after World War I, Lauterpacht had witnessed the horrible November 1918 pogrom in Lemberg, a contested city within the newly independent Poland. The war was over, yet Jews continued to be slaughtered.[5]

As borders were getting drawn anew across the globe, Lauterpacht dedicated his life to providing protections for minorities in these new states. He believed that Britain could use its imperial power to bring lasting peace, including support for both Jewish nationalism in Palestine and rights for Jews and other minorities throughout Europe.[6] Lauterpacht would become a leading law professor at Cambridge and later a judge on the International Court of Justice. He is credited with establishing that international law prohibited territorial conquest through warfare; that’s precisely the expansionist “discretionary wars,” to use rabbinic terms, that Kook wanted to end. Lauterpacht also helped establish that those who waged aggressive warfare could be placed on trial. His advocacy directly led to the Nuremberg trials against Nazi figures after World War II. This was a deeply personal case for Lauterpacht. His parents, siblings, and extended family were all killed in the Holocaust.[7]

Another prominent international jurist who escaped Europe before the war and worked with Lauterpacht on the Nuremberg trials was Jacob Robinson (1889–1977). Robinson was born in a small village in the Russian empire to an Orthodox Jewish family from distinguished rabbinic lineage. Like many others, he sought solutions to the “Jewish problem” after the antisemitic violence in Kishinev and elsewhere. After earning his law degree, he was drafted into the Russian army in 1914. He was captured by the Germans and spent the next three years in eight different German POW camps. Somehow surviving, he returned home to the newly independent Lithuania, where he not only led a Hebrew-language school but was also elected to the Lithuanian parliament. Robinson became a renowned advocate for national minority rights, playing critical advocacy roles in the Congress of European National Minorities and at the League of Nations. Throughout the 1920s, he promoted a “pan-Europa” transnational community that would allow minorities to peacefully live within whatever national borders they found themselves.[8] At the same time, he was also the de facto leader of Lithuanian Zionism. Ben-Gurion even deemed him as “the most important man in Lithuania.”[9]

For many Jews, international governance presented an enticing alternative to pacifism toward achieving the prophetic visions of a new world order. We don’t need to naively declare that violence is never justified. Instead, we can work to create an institutional system that will find alternative methods for conflict resolution. If peace efforts fail, then these bodies will act to ensure that any belligerent aggressors face justice. The world can together agree upon what military actions are acceptable. They will provide direction for moral dilemmas alongside clarity for determining which sides were right or wrong. For many, this was, and is, an alluring vision of prophetic proportions.[10] 

Yet could international governance deliver on these high hopes? Could world powers, in fact, now provide justice for the Jewish people and other persecuted groups? 

 

Two Excommunicated Rabbis and the Changing Self-Image of the Jew 

 

In August 1920, a book ban was issued by the leaders of the ultra-Orthodox community of Jerusalem. The author of the prohibited book was none other than Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, who had recently returned from London to assume the position of the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem. Once settled, R. Tzvi Yehuda published his father’s major treatise, Orot (Lights), which included his reflections on the Great War from Switzerland and his hopes for a new era in international relations. 

What raised the ire of his critics to ban this book? R. Kook had equated the spiritual merits accrued by youthful physical training to those gained by piously reciting Psalms or mystical enchantments. This was not the first time R. Kook had aroused controversy for praising the ethos of self-defense. In the first years of the twentieth century, Jews—usually immigrants fleeing from the pogroms in Russia—founded different groups to build character based on physical toil and exercise. “Muscular Jews” could work the land and fight for themselves. Kook wrote enthusiastically about the importance of Jewish self-defense, viewing the phenomenon as “heartwarming.”[11] While recognizing that these groups were led by secular Jews, he embraced their efforts. He mourned for two that were killed in 1911 as “holy martyrs,” despite the fact that both had abandoned the religious lifestyles of their upbringing.[12] For R. Kook, physical strength was a sign of renewed Jewish vigor to develop the homeland and instill fear in its enemies.

Yet his latest expression of praise for profane labor and physical strength—comparing it to a classic religious act of beseeching God for assistance—was too much for those who viewed the Jewish hero as pious, pensive, and passive. They wanted R. Kook out of Palestine. The controversy quickly spread throughout the Jewish world, with competing images of Jews and Judaism at stake.[13] 

Unlike several of R. Kook’s apologetic defenders, one of his most strident supporters felt that R. Kook didn’t go far enough. What’s the benefit, he asked, of simply reciting Psalms as a protective charm or incantation? 

 

It is unquestionable that to strengthen Jewish boys to enable them to defend themselves against their pursuers (with God’s help) is a greater mitzvah (religious deed) than reciting Psalms.… Reciting Psalms is the task of the indolent; calisthenics is the task of the industrious. 

 

Prayer, he added, can have a valuable role, but only alongside self-defense training. He further accused R. Kook’s critics of timidity and suggested they instead go back to Europe. Their cowardice was only causing fear among the Jewish residents from antisemitic Arabs, who looked upon diffident Jewish neighbors as “dead meat.”[14] 

R. Kook’s defender, Rabbi Hayim Hirschensohn (1857–1935), knew something about rabbinic bans. He himself had left Jerusalem two decades earlier following controversies over his own publications. Unlike most of the prominent Zionists of this era, Hirschensohn was born in the Land of Israel. His parents were proto-Zionists (ĥovevei Tziyon) who had immigrated from Pinsk in 1847. They helped develop Jewish settlement in the cities of Safed and Jerusalem before Herzl was even born. The younger Hirschensohn followed in their footsteps by organizing the acquisition and development of properties around the country. He later became a founding member of the religious Zionist movement, Mizrachi. 

As a scholar, R. Hirschensohn aroused the ire of traditionalists in Jerusalem. This was partly because of his outspoken advocacy for reviving Hebrew as a spoken language, including his founding, with Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, of an organization toward that goal. (He and Ben-Yehuda were the first two families to enforce Hebrew-speaking in their homes). He also displayed openness toward analyzing classic rabbinic texts from a critical historical lens. These factors, among others, led to his formal excommunication by the old-school rabbis of Jerusalem. Needing to make a living, Hirschensohn was forced to leave his birthplace. 

So, in 1904, the same year that R. Kook immigrated to Jaffa, R. Hirschensohn made it to Hoboken, New Jersey, where he served as a rabbi for the rest of his life. During World War I and its aftermath, he attests, he was deeply engrossed in pastoral work with veterans and their families, for which he received a letter of commendation. R. Hirschensohn remained active in various Zionist organizations and maintained correspondence with the great rabbinic figures in Palestine. Yet he died in relative obscurity, with his writings becoming well-known only in the past couple of decades. His works remain particularly important because in the wake of the horrors of World War I and the excitement of the Balfour Declaration, he wrote several books dedicated to establishing the legal groundwork for a democratic state within Jewish thought, including addressing the dilemmas of war and conquest.[15] 

 

The Jewish Legion and the Hasmonean Spirit of Self-Determination 

 

The 1920 excommunication controversy was not the first time that Rabbis Kook and Hirschensohn had supported Jews taking up arms. Both men had endorsed enlistment during World War I in the so-called Jewish Legion, battalions within the British army composed of Jewish volunteers from England, North America, and other countries to fight in Palestine. They were created upon the initiative of Joseph Trumpeldor and Vladimir Jabotinsky. Trumpeldor was a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War in which he lost his left arm and received four medals of bravery, making him the most decorated Jewish veteran of the Russian Army. Jabotinsky was a Russian writer who made Bialik’s poem on the Kishinev pogrom famous by translating it into Russian. More significantly, he had been an organizer of Jewish self-defense organizations and an advocate for minority rights in Europe, seeking to protect the Jewish people with both law and shield.[16] 

During World War I, Trumpeldor and Jabotinsky sought British permission for Jews to fight the Ottomans in Palestine. After protracted negotiations, including those of Chaim Weizmann, the Legion finally formed and played a minor role in completing the British conquest of Palestine in 1918. Its fighters included David Ben-Gurion, later Israel’s first prime minister; Eliyahu Golomb, the founder of the pre-state Haganah defense force; and Berl Katznelson, a future labor leader. 

The Legion did not accomplish much and soon disbanded, yet it transformed the image of the Jew into someone who could fight for himself and his homeland. The chaplain of the Legion was Reverend Leib Falk (1889–1957), who grew up in Boisk and studied in the school of R. Kook and Seidel. In a Hanukka holiday sermon, Falk reflected on the significance of the first Jewish military corps that had fought in nearly eighteen hundred years: 

The whole world was watching [and] were looking on us, but they see now the Maccabean spirit revived, they see now that Israel is not only powerful with his voice, but he has also a mighty arm.... The Jewish soldier upholds now the honour of our nation. The Jewish warrior saved our national honour which was at stake.[17]

 

While the troops were still in England, R. Kook visited Falk and his men. Previously, R. Kook had opposed the enlistment of yeshiva students (frequently new immigrants from eastern Europe) into the British army because of their inability to maintain a religious lifestyle.[18] Yet he bestowed Jewish Legion fighters with blessings of strength while deeming them as the bearers of the beginning of salvation.[19] Years later, when the Jewish Legion’s flag was brought to Palestine for a grand ceremony, R. Kook compared it to the banners that the Israelites used in the desert on their way to conquering the Land of Israel.[20]

Yet it was R. Hirschensohn who penned the most extensive treatise in support of the Legion. Even though Jews were fighting within a foreign army, he nonetheless deemed fighting in Palestine as within the category of an “obligatory war” for the liberation of the homeland. Earlier rabbinic Zionist figures were concerned that military activity may violate talmudic oaths that prohibited the Jews during their exile period from “rebelling against the nations” or “rising up together in force.” [21] They thus advocated for a peaceful settlement through land acquisitions. R. Hirschensohn was not deterred by this talmudic prohibition; it applied, in his mind, only to rebellions in foreign lands, not to conquering the Holy Land. This was especially true since the British had recognized the right of the Jews to establish a state in Palestine. This was not treason, but rather a deeply honorable fight by soldiers for their homeland which had been taken from their people centuries beforehand. Most significant about his declaration was the negation of the talmudic impulses against militarism as binding on the Jewish people in the current era. It was a holy deed, in his mind, not just to settle the land, but to fight for it.[22] 

 

A Temple of Peace Without Sacrifices?

 

Renewed Jewish warfare naturally meant that Jews would need to think about the legacy of biblical warfare. Like R. Kook, R. Hirschensohn sought to neutralize the ethos behind the Bible’s total wars, albeit more radically. First, he contended, any remnant of the Canaanite nations has long been lost, thereby making the commandments irrelevant. Second, while the commandment to conquer the land is eternal, the clause to “leave no one alive” among the land’s inhabitants was only applicable to Joshua’s generation, when such military tactics were necessary to conquer the land and remove the fears of the Israelite people. Once completed, however, no such clause existed; as such, we don’t find Kings David or Solomon fighting total wars against the local inhabitants.[23]

Even if we could identify the seven Canaanite nations, he further argued, we would not wipe them out because such behavior is morally unacceptable in our era. “It is prohibited to violate international law that regulates the conduct of war by charter. God forbid that Israel be regarded by the nations as barbaric murderers who violate international law and the norms of civilization.”[24] The continued history of biblical warfare—alongside our moral intuitions—proves that this biblical verse was a temporary provision, not a permanent commandment. 

Given his embrace of the norms of civilization to reject this biblical model of warfare, one might expect that R. Hirschensohn would be enthusiastic about the postwar treaties to prevent armed conflicts. Yet R. Hirschensohn expressed doubts that these proposals to resolve international conflicts would be more successful than earlier treaties. [25] Those rules, which governed hostile conduct, seemed utterly ineffective during the Great War. Hirschensohn was skeptical that the efforts of American president Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations, meant to prevent the outbreak of war, would be any more effective. Ultimately, these bodies were subject to the political interests of powerful nations, which would thwart any real attempt at justice. 

Indeed, an early glimpse of this problem emerged in the aftermath of the post-war Lemberg pogrom. Wilson initially pushed hard for strict provisions of minority rights as a condition for Polish sovereignty. He pulled back when a related measure was proposed that would possibly sanction racial segregation in America.[26] Protecting minority rights was important, but only if it didn’t endanger American interests. 

Instead of a politicized court, R. Hirschensohn desired to build, in the spirit of the prophets, a new house of worship on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount. It would feature song and prayer but leave out the animal sacrifices mandated in the Bible. The Temple would serve as a “House of Peace” to advocate for each nation to thrive within its own borders without succumbing to the evil excesses of nationalism. He penned an extensive essay to resolving how Jews could walk onto the Temple Mount in light of heavy ritual restrictions against treading on its sanctified grounds. Hirschensohn sought to ensure that Zionism would have a center for religious and moral development that would guide Jewish nationalism. It would also serve as a model for nationalist movements around the world.[27]

Yet he also had a political agenda: If the Jews did not develop the Temple Mount, it would not remain closed to all. Instead, it would be controlled by foreigners and Arab Muslims. The Jews would be left standing, as they had throughout centuries of exile, by the Dung Gate, with all that this name entails. 

R. Kook rejected this proposal. While agreeing that Jewish nationalism must be rooted in a religious spirit, he disallowed stepping on the Temple Mount, let alone building on it. He further criticized R. Hirschensohn for eliminating the use of animal sacrifices. Hirschensohn had written that the restoration of the sacrifices “would make us the object of ridicule before all the nations of the world. Instead of being a light to the nations, they would think of us as an unenlightened people who walk in darkness.”[28] In R. Kook’s mind, this was a religious reform corrupted by the ideals of European philosophy. We should leave the Temple Mount alone and instead build a synagogue next to the Western Wall that could serve as a house of prayer and peace.[29] 

R. Hirschensohn, in reply, accused Kook of making a religious and political error that was equivalent to the 1903 “Uganda plan” to grant the Jews a state in Eastern Africa. Just as you can’t temporarily replace the Holy Land with some other territory, you can’t replace the heart of the Temple Mount with its outer western wall! Either Jews settle their territory or someone else will. As for R. Kook’s jibe that he was overly influenced by Western norms, R. Hirschensohn replied that there is no doubt that the Great War had shown the failings of European culture. Nonetheless, the prophets repeatedly asserted that God did not truly desire animal sacrifices.[30] With all the failings of Western culture, knowledge and wisdom would not recede backward, or as he put it, that “which is uncivilized will not suddenly become civilized!”[31] In any case, the mission of the hour was to purchase all holy sites toward ensuring our political and spiritual future.[32]

 

The Value of Treaties 

 

R. Herschensohn’s idyllic visions for a “Temple of Peace” are stirring yet fantastical. He also does not offer a sufficient answer as to how it would avoid the politicization that plagues other international bodies. It’s possible that this was more a theoretical exercise than an actual plan.[33] 

Nonetheless, his writing reflects a deep ambivalence on the potential success of international bodies to execute justice in a world of competing nationalistic claims. On the one hand, there is a genuine desire to promote humanistic values that will avoid a repetition of the unnecessary bloodshed of the Great War. On the other hand, R. Hirschensohn recognizes that political interests will dominate international bodies. Therefore, to achieve equity, Jews need to take hold of what belongs to them, such as the Temple Mount, based on their own values and interests. Otherwise, someone else will decide based on their interests, not justice. 

This weariness toward international political bodies is also reflected in R. Herschensohn’s extended 1926 treatise on the standing of international treaties. Nations should be careful before signing treaties, he believed, because once they commit, they are liable to punishment for breaking their word. This is why the Israelites were punished by God for violating the covenant at Sinai and breaking His law. So too, he asserted, Germany got its due in World War I because Kaiser Wilhelm had treated the 1839 Treaty of London that granted sovereignty and neutrality to Belgium as “a scrap of paper.”[34] The Allies were justified in resisting Germany since treaties are only binding when they are reciprocally observed.[35] 

Yet treaties are not the only obligations that are binding on the Jewish people. So, too, are the ethical practices of “civilizations.”[36] While he doesn’t fully translate that term, it seems that he has in mind the widespread moral sentiments of modern civilized nations.[37] Violating these standards, in his mind, constitutes a grave desecration of the reputation of God and His people. Considering these beliefs, we can further understand his rejection of the models of fighting against Amalek and the Canaanite nations. Whether or not there is a treaty against total war or genocide, Jews must hold themselves to the highest standards of morality and build a stellar reputation.[38] 

So what would a Jewish state do in this era of treaties? R. Hirschensohn argued that it should make accords with as many foreign nations as possible—in Europe, America, and Africa. Like R. Kook, R. Hirschensohn asserted that imperialist excursions beyond Israel’s borders had no place in contemporary Jewish law and that all wars required moral justification.[39] Nations must stick to their own borders. As such, there was a confluence here between the religious value of international peace and Jewish national interests. 

What about Arabs living within Palestine? R. Hirschensohn claimed that permanently ceding territory in the Holy Land would violate the biblical mandate to conquer the land. He also believed that Jews should not quickly initiate negotiations that would put them in a position of weakness.[40] Yet he recognized that despite the Jewish historical claim to the land and the Balfour Declaration, there was an Arab population who had legitimate conflicting claims to the same territory. This was primarily because they were residents in the land. At the end of the day, the strongest claim to any territory is based on settlement. Given these competing legitimate claims, he suggests that Jews should form long-term peaceful accords with their neighbors. One day, he hoped, the Jews could peacefully get full control of the territory. In the meantime, it was in the interests of all parties involved to have peaceful relations.[41]

Independent of one’s assessment of R. Hirschensohn’s particular strategy, the framework of his analysis is particularly striking. On the one hand, he embraces positive developments in international mores. Judaism is a peace-promoting religion that should support all initiatives to reduce animosity and bloodshed, even with those competing for hold of the Holy Land. This entails integrating new values—including democracy, minority rights, and conventions to limit the horrors of war—by finding support for them in traditional Jewish texts. 

On the other hand, he understood that it was far from clear that international institutions will have the ability to promote and enforce these values. There are too many national interests at stake to make this possible.[42] Thus, Jews must wisely develop a strategy that will endorse refined values while actively promoting their own political interests. In his time, this meant taking hold of their homeland through the purchase of holy locations and the settlement of the Land of Israel. 

 

Arab Riots in Palestine and the Triumph of British Political Interests 

 

The most pressing question, however, was whether force would also be necessary to reestablish Jewish sovereignty in Palestine. Both Rabbis Kook and Hirschensohn hoped that a combination of Jewish political initiatives and international diplomacy would be sufficient. Yet this was not meant to be. In March 1920, Trumpeldor was sent to help protect Tel Hai, an upper Galilean settlement that ended up under French control in the unstable period after World War I, leaving those Jewish settlers suddenly outside of British auspices. In a chaotic confrontation with Arab Bedouins from Syria, Trumpeldor was killed, alongside five other Jews, including a couple of other Jewish Legion veterans. His alleged dying words become immortalized as the fighting spirit of the new Jew: “No matter, it is worth dying for the country.”[43] 

Trumpeldor would become lionized by Zionist writers like Hayim Yosef Brenner, who eulogized this “symbol of pure heroism” for teaching that it is good to die for the national cause. Tamares the pacifist had opposed the Jewish Legion and saw Trumpeldor’s legacy as the embodiment of force and ultranationalism, but his views were hardly noticed.[44] The self-image of Jews was being transformed. A few years later, Jabotinsky would break away from the Zionist Organization and establish the revisionist Zionist organization “Betar.” The name commemorated the last fighting ground of the Jewish people in the second century, but also paid homage to the fallen hero of Tel Hai, with the letters of Betar standing for “the covenant of Joseph Trumpeldor.” 

Jewish-Arab tensions were also rising in Jerusalem. Jabotinsky warned the local British military governor of an upcoming slaughter, this time by Arabs against their Jewish neighbors. Jabotinsky and other founders of the Jewish Legion had been busy training the Jews in calisthenics and self-defense; it was their group, among others, for whom Kook’s praise in Orot had earned him the scorn of the local ultra-Orthodox leaders just a few months later. When the riots started in Jerusalem’s Old City, however, his men were not around. Several Jews were killed and over two hundred more were wounded. Two sisters were raped. 

Long aware of the self-defense groups, the British governor nonetheless arrested Jabotinsky and his men for carrying illegal weapons, with Jabotinsky receiving a fifteen-year jail sentence. Hirschensohn, from afar, would cite the case as an example of the ways in which a civilized justice system can become corrupt.[45]

R. Kook joined others in demanding Jabotinsky’s release as he and his comrades threatened to go on a hunger strike. R. Kook saluted their brave efforts but warned that Jewish law strictly prohibits taking such drastic protest measures.[46] Jabotinsky stopped the hunger strike. Soon afterward, his sentence was commuted, alongside those of many of the Arab rioters. R. Kook protested to the British high commissioner that the Arabs should be punished politically for the violence, but to no avail.[47] 

For now, the international community stayed the course with British plans for Palestine and affirmed the Balfour Declaration in the San Remo conference a month later. Yet Arab-Jewish tensions remained high and in May 1921, riots would break out again, this time in Jaffa. Forty-seven Jews were killed, and over 140 more wounded. Among the dead was the writer Brenner, who had been busy editing the letters of Trumpeldor. 

Yet the biggest turning point was 1929. Arab-Jewish tensions over control of the Western Wall had existed for several years but escalated after a march in Jerusalem’s Old City on Tisha B’Av, Judaism’s annual day of mourning for the Temple’s destruction. R. Kook, who had protested restrictions on Jewish access to the wall for several years, supported the march, telling a local newspaper that the youth had demonstrated “national pride and Maccabean zealousness” toward defending Jewish rights to the holy site.[48] Arab riots soon broke out in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and other locations. 

The riots left the Jewish community particularly vulnerable since most of its leadership was in Zurich for the sixteenth Zionist Congress. Beyond working with the remaining Zionist authorities to secure British protection for the Jewish settlements, R. Kook sent a brief letter through the head of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “To the entire Jewish world: All of the Jewish community in the Land of Israel is in danger. Act to save us in any way you can as fast as you can.”[49] The sense of urgency was palpable. 

Robinson and other activists organized mass rallies, sent urgent telegrams, and penned editorials to get the League of Nations to act. They called on the mandate’s commission to protect the Jewish people, noting their centuries-long connection to the Holy Land. They further demanded the removal of British officials who had not come to their rescue. No response came. In the end, more than 130 Jews were killed over two hot August weeks. 

Lauterpacht, the rising jurist now teaching at University College of London, lamented the tepid British response and its failure to ascribe full blame to the Arab side. Why did the British fail to protect the Jews? Lauterpacht’s answer was telling: even the mighty British empire had to cower before the prospect of a religious war with all of Islam. Britain cares about minority rights. But it had to take into consideration its own political interests in placating the feelings of the millions of Muslims that lived within its empire.[50]

Lauterpacht’s conclusion was reached after the publication of the findings of the Shaw Commission that investigated the riots. The Muslim mufti, Haj Amin al Husseini, blamed the Jews for provoking the rioters. Kook forcefully retorted these claims and accused the Husseini of incitement. While expressing hope and belief that most of the Arabs wanted to continue to live in peace with the Jews, he insisted on Jewish rights to their holy sites and encouraged their settlement.[51] A similar sentiment was expressed by Hirschensohn, who further encouraged Jews to learn Arabic so that they could build personal relations with their Arab neighbors and thereby circumvent the incitement of their leaders. 

After their investigations, the Shaw commission concluded that the Arabs were the guilty instigators. Nonetheless, they argued that the broader cause of the violence was Jewish immigration. How could the British recognize that the Arabs were guilty of violence yet punish the Jews politically? Many in Britain had concluded that the Balfour Declaration was a mistake and against their interests. The solution came in the White Paper issued by Colonial Secretary Passfield in October 1930. Britain must restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases to ensure that the Jews remain a minority and do not negatively impact the Arab economy – or broader Arab support for Britain. R. Kook, for his part, condemned Britain for its treachery. He wondered aloud if his Majesty’s government had abandoned its esteemed role in the world’s redemption. Deliverance, he asserted, would come in other ways.[52] 

It certainly didn’t come from Britain. Ultimately, after another extended period of violence later in the decade, the British would issue, on the eve of the Holocaust, an even more restrictive immigration policy (the 1939 “white paper”) which essentially undermined the Balfour Declaration and their entire mandate. Weizmann appealed to the League of Nations, but to no avail. 

Stung by the betrayal of the British, Zionists learned what R. Hirschensohn had declared several years beforehand: when it comes to international politics, interests will trump justice. 

 

“The Generation Is Not Ready”: The Education of Jacob Robinson 

 

If the mandate failed to protect Jews in Palestine, it did little better in Europe. The idea behind the minority rights treaties was a sense of reciprocity between different states: “I protect your minority; you protect my minority.” Yet as the interwar period progressed, it became clear that attempts to protect minority rights in Europe were no guarantee to help the stateless Jews. Jewish loyalty was regularly suspect in these new ethnic states, with Jews suffering discrimination and persecution in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and elsewhere. As Robinson darkly quipped about the interwar period, European reciprocity meant “I hit my Jews, you hit your Jews.”[53] Recognizing the failure of the interwar treaties to protect Jews or other minorities, Robinson recognized that the only real solution for European Jewry was to emigrate to Palestine, or as in his case, to flee to America.

While Lauterpacht would continue to promote international legal protections as a judge on the International Court of Justice, his colleague Robinson became more skeptical of its potential efficacy. After Israel’s founding, Robinson served as a leading adviser on diplomacy and international law to the Israeli delegation at the United Nations. He was weary of the prospects of the UN providing real solutions to human rights problems. Its Genocide Convention, developed in the wake of the Holocaust, was too vague and lacked any enforcement mechanism that would make it efficient. Moreover, it and other UN initiatives would be manipulated by Israel’s Arab neighbors and minorities to attack the Jewish state, even as these countries would do nothing to respect the human rights of minorities in their own lands. 

While he remained a prominent, albeit somewhat reluctant, international jurist, Robinson understood that national interests and politics would forever play a problematic role in international law. Toward the end of his life, he would assert that while local protections for minorities remained important, the globalized system had failed. Recalling his childhood yeshiva education, he cited the talmudic expression lo ikhshar dara (the generation is not prepared) to assert that the world had been insufficiently ready to weave minority rights into its social fabric.[54] 

In the coming decades, rabbinic scholars would collectively take a similarly ambivalent but increasingly critical view of such international bodies.[55] Many were thankful for the essential role of the UN in the eventual establishment of the State of Israel after World War II. This was despite it coming way too late to save the six million Jews killed in the Holocaust and not preventing the Jews from still having to go to war to gain what the international community had been promising for over thirty years.[56] Going beyond particular Jewish interests, others appreciated the attempt by international organizations to reduce warfare and limit the atrocities committed when war occurs. They further noted that despite the imbalance of power between strong nations and weak ones, the United Nations and other bodies still promote the important idea that even the smallest of nations have basic rights that should not be trampled upon.[57]

One scholar, Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, even went so far as to assert that Jewish law would obligate Israel to observe all international treaties limiting warfare—including a total ban on war—provided that all parties equally respect these obligations. In the meantime, he noted, lo ikhshar dara, the generation is not ready to reciprocally implement such measures.[58] 

Aspirations are not a measure of success. The criteria must be whether treaties are loyally followed by their signatories and if international bodies prevent moral mayhems. In the years that have passed since R. Hirschensohn wrote, these institutions were entirely ineffective in preventing the continued pogroms in Europe after World War I, the horror of the Holocaust, and the forced migration of 850,000 Jewish residents from Arab countries in the 1950s and 1960s, to name just a few egregious examples. When preparing to attack Israel in May 1967, the Egyptian army demanded that UN peacekeeping forces immediately leave the Sinai area; the UN forces hastily left without even an appeal by the UN secretary-general to Egyptian leaders.[59] In 1975, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution declaring that “Zionism is a form of racism,” with the support of the USSR, Arab- and Muslim-majority countries, and many African countries, essentially rejecting, again, the justice of the Balfour Declaration. (The resolution was repealed only in 1991.) Many observers also accuse these bodies of unfairly singling out Israel for censure in its complex and protracted struggle with Palestinians while ignoring many travesties around the world.[60] This alleged bias has, in part, led many rabbis and Zionists to severely question whether these international bodies can ever provide justice in the Middle East and around the world.[61] 

 

Rwanda, Syria, and the Education of Samantha Power

 

The “failure to protect” critique against international bodies has extended well beyond Jews and Israel. It has also been leveled against Pol Pot’s terror in Cambodia, Saddam Hussein’s destruction of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the Bosnian Serbs’ eradication of non-Serbs, the Rwandan Hutus’ systematic extermination of the Tutsi minority, and the systematic killing of ethnic Darfuri people in Western Sudan. There are many reasons given for these failures. Some assert that the diffusion of responsibilities to prevent war crimes absolves too many specific international players of taking the lead.[62] Yet it’s also clear that the politics of these bodies regularly prevents them from acting. To take the most obvious example, the UN Security Council, with veto power given to its five permanent members, is helpless in addressing Chinese human rights abuses or the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea and its subsequent invasion of all of Ukraine. As historian Paul Kennedy has documented, the granting of additional privileges to great powers is inherent to the UN system and, more fundamentally, to any international body that is dependent on its member-states to provide its funding and soldiers.[63] Despite its improvements over the League of Nations, the UN cannot circumvent the political nature of any international body.       

There was no greater critic of the Western response to these twentieth-century atrocities than Samantha Power. Her award-winning, best-selling book “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide extensively documented these cases, including the 1994 ethnic cleansing in Rwanda. Power showed how political considerations led the Clinton administration to ignore the plight of the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis who were killed and raped over four months. U.S. officials, for example, purposely avoided utilizing the “G-word” (genocide) in describing the atrocities because that might obligate them—morally, if not legally—to intervene under the 1948 Genocide Convention. This treaty, whose potential effectiveness was doubted by Robinson, as we noted, was the culmination of years of work by Lauterpacht and especially Raphael Lemkin, another European Jew who had fled Europe and became a leading international jurist. They believed it would succeed in committing countries to prevent and punish “crimes against humanity,” a term coined by Lauterpacht.[64] It was signed and affirmed by well over a hundred nations, including leading superpowers. None of those signatures helped when the Hutus began their slaughter. 

Power singled out senior administration officials like National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, who had written a well-known critique of immoral realpolitik considerations in previous eras of American foreign policy yet had now fallen into the same trap. Power’s book helped inspire the 2005 “Responsibility to Protect” declaration of all UN member states to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 

Two decades later, Power became the American ambassador to the United Nations under President Barack Obama. A civil war was raging in Syria, with the UN Security Council unable to act because Russia vetoed any measures against the Syrian government. Then Syria used chemical weapons against her own citizens. Such weapons have long been banned under international law with a nearly universal and unprecedented endorsement from countries around the world. This had been a declared “red line” of Obama, even as he was wary of an unpopular excursion of American troops into another bloody Middle East conflict. According to one aide, Obama even noted, “People always say never again, but they never want to do anything.” [65]

Yet Power wanted to act. She declared in the UN that the international system had broken down in Syria, with one side being gassed and the other feeling it could get away with it. Claiming that all alternative options were exhausted, she called for limited military strikes. “If violation of a universal agreement to ban chemical weapons is not met with the meaningful response, other regimes will seek to acquire or use them to protect or extend their power.”[66] At stake, in other words, was whether treaties had teeth or were just another scrap of paper. 

In the end, Obama called off airstrikes, instead electing to work with the Russians to get the Syrians to give up their chemical weapons. Subsequently, Obama’s aides have testified about the many political and strategic considerations that led the White House to abandon this limited military action. Some have further asserted that Obama did not want to risk ruining negotiations with the Iranians over their nuclear ambitions.[67] Whatever the reason, America, followed by others, backed away. Syria, with Russian support in both the UN and on the battlefield, continued to commit atrocities in places like Aleppo, including the repeated use of chemical weapons it hid from international inspectors. 

Power, for her part, was left to Twitter to share her indignation while delivering scathing speeches at the Security Council against the Russians. “Aleppo will join the ranks of those events in world history that define modern evil, that stain our conscience decades later. Halabja, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and now, Aleppo.… Are you truly incapable of shame?” Powerful words, but international treaties were meant to be backed by more than speeches and 140-character tweets. The Russian ambassador retorted by calling her Mother Theresa and called it a day. Since then, critics of American policy have labeled Power a hypocrite and questioned whether she should have resigned.[68] 

In her memoir, aptly titled The Education of an Idealist, Power admirably lays out her conflicting feelings. Perhaps American intervention would have failed and uselessly endangered American soldiers. Or perhaps the administration, and the entire system, simply failed. 

The ultimate result was pretty bad: the Syrian regime, with Russian and Iranian support, massacred hundreds of thousands more while causing a flood of refugees which has left them homeless and Europe politically unstable. Western inaction also left the roughly 30 million Kurds quite vulnerable to the whims of the despotic leaders of four countries in which they reside, one hundred years after the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, signed between the Allies and the defeated Ottomans, called for an independence referendum in their territory. Despite all the treaties and promises they were given over the century, they have neither a state nor minority rights. 

These examples only strengthen R. Hirschensohn’s basic claim: International laws and treaties provide no guarantee that justice will be executed or that the innocent will be protected. Sometimes they will help, which is a good thing, but many times they will not. Even people with the best of intentions like Lake and Power fall into the trap of allowing power and politics to color, if not shape, international legal bodies. 

This sad but important truth does not mean that we should simply dismiss the ethics that international law aspires to implement. While displaying great skepticism about the efficacy of the system, R. Hirschensohn affirmed many of the values of “civilized society.” He sought to prove how Judaism may incorporate concepts like democracy and minority rights in order to make them valuable to Jews on their own terms, independent of their enforcement in broader international society. If, for example, forsaking total war tactics is an upright decision, then Jews should integrate and implement those values for integral reasons, let alone for preserving our reputation as an ethical people.[69] 

At the same time, Jews should not be naive about the prospects of international bodies providing them with support or protection. In practice, self-help is the prevailing rule of world affairs. Jews cannot wait for others to deliver justice. In an international order deeply impacted, if not driven, by interests, then Jews need to proactively do what it takes to protect themselves. 

 

Notes


 


[1] Iggerot HaRaayah, vol. 3, no. 852, 131–33. See Yitzhak Krauss, “HaTeguvot HaTeologiyot al Hatzharat Balfour,” Sefer Bar Ilan 28/29 (5761): 81–104. 

[2] See Ginzei HaRaayah, Iggerot, 157–59. See also Ari Schwat, “Sibot Erekh HaGvurah HaFizit VeHaTzvait BaMishnat HaRav Kook,” in Nero Yair (Mitzpeh Yericho, 5773), 353–394. 

[3] Iggerot HaRaayah, vol. 3, no. 871, 155–159.

[4] James Loeffler and Moria Paz, eds., The Law of Strangers: Jewish Lawyers and International Law in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 2019).

[5] See Jeffrey Veidlinger, In the Midst of Civilized Europe (Metropolitan, 2021).

[6] James Loeffler, Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, 2018), 22–27.

[7] Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, The Internationalists (New York, 2018), 298–305.

[8] Loeffler, Rooted Cosmopolitans, 31–50.

[9] Omry Kaplan-Feuereisen and Richard Mann, “At the Service of the Jewish Nation: Jacob Robinson and International Law,” Osteuropa 58:8/10 (August-October 2008): 164.

[10] See Lauterpacht’s May 1950 speech given in Jerusalem, cited by Loeffler, Rooted Cosmopolitans, 176. 

[11] Iggerot HaRaayah, vol. 2, 54. 

[12] Maamarei HaRaayah, vol. 1, 89–93. See Hagi Ben-Artzi, HeĤadash Yitkadesh (Tel Aviv, 2010), 70–73.

[13] On the controversy, Mirsky, Rav Kook, 167–169, and the introduction to Orot, trans. Bezalel Naor (Jerusalem, 2015). 

[14] Ĥiddushei HaRav Hayim Hirschensohn LaMasekhta Horayot, vol. 3, 33a (letter 23). The letter is dated November 1924. On Hirschensohn’s letter and Kook’s reply, see Naor’s introduction to Orot

[15] Luz, Wresting with an Angel, 222, regards Hirschensohn as the only religious-Zionist thinker who was systematically engaging in political thinking.

[16] Colin Schindler, The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebrew (Cambridge, 2015), chapter 7.

[17] Cited in Michael Keren and Shlomit Keren, We are Coming, Unafraid: The Jewish Legions and the Promised Land in the First World War (Lanham, MD, 2010), 116.

[18] Kook’s letter to Chief Rabbi Hertz is found in Iggerot HaRaayah, vol. 3, no. 859. See Rosenak, HaRav Kook, 156–160.

[19] Iggerot HaRaayah, vol. 3, no. 974. Kook further advised Falk on how to maintain standards of dietary law observance. 

[20] Ari Shvat, Leharim et HaDegel, chapter 11.

[21] Warren Ze’ev Harvey, “Rabbi Reines on the Conquest of Canaan and Zionism,” in The Gift of the Land and the Fate of the Canaanites, ed. Katell Berthelot et al. (Oxford, 2014), 386–398.

[22] Malki BaKodesh, vol. 1, 18–22, 142–163.

[23] Hayim Hirschensohn, Eleh Divrei HaBrit, 70, 79. Kook had also tentatively suggested this idea but ultimately rejected it. See Kook, Tov Ro’i: Sota, 22. For another openly apologetic attempt to limit the meaning of this commandment to not require annihilation, see Rabbi Tzvi Mecklenberg, HaKetav VeHaKabbala on Deuteronomy 20:16.

[24] Hirschensohn, Eleh Divrei HaBrit, 70.

[25] Malki BaKodesh, vol. 1, 15–16.

[26] Loeffler, Rooted Cosmopolitans, 14–15.

[27] Malki BaKodesh, vol. 2, 5–31 (which includes part of Kook’s letter), especially pp. 26–28.

[28] Ibid., vol. 1, 11. 

[29] Iggerot HaRaayah, vol. 4, 23–25. Also printed in Malki BaKodesh, vol. 4, 4–5. On the relation of these passages to the depiction of a future Temple in Herzl’s utopian novel, Old-New Land, see Eyal Ben-Eliyahu, “Lehakim Binyan Ĥadash?” Cathedra 128 (Tamuz 5768), 101–112. 

[30] Malki BaKodesh, vol. 1, 62–64. See also p. 56.

[31] Ibid., vol. 4, 8.

[32] Ibid., vol. 2, 28. He emphasizes that these holy sites should be utilized for the search of wisdom, not extremism. On the history of Jewish attempts to purchase holy sites in Palestine, including areas around the Temple Mount, see Dotan Goren, UVa LeTziyon Goel (Beit El, 2017).

[33] This is implied in Hirschensohn’s follow-up letter.

[34] Hirschensohn, Eleh Divrei HaBrit, introduction.

[35] Ibid., 8. The importance of reciprocity is made explicit in Midrash Shoĥer Tov on Psalms 60:2 regarding the wartime behavior of King David. 

[36] Hirschensohn, Eleh Divrei HaBrit, 13–14. 

[37] Hirschensohn may have in mind the notion of the “standards of civilization” that circulated since the nineteenth century within international legal circles and has made a recent revival. See David P. Fidler, “The Return of the Standard of Civilization,” Chicago Journal of International Law 2:1 (2001): 137–157.

[38] This might even mean upholding agreements made under false pretenses. Following talmudic precedent, he noted that Joshua chose to maintain his peace treaty with the Gibeonites, one of the Canaanite nations, in spite of the fact they had fooled the Israelites into thinking that they came from distant lands. While the treaty was not compulsory, the Israelites kept their promise since others would think they don’t keep their word. See Hirschensohn, Eleh Divrei HaBrit, 71–72.

[39] Malki BaKodesh, vol. 1, 143–149.

[40] Eleh Divrei HaBrit, 175–176.

[41] Ibid., 37–38.

[42] For a similar attitude in more recent writing, see Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, Halakha BeYamenu (Ashkelon, Machon HaTorah VeHaAretz, 5770), 378.

43 Regarding the veracity of this final statement and Trumpeldor’s broader relationship to Judaism, see Moshe Nahmani, HaGibbor HaLeumi: Perakim BeĤayav shel Yosef Trumpeldor (2020), 131–256.

[44] See Tamares, Shelosha Zivugim Bilti Hagunim (Pietrkow, 1930), 9, 40, 60–61.

[45] Malki BaKodesh, vol. 2, 159–160.

[46] Otzrot HaRaayah, vol. 1, 393–395.

[47] Iggerot HaRaayah, vol. 5, 333.

[48] As cited in Hillel Cohen, 1929: Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Brandeis, 2015), Kindle location 1755. See also Kook’s testimony to the British investigation commission published in Otzrot HaRaayah, ed. Moshe Tzuriel, vol. 2, 359–360. On Kook’s reaction to the 1929 riots, see Yosef Sharvit, “HaRav Kook UMeoraot 5689,” Sinai 97 (5745): 153–185.

[49] Central Zionist Archives, A176/11.

[50] Loeffler, Rooted Cosmopolitans, 28–30, 49–50.

[51] Iggerot HaRaayah, vol. 5, 143 and Maamarei HaRaayah, 252–53. See also Mirsky, Rav Kook, 196–202 and Shtamler, Ayin BeAyin, 199–201. R. Kook also told that Zionist Congress that he regretted how the fight over the Western Wall became such a flash point. See Cohen, 1929, Kindle location 4665–4680, based on documents found in Central Zionist Archives S100/10. 

[52] Kook, Ĥazon HaGeula (Jerusalem, 5701), 46–47.

[53] Ibid., 56–57.

[54] Jacob Robinson, “International Protection of Minorities: A Global View,” Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights (1971): 61–91. See Loeffler, Rooted Cosmopolitans, 171–201 and Gil Rubin, “The End of Minority Rights: Jacob Robinson and the ‘Jewish Question’ in World War II,” Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook 11 (2012): 55–71. Rubin dubs Robinson’s later career as one of a “reluctant internationalist.” See his article, “A State of Their Own: Jewish Internationalism and Human Rights,” Marginalia, June 6, 2018. 

[55] For a survey of positions, see Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer, “Yaĥas HaHalakha LaMishpat HaBeinleumi” (unpublished PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 2011).

[56] See Soloveitchik, Kol Dodi Dofek, 31–32.

[57] See Rabbi Hayim David HaLevi, Dat UMedina, 21–22, 37–38.

[58] Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, Amud HaYemini, siman 16, 195.

[59] Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 67–75.

[60] See, for example, Dore Gold, Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos (Forum, 2004); Justin S. Gruenberg, “An Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Are All Countries Treated Equally?,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 513 (2009): 41. Gerald M. Steinberg, “The UN, the ICJ and the Separation Barrier: War by Other Means,” Israel Law Review 38:1–2 (Winter-Spring 2005): 331–347.

[61] See, for example, Rabbi Avraham Sharir, “Etika Tzeva’it al pi Halakhah,” Teĥumin 25 (5765), 436 and Rabbi Avraham Sherman, “HaMishpat HaBeinleumi (BaMilĥama) LeOhr Mishpetei HaTorah,” Torah SheBe’al Peh 44 (5764), 74. See also Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, Halakha BeYamenu, 378.

[62] André Nollkaemper, “‘Failures to Protect’ in International Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law, ed. Marc Weller (Oxford, 2015), 439.  

[63] Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man (Vintage, 2007), Kindle Location 495.

[64] See Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, “Human Rights and Genocide: The Work of Lauterpacht and Lemkin in Modern International Law,” The European Journal of International Law 20:4 (2010): 1163–1194. 

[65] Ben Rhodes, “Inside the White House During the Syrian ‘Red Line’ Crisis,” Atlantic, June 3, 2018.

[66] “The Ambassador to the UN’s Case against the UN,” Atlantic, Sept 6, 2013; “Samantha Power’s Case for Striking Syria,” Washington Post, Sept 7, 2013.

[67] See Natasha Bertrand and Michael B Kelley, “The Startlingly Simple Reason Obama Ignores Syria,” Business Insider, June 4, 2015.

[68] See, for example, Tony Badran, “‘Ambassador Samantha Power Lied to My Face about Syria,’ by Kassem Eid,” Tablet, February 27, 2018 and Steve Bloomfield, “The Obama Administration’s Misadventures in Foreign Policy,” Prospect Magazine, November 2019.

[69] An exemplar of this idea was Israel’s first Ashkenazic chief rabbi, Yitzhak Herzog, who wrote about Jewish law while in dialogue with international norms and ethical standards. See R. Herzog’s essay on minority rights in Israel, “Zehuyot HaMi’utim Lefi HaHalakha,” Tehumin 2, 169–179. 

Book Review: Michelle J. Levine on Ramban

Book Review

By Rabbi Hayyim Angel

 

Michelle J. Levine, Navigating Wilderness: Ramban’s Commentary on the Exodus and Numbers Narratives (Kodesh Press, 2025)

 

          In a book review essay I wrote over twenty years ago on a Memorial Volume for Professor Nehama Leibowitz (Pirkei Nehama), I outlined a fundamental difference that generally exists between those who study Tanakh as the primary text, and those who focus on the work of a particular commentator:

In line with all traditional exegesis, Professor Nehama Leibowitz emphasized that we must scrutinize the meaning and significance of each word and passage in the Torah, and perceive its messages as communicated directly to us. We accomplish these daunting tasks by consulting the teachings of the Sages and later commentators. In effect, they serve as our eyes through which we understand the biblical text in its multifaceted and ever-applicable glory. Of course, their opinions must be painstakingly evaluated against the biblical text...

          To those studying parshanut as a discipline, whether for methodological approaches or in historical context, Midrashim and commentators are no longer secondary to the biblical text. They are three-dimensional people living in specific times and places. Parshanut scholarship investigates how a given exegete approached the text, and what influenced him, such as Midrashim and earlier commentaries, intellectual currents of his time, and other historical considerations beyond purely textual motivations. The student of Tanakh views commentary as secondary literature, while the student of parshanut or history treats exegetes as primary sources. These contrasting perspectives almost necessarily will yield different understandings of the comments of our commentators (Tradition 38:4, Winter 2004, pp. 112-113).

 

          Professor Michelle J. Levine’s recently published volume on Ramban’s interpretation of the wilderness narratives in the books of Exodus and Numbers is a remarkable exception to the aforementioned dichotomy. She takes readers on a journey through the biblical narratives through the eyes of one exceptional commentator, Ramban (Rabbi Moshe ben Nahman, Spain-Israel 1194-1270). Levine’s expertise in Ramban’s commentary and the secondary scholarly literature on Ramban’s work shine forth on every page and in her learned footnotes. Strikingly, Levine provides a holistic approach on how Ramban learns the biblical texts.

          Ramban composed a three-tiered commentary, exploring the layers of peshat (plain sense, contextual meaning), derash (deeper meaning, homiletical teachings), and mysticism. Ramban navigates his own path guided by Midrash, Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Rambam, Radak, and Rabbi Joseph Bekhor Shor. Transcending the works of his illustrious predecessors, Ramban also “often groups many biblical verses together to develop a wide-all-encompassing analysis that seeks to educe their integration as a literary unit and to extrapolate their fundamental motifs and concepts” (5). Ramban stresses that while God revealed the Torah and it is true, it is vital to focus on how God, as Narrator, relates the story. The literary form of the narratives contribute substantially to the meaning of the Torah (8). These overarching premises of Ramban’s commentary remain relevant and illuminating to this very day.

          For example, Ramban observes that after Pharaoh decrees that Egyptians must drown baby Israelite boys, two Levites get married and have a son:

Then Pharaoh charged all his people, saying, “Every boy that is born you shall throw into the Nile, but let every girl live.” A certain man of the house of Levi went and married a Levite woman. The woman conceived and bore a son; and when she saw how beautiful he was, she hid him for three months (Exodus 1:22-2:2).

 

These Levites, whom we later learn are Amram and Jochebed, just gave birth to Moses. We also learn later that Moses already has an older brother, Aaron, and Moses’ sister (generally, but not universally, understood to be Miriam) watched over him in the ensuing narrative. From the impression given by the narrative, however, it would appear that Moses was born right after his parents’ marriage, as there is no notification of the births of Miriam and Aaron.

          One midrashic reading (Sotah 12a-13a) assumes that after Pharaoh’s evil decree to drown all baby Israelite boys, Amram and Jochebed separated since there was a 50% chance of having a boy who would be drowned. They were filled with despair and helplessness. It was their precocious daughter Miriam who persuaded them to resume having children so there would be a chance to have girls and thereby perpetuate the nation of Israel. The Torah presents Moses’ birth after his parents’ marriage since Moses was born after the remarriage of his parents.

          Ramban disagrees with this reading. The juxtaposition of Pharaoh’s decree and Moses’ parents’ marriage serves to highlight the moral courage and heroism of Amram and Jochebed who challenged Pharaoh’s decree. The Torah does not mention the births of Miriam and Aaron at this juncture, since Pharaoh issued his decree after they already were born. The Torah wants to focus the reader’s attention on the heroism of Moses’ parents and on the birth of Moses.

          Ramban notes further that Jochebed also acts courageously by attempting to save Moses. Ramban then connects this narrative to the exceptional virtue of Pharaoh’s daughter, who rescued and adopted Moses, defying her own father’s evil decree. Ramban even surmises that Pharaoh’s daughter subsequently persuaded her father to repeal his wicked decree. Levine concludes, 

Thus, Ramban’s commentary spotlights how Moses is surrounded by central personages who act with intent, purpose, and focus in order to be vehicles for salvation from a situation of oppression. With this in mind, readers can better appreciate when Moses himself initiates his own parallel actions to save others from injustices (37).

 

          Through this and countless other examples, Professor Levine’s volume is a truly welcome contribution, enabling readers to have a sustained focus on Ramban’s singular contributions to Tanakh learning and its religious meaning.

 

Theology and Ethics in Modern Orthodoxy

The great figures in Modern Orthodoxy, such as Azriel Hildesheimer, Samson Raphael Hirsch, Abraham Isaac Kook, and Joseph Soloveitchik were all concerned with theological and ethical as well as halakhic issues. These thinkers understood that Orthodox Jews had to carve out a place for themselves in the modern world, and this meant that they needed to be educated in modern philosophy and science even as they were required to study Talmud and apply halakha to the new problems that modernity posed. These thinkers believed that Judaism could be a beacon of religious observance and ethical idealism in the modern world. They, of course, focused on Torah study in the yeshiva and halakhic observance throughout the Jewish community; but they also sought to use modern philosophy to find new ways to explain both to Jews and non-Jews, the meaning and role of Torah in modernity.

However, something has happened in late modernity or what some call “postmodernity” that has changed the relationship between Orthodox Judaism within and without the Jewish community. Increasingly, it appears that Orthodox Jews are abandoning the world for the safe confines of the yeshiva and the four cubits of halakha alone. This has led to the adoption of all sorts of halakhic strictures and a hyper-sensitivity to fulfilling minute details of halakha as the sole criterion of Jewish authenticity and allegiance to God. It has also led to the strange phenomenon of the self-ghettoization by Jews in Western countries and Israel, despite the fact that these countries are largely open to Judaism and give Jews freedom of religion. The self-ghettoization of the observant community has also brought with it an aversion to pursuing careers in the secular world. This in turn has led to a situation of self-inflicted poverty that requires increasing numbers of Jews to become dependent on hand-outs from the very secular States that they loathe and deride. As these communities continue to grow while at the same time liberal forms of Judaism are shrinking in appalling numbers, responsibility for an intelligent, theologically and morally sophisticated observant Judaism falls upon Modern Orthodoxy. However, given that modern Orthodoxy itself is moving toward Hareidi forms of Judaism, it is not clear that Modern Orthodoxy will be up to the challenge that faces it.

Postmodern Hyper-Secularism

Certainly the world has changed radically since the heyday of Modern Orthodoxy in the mid-twentieth century. The world has become more secular, more focused on individualism and less on family and community, more permissive of all kinds of activities that the Torah prohibits, and also less open to the advice that traditional religion offers. The traditional values of respect for authority, personal humility, self-restraint, and communal loyalty have been replaced by a culture of emotional release, self-expression, and radical individualism that looks askance at any structures that would limit the personal quest for gratification and fulfillment. What was impossible to show and say in popular media in the 1950s and 1960s is now commonplace. Cable television and the internet open up ever-new portals to the expression and celebration of sex, greed, vice, and violence with a peculiar fascination with vampires, zombies, and the occult. The pace of the process of assimilation and intermarriage in the larger American Jewish community continues to increase; and what is most alarming here is that most non-Orthodox Jews do not really seem to care. Unfortunately, our treasured State of Israel is very much part of the postmodern global world and is therefore just as vulnerable to global postmodern culture as the United States is. Given these realities, it is understandable that Orthodox Jews are closing themselves off from the larger world and turning more and more inward. This has led to the growth in Hareidi forms of Judaism in both the Diaspora and in Israel. As members of these forms of Judaism retreat from the world, they have rejected precisely those theological and ethical elements in Modern Orthodoxy that sought to connect observant Jews to modern philosophy, ethics, politics, and culture.

In my recent book, The Future of Jewish Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), I argue that Judaism cannot afford to abandon the world. I try to show that the Torah requires Jews to live up to a standard of holiness in which both ritual and moral purity are paramount. Furthermore, I argue that moral purity does not mean focusing on helping only fellow Jews but non-Jews as well. It is therefore neither an Orthodox nor Reform idea, neither a religious nor a secular Zionist idea that Jews should act for the sake of the world. Indeed, it is a divine imperative that forces Jews out of the safe and secure confines of their communities to act to redeem the world. And I would venture to say that one of the real misunderstandings of holiness or kedusha is the belief that one can be holy by focusing on ritual purity alone; it is one of Judaism’s unholy temptations to think that one can fulfill the manifold mitzvoth of kedusha by focusing on ritual observance alone. Certainly, Jews must live according to the dictates of halakha; but following these dictates must include a consciousness of Who commands them and what Hakadosh Barukh Hu wants observance of His laws to bring about. And that involves not only the holiness of the Jewish community as a goy kadosh, a holy nation, but the redemption of the entire world.

In my book I also argue that Judaism today is particularly in need of a theology to explain to both Jews and non-Jews what its central beliefs and doctrines are. This is especially necessary in a pluralistic world where Judaism competes with multiple religious, philosophical, and secular ideologies in what has been called the global “supermarket of meaning.” A good Jewish theology is necessary for Judaism, for Jews often are unclear about what their beliefs are and they then have difficulty explaining to themselves, let alone, others what Judaism requires them to believe.

In another situation of pluralism, in Muslim Spain, Maimonides faced a similar problem to the one we see today, and this is one reason he wrote both the Mishneh Torah and the Guide of the Perplexed. In a certainly novel move for a book on Jewish law, Rambam began his Mishneh Torah, his “Repetition of the Law,” with theology.

The foundation of all foundations and the pillar of wisdom is to know that there is a Primary Being who brought into being all existence. All the beings of the heavens, the earth, and what is between them came into existence only from the truth of His Being. (Maimonides, 1982, Knowledge: Foundations of the Torah 1:1)

To say that the “foundation of foundations” of all existence is God is to say that God is not only the foundation of Torah and Israel, it is to acknowledge that God is the foundation of all that is; and this includes both the physical world of the heavens and the earth and the spiritual world of religion, knowledge, and truth. The scope of God’s creative being and concern thus reaches well beyond the Jewish community to the larger horizons of the earth and heavens. And as His goy kadosh, his holy people, Jews must recognize the near infinite scope of their concerns. This infinite scope is there precisely because God is infinite and beyond limits. In addition to celebrating God’s infinite power and concerns, Maimonides went on to paint a picture of God as infinite in wisdom, transcendent of all materiality, One and unique among all that is. In his Guide of the Perplexed each of these aspects of God were carefully delineated through the use of both logic and verses from the Torah.

Maimonides followed the theological beginning of the Mishneh Torah with a section on “moral dispositions” and ethical conduct. Here, he adopted Aristotle’s “character ethics” to the Jewish system of halakha, arguing that doing mitzvoth was a form of habituation that cultivated Jewish moral virtues and produced a uniquely Jewish moral character. The combination of theology and ethics that begins Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah suggests a marriage of theology and ethics in Judaism that culminates in the modern world with the notion that Judaism is a religion of “Ethical Monotheism.” Here the Jewish belief One God is coupled with the manifold ethical commandments and prophetic ethical ideals to suggest that Judaism can play a leading role in representing and motivating ethical action in the modern world.

Ethical Monotheism had an enormous impact on both modern Jewish thought and practical Jewish life in the modern period. Ethical Monotheism set the terms and concepts and language through which much of European, American and Israeli Jewish thought and theology was developed. In the area of Jewish practice one of the great products of Ethical Monotheism was the Pentateuch and Haftorahs of J.H. Hertz. Hertz was Chief Rabbi of the UK and in the latter half of the twentieth century his tall blue Humash could be found in both Orthodox and Conservative Synagogues throughout the English speaking world (and even some Reform Congregations)—thus giving expression to a theology that was common to Kelal Yisrael. This book combined commentaries from Hazal, parashanut, philosophy, theology, literature and politics—Jewish and non-Jewish—to suggest that Judaism, as “Ethical Monotheism,” had played and could continue to play a central role in the ethical project of modernity.

Times have changed making both Ethical Monotheism and the Hertz Chumash seem dated, although Jewish theology and ethics and the notion of Kelal Israel are certainly not dated. Indeed, I would argue that the need for compelling expressions of these notions are all the more needed in our contemporary world. It must be said however, that the overly rational and universalizing moves of Ethical Monotheism were never totally adequate to comprehending and expressing the particularity and depth of the communal, textual, legal, and liturgical aspects of Judaism. The theology of Ethical Monotheism, schooled in Greek metaphysics as it was, stressed the distance and transcendence of God over His immanent and personal characteristics thus rendering him unapproachable to the everyday Jew. In some modern expressions of Ethical Monotheism, universal ethics instead of monotheism came to dominate, thus robbing Judaism of both its connections to the Jewish people and to God. This led, particularly in modern liberal forms of Judaism, to leaving Jewish peoplehood and God behind and focusing on social and political ethics in the world alone. One the other hand, the overly intellectual and conceptual character of Ethical Monotheism gave it a kind of elite character that removed Jewish theology from the people, favoring individuals with philosophical training. Ethical Monotheism also supported the modern focus on the individual over the community. Therefore, one could say that whereas Ethical Monotheism facilitated the relationship of Jews to the modern world it did not bring Jews very deeply into the spiritual heart of Judaism and the Jewish community.

The Medieval Response of Halevi

Already in the Medieval period there developed a response to the austere and utterly transcendent God of Maimonides. Here, the central philosophical opponent was Yehudah Halevi, (1075–1141) the Spanish Jewish poet, philosopher, and theologian. In his Kuzari in which a rabbi has a dialogue with the King of the Khazars to convince him of the superiority of Judaism over other religions and philosophies, the rabbi points out that the God of Israel is certainly El Elyon, God on High, but He is also “the God of the ancestors, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob” (Halevi, 1964, 58). This is the God of a family and a people. Halevi points out the central problem of a purely philosophical approach to God. The doctrine of the perfect God of the philosophers “leads them to teach of a Supreme Being which neither benefits nor injures, and knows nothing of our prayers, offerings, obedience or disobedience” (Halevi, 1964, 201). Indeed, how does one pray to the God of Ethical Monotheism? How find solace in His utter transcendence and awful power? How does one even address Him? How call on Him? Halevi tells us that the pious ones of the Torah had to comprehend God by means of “intermediaries,” and he calls these intermediaries: glory, kavod, presence, shekhinah, dominion, malkhut fire, esh cloud, anan, likeness, tzelem, and form d’mut. These intermediaries Halevi says “proved to them that He had spoken to them, and they styled it Kavod HaShem: Glory of God” (Halevi, 1964, 200).

Kedusha-Holiness: The Missing Link

In my book I summarize the limitations of Ethical Monotheism by arguing that it overlooks the Torah’s concern with issues of kedusha.[1] Kedusha or holiness is a dynamic concept that includes both ritual and ethical concerns. Kedusha is a goal set for the entire Jewish community, kol adat Israel, and requires a community to be achieved. Kedusha is centered in God as the common designation for God, HaKadosh Barukh Hu, The Holy One Blessed Be He, suggests. Yet although kedusha ultimately resides in God, His mitzvot supply the conduits and intermediary structures that bring holiness into the very body individual and body politic of Judaism. Kedusha traces out a domain that encompasses both God’s transcendence and immanence, and assures that at every moment the Jew can be in contact with God. That the mitzvot intend to supply conduits to bring kedusha into the human sphere is articulated clearly in the basic formula of the berakhah or blessing: Barukh Atah Adonai Eloheinu Melekh HaOlam asher Kiddeshanu Bemitzvotav. “Blessed art You, LORD, Our God, King of the universe, Who has made us holy through his commandments.”

In focusing on kedusha, I mean to both uphold the rich theological and ethical traditions of Ethical Monotheism and correct its overly intellectual approach by highlighting the importance of halahkic, ritual, and communal structures of Judaism. Since kedusha as it is presented in the Torah has both ritual and ethical qualities, a focus on it has the capacity to bring Jewish concerns with ritual observance and social and political concerns for the moral state of the world. In this sense I hope that a focus on kedusha can served to revive the original theological and ethical spirit of Modern Orthodoxy. However, given the recent turn in Orthodox Judaism toward intense halakhic study and ritual observance one hardly needs to argue to Orthodox Jews that Judaism concerns this issue. So what I will do in this essay now is to make the case that seems to have been lost in the recent turn inward in Orthodoxy, and that is the case for the ethical dimension of kedusha.

Leviticus19: Kedoshim Tiheyu

To make my case that a concern with kedusha requires Jews to be concerned with ethical issues, I take as my central text Leviticus 19 Kedoshim Tiheyu: You Shall Be Holy. Sitting in the middle of the third book of the Torah, the first chapter of Parashat Kedoshim, is found close to the middle of the Torah. Given its comprehensive scope, many rabbinic commentators have spoken of it as containing a condensed summary of all of Torah. Rashi reiterates the words of the Sifra when he says of chapter 19 that “the essentials of the Torah are dependent on it” (Rashi on Lev 19:1). And R. Levi in Midrash Vayikra Rabba says that most of the commandments of the Decalogue are included in chapter 19.[2]

Chapter 19 begins with requirements of the sacrificial cult and then moves outward to include how one deals with every form of social relation. The vision is at once ideal and practical, religious and secular, moral and spiritual. In his commentary on Leviticus, Jacob Milgrom stresses that what we have in this text is a full recipe or rule for the holy life. “Its unique placement here underscores the importance of the prescriptions that follow: they are quintessentially the means by which Israel can become a holy nation” (2000,1603).

The combination of ritual and ethical directives as they are presented in Leviticus 19 will become a model for the rabbinic Judaism that follows the Israelite religion of the Bible and creates one of the distinctive marks of Judaism as it develops into the modern period. That the ethical commandments have the same status as the ritual commandments means that holiness can never be purely a matter of ritual purity or other-worldly spiritual engagement. That the ethical commandments are included along with the ritual commandments in a code of holiness means that there is a holy dimension to ethics and an ethical dimension to holiness. Because God commands both ethical and ritual purity, Jewish theology can neither be only about ritual nor about ethics, but must deal with both equally. This gives Jewish theology its embodied social and political form. And because Leviticus 19 is not only a list of ethical and theological commands, but includes matters of ritual, economic, and everyday life, that is, because Leviticus 19 presents the holy life in a comprehensive life pattern, this means that Jewish theology is not simply a series of ideas and moral laws, but has a systematic quality that aims to penetrate all aspects of life.

One of the most famous lines of Torah is found in Leviticus 19:18 “You shall love your fellow/neighbor as yourself,” v’ahavta l’reakhah kamokha.” The commandment “Love your neighbor as yourself” requires great personal insight as it requires one to at once put oneself in the shoes of the other and to see the other one like ourselves. Rabbi Akiba called this commandment, the “great rule of the Torah.” It is a kind of Kantian categorical imperative of Judaism. And we can take it as the ultimate rule for the holy life. Note that it is not an abstract rule but a very concrete and living one that requires an inward act of imagining the other as a self, indeed, as oneself. This rule is essentially different from the moral laws of the Decalogue in that it requires something like an act of introspection before one acts in relation to other humans. The rule supplies a kind of moral rationale that we do not find in the Decalogue. There we are told, “Do not murder, Do not steal, Do not covet.” And here, in Leviticus, we are told why: because the other is a human self like you! But Leviticus 19 also pushes the holy person beyond his neighbor.

When a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not wrong him. The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I the Lord am your God (Lev 19:33–34).

Here, the stranger is brought into the code that rules the holiness of the community. The ethical standards given to the kinsperson are extended to the stranger. He and she are to be regarded “like one of your citizens” and even like yourself! And the text gives us the reason: “for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” With this statement, the moral import of the experience of the people in Egypt becomes clear. Israel was made to experience slavery, homelessness, and strangeness “in a strange land” so that she could understand and have compassion for the stranger in her midst.

The Torah text of Leviticus 19 stands as a central text of an extensive ethical discussion of what the holy life requires of Jews. It is a clear portrait of the Torah’s sense that holiness is “not in heaven” (lo ba-shamayim hi ( Deut 30:12) but on earth and embedded in the everyday relations of family, friends, and work life. Rabbi Israel Salanter, (1810-1883) the great Lithuanian Musar (Ethics) scholar, stresses the “earthly” quality of holiness. He says that although it is commonly “accepted in the [Jewish] world to associate the holy person with one who is great in Torah and Fear (of God), according to hazal (the rabbinic sages) there is another aspect to holiness—how one deals in money matters.” Rabbi Salanter argues that holiness involves our daily interactions in “commerce, work, and interpersonal relations.”[3] Referring to Leviticus 19 he says, it “establishes that the conditions for holiness are: do not steal, do not lie, you shall not do an injustice in judgment.” He supports his reading by the following interpretation of Leviticus 19:2: “You shall be holy for I, the LORD, your God, am holy.” “I, God, am holy, so to speak, in heaven, so if I require holiness of you, my intent is that you be holy in earthly, material matters.” [4]

The model that Leviticus 19 establishes for holiness follows the dictate of the command in Exodus that Israel “Shall be a Kingdom of Priests and a Holy Nation.” This means that no aspect of life can escape the exacting standards of holiness so that the profane sphere of everyday life is just as open to holiness as the sphere of the sanctuary. The ethical vision of the priests in the “Holiness Code” of Leviticus means, too, that the Holy God is never far off from any human action. Indeed, the fact that God declares his presence “I am the LORD, Your God,” at the end of almost every one of His ethical commands, suggests that He wants to insert Himself at the nexus of all human actions and all human relations. And this means, too, that every “horizontal” relation that humans have with humans includes a “vertical” relation with God.

Holier Than Thou

The holy life is like a sacred ladder that one climbs through much personal sacrifice and hard moral discipline and spiritual work. Rising up in the ladder of holiness, the religious searcher can easily come to look down upon those who they perceive to be below them or those who do not even try to make the climb. And thus we have the common phenomenon of the religious person who regards himself “holier than thou.” Because halakha carefully delineates a system of the holy and the profane, the pure and impure, it is easy to get caught up in the intricacies of what can and cannot be eaten, what can and cannot be touched, and the when and how of the performance of mitzvoth and thereby forget the spiritual and ethical goal of the fulfillment of mitzvoth.

Prophetic Holiness and Ethics

It is well known that the classic yeshiva curriculum is dominated by the Talmud, not by the Torah and its rabbinic and philosophical exegetes. When Torah is studied, it is largely limited by a focus on Humash, or Pentateuch, and does not go beyond this to the Ketuvim (Writings) and Neviim, (Prophets). Given the theological and ethical treasures in these books, it is certainly a shame and a loss to the observant world. It is also somewhat odd that these texts are not systematically studied, given that we read from these books in the Haftarot every Shabbat and Festival. Of the many Haftarot that we read, the book that we read most often is Yeshayahu or Isaiah. If Orthodox Judaism ignores Isaiah, Devarim Rabba places Isaiah alongside Moses as the greatest of the prophets (2:4). Isaiah has a central standing among the prophets of Israel and it is noteworthy, given our concerns with kedusha that the most common epithet for God that Isaiah uses is K’dosh Yisrael “The Holy One of Israel” (Is 1:4).

According to Isaiah and most of the other classical prophets, holiness is articulated in terms of social justice and political ethics. In focusing on social morality, the prophets, at times, appear to be opposing the centrality of the cult and issues of ritual purity. Despite this however, Jewish critics like Yehezkel Kaufmannn, Moshe Weinfeld and Shalom Paul, argue that the prophets did not seek the end of sacrifices and traditions or ritual purity any more than they wanted the monarchy to end. Rather, they were critics of these institutions who sought to rid them of corruption and place them in their rightful place in service to God. That Isaiah’s vision of the angels proclaiming God’s holiness: Kadosh, Kadosh, Kadosh, occurred in the Temple (Is 6:3) and that the prophet Ezekiel was himself a priest, certainly suggests that the prophets did not intend to do away with the priesthood. However, with Isaiah, we do have one of the most forceful critics of excessive concern for the intricacies of ritual purity and holiness alone. That Isaiah refers to God as “the Holy One of Israel” and uses this appellation consistently throughout his text, suggests that ethics is not only required by the Holy One of Israel, but that the Holy One Himself is morally righteous and that human righteousness is grounded in God. In verse 5:16 Isaiah says: “And God the Holy One is sanctified through righteousness” (Holy Scriptures, JPS translation,1950); or an alternative translation could be “The holy God shall make Himself holy (n’qadesh b’tzedeq ) through righteousness.” So Isaiah’s view, following the Torah’s view, is that the moral law is underpinned and founded in God. Let us hear the words of Isaiah, which as he says, are the word of God.
Hear the word of the Lord…
“What need have I of all your sacrifices?”
Says the Lord.
“I am sated with the burnt offerings of rams,
And suet of fatlings,
And blood of bulls…
Who asked that of you?
Trample my courts no more;
Bringing oblations is futile,
Incense is offensive to me,
New moon and Sabbath
Proclaiming solemnities
Assemblies with iniquity
I cannot abide. …
Though you pray at length,
I will not listen
Your hands are full of blood—
Wash yourselves clean
Put your evil doings
Away from My sight,
Cease to do evil,
Learn to do good
Devote yourselves to justice;
Aid the wronged,
Uphold the rights of the orphan;
Defend the cause of the widow.”
IS 1:10-17

The words of Isaiah here, uttered with so few Hebrew words are a wonder to behold. Isaiah rips through the fabric of sacrificial life, the very nexus of the relationship with God established by the Levitical priests, “Your hands are full of blood.” Here, the expiatory power of the blood of sacrifice is mocked and the line seems to suggest instead that there is an excess of bloodshed. The extent of the verbal charge against the sacrificial cult is comprehensive, from daily sacrifice, to Shabbat, to the festivals, and even unto verbal prayer. “What need have I of all this? Who asked this of you?” The answer could be easy: “What do you mean?” the people might say. “Certainly, it was You, God, who asked this of us. It was You, God, who established the sacrificial cult, who determined the rules of Shabbat and the festivals as the very vehicle to make us holy. Now you are telling us you have no use for it all!” Without answering these questions, God uses the language of purity, “wash yourselves clean,” and directs it in a thoroughly moral and non-ritual direction. Here, Isaiah makes a move that we often see in the prophets, to use ritual purity, as a metaphor for moral purity.

Then, through Isaiah, God presents the people with what simply could be called an ethical manifesto, which, following the short form of the Hebrew, could be put this way.

Cease evil,
Learn good
Seek justice;
Correct oppression,
Defend orphans,
Plead for widows.

Here, in short, is an ethical doctrine which begins in stopping evil in oneself, moves to education in the ways of goodness, and then extends human efforts outward to seek justice. Justice, here, is seen in countering oppression against those that are powerless, the orphan and the widow, thereby representing all who are marginal and have no obvious figures of power to protect them.

Isaiah is not alone in speaking the words of social ethics. His contemporary Amos, who prophesied in the Northern Kingdom, also put forth a doctrine of social justice:

Hear this, you who trample on the needy
And bring the poor of the land to an end,
Saying when will the new moon be over
That we may sell grain?
And the Sabbath that we may offer wheat for sale
That we may make the ephah small and the shekel great,
And deal deceitfully with false balances,
That we may buy the poor for silver,
And the needy for a pair of sandals,

I will make the sun set at noon,
I will darken the earth on a sunny day
I will turn your festivals into mourning
(Amos 8:4-10).

Is this a new instruction, a new Torah replacing the old? Is this a new way to holiness dispensing with all the laws of sacrifice, of Shabbat, of the festivals, and of dietary laws and ritual purity? Certainly, this is the position of Protestant Christianity.

Yet here I would suggest that the prophets are speaking to their contemporary moment in the strongest way possible. They mean to correct abuses in Israelite religious life and the cult, and were not attempting to abolish its institutions and structures. Certainly, from the position of rabbinic tradition, the Torah and its rituals laws of holiness and purity will never be abrogated. The Torah is given as an eternal covenant, berit olam, between God and Israel, and all of rabbinic Judaism is built on the divinely sanctioned status of the laws and rituals that are given in the Torah.

The great Jewish biblical critic, Yehezkel Kaufmannn, while recognizing real innovation in the texts of Isaiah and the classical prophets, argues that Isaiah works upon already existing moral themes in the Torah. Kaufmannn states that “the prophetic demands for social justice echo, for the most part, the ancient covenant laws” (1960, 365). He reminds us that, in the flood story, God dooms a whole society for moral corruption.” Sodom and Gomorrah were also destroyed for lacking ten righteous men, and the Canaanites lost their land because of their corrupt sexual ways” (1960, 366).

However, if Kaufmannn believes that the prophets did not want to abolish sacrifices and the cult, he is also clear that what we have in the classic Israelite prophets is not just a repetition of the morality of the Torah but an innovation beyond it. Here, Kaufmann argues that the prophets offer a heightened sense of morality. Where the Torah equated destruction of Israel with the heinous sins of idolatry and incest committed by a large group of people, we see that God “threatens national doom and exile for everyday social sins” (1960, 366). Kaufmannn states that it is remarkable how few times Isaiah refers to the sin of idolatry and how sensitive he is to moral slights to the poor and the powerless. Indeed, it is these “small sins” of social justice that bother the prophets and not the “venal sins” of murder, idolatry, incest, and inhuman cruelty that the Pentateuch is concerned with.

Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel also points us to the heightened moral sensitivity of the prophets. “Indeed, the sort of crimes and even the amount of delinquency that fill the prophets of Israel with dismay do not go beyond that which we regard as normal, as typical ingredients of social dynamics. To us a single act of injustice—cheating in business, exploitation of the poor—is slight; to the prophets, a disaster. To us injustice is injurious to the welfare of the people; to the prophets it s a deathblow to existence: to us an episode; to them, a catastrophe, a threat to the world” (1962, 4).

As to why the prophet is so sensitive to what appears to be trivial moral concerns, Heschel sees this as a reflection of the acute moral sensitivity and highest moral standards of God. The God of the prophets is concerned with the details of little human lives, his compassion is so great that he is fundamentally concerned with the seemingly insignificant poor. “Prophecy is the voice that God has lent to the silent agony, a voice to the plundered poor, to the profaned riches of the world” (1962, 5).

It is a shame that the curriculum of our Orthodox yeshivot do not include intensive, sophisticated study of the Neviim and have left these texts of the written Torah to the Liberal Jewish Seminaries and the Christians. For the words of the Prophets are no less words of Torah and divrei Elokim than are the words of the Humash and Psalms and the Mishna and Gemara.

In the pre-modern world where Jews were excluded by Christians and Muslims alike from working and participating in their host cultures, there were good reasons why Jews kept to themselves. In those times when Jews were often persecuted and Judaism derided as a dead or false religion, one can also understand that there was Jewish fear and antipathy toward non-Jews. Today, however, where Jews have civil and political rights especially in the West, the continued self-ghettoization of the Jews and negative remarks one sometimes hears uttered by some Jews and even their rabbis toward non-Jews are morally and spiritually reprehensible. When one hears of a group of Orthodox Rabbis in Israel who issue public prohibitions against renting apartments to Arabs, or “religious” Jews in the old city who spit on Catholic Priests, one wonders why these Jews, who so devoutly study Talmud, manage to miss these words of the great Tosafist, Rabbenu Tam. “One should be envious of the pious and more than these of the penitents, and more than these of those who…from their youth have been diligent in the service of the Lord, blessed be He…And one should be envious of the nations of the world who serve God in awe, fear, and submission.” [5] And our devout co-religionists might also learn from the words of Bahya ibn Pakuda, who said in his introduction to Hovot haLevavot, The Duties of the Heart.

I quote from the dicta of the philosophers and the ethical teachings of
the ascetics and their praiseworthy customs. In this connection our Rabbis
of blessed memory already remarked (Sanhedrin 39b): In one verse it is
said “after the ordinances of the nations round about you, you have done (Ezek 11:12); while in another, it is said “After the ordinances of those around you , you have not done (Ezek. 5:7). How is this contradiction to be reconciled? As follows: Their good ordinances you have not copied; their evil ones you have followed.” The Rabbis further said (Megillah 16a). “Whoever utters a wise word, even if he belongs to the gentiles, is called a sage.”[6]

The Orthodox community is where many Jews look for “authentic” Judaism. The Orthodox community is where Jews seek and expect to find our Tzaddkim and our Kedoshim, our righteous and holy ones. And one can say, too, that what the religious world needs most today are precisely these kind of exemplars of the righteous and holy life. Yet precisely at his moment of great need, Torah Sages are retreating from the world and advising their students and followers to do the same. This is tantamount to taking Torah and God out of the world at the time when the world most needs Torah and God. So my plea in my book and in this article is that Orthodox Jews live up to the challenge of the great figures of modern Orthodoxy and the command of God in the Torah. Kedoshim Tiheyu: Be holy in mind, in deed, in ritual and behavior, in the synagogue, in court and field. We must be exemplars of the Torah way of life, committed to performance of the ritual mitzvoth as well as the mitzvoth of justice, righteousness, compassion and derekh erets.

[1] My book also offers a philosophical defense of religious language in which I use contemporary philosophies of language taken from the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (see Kepnes, 2013, Ch.1, “Addendum.”) and Paul Ricoeur (ch.7, 176ff). Contemporary philosophies of language, with their focus on text, narrative, metaphor, and religions as “language games” offer a different basis than Greek philosophy which is built on propositions, concepts and syllogistic logic. These Greek tools are not really native to the language and rhetoric of Torah so that Jewish philosophers who use them are constantly involved in processes of translation of Torah terms into Greek terms. Torah and rabbinic literature naturally swims in the language of text, metaphor, parable, and analogy. I therefore would suggest that the turn to language in contemporary philosophy supplies an alternative paradigm that can serve Modern Orthodoxy well as it searches for a new “non-Greek” basis beyond Maimonides and classical Ethical Monotheism, to ground its claims to truth and wisdom and supply a connection to the postmodern world.
[2] See Ibn Ezra’s commentary on Leviticus 19 for a quick and handy list of parallels between Leviticus 19 and Exodus 20.
[3] Salanter’s on Vayiqra 19 in Itorei Torah, The translation is by Walter Herzberg.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Sefer Hayashar Book of Righteousness (Jerusalem: Eshkol, 1967), 43.
[6] Bachya ben Joseph ibn Pakuda, Duties of the Heart, Trans. Moses Hymanson (Jerusalem: Feldheim, 1970), 45.

REFERENCES

Bachya ben Joseph, ibn Pakuda, (1970) Duties of the Heart, Trans. Moses
Hymanson . Jerusalem: Feldheim,

Greenberg, A (1996) Itorei Torah [Hebrew]. Tel Aviv, Yavneh.

HaLevi, Yehuda (1964) The Kuzari. New York: Schocken Books.
Heschel, A. J. (1962) The Prophets. New York: Harper & Row.
Kepnes, Steven (2013) The Future of Jewish Theology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kaufmann, Y. (1960). The Religion of Israel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Maimonides, M., & Pines, S. (1963). The Guide of the Perplexed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Maimonides, M., & Klein, I. (1982). The Code of Maimonides: Mishneh Torah. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Milgrom, J. (2000). Leviticus 17-22. New York: Doubleday.

Tam, Rabbenu (Jacob ben Meir) (1964) Sefer Hayashar. Book of Righteousness.
Jerusalem: Eshkol.

Rabbi Hayyim Angel to run the next Foundations Minyan on May 10

On Shabbat, May 10, from 10:00-11:30 am ET, Rabbi Hayyim Angel will lead the next Foundations Minyan. Foundations is a full-length service, and features explanations on the weekly Torah reading from Rabbi Hayyim Angel.

The service is free and open to the public. It is located at Congregation Beth Aaron, 950 Queen Anne Road, Teaneck, New Jersey.

 

 

 

 

 

Everyday Kiddush Hashem: The Power of the Personal Model

 

            I’ll never forget what happened on my first trip to Israel.

            It was the summer I turned 25, and I had been working on Parliament Hill in Ottawa. At the time, I had been invited to join a parliamentary fact-finding mission organized by the Canadian Jewish community through the Canada-Israel Committee. 

            I had joined the trip having been raised a Christian in rural Canada—a world that can feel light years away from the Jewish community, let alone the Middle East. It was my first trip overseas and, suffice to say, I would experience many “I’m not in Kansas anymore” moments in our brief but packed time in Israel.

            Of all the remarkable sights, people, and conversations I would encounter, one that still resonates took place at the Kotel. A small group of us—all Canadians who were not Jewish—were standing in the men’s section of the plaza, observing this fascinating world in which we found ourselves. An Orthodox Israeli said something to us, possibly in Hebrew, and our guide responded to him. Apparently, he had asked if we were Jewish and would like to borrow tefillin, to which our guide politely responded that the group wasn’t Jewish. 

            The Orthodox man quickly and warmly responded in English: “Welcome to Israel!”

            Three simple words in an encounter I’m sure he would forget momentarily, and one that he no doubt had experienced many times before. But for me, it spoke volumes. 

            Here we were at a site of extraordinary holiness to a man who, by all appearances, took the holy very seriously. We were tourists soaking it all in and standing out in the crowd with our awkward, cardboard kippot.

            And yet, he made us feel welcome. Like we belonged there.

            When I share my story of choosing to become Jewish, I always speak of the power of that trip—and so many other serendipitous events that would draw me to discover the beauty of Am Yisrael and the beauty of our precious Torah. Little did I know back then that an unexpected moment at the Kotel would be a milestone on a journey into Zionism, Judaism, and ultimately dedicating my career to serving the Jewish people as an advocacy and communications professional. 

            In the years that followed, my spiritual path went hand-in-hand with my career path. I took a job at the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA—the advocacy agency of Canada’s Jewish Federations) and, later, UJA Federation of Greater Toronto. In a world where Jews and Israel are so often misunderstood, if not outright maligned, I was passionate to make a difference. And I felt that my personal and professional background could make for a unique contribution. 

            So, too, my training in public opinion research—developed at a consulting firm I had joined after Parliament Hill—would give me a window into how Canadians view Jews, Israel, and antisemitism. Over the years, I would have the privilege of working on the research teams conducting some of the most important studies of Canadian public opinion on these issues, uncovering data trends and messaging proven to open minds and win allies for our cause.

            Those years of research, including data gathered in the wake of the heinous October 7th attacks, revealed a wide range of nuanced findings that are perhaps best left to another essay. But in the context of the title topic of this article, I am reminded of a few findings that offer compelling evidence of the power of the personal model—the power of Kiddush Hashem—in shaping views of Jews beyond our community.

            In Canada, home to the Diaspora’s third-largest Jewish community, Jews constitute roughly one percent of the general population. Broadly speaking, the research is fairly consistent in terms of how Canadians perceive us. 

            When it comes to views of different religions, Judaism is among the most positively regarded, with favorability scores similar to Protestant Christianity. The only religion that typically surpasses Judaism in popularity among Canadians is Buddhism. Every other religion, including Catholicism and Evangelical Christianity, enjoys lower favorability scores than Judaism.

            But to be Jewish is, of course, also to be part of a people. And when it comes to views of Canadians of different ethnic or cultural backgrounds, Jews are similarly seen in very positive terms. The proportion of Canadians who have positive views of Jews is comparable to those who have a positive view of people of British or French origin, the two groups with the highest such scores in Canada (which is no doubt indicative of their relatively large representation within Canadian demography). Across studies, there is a consistent majority of Canadians who feel that Jews make a positive contribution to Canadian society. 

            On the other side of the ledger, the research certainly shows that antisemitism exists in Canada. Based on all of the studies I’ve worked on or reviewed, I would estimate that somewhere between ten and fifteen percent of Canadians hold clearly antisemitic views. Depending on the antisemitic trope being tested by a pollster, the numbers climb disturbingly higher than that threshold on particular questions. Most Canadians have little understanding or opinion either way when asked about antisemitic tropes. The issue is largely tabula rasa to a public that has devoted minimal consideration to a topic that appears to have no meaningful connection to their lives. However, as a general rule, when asked whether a respondent agrees with a particular antisemitic trope or conspiracy theory, for every one Canadian who agrees with such a hateful statement, there are approximately two Canadians who strongly disagree with these views. 

            A two-to-one ratio is, of course, an encouraging sign if one is marketing a product or a political party. But that’s not what we’re doing when we advocate for Jews, Israel, and—for that matter—fundamental human rights. Experience suggests that it doesn’t require a hateful majority for a society to cross an antisemitic Rubicon. It simply requires the forces of moderation to remain silent and preoccupied with other matters, while a loud and aggressive fringe dominates the discourse and shatters the boundaries of what’s socially acceptable—increasingly marginalizing and threatening Jews in the process. Of the many lessons we Diaspora Jews should urgently internalize from the post-October 7th experience, it’s the danger posed by this dynamic. The question is: How do we combat it? 

            In 2022, I was privileged to be part of a team that conducted a public opinion study as a collaboration of CIJA, Federation CJA of Montreal, and UJA Federation of Greater Toronto. In addition to asking Canadians what they thought of Jews, Israel, antisemitism, and various related issues, we asked the question: Do you have a close Jewish friend or colleague? Nearly one in five respondents answered in the affirmative. We examined their views in depth, and the results were remarkable.

            Respondents who had a close Jewish friend or colleague were two times more likely to say that Jews make a positive contribution to Canadian society, as compared to those who did not have a personal connection to Jews. Similarly, those with a close Jewish friend or colleague were twice as likely to strongly oppose antisemitism, again compared to those without a personal relationship to a Jew.

            Prior to my conversion, I once spoke to a group of Jewish students in Ottawa, with whom I shared that they would be wise to see themselves as ambassadors for the Jewish people. Having grown up in a rural area where there are virtually no Jews, I shared with them that they may be the first and only Jew that someone meets—and that this comes with both opportunity and responsibility. Years later, I was seeing this principle come to life in the data before my eyes. The results were a stunning demonstration that, just as they say that all politics is local, the personal is powerful when it comes to how we understand people from different lived realities. 

            “Sanctifying the Name,”[i] a characteristically thoughtful essay by Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, zt”l, unpacks how the principle of Kiddush Hashem (sanctifying the divine name) has been interpreted by rabbonim throughout history. He notes that martyrdom is, of course, core to our understanding of Kiddush Hashem, citing the willingness of Jews to sacrifice themselves for their faith—be it at the hands of the Seleucid Greeks, the Romans, or the Crusaders. But Rabbi Sacks goes on to cite a passage from Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, which has powerful import for our daily lives:

 

If a sage “speaks pleasantly to others, is affable and gracious, receives people pleasantly, never humiliates others even though they humiliate him and honors others even though they disrespect him…with the result that all praise him, love him, and approve of his deeds—such a person sanctifies God’s name. Of him, Scripture (Is. 49:3) says: “And He said to me: Israel, you are my servant, in whom I will be glorified.”

 

            Like most of us, I cannot credibly speak of what it means to be a sage. But as Jews who live in a free and democratic society—a society in which we can express our authentic selves to the world around us—we each have an opportunity to infuse the underlying principles of Kiddush Hashem in our daily lives. In this regard, the data seems to paint a compelling picture. By simply being openly Jewish and a good, relatable person, one has the power to strengthen the “brand” of the Jewish people and reduce antisemitism among their peers.

            To be sure, this is not to suggest a singular solution to antisemitism. Nor is it to imply that the same kindness and personal connection that creates allies among people of goodwill can somehow transform a hardened antisemite or protect our community from those who wish us harm. But it is to say that, in the fight against antisemitism, if we are solely focused on those who hate us, we are ignoring those who—with the right outreach—will stand with us and on the right side of history. 

            I would also argue that effective ally-building doesn’t begin by telling people beyond our community what they should think. Rather, as the data suggests, it begins by simply showing up as a good person—as reliable friend or colleague—who is openly Jewish, and therefore brings credit to the Jewish people.

            In today’s environment, it also seems clear that it isn’t enough to simply show up. At a time when antisemites are attempting to defame what it is to be Jewish, we need to own and define our identity—and not only for ourselves. We need to warmly share our experiences—our Passover sedarim, our Shabbat dinners, our Chanukah parties, our family histories, our photos and stories from our last trip to Israel, and so much more—because the humanization of the Jewish experience is a powerful antidote to the dehumanization of Jews. And as someone who has lived that journey of discovering the beautiful world of Jewish life, I have seen firsthand how we look from the outside in—and we need to open those windows wider than ever if we want a society of allies rather than bystanders.

            And last but not least, humanizing the Jewish experience also means humanizing the impact of the hate we’re facing. There is compelling psychological research to demonstrate the power of personal anecdotes. We can and must talk about history, hate crime statistics, and the geopolitical threats facing Israel and Jews. But if we talk in abstract terms—if we fail to share the personal impact of antisemitism on our families and communities—we risk giving the impression that this is an academic matter, rather than a threat that’s harming and hurting the people they care about: their close Jewish friends and colleagues.

            Welcome to Israel. If three simple words from a stranger can shift a paradigm and enter the heart, one can only begin to imagine the power of our personal example—through everyday acts in the spirit of Kiddush Hashem—on the lives of those around us.


 


[i] Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, “Sanctifying the Name,” in Covenant & Conversation, Leviticus: The Book of Holiness (New Milford, CT: Maggid Books & The Orthodox Union, 2015), 321. 

Rabbi Hayyim Angel to teach four-part Zoom series on Ezra-Nehemiah

On Wednesdays, May 7,14, 21, and 28, from 8:30-9:30 pm ET, Rabbi Hayyim Angel will teach a four-part Zoom series on the biblical book of Ezra-Nehemiah. We will consider the central themes of the book, and consider how strikingly relevant the book is to today's times.

 

The classes are sponsored by the Jewish Center of New York, and are free and open to the public.

 

Registration is required to join the class and receive the Zoom links, and sponsorship opportunities are available. To register and for more information, please go to this link:

https://www.jewishcenter.org/event/Ezra%20and%20Nehemiah 

Learning Where the Evil Lies

 

            The High Holiday season—in the midst of which I am writing these words—calls on Jews to examine ourselves, to reflect on our moral and ethical shortcomings, and to seek ways of mending these faults so as to turn, or return, to the right path. Moreover, our tradition makes clear that we are to subject ourselves to this self-examination not just as individuals but collectively. The confessional sections of our liturgy are replete with verbs in the first-person plural. We, like our ancestors who came before us, have sinned. We have turned from God’s goodly laws and commandments. We have sinned against God, willingly and unwillingly. Not to mention entire piyyutim (liturgical poems) of more specific, concrete offenses to which we confess, knowing that we individually have not committed these acts but accepting collective moral responsibility for the possibility that someone in our community has.

            To be sure, Jews are not alone in being called to this effort of self-examination. The Puritans who founded my university and nurtured it in its early years likewise felt the obligation to probe their innermost consciousness, and not just once per year. Calvin wrote, "Let us … unremittingly examining our faults [and] call ourselves back to humility. Thus, nothing will remain in us to puff us up; but there will be much occasion to be cast down.” And in the same vein, “the more severe we are toward ourselves, and the more sharply we examine our own sins, the more we ought to hope that God is favorable and merciful toward us.” For Calvin, of course, and among the Puritans more generally, the emphasis on atonement and redemption that we find in our tradition is largely missing. Reflecting on one’s faults had religious value—“it could not happen otherwise than that the soul itself, stricken by dread of divine judgment, should act the part of an avenger in carrying out its own punishment,” and “those who are really religious experience what sort of punishments are shame, confusion, groaning, displeasure with self, and other emotions that arise out of a lively recognition of sin”—but when it came to possibilities for redemption, the non-elect were the non-elect, and that was that. By contrast, for Jews a large part of the motivation for self-examination is the desire to return: at the individual level to improve one’s personal behavior, and at the community level to repair the world in which it is our lot to live.

            This collective sense of moral responsibility for our world feels especially acute in the wake of the events of the past twelve months. Most obviously, for those living in Israel and in surrounding areas the past year has brought unspeakable atrocities, violence on a horrifying scale, and widespread death. But for us as Jews living in the United States, and especially in the privileged setting of a university like mine, the past year has also brought experiences no one wishes to relive, including repeated and sustained outbursts of raw bigotry of a kind rarely seen in our normally more elevated community. It is hardly surprising that this experience has brought forth a profusion of efforts to understand what has happened, and to search out the flaws in our community’s institutional make-up, and especially that of our universities, that have fostered these failings. More in keeping with the Jewish tradition than Calvinist thought, much of this effort is now devoted to considering changes for which the need is plainly urgent. 

            The twentieth-century theologian Langdon Gilkey observed that “what we believe is largely determined by where the evil seems to lie.” Over the past year we, meaning Jews but also the American polity more generally, have gained a new understanding of where the evil lies that has so devastatingly infected our lives. Although I hesitate to place too positive a gloss on this new understanding—to repeat, it has emerged as a consequence of events no one would choose to relive—there is moral value in seeking to make our world better, and to the extent that knowledge of our collective and institutional shortcomings is a necessary precursor to undertaking that improvement then it too has value. Gilkey was a theologian and I am not, and so I may well be using the word “believe” in a different sense than what he had in mind. But I am comfortable nonetheless with the notion that what we have learned has shaped our understanding in ways that signal what is to be done.

            I think we can apply this new understanding in two distinct areas. One concerns us directly as Jews. The other concerns our universities, but it turns out that we as Jews have something specific and important to bring to that effort as well.

            To begin with the Jewish world, following the events of the past year we now have a different sense of where the salient threat lies—not the armed threat to Israel, but the threat to the wellbeing and security of our own community here. Groups of fellow-citizens whom Jews have overwhelmingly supported in the past, and with whose fundamental goals we still feel resonance, have actively and aggressively arrayed themselves against Jewish interests and derisively dismissed Jewish concerns. Nor were these reactions a response to the violence of Israel’s response to the October 7 terrorist attack. Numerous groups were willing to proclaim their total lack of sympathy for the victims on the day the attack occurred, before Israel had launched any response whatever.

            What kind of values, we are entitled to ask, do these groups hold? And given whatever values they do hold, are we really obligated to support these groups? Simply seeking to promote one’s own interest, or one’s own group’s interest, is hardly a valid moral principle. That requires some broader, more universalistic basis. For all the reasons that our tradition so eloquently teaches, we sympathize and seek to ally ourselves with people who meet persecution, or discrimination, or other forms of unfair treatment. “You shall have one manner of law as well for the stranger as for one of your own country” is a valid moral principle and we are right to adhere to it, whoever is the “stranger” in question. But institutionalized groups who insist on this principle for themselves while denying it for others are not, in fact, principled. They forfeit their claim to our support on moral grounds. 

            In a similar vein, we have learned that familiar principles of civic engagement, most obviously free speech, are likewise subject not only to abuse (Jews have known this for centuries) but to misappropriation for self-serving purposes. As we look back on the past year, it is breathtaking how rapidly many in our universities have pivoted from full-throated advocacy of trigger warnings and safety zones to the notion that any verbal or written statements, even the vilest calumnies deliberately designed to provoke, humiliate and offend, are sacrosanct. Moreover, many of our students, and their supporters, now exhibit an understanding of free speech to mean not only that they are entitled to say whatever they want, about anything or anyone they choose, but, further, that there should never be any consequences to them for the content of that speech: freedom of speech somehow has come to encompass freedom from criticism for whatever one has said. Members of the Jewish community cannot help but notice that this stunning pivot from over-protection to anything-goes took place only once the identity of the people who might benefit from the protection against unlimited free speech, including hate speech, shifted from the traditionally shielded groups to Israelis, Zionists, and Jews. 

Yet more troubling at a practical level, and especially visible at our universities, is today’s invocation of the principle of free speech to defend acts that would plainly be prohibited if they were to be committed in a different context. Is someone impeding your ability to walk from one building to another? In the eyes of many of my faculty colleagues at Harvard, he’s merely exercising his right to free speech. Is someone blocking students from entering their classroom? Again, merely exercising free speech. Is someone shouting into a bullhorn so that our students can’t hear either the instructor or one another? Here too, all merely free speech. Roughly a half-century ago, as a then-young member of the Harvard faculty, I served on a committee that considered, among other questions, whether the university should have a separate disciplinary code for political offenses—in effect, analogous to the long-ago practice in Tsarist Russia. Suppose, for example, some student threw a brick and smashed a shop window on the street: should there be one penalty if he was simply drunk, and a different penalty if he meant the act as a political statement? Our committee voted not to have separate disciplinary systems; a violation was a violation, regardless of what inspired it. I thought that decision was right then, and I think it’s right now. Preventing other people from going about their everyday activities is not merely exercising free speech, no matter what the person doing the obstructing is saying.

In this context too, we as Jews do well to take notice of the different principles that many, again especially at our universities, seek to apply depending on the content of the speech. I am confident that most faculty members at most universities would sharply condemn disruptive actions by students and others calling to end affirmative action admissions while concealing their identity by placing over their heads white pillowcases marked with gold crosses. Today all too many of them, I fear, would view differently the identical disruptive acts committed by people calling for an end to the admission of students from Israel, while concealing their identity with white-and-black checkered dishtowels. 

Most urgent, I believe, is the need to prevent our public spaces, in the universities and elsewhere, from becoming areas where Jews do not feel comfortable going. In the 1930s, in Germany, Austria, Poland, and other European countries, everyone understood that urban public spaces were places where Jews were not welcome and should not go. We must not allow the public spaces of our American cities to become Jew-free zones. Here too, Gilkey was a theologian and I am not, and so all this may not constitute “evil” in the sense that he had in mind. But it constitutes an existential threat to our community, and for our purposes learning what that threat is and where it lies rightly shapes what we believe.

The second area in which what we have learned over the past year has changed our beliefs concerns our universities more specifically. At Harvard, I am glad to say, our leadership has at least voiced an intent to set the university on a path to useful reform. There is now widespread acknowledgement, as reflected in the recent report of the university’s working group on “open inquiry and constructive dialogue,” that in fact too much of our inquiry is not open and too much of our dialogue is not constructive. Many ideas that are widely held among the American population are, for practical purposes, impossible to express on our campus. The result is to circumscribe not only everyday conversation but the content of both teaching and research.

There is also now recognition that we too often fail to expose our students to ideas and even facts that challenge or extend the preconceptions with which they arrive here. In an earlier era, it was widely accepted that part of the purpose of a university education was precisely to lead students to question their pre-college perceptions. Max Weber wrote that “the primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize ‘inconvenient’ truths.” In more recent times such notions have faded from view. In his address to our entering class at this year’s fall convocation, Harvard President Alan Garber recommended that each student make it a point to take at least one course that would likely make him or her feel uncomfortable. He likewise recommended that students deliberately place themselves in settings, either in the classroom or elsewhere, where they would encounter views with which they disagree. The contrast to the recent commitment to trigger warnings and safety zones is self-evident.

Part of the underlying problem, I believe, is the atomization of our society that our universities simply mirror. We attach enormous value to the diversity of the student body, at least in some dimensions, so much so that at my university we engage in hugely expensive and time-consuming litigation to preserve it. But once students are here, there is little effort to prevent their separating themselves into highly homogeneous enclaves. Our universities are, in microcosm, an example what my Harvard colleague Michael Sandel calls the “sky-boxification” of America—except that in this case it is not merely the wealthy and privileged who seek to separate themselves. None of this is new, and it is probably less true today than it was in the past. But it remains true nonetheless, and we now have a deeper understanding of the harm it does. Specifically, it shields our students from awareness of ideas and concerns from outside their narrow circles. It thereby blunts our efforts to educate them to become effective citizens of the republic.

Further, to the extent that views held in one circle may have as much claim to validity as those in another, this segmentation thwarts yet another aim of the education we seek to impart, namely the difficult and sometimes uncomfortable ability to cope with conflicting ideas. Scott Fitzgerald famously wrote that “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.” Over the past year we have seen the harm done by the lack of that ability. A building in Gaza is a Hamas arsenal? No, it’s a hospital. Jews have a right to self-determination in their own independent country? But Palestinians have a right to self-determination in their independent country. If two ideas are in tension, at most one can be right. The examples are endless.

The solution to this intellectual limitation surely does not rest on perfunctory training sessions administered to students by a constitutionally unsympathetic DEI bureaucracy. What is required is a more serious form of engagement, in which students and others do not simply hear about the value of considering competing world views but actively participate in doing so, both in the classroom and in other settings. One of the most rewarding pedagogical experiences I’ve had in my more than 50 years of university teaching was a course that for many years I co-taught with a close friend in the English Department. The object of the course was to explore how people from different intellectual disciplines view topics of common interest; I represented the social sciences, my colleague the humanities, and we had numerous guest speakers from the natural sciences. Our aim was not to cover over differences in viewpoint but instead to highlight them and explore them. Some of our disagreements were sharp. I recall, for example, that my English professor friend was (as he remains) a committed devotee of Henry David Thoreau. I find much of Thoreau not just wrong but wrong-headed. We sometimes had that debate in class, and it was a vigorous one. For the students who watched it, realizing that the two of us were, and remained, close friends was probably more educational than whatever either of us actually said.

And here I think we as Jews have a particular contribution to make to this effort. Jewish learning has always, and perhaps uniquely, emphasized the value of debate and disagreement.  The Talmud tells us that for three years the house of Shammai and the house of Hillel disagreed: these said the halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and those said the halakha is in accordance with our opinion. Ultimately, a divine voice emerged and proclaimed “both these and those are the words of the living God” (Eruvin 13b). The fact that the voice went on to say that halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the house of Hillel is almost beside the point. The Tosefta instructs us to “make for yourself a heart of many rooms, and enter into it the words of the house of Shammai and the house of Hillel.” 

The value Jewish learning places on disagreement also emphasizes the interpersonal aspect of the learning process. The education our universities provide should not be parallel play in a sandbox. We need to encourage our students to regard one another as partners in learning. The value Jewish tradition places on debate and disagreement as essential to the learning process appears perhaps most dramatically in the poignant and ultimately tragic story told of Rabbi Yohanan, one of the leading amoraim of the second generation, and his friend and study partner (as well as his brother-in-law) Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish—commonly called Reish Lakish—whom Rabbi Yohanan raised up from an unsavory background to become also one of the leading Torah scholars of the time. According to the Talmud (Bava Metzia 84a), one day, during the course of arguing a point of halakha, Rabbi Yohanan said something that offended Reish Lakish. The two men quarreled, which so affected Reish Lakish that he died. Rabbi Yohanan’s colleagues, recognizing the void left in his life, chose Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat as his new study partner. The story continues,

 

Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat went and sat before Rabbi Yohanan. With regard to every matter that Rabbi Yohanan would say, Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat would say to him, there is a ruling taught in a Baraita that supports your opinion. Rabbi Yohanan said to him, in my discussions with the son of Lakish, when I would state a matter he would raise twenty-four difficulties against me in an attempt to disprove my claim, and I would answer him with twenty-four answers, and the halakha would become broadened and clarified. And yet you say to me, there is a ruling taught in a Baraita that supports my opinion. Being rebutted by Reish Lakish served a purpose. Your bringing me proof to my statements does not.

 

Soon thereafter, Rabbi Yohanan went insane and then died.

The value of entertaining conflicting opinions, and of engaging in debate, reflects a further core principle that also belongs at the center of the education we seek to provide: The uncertainty that results from our innate human limitations. This principle, too, is essential to Jewish learning. Even for those who take the written Scriptures to be the sure words of the divine, the interpretation of these words is necessarily a human endeavor, and therefore subject to uncertainty and error. Learning about one’s own ignorance is also an important part of a university education. In Jewish learning, it is that essential human ignorance, and the inescapable uncertainty to which it gives rise, that renders disagreement and debate worthwhile. This does not mean, of course, that any claim, no matter how absurd or offensive, must be entertained. A community is entitled to rule some ideas out of bounds, and the community that gave us the Talmud did so. But disagreement and debate are key to how we learn, and not just when we are students in the narrow sense. They are also part of how we humans make intellectual progress.

The past year has been a difficult one for all of us, and unbearable for many. It has taught us some things we would prefer not to have known.  But we have lived through this experience, and we have learned from it. We now know that we can no longer count on what we thought we could count on. It is now our obligation to act accordingly. 

 


 


* I am grateful for helpful conversations with Daniel Finn, Erik Nordbye, and Jonah Steinberg.

Op Eds on Israel and the Jewish People

Op-Ed Pieces by Rabbi Marc D. Angel

Is the American Dream Imploding?


(This piece appeared in The Jewish Journal of Los Angeles, March 13, 2024.)


My middle name is Dwight.


That name symbolizes a great American story.


My grandparents, born in Turkey and the Island of Rhodes, arrived in the United States in
the first decades of the twentieth century. They settled in Seattle, Washington, in the emerging
community of Judeo-Spanish-speaking Sephardic Jews.


My mother’s father was a barber. My father’s father had a shoeshine stand. They arrived
in America with little money, little formal education, but great courage and hope. They left
impoverished communities in the old world to raise their families in the land of freedom and
opportunity.


Like most immigrants of that time, my grandparents wanted their families to adapt to
America. Their children attended public school and grew up as a transition generation between
the old world and the new. My generation were full-blooded Americans.


I was born in July, 1945, and named after my maternal grandfather Marco Romey. But
my mother added a middle name, Dwight, after General Dwight David Eisenhower. I was named
after an American hero. I was an organic part of American life.


In school, we pledged allegiance to the flag of the United States every day. We learned
about Washington and Jefferson and Lincoln. They were our forefathers. Our relatives served in
the American military. Our mothers and aunts knitted clothes for American soldiers. We were in
America not as guests but as equal members of society,


My generation, almost all the grandchildren of immigrants, were well educated, hard-
working and sincere believers in the American Dream. We were better educated and more
affluent than our grandparents—exactly as they had hoped would happen. Our goal was to be
constructive members of society and to contribute to the ongoing flourishing of America.


With our children and grandchildren, we thought that the American Dream would
continue to thrive and expand. But it seems that American society is increasingly marred by anti-
Semitism, racism, and violence. The virus of hatred has infected political life, universities, and
businesses. The virtues of America are often under-appreciated while the sins of America are
highlighted and exaggerated. America is undergoing a spiritual, social, and political implosion. It
has become difficult to feel that we are “one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all.” The forces of hatred and divisiveness have become more brazen.


My middle name is Dwight, and I am proud to be a bearer of the American Dream. My
name symbolizes the dream of immigrants to identify with America, to become full-blooded
Americans. America is at risk of losing that dream. It needs to restore confidence and pride in
America as a bastion of freedom and opportunity, a land where people of all religions and races

can feel safe and secure, where everyone can work together for the betterment of society as a
whole.


Let us not forget the American struggles for freedom, democracy, and opportunity. Let us
build on the American Dream for ourselves and for our future generations.


I want to believe in that future, sure as my middle name is Dwight.
 
The Hatred Syndrome
(This piece appeared in The Jewish Link, April 11, 2024.)


It is a strange feeling to be hated by people who don’t know you and don’t want to know
you. It is perplexing to hear people calling for your death and the death of all your people
without ever considering your humanity, your goodness, your contributions to society.


Haters don’t see their victims as fellow human beings. They create and foster ugly
stereotypes. They promote outrageous conspiracy theories that dehumanize their targets.
Hatred is an ugly thing. It not only promotes hatred of the perceived enemy, but it distorts
the lives of the haters themselves. Energy and resources that could be utilized to build
compassionate societies are instead diverted to hatred, weaponry, death, and destruction.


We have always been aware of an undercurrent of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel attitudes,
but things today seem qualitatively and quantitatively different. We witness throngs of people
throughout the United States and throughout the world who brazenly and unabashedly call for
the annihilation of Israel and the murder of Jews. The public display of raw hatred is alarming.


I suspect that many of those spewing hatred of Israel and Jews don’t even know Israelis
or Jews in person. They don’t hate actual Jews; they hate stereotypes of Jews. They are
indoctrinated with propaganda and are fed a stream of lies about Israel and about Jews. The
haters are steeped in their hateful ideology and are not interested in civil dialogue and
relationship with actual Jews and Israelis. They know little or nothing about the connection of
Jews to the land of Israel going back thousands of years, from biblical times to the present.


So why do so many haters take aim at Jews and Israel? Some of this hatred stems from
anti-Jewish religious teachings. Some of it stems from jealousy at the phenomenal success of
such a tiny group. Some people spew hatred as a way of making themselves seem important, as
though picking on Jews somehow makes them appear stronger and braver.


Erich Fromm has written of the syndrome of decay that “prompts men to destroy for the
sake of destruction and to hate for the sake of hate.” Many people poison their own lives with
hatred and only feel truly alive and validated when they express hatred of others.


When societies allow hatred to flourish, they are sowing the seeds of their own
destruction. When universities, media, and political forums condone blatantly anti-Jewish
intimidation and violence, the infection spreads well beyond Jews. Civil discourse is threatened.
Respectful dialogue is quashed.


All who stand for a civil society must not be intimidated by the haters, bullies, and
supporters of terrorism. The syndrome of hate eats away at the foundations of society. It must not
be allowed to prevail.


Rav Nahman of Bratslav taught: The whole world is a narrow bridge (precarious), but the
essential thing is not to be afraid, not to be afraid at all.

 

Thoughts on Israel and the Jewish Future
(This piece appeared in The Jerusalem Post, April 30, 2024.)


In the short term, things look very difficult. Israel is in the midst of military
confrontations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. In spite of the remarkable achievements of the
IDF in Gaza, the war lingers on with no clear end in sight. Israel faces increasing international
censure from the United Nations, the International Court, and from political leaders around the
world. American college campuses are rife with anti-Israel activity. Radical Hamas supporters
unashamedly call for the destruction of Israel and the murder of Jews.


We all feel the pain and the pressure. We are going through a protracted nightmare. And
it won’t likely get better in the short term.


But the crisis will pass, sooner (hopefully!) or later. How can things change for the better
in the long term?


Israel must conclude its war in Gaza as quickly and effectively as possible. It must work
with allies to put into place a responsible Palestinian leadership that will eschew ongoing warfare
and that will work peacefully with Israel for the benefit of all. It cannot ignore the Palestinian
issue or let it fester endlessly. 


Israel has taken great strides forward through the Abraham Accords. The more Arab and
Muslim countries recognize Israel, the more secure Israel becomes. Formal diplomatic relations
with Saudi Arabia would be a potential game changer in the Middle East. Aside from the
political and economic benefits, it would undercut the hateful voices that call for Israel’s
destruction. It would make it clear that Israel is strong, creative, and a genuine partner with other
nations seeking a harmonious region.


While short-term challenges must be faced courageously, we need to focus on long-term
resolutions of problems. It isn’t realistic to expect that the deep hatred of our enemies will
dissipate overnight. The ugly anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism that have exploded in recent
months will not suddenly cease. But visionary leadership can help us move gradually and
intelligently beyond the problematic status quo. In spite of all the battles and threats, we need to
formulate sensible strategies to bring us to a lasting peace.


We need to be strong to defend ourselves from our enemies; but we need special strength
and blessing to work for and attain peace. Indeed, it may well be more difficult to achieve peace
than to win wars. 


“The Lord gives strength to His people, may the Lord bless His people with peace.”

 

Beyond Victimhood: A Positive Jewish Message
(This piece appeared in The Jerusalem Post, May 29, 2024.)


The Holocaust, understandably, haunts the Jewish people. We can never forget the
millions of Jews who were tortured and murdered by the Germans and their collaborators.
Whenever a crisis erupts that threatens Jews, there is an almost visceral reaction to call up the
memory of the Holocaust.


After the Hamas massacre of Israelis on October 7, the Jewish media were quick to report
that this was the highest number of Jews murdered in a single day since the Holocaust.
In attempting to combat anti-Semitism in New York, a program was initiated to bring all
eighth-grade students to the Museum of Jewish Heritage, where they could learn about the

Holocaust. When international leaders visit Israel, a visit to Yad Vashem is almost always part of
the itinerary.


The prevailing wisdom is that when people—especially young people—learn about the
horrors of the Holocaust, they will become more sympathetic toward Jews and aware of the
dangers of religious and racial hatred. With more knowledge about the Holocaust, it is assumed
that people will be less prone to anti-Semitic attitudes and behaviors.


The various efforts at Holocaust education have had a positive impact on many. And yet,
Holocaust education—unless handled very well—can have negative consequences. For those
steeped in anti-Jewish hatred, the Holocaust may actually encourage their anti-Semitism. They
view Jews as a despised minority group that is an easy target for hatred and violence. They see
that millions of Jews were systematically slaughtered while much of the world stood aside. In the
minds of rabid Jew-haters, the Holocaust is an ideal, not a disaster.


While maintaining the memory of the Holocaust is surely very important, we need also to
project a positive image of Jews, Judaism, and Zionism. Much of the anti-Semitism we face
today is directly related to anti-Zionism. We need to focus on conveying the historical
connection of the Jewish people to our land going back to biblical days.


Even after being exiled from the Land of Israel several times over the millennia, in the
last instance at the hands of the Romans in 70 CE, the Jewish People have continued to live in,
pray for, and dream of a return to their historic homeland.


After nearly 1,900 years, the Jews gained sovereignty over their land with the
establishment of the modern State of Israel. This is one of the most amazing adventures in
human history. For an ancient people to return to their historic homeland and build a dynamic,
democratic society is an unprecedented story of courage, faith, and persistence.


Our story is truly inspiring and full of hope, spirituality, creativity, courage, and
resilience. Despite all the hurdles we have had to face—and still face—the Jews are a strong and
vibrant people. We need to tell our story in a confident voice—not as propaganda, not in sound
bites, but in a sophisticated and intelligent way that will convey the power of the Jewish
experience.


The re-emergence of a sovereign Jewish state is a remarkable historic achievement. Yet,
as we know, it has not been received with love or understanding by many in the Arab world. In
particular, we face those who foster the Hamas ideology that negates the Jewish right to our own
land.


The goal of the haters, by their own admission, is the destruction of Israel and the Jewish
people. And while wars on the battlefield can achieve military victories for Israel, ultimate
victory will come only when the ideology of hatred is defeated. Just as Israel devotes so much
courage and brilliance to its physical defense, it needs to devote equal—and more—courage and
brilliance to fighting the murderous ideology that has infected many beyond Hamas.
To combat this ideology of hatred, we need more than Holocaust education.


We need a powerful, positive presentation of Jewish history, Jewish connection to the
land of Israel, Jewish idealism, and Jewish striving for peace and mutual understanding.
We would do well to remember the prophecy of Isaiah (42:6), who relates God’s
wondrous promise to the people of Israel that they will become “a light unto the nations.” We
need to focus on the light; on what we have given, are giving, and can give to the world.
Isaiah (51:3) foresaw a time like ours when the wasteland that was Israel turned into a
beautiful and thriving country: “For the Lord comforts Zion; He comforts all her waste places

and makes her wilderness like Eden, her desert like the garden of the Lord; joy and gladness will
be found in her, thanksgiving and the voice of song.”
That is Zionism, that is Judaism, that is the aspiration of the Jewish people.


 
Refining Our Messaging on Anti-Semitism
(This piece appeared in The Jewish Journal of Los Angeles, August 20, 2024.)


 We are rightfully concerned with anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, and we are quick to
publicize every instance of malice and injustice against our people. Our media decry the spread
of Jew-hatred. Our various spokespeople lament the increase in anti-Semitic acts, especially
since October 7.


It is important to expose and combat anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism with all our might.
But is our messaging unwittingly actually leading to an increase in Jew-hatred?


In his book, Subliminal, Dr. Leonard Mlodinow discusses a surprising phenomenon.
Public service announcements sometimes backfire. For example, some ads urge visitors to
national parks not to litter. In one controlled study, an ad denounced littering—and this resulted
in less littering. But another ad included the phrase “Americans will produce more litter than
ever.” This ad actually led to an increase in littering. Dr. Mlodinow points out that the subliminal
message of the latter ad is that it’s really okay to litter; everyone is doing it! (pp. 170–171).


When people are constantly told that anti-Israel sentiment is rampant, subliminally at
least some of them will think: It’s okay to hate Israel, lots of people do. If people are given
statistics that anti-Semitic or anti-Israel acts are increasing dramatically, at least some of them
will conclude that if so many people hate Jews and Israel, it’s okay for me to do so also. 
Publicizing anti-Israel and anti-Jewish behavior can be a double-edged sword. We need
the world to know what’s happening and rally good people to fight the injustices against us. But
by highlighting how many people hate us, we actually may be encouraging closet anti-Semites to
come out into the open with their venom. The more visibility anti-Semites have, the more they
create a snowball effect drawing others into the hatred syndrome.


In another of his books (Emotional), Dr. Mlodinow writes about psychological contagion.
Research is being done about “the spread of emotion from person to person or throughout an
organization or even an entire society” (p. 184). When crowds get fired up against Israel and
against Jews, the hatred can become “contagious.” It is difficult to combat this type of
psychological contagion; but just condemning it will not make it disappear.


We fight the anti-Semites and anti-Zionists by strengthening our own communities; by
insisting on prosecution of hate crimes; be electing pro-Israel officials; by working with good
people to foster civil society. But we also have to promote positive messaging to the general
public.


Instead of constantly publicizing the increase in anti-Jewish words and deeds, we ought
to be emphasizing the many millions of people who admire and support Israel and Jews. Instead
of giving front page attention to anti-Israel “celebrities” we ought to highlight the pro-Israel
voices and reserve the bad actors for the back pages. 


The overwhelming majority of the public abhors terrorism. They resent “activists,” i.e.,
haters who block highways, disrupt college campuses, vandalize businesses, attack innocent
individuals on the basis of religion, race, nationality, or other reasons. Instead of the media

showering so much attention on the haters, we should be demanding even more attention on
those who promote civility, mutual respect, and intergroup cooperation.
We certainly must condemn and fight anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. But our
messaging must be positive and must draw on the goodwill of millions of people who appreciate
the values of Israel and the Jewish People. 

 

An Israeli Peace Initiative
(This piece appeared in The Jerusalem Post, August 25, 2024.)


 Maimonides described messianic times as an era when Israel would simply be left alone
in peace. In his Mishneh Torah, in the “Laws of Kings and Wars” (12:4), he writes: “The Sages
and the prophets did not yearn for the messianic era in order to have dominion over the entire
world, to rule over the gentiles, to be exalted by the nations, or to eat, drink, and celebrate.
Rather, they desired to be free to involve themselves in Torah and wisdom without any pressures
or disturbances, so that they would merit the world to come.”


Imagine a time when Israel—and the Jewish People as a whole—would not be subject to
hatred, violence, terrorism, or war. Imagine a time when we could devote all our energies to our
minds and spirits, to maintaining a righteous and prosperous society. Unfortunately, we still live
in an unredeemed world, and the messianic dream seems further away than ever. But we must
not give up on this goal.


At present, Israel is engaged in conflict with Hamas, various Palestinian terror groups,
Hezbollah, the Houthis, and, of course, Iran. The Jewish State is also confronted with a growing
number of countries that are choosing to recognize a Palestinian state without due concern for
Israel’s vital interests. Jews in the Diaspora are facing anti-Semitism in the media, on college
campuses, and by pro-Palestinian mobs.


How can we dream of a time of peace when our current reality is very far from being
peaceful? The answer is that we must not abandon our dream, regardless of all the negative
elements in our world. We must envision and work for a new era of peace.


However, it appears hopelessly naïve to speak of peace at a time like this. The haters are
not interested in peace, unashamedly calling for the annihilation of Israel and the murder of
Jews. Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian nationalism fan the hatred. Iran uses its power and
money to foster violence against Israel. The animosity seems intractable.


Does it make sense to plan for the “day after” when that day seems so remote? On the
other hand: Does it make sense not to plan for the “day after”?


Our real enemy is hatred. 


It is hatred that fuels Iran, Palestinian terrorists, and anti-Semites in general. It isn’t likely
that we’ll be able to eradicate all hatred, but we can make inroads and turn the tide.
Dr. Leonard Mlodinow of Cal Tech, in his book Emotional, discusses “psychological
contagion” through which attitudes are transmitted. He reports on research regarding “the spread
of emotion from person to person or throughout an organization or even an entire society” (p.
184). A psychological climate emerges that draws people into the “contagion.” Certain ideas and
attitudes take on a snowball effect. The contagion cannot be staunched unless a powerful
“counter-contagion” takes hold.

When crowds get fired up against Israel and against Jews, the hatred is “contagious.”
Haters are emboldened when others are drawn into their group. The more haters, the more people
are driven to commit violent acts and speak malicious words.


Israel needs to undertake a serious peace offensive. 


It has demonstrated its amazing military prowess and must continue to be as powerful as
possible. At the same time, it can help create positive “psychological contagion” that will draw
people to its vision for a peaceful future.


Israel has already made dramatic strides forward with the Abraham Accords. It would be
significant if Israeli leaders would publicly meet with the leaders of the Arab countries included
in the accords. The world needs to see that Israel and Arab nations respect and cooperate with
each other. 


People need to sense that a wider network of peaceful relations is possible.
The world also needs to hear from Israeli Arabs who are demonstrating allegiance to
Israel and working with Israeli Jews to build a better society. Israeli Arabs are successful in so
many ways. Their stories are very important.


Israel and Saudi Arabia have been considering a path toward mutual recognition. If this
can be achieved, it will be a dramatic step on the path to a wider regional détente.
At present, the ayatollahs have firm control in Iran, but it is possible that, at some point,
the opposition will rise and topple the regime. If Iran can be freed of Islamic fundamentalist rule,
there can be an opening for civil relations with Israel. We must make it clear—loudly and
often—that we have no interest in war with Iran.


As Israel promotes a serious peace initiative, it will need to relate to the Palestinian
people. The status quo of ongoing terrorism and war is certainly not in the interest of Israel, and
not in the interest of the Palestinians. It does seem almost impossible at this time to find a
responsible Palestinian leadership that will negotiate reasonably with Israel; there have been so
many failed attempts in the past. But our long-term vision must transcend the current realities
and plan strategically for a long-term détente with the Palestinians.


A serious peace initiative is in Israel’s interest. It will help turn back the anti-Israel and
anti-Semitic psychological contagion and replace it with a growing respect and support for Israel
and the Jewish people.


Maimonides taught that our goal for messianic times is simply to be left in peace, to be
free of hatred and wars. We need to keep this goal in mind—and work to bring this vision into
reality.
 
Blessings and Curses


(This piece appeared in The Jerusalem Post, October 31, 2024.)


“And I will bless them that bless you, and anyone who curses you I will curse” (Bereishit
12:3).


God called on Abram to move from his birthplace and to set off for a new land. Abram
was to lay the foundations for a righteous society that recognized the One God and that
repudiated all forms of idolatry. God promised Abram that he would be a blessing to all the
families of the earth.


Setting new standards of faith and morality, Abram would attract followers. But he would
also be the target of enemies who resented his teachings. So God reassured Abram that God will

bless those who bless him and curse those who curse him. God’s promise is echoed in the
blessing later given to the Israelites by Bilam: “Blessed be everyone who blesses you, and cursed
be everyone who curses you” (Bemidbar 24:9).


 Throughout the history of our people, surely there have been many who have been
blessed by their blessing us. Many millions of people have led happier and more meaningful
lives by their attachment to the Hebrew Bible. Many have blessed, and have been blessed by, the
many contributions of the Jewish People to civilization.


Likewise, throughout history, there have been many who have cursed us and have
committed every sort of atrocity against us. But in what ways have they themselves been cursed
by God? It sometimes (often?) feels that the haters are not subjected to the wrath of God. In our
own times, we see anti-Semites/anti-Zionists eagerly cursing and threatening us. Although we
are blessed with a strong State of Israel and a robust diaspora community, the enemies are
relentless. We wonder: In what way is God cursing those who curse us?


Perhaps God’s blessings and curses are not externally imposed, but are consequences of
people’s own choices in life.


The Torah presents two paths for humanity. The positive essence of Judaism teaches us
to choose life, love our fellow human beings, serve the Lord faithfully. All who attach
themselves to these ideals are themselves blessed. They live constructive, love-filled lives. Their
faith strengthens them in good times and bad.


But those who curse us and our teachings are thereby choosing a destructive way of life.
Their hatred poisons their lives. By cursing us and what we represent, they actually bring a curse
upon themselves.


When the State of Israel was established in 1948, the Arab world exploded in hatred of
the Jewish State. In all these years, Palestinians and supporters have invested billions of dollars
in weaponry, tunnels, anti-Israel boycotts. What is the result of all this hatred? Instead of having
a peaceful and prosperous Palestinian society, the Palestinians are cursed with an ongoing legacy
of hatred, violence, and loss of life. They have raised generations of haters rather than
generations of those who choose life, who bless Israel as a partner in peace and prosperity.
More generally, those who curse and hate Israel thereby undermine their own lives.
Instead of devoting their energies, talents and resources in constructive ways, they embrace a
negative way of life.


When God assured blessings for those who bless Israel and curses for those who curse
Israel, these were not idle promises. They are fulfilled every day of the week.
We surely would like the haters to re-think their destructive ways and free themselves of
the curses they have brought upon themselves and others.


Those who choose blessing and life are themselves blessed. Those who choose cursing
and death are themselves cursed.
 
Reclaiming Bible Zionism


(This piece appeared in The Jewish Link, December 12, 2024.)
 

What is Zionism after all?

The term seems to have originated in the 1890s by Nathan Birnbaum, founder of the
Kadimah nationalist Jewish students’ movement. Theodor Herzl popularized the term as the
expression of the Jewish People’s national aspiration to return to their historic homeland in Zion.


The term “Zionism” is often used by friends and enemies of Israel without proper
reference to its historic roots in biblical times. Zionism didn’t just pop up in a vacuum, as though
it was a new and artificial framework for Jews to return to their land. Although the term as a
political movement dates from the late nineteenth century, it in fact encapsulates thousands of
years of Jewish attachment to their historic homeland.


Zion is mentioned over 150 times in the Hebrew Bible. While originally referring to
Mount Zion, it came to refer to Jerusalem and then to all the land of Israel.


Rabbi Dr. Henry Pereira Mendes, who was associated with the historic Spanish and
Portuguese Synagogue of New York from 1877 to 1937, advocated what he called “Bible
Zionism.” He was proud of the fact that Theodor Herzl asked his cooperation in organizing the
Zionist movement in the United States. Dr. Mendes was elected vice-president of the Federation
of American Zionists and a member of the actions committee of the World Zionist Organization.
He believed that Zionism had the goal of establishing a Jewish State founded upon the principles
and ideals of the Jewish religious tradition. In a letter to Haham Gaster of London (July 21,
1903), Dr. Mendes wrote: “Here is true work for Zionists: to keep Hebrews true to Jewish life,
Jewish law, Jewish sentiment.”


Dr. Mendes taught that “Bible Zionism” aspired to go beyond simply providing a
homeland for Jews. It had a universal message and goal: “Peace for the world at last and the
realization of reverence for God by all men. These are the essentials for human happiness.
Zionism stands for them.”


We rarely hear about “Bible Zionism” from Israeli political leaders, media, or the various
Zionist organizations worldwide. But wouldn’t it be nice if leaders and opinion makers reclaimed
“Bible Zionism” and reminded the world at every opportunity of the biblical roots of Zionism?


“Bible Zionism,” as Rabbi Mendes pointed out, has a dual agenda. It stresses the national
aspirations of the Jewish People to live in their own historic homeland and foster their religious
and cultural traditions. The prophet Isaiah foresaw that Jews will “come to Zion with songs and
everlasting joy upon their heads; they shall obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing will
flee away” (Isaiah 35:10). He taught that “Zion will be redeemed with justice and those that
return to her with righteousness” (1:27).


But “Bible Zionism” also points to the ultimate victory of justice and righteousness for
Israel and the entire world. Isaiah taught that many people shall come to Zion “for out of Zion
shall go forth Torah and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem” (Isaiah 2:3). Isaiah looked to the
day when “the nations shall see your righteousness and all kings your glory” (62:1–2). The
prophet Zechariah (8:3) taught that the Lord has returned to Zion and that “Jerusalem shall be
called the city of truth and the mountain of the Lord of hosts the holy mountain.” Zion was to be
a bastion of truth, justice and wisdom for the entire world.


Recent months have seen ugly manifestations of anti-Zionism throughout the world. The
haters have distorted the meaning and mission of Zionism. We need to embrace “Bible Zionism”
in every forum to set the record straight.


 The Psalmist sang (122:6): “Pray for the peace of Jerusalem; they who love you will
prosper; peace be within your walls, prosperity within your palaces.” Just as those who love and
support Zion will be blessed, the Psalmist warns (129:5): “May all who hate Zion be put to
shame and turned back.”

As for us, we must heed the words of Isaiah (62:1–2): “For the sake of Zion I will not
hold my peace, and for the sake of Jerusalem I will not be still, until her righteousness goes forth
like radiance and her salvation like a burning torch.”

Surprised by Anti-Semitism/Anti-Zionism? Yes and No


(This article appeared in The Jewish Journal of Los Angeles, December 23, 2024.)


Although Jews have faced anti-Semitism from time immemorial, it always comes upon
us as something new. It surprises us. We don’t understand it.


We strive to be good people, good citizens; we are kind-hearted and generous. We devote
ourselves to the education of our children, to the betterment of society, to justice and
compassion. We have our share of faults along with all other human beings; but by and large, we
are a good, responsible, hard-working community.


And yet, no matter what we do, people hate us! They don’t see us as individual human
beings but as a vast stereotype. They don’t care if we are religious or not religious; if we are
liberals or conservatives. If we are Jewish, they are against us and want to hurt us.
It was once thought that the establishment of the State of Israel would bring anti-
Semitism to an end. After all, Jews would then have a feeling of security in the world, a safe
haven where no one would bother us.


But the Jewish State has simply become a new target for the anti-Semites. They now
couch Jew-hatred for hatred of “the Zionists.” Anti-Semites don’t have a problem with Hamas
firing thousands of missiles at civilian centers in Israel; but when Israel responds by bombing the
enemy, Israel is immediately condemned and vilified by the haters. For the anti-Semites, Israel is
always wrong regardless of what it does or doesn't do.


Happily, there are many millions of people who feel warmly toward Jews and the Jewish
State. Happily, many millions of people admire the accomplishments of the State of Israel in the
face of so many obstacles; they respect Israel’s right—and obligation—to defend its citizens.
But when we see outbreaks of blatant anti-Jewish violence, anti-Jewish rhetoric, anti-
Israel demonization—it surprises and pains us!  In spite of thousands of years dealing with anti-
Jewish hatred and persecution, we still are not used to it. We somehow think that humanity will
improve, will judge us fairly. We grow optimistic at any sign of peace and understanding, mutual
cooperation, and solidarity.


We keep telling ourselves that most people are good and that reason will ultimately
prevail. The haters will eventually overcome malice and violence; they will realize the value of
peaceful and respectful cooperation. In a world of over seven billion human beings, surely there
must be room for the infinitesimal presence of 15 million Jews. In a world with so many
countries, surely there must be room for one tiny Jewish State that wants nothing more than to be
able to live in peace and security.


But the anti-Semites and anti-Zionists don’t really care. They don’t want to be reasoned
with; they don’t want to listen. They have their agenda of hate.


Saul Bellow, the American novelist who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1976,
wrote in his book To Jerusalem and Back: A Personal Account: “…There is one fact of Jewish
life unchanged by the creation of a Jewish state: you cannot take your right to live for granted.
Others can; you cannot. This is not to say that everyone else is living pleasantly and well under a

decent regime. No, it means only that the Jews, because they are Jews, have never been able to
take the right to live as a natural right….This right is still clearly not granted them, not even in
the liberal West.”


Bellow’s complaint is not new. Jews throughout the generations have had to face the
same stark reality: Jews, because they are Jews, cannot take the right to live as a natural right.
That’s the sad part of the story.


But that’s not the end of the story. Even if there has long been hatred and violence
directed against Jews…we are still here! We continue to live, to thrive, to hope.
The late Jewish thinker, Simon Rawidowicz, wrote an essay about “Israel: The Ever-
Dying People.” He noted that Jews have often felt that theirs was the last Jewish generation.
Jewish survival seemed hopeless. But although we were “ever-dying,” we were in fact ever-
living! We often felt despair; but hope and persistence prevailed. Jews found ways to overcome
all who would decimate us.


Although current manifestations of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism are ugly and painful,
we must take the long view of things. This isn’t the first period of Jewish history where Jews
faced viciousness and violence. It likely won’t be the last period either. But long experience has
taught us to stay strong, stay confident, stay positive. The challenge to our generation is to stand
tall as Jews, to stand strong on behalf of Israel.


And we do look forward to a time when humanity will overcome the disease of anti-
Semitism. Meanwhile, we recall the words of Rav Nahman of Bratslav: All the world is a narrow
bridge; the essential thing is not to be afraid, not to be afraid at all.

Nehama Leibowitz and the Paradox of Parshanut

Nehama Leibowitz and the Paradox of Parshanut:

Are Our Eyes on the Text, or on the Commentators?[1]

By Hayyim Angel

 

 

 

Introduction: The Commentators as Our Eyes to the Text

 

In Elementary and High Schools, we do not study parshanut or exegetical methodology for their own sake; rather, we study Torah with the assistance of its interpreters. And if, God forbid, the Torah should be pushed to the side—whether its stories and laws, its teachings and ideas, its guidance and beauty—because of overemphasis on parshanim, then any small gain my book achieves will be lost at a greater expense (Nehama Leibowitz).[2]

 

In line with all traditional exegesis, Professor Nehama Leibowitz, zt”l (henceforth, Nehama, as she preferred to be called) emphasized that we must scrutinize the meaning and significance of each word and passage in the Torah, and perceive its messages as communicated directly to us. We accomplish these daunting tasks by consulting the teachings of the Sages and later commentators (mefarshim). In effect, they serve as our eyes through which we understand the biblical text in its multifaceted and ever-applicable glory.

Of course, the opinions of the mefarshim must be painstakingly evaluated against the biblical text. Sometimes, one position is preferable to another because it captures the language or the spirit of a passage more fully.[3] On many occasions, the text simultaneously sustains multiple interpretations on different levels.[4] But it is always the text that commands our attention.

            To those studying parshanut as a discipline, whether for methodological approaches or in historical context, Midrashim and commentators are no longer secondary to the biblical text. They are three-dimensional people living in specific times and places. Parshanut investigates how a given exegete approached the text, and what influenced him, such as Midrashim and earlier commentaries, intellectual currents of his time, and other historical considerations beyond purely textual motivations. The student of Tanakh views commentary as secondary literature, while the student of parshanut or history treats exegetes as primary sources. These contrasting perspectives almost necessarily will yield different understandings of the comments of mefarshim.

            For the most part, Nehama avoided studying Tanakh in its historical context, and likewise was reluctant to consider Midrashim and the works of later commentators in their respective settings. In particular, she devoted an entire study in an attempt to demonstrate that Rashi on the Torah always was motivated by textual considerations, and never exclusively by educational or other religious agendas such as polemics. Because of her emphatically text-centered methodology, Nehama also did not focus on individual contributions of mefarshim. She brought all mefarshim to her studies simultaneously, utilizing those comments that she believed elucidated the text of the Torah.

In theory, the disciplines of Tanakh and parshanut should be complementary. A heightened understanding of parshanut certainly offers one a more finely tuned ability to study Tanakh through the eyes of the mefarshim. But, as Nehama warned, it is all too easy to become sidetracked from the biblical text by overemphasizing parshanut. In light of this tension, we will consider those essays in Pirkei Nehama: Nehama Leibowitz Memorial Volume that explore the strengths and limitations of Nehama’s methodology.[5]

 

Close Text Reading and Nehama’s Evaluation of Peshat

 

Moshe Ahrend (pp. 42–49) and Elazar Touitou (pp. 221–227) observe that Nehama espoused a broad definition of peshat that places the overall spirit of a passage (ruah ha-ketuvim) at the forefront of inquiry. In contrast, exegetes such as Rashbam were more concerned with local meanings of what is found explicitly in the text (cf. Cohn, pp. 106–107).[6]

David Zafrany notes that Nehama accentuated the finest semantic nuances and redundancies (pp. 75–77). Predictably, this exegetical position led to Nehama’s particular fondness for the commentaries of Rashi and Ramban.[7] In contrast, exegetes such as Rashbam and Ibn Ezra believed in kefel ha-inyan be-milim shonot (poetic repetition) and other idiomatic conventions in the Torah. Nehama often referred to the latter group as “rodfei ha-peshat” (those who pursue the plain sense of the text) as a means of criticizing their viewpoint (cf. Ahrend, p. 38).

This discussion also underlies Nehama’s favorable outlook toward Benno Jacob and the Buber-Rosenzweig translation of the Torah. Although Nehama was acutely aware that these authors were not Orthodox Jews, they were attentive to the finer literary qualities of the biblical text, attributing significance to each word of the Torah.[8] Rivka Horowitz discusses the impact of these twentieth-century German-Jewish writers on Nehama (pp. 207–220).[9]

Moshe Sokolow (pp. 298–300) and Amos Frisch (pp. 313–323) both illustrate Nehama’s love of comparing and contrasting parallel biblical texts. Nehama followed the path of Rashi, Ramban, Malbim, and Netziv, against the approach of Ibn Ezra, Radak, and Ibn Caspi. The latter generally treated such repetitions as stylistic variations, without meaningful significance.

            These discussions illustrate vital aspects of Nehama’s learning methodology, and explain how she related to different commentators as a result. However, the majority of essays in Pirkei Nehama make parshanut the primary source of inquiry, exploring the methodology of various exegetes and/or Nehama as a parshanit and educator in her own right. One theme conspicuously (and unfortunately) absent from this volume is an essay devoted to Nehama’s own original interpretations on the Torah.

 

Between Dogmatism and Historicism

 

Dogmatism aspires toward absolute, supertemporal authority, but for this it pays the heavy price of blurring the distinctiveness of periods and perspectives. Historicism strives for greater differentiation and for explaining causal connection and circumstantial conditioning; but with its gain comes the loss it incurs with its complete relativization (Uriel Simon).[10]

 

Gavriel H. Cohn likens Nehama’s educational technique to Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik’s memorable portrayal of his learning dialogue with the great talmudists (p. 26).[11] Her iyyunim guide the reader to the text, surrounded by mefarshim spanning many generations (cf. Cohn, p. 97).

            Several writers observe that Nehama’s synchronic and text-centered approach often comes at the expense of other aspects of parshanut study. In an analysis of Nehama’s methodology, Yisrael Rozenson remarks that Nehama treated Rashi and many other commentators as standing above historical circumstance and influence, exclusively interpreting the biblical text.[12] Gavriel H. Cohn notes that Nehama did place Abarbanel and Hirsch in their historical settings on occasion, and in rare instances she did so for others as well (p. 97, n. 18; cf. Ahrend, p. 39; Touitou, p. 232). With Rashi, however, there could be no exceptions. Nehama tried valiantly to demonstrate that Rashi on the Torah always was motivated by textual nuances and difficulties, and never exclusively by religious or polemical considerations. Her extreme position on this issue generated the greatest amount of critical discussion in Pirkei Nehama.

It is specifically through the defense of Nehama’s outlook by Shemuel P. Gelbard that one readily can identify its shortcomings (pp. 177–185). Gelbard asserts (p. 178) that Nehama did not prove her point conclusively in her article, “Rashi’s Criteria for Citing Midrashim.”[13] While allowing for rare exceptions for educational or polemical concerns, Gelbard maintains that Rashi almost always was motivated by something in the biblical text (p. 179). To substantiate his thesis, Gelbard adduces an impressive array of midreshei aggadah cited by Rashi that all address some difficulty in the text even as they also teach important religious lessons.

Enlightening in their own right, Gelbard’s examples do not prove his or Nehama’s claim, for two reasons: (1) To verify Nehama’s argument, one must take into account not only the Midrashim that Rashi cites, but also those he does not cite. Why does Rashi quote one Midrash instead of another, when the latter also may have been responding to a similar text anomaly?[14] (2) There could be, and in fact are, other examples in Rashi’s commentary that do not fit into this general analysis, a point Gelbard himself concedes. At the end of her article on Rashi’s criteria for selecting Midrashim, Nehama left the first issue for another study. The articles of Yitzhak Gottlieb and Avraham Grossman in Pirkei Nehama should be considered, respectively, as attempts at such further studies. They convincingly identify motivations in Rashi’s commentary beyond pure adherence to the biblical text.

Yitzhak Gottlieb quotes Nehama’s assertion that Rashi quoted Midrashim pertaining to semikhut (juxtaposition of passages) only when the juxtaposition presents some textual difficulty (pp. 149–175).[15] Gottlieb notes that although we always can find some text motivator for semikhut, it is more relevant to ask if there is a fundamental difference between those Midrashim that Rashi quoted and those he did not (p. 170; cf. p. 150, n. 4).[16] After a comprehensive examination of the midrashic discussions of semikhut, Gottlieb cannot ascertain any distinct pattern for those Midrashim that Rashi quoted versus those he did not, leading him away from Nehama’s conclusion. Gottlieb concedes that Rashi may not have had these omitted Midrashim available to him. But if Rashi did have them, it is reasonable to conclude that although Rashi generally was motivated by text concerns, he also cited certain Midrashim instead of others for other reasons, including his desire to disseminate his religious ideals: for example, to provide comfort for persecuted Jews, to affirm God’s love of Israel, and to defend Judaism against Christian polemical accusations (p. 174, esp. n. 99).

Avraham Grossman bolsters Gottlieb’s conclusions by identifying likely polemical and educational examples from within Rashi’s commentary on the Torah (pp. 187–205). Grossman surveys opinions of scholars ranging from Nehama’s extreme efforts to deny all historical impact on Rashi, to Yitzhak Baer and Elazar Touitou’s equally far-reaching assertions about the impact of historical circumstances on Rashi’s commentary.[17] Grossman adopts a middle position and maintains that many instances of Rashi’s selection of Midrashim do address textual difficulties, but others emerged primarily from polemical, or other religious concerns.

Rashi saw assimilation and persecution among French Jews, and therefore used his commentary to inspire them during the grim period surrounding the First Crusade. Grossman asserts that on occasion, Rashi may have selected Midrashim he knew were far from peshat in order to convince his community that they are loved by God and should remain faithful to the Torah and mitzvoth (p. 189).

Grossman then cites examples where Rashi explicitly stated that he preferred an interpretation le-teshuvat ha-minim (to answer the heretics) to explanations of the Sages, since Christians were taking the midrashic messianic interpretations of biblical texts and applying them to the Christian savior (p. 190).[18] However, these instances occur exclusively in Rashi’s commentaries on Nakh. In Rashi’s commentary on the Torah, there are no explicit examples, making the enterprise of pinpointing polemical exegesis speculative.[19] Grossman rises to this challenge by adducing ten instances of polemic and five of other religious-educational matters, where Rashi on the Torah clearly deviated from peshat or consistently selected certain types of Midrashim from among many others to support his educational agendas.

            For example, Rashi’s famous rereading of Jacob’s statement to Isaac—anokhi. Esav bekhorekha, “It is I. Esau is your firstborn” (Gen. 27:19)—is against the plain meaning of the text. In the generation following Rashi, Rabbi Menahem ben Shelomo (Sekhel Tov) wrote that were one to accept Rashi’s reading here, a dualist would be able to support the existence of two deities from the Ten Commandments by reading its first verse, “Anokhi. Hashem Elokekha”! Grossman maintains that Rashi knew he was deviating from peshat in this instance (pp. 192–193). He did so, in all likelihood, because Christians regularly accused Jews of being deceitful in business, emulating their ancestor Jacob.[20] By writing that Jacob did not use deceit (even translating “mirmah” as “wisdom” on 27:35), Rashi deflated the Christian indictment at its roots.

            Grossman also demonstrates that Rashi consistently quoted Midrashim that defended the character of Jacob and those that lambasted Esau. Such consistent patterns plausibly can be understood against the background of Jewish-Christian tensions in medieval Europe. Rashi used Jacob as a symbol for the Jews, and Esau represented a combination of Edom, Rome, and Christianity.[21] Although several of Rashi’s comments also may address textual anomalies, the consistent pattern of midrashic selections can be understood more fully against the polemical backdrop.

At the end of his article, Grossman reaffirms that many of Rashi’s comments were in fact textually motivated (pp. 204–205). However, the primary, overarching goal of his commentary was to provide religious guidance to Jews. If his educational goals coincided with peshat—which they usually did—then Rashi could teach biblical text and Judaism simultaneously. If not, Rashi favored religious teaching over a sterile, “scientific” response to the biblical text. Although one may debate individual examples cited by Grossman, blatant deviations from peshat such as “Anokhi. Esav bekhorekha” and consistent patterns of Rashi’s citation of certain Midrashim over others confirm his general thesis.[22] In a separate article published in the same year as Pirkei Nehama, Shemuel P. Gelbard also reached the conclusion that Rashi had several “meta-issues” behind his commentary.[23]

In his essay on Nehama’s treatment of Rashbam, Elazar Touitou (p. 232) marvels at Nehama’s reluctance to acknowledge Rashbam’s operating in polemical context even when Rashbam explicitly stated that he was responding to minim (Christians).[24] Touitou’s most convincing example of polemic relates to the Golden Calf episode. Although Nehama credited Rabbi Judah Halevi (Kuzari 1:97) for defending the honor of Israel in his interpretation of the Golden Calf episode,[25] she did not envision a similar possibility for Rashbam when he wrote (on Exod. 32:19) that Moses dropped the tablets because he was physically exhausted. As a result, Nehama rejected Rashbam’s unusual interpretation outright:

 

It appears to us that Rashbam, considered one of the greatest pashtanim, has distanced himself significantly from the peshat of the text. Does the text want to teach us about Moses’ physical weakness? It appears that the description of the shattering of the tablets in Deuteronomy completely refutes his comments.[26]

 

To justify Rashbam, Touitou notes that medieval Christians viewed the Golden Calf episode as proof of Israel’s failure to accept God (p. 229). They claimed further that Moses’ shattering of tablets represented the abrogation of God’s covenant with Israel. Well aware of these assertions, Rashbam feared that French Jews, suffering from persecution and discrimination in Christian society, might have their resolve further weakened by these arguments. Therefore, Rashbam eliminated the sting from the Christian position by maintaining that Moses was physically exhausted. But there is little doubt that he understood peshat in the verse.[27]

By demonstrating how certain interpretations of Rashi and Rashbam can be explained in historical context, Grossman and Touitou are able to justify why these commentators veered from peshat on occasion. Nehama’s insistence on viewing Rashi and Rashbam exclusively as eyes to the text led her to rebuke Rashbam’s interpretation of Moses’ dropping the tablets and simply to ignore Rashi’s comments on “Anokhi. Esav bekhorekha.” Moreover, she neglected opportunities to highlight the heroism and greatness of Rashi and Rashbam as religious leaders in medieval France.

However, the historical approach to parshanut, when taken too far, can undermine peshat learning. For example, Touitou (pp. 230–231) observes that Rashbam deviated from the midrashic reading of the sale of Joseph, maintaining that the Midianites (and not Joseph’s brothers) sold Joseph to the Ishmaelites (Gen. 37:28). Touitou questions whether the text alone really would have motivated Rashbam to offer a new interpretation. Touitou further observes that Rashbam waited until Parashat Vayyeshev (Gen. 37:2) to introduce his discussion with his grandfather Rashi pertaining to the importance of peshat, and the ability to formulate perushim ha-mehaddeshim be-khol yom (new interpretations that develop each day).

Touitou proposes that Rashbam was responding to Christian paralleling of the Joseph narratives to the stories relating to the betrayal of their savior. Therefore, Rashbam wrote that the brothers did not sell Joseph in order to upset the parallels Christians were trying to create. Touitou further suggests that Rashbam waited until Vayyeshev to discuss his peshat methodology precisely because of the importance of anti-Christian polemics behind his emphasis on peshat.

Though stimulating, Touitou’s hypothesis is unconvincing. Why did Rashbam fail to introduce the importance of peshat during so many earlier stories in Genesis also associated with polemics? More significantly, Touitou attempts to bolster his thesis by asking, “Is it reasonable that Rashbam would deviate from such an established interpretation,” and by wondering whether the text alone really would have motivated Rashbam (p. 230). These questions essentially eliminate peshat study, and reduce all novel interpretations to polemical responses.

Nehama may have been unnecessarily harsh on Rashbam for his explanation of Moses’ dropping the tablets out of exhaustion. However, that overly critical viewpoint appears to be a small price to pay for what otherwise might lead to the overlooking of a genuine text issue by relativizing an interpretation to historical circumstances. Nehama devoted an entire iyyun to the sale of Joseph, demonstrating how Rashbam derived his opinion from the text, and also how many later commentators adopted his approach.[28] While Rashbam’s original reading subsequently could have been useful to counter Christian arguments, there is no reason to believe that polemics are what motivated Rashbam in this instance. His interpretation is reasonable, if not likely, in peshat.

For that matter, Nehama’s ascribing Rabbi Judah Halevi’s interpretation of the Golden Calf episode to his love of Israel also leads to this problem. Many later commentators, from Ibn Ezra until Amos Hakham (Da’at Mikra), adopted the Kuzari’s general explanation as peshat in the narrative. By suggesting that Rabbi Judah Halevi was motivated by his love of Israel, Nehama sidestepped an important peshat debate that continues until today.

            After all this discussion, it seems that one must modify Nehama’s earlier comments only slightly: In her study of Rashi’s selection of Midrashim, she should have written that Rashi generally cited Midrashim to address textual concerns, but occasionally allowed his overarching role as Jewish educator to supersede technical peshat considerations (as argued by Gelbard, Gottlieb, and Grossman). In her iyyun on Moses’ shattering the tablets, Nehama might have extolled Rashbam as a religious leader[29] or omitted his comments, rather than sharply rejecting them.

However, Nehama’s general approach still holds true: one always must begin by searching for text motivations for mefarshim. Only in cases where a pashtan does violence to the text, or when consistent exegetical patterns can be demonstrated, should one look elsewhere for possible motivations—and these must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. It is preferable to adopt Nehama’s original position as a starting point, rather than to lose any dimension of the Torah itself.

 

Nehama’s Avoidance of Diachronic Surveys of Parshanut

 

Uriel Simon’s essay surveys mefarshim in chronological sequence, paying close attention to who had which commentaries before him (pp. 241–261). At the same time, he remains focused on text-based questions.

In her iyyun addressing why Joseph never contacted his family during his 22-year stay in Egypt, and Joseph’s ostensibly vengeful behavior toward his brothers, Nehama wrote that all commentators addressed these issues.[30] Simon criticizes Nehama for saying that “all commentators” dealt with her questions—this simply is not true (p. 244). Simon then surveys Jewish interpretation from the Second Temple period through Abarbanel, demonstrating the impact of earlier writers on later writers, particularly with respect to the initial questions they asked when addressing the text. Simon demonstrates that without a diachronic study, one cannot appreciate the unique contributions of each commentator on a given issue.

Simon’s essay is valuable, but it still leaves Nehama’s iyyun intact—as an ahistorical study. Simon’s discussion of the development of the ideas complements Nehama’s exclusive text study and the relevance of the text to Jews today. Nehama did not stress the contributions of individual commentators, because she focused on the text itself.

 

Nehama’s Reluctance to View Tanakh in Historical Context[31]

 

Moshe Ahrend observes that Nehama drew on a wide variety of sources, but generally avoided ancient Near Eastern sources (p. 47). Nehama appears to have been concerned that whatever benefits might be derived from such inquiry could be neutralized by the religious dangers inherent in considering a divine text in light of human-authored parallels.[32]

In addition to this motivation for Nehama’s reluctance, her avoidance of ancient Near Eastern texts fits into her overall approach of eschewing the placing of Tanakh and mefarshim into historical frameworks. Yisrael Rozenson observes that even in those few instances when Nehama did refer to the historical setting of the Torah, she generally mined the parallels for psychological insight.[33] For example, Nehama cited the debate between Rashi and Ibn Ezra on Pharaoh’s “readying his chariot” (Exod. 14:6): Rashi wrote that Pharaoh did so himself, whereas Ibn Ezra assumed that Pharaoh ordered his attendants to perform that labor. In support of Rashi’s interpretation, Nehama cited James B. Pritchard’s Ancient Near Eastern Texts, which mentions that Thutmose III of Egypt personally went to the forefront of his battalion.[34] However, Nehama was not trying to bring a precedent to support Rashi’s interpretation from a parallel context. She was bolstering the timeless, psychological interpretation of royal initiative as illustrated by Rashi. In her iyyun, Nehama then quoted a second “proof” for Rashi—King Abdullah’s personally firing the first shot during Israel’s War of Independence!

 

Nehama in Her Context[35]

 

Nehama, of course, also reacted to the realities of her own time. She saw a troubling rate of assimilation among Jews. This may have factored into her emphasis on mitzvah observance, personal responsibility, psychological issues, and repentance, rather than abstract theological issues (see Cohn, p. 103; Horowitz, p. 207). Nehama accentuated these matters to the extent that they rightfully merit entire articles in Pirkei Nehama. Menahem Ben-Yashar addresses psychological-educational issues in Nehama’s writings, Menahem Ben-Sasson analyzes Nehama’s stress on repentance, and Erella Yedgar surveys Nehama’s teachings of personal and interpersonal responsibility.[36]

Gavriel H. Cohn contrasts Nehama’s approach with the one prevalent among secular Zionists, who studied Tanakh as ancient history and who placed archaeology at the forefront of their study (p. 27). Nehama’s blanket avoidance of those dimensions is better understood in this context. Nehama emphasized the eternal relevance of the Torah, not its setting in the ancient world.

            As Rivka Horowitz points out, Nehama realized that secular biblical scholarship often was inimical to traditional values and did not always value the meaning of each and every word in Tanakh. Could it be that Nehama’s unusually sharp attacks against the “rodfei ha-peshat” (where Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, and Radak bear the brunt of her criticism) were also a veiled polemic against these secular scholars?

Like all traditionalists, Nehama believed that Jewish values emerge from the text of the Torah. She also considered any deviations from peshat a compromise to one’s interpretation. Rashi was her ideal commentator, because he noticed the finest text nuances and tried to capture their religious messages. Perhaps her extreme assertion that Rashi cited Midrashim exclusively motivated by the text emerged from her confidence that Rashi shared her own approach (cf. Ahrend, pp. 44–45; Cohn, p. 97). As several writers in Pirkei Nehama have demonstrated, however, many earlier mefarshim—even Rashi—balanced textual and religious agendas in their commentaries.

 

Conclusion

 

The writers in Pirkei Nehama convincingly demonstrate that Nehama’s principles of interpretation are limiting on several fronts. By downplaying the role of historical context, one loses dimensions of the Sages and later commentators as teachers and spiritual guides in history (Gottlieb, Grossman, Touitou). By treating all commentators synchronically, one does not appreciate the development of ideas over time, or the contributions of individual exegetes (Simon). By ignoring the historical setting of Tanakh, one forfeits the gains that parallel Near Eastern sources offer (Ahrend, G. Cohn). In a majority of these instances, however, Nehama appears to have consciously sacrificed those dimensions of Tanakh study in favor of the living discussions and evaluations made possible by her synchronic, non-historical focus.

Returning to the premise of Simon’s article, much of our discussion revolves around the formulation of one’s questions. Nehama asks: What does the Torah, as a divinely revealed, living document, teach us? How can Midrashim and mefarshim highlight these lessons? Simon asks: How has a given text been interpreted historically? When did different questions and ideas first appear in Jewish exegesis? What influence did earlier commentators have on later commentators? Grossman and Touitou ask: How did Rashi, Rashbam and others use their commentaries to promote their religious ideals in medieval Christian Europe?

Let us return to Rashi’s treatment of “Anokhi. Esav bekhorekha.” In a study parallel to his own on the Joseph narratives, Uriel Simon would quote Rashi’s comment with its midrashic antecedents, and then show how later commentators generally rejected this interpretation as being distant from peshat. Avraham Grossman and Elazar Touitou would cite this comment of Rashi as proof that he was addressing polemical issues. Alternatively, or as a complementary suggestion, they could maintain that Rashi was offering an educational lesson in the greatness of biblical heroes.[37]

For Nehama, though, these discussions may be important for understanding Rashi, but they are not relevant to a peshat understanding of the Jacob narratives. According to Nehama, the Torah teaches that Jacob erred in his deception, and paid a heavy price for it.[38] So naturally, she omitted Rashi’s comments, which do not fit the peshat of the text.[39] A comment by Rashi such as this one undermines Nehama’s sweeping assertion in her study of Rashi’s methodology, where Rashi is the primary source. But her iyyun, where the Torah is the primary source, should not be, and is not, affected at all.

Ultimately, the tension between viewing mefarshim as secondary or primary sources always will remain. At the same time, however, the related disciplines ideally will grow together, shedding light on each other’s insights. Our task is to remain fully conscious of these different perspectives, what each can contribute, and the strengths and limitations of each viewpoint. The essays in this volume successfully bring many of these issues into sharp focus.

            Pirkei Nehama is a meaningful tribute to Nehama, exploring and evaluating her contributions to Tanakh and parshanut, her methodology, and her educational techniques. We may now better appreciate her work in its historical context and her learning and educational methods. We can appreciate the areas of inquiry generally missing from her approach. Most importantly, Nehama’s legacy will not be found primarily in her contributions to our understanding of the mefarshim; it is in her peerless ability to use the teachings of our Sages and commentators to guide us lovingly through every nuance of the eternally relevant Torah.

 

Notes

 

 

[1] This article appeared in Tradition 38:4 (Winter 2004), pp. 112–128. Review of Pirkei Nehama: Nehama Leibowitz Memorial Volume, ed. Moshe Ahrend, Ruth Ben-Meir and Gavriel H. Cohn (Jerusalem: Eliner Library, The Joint Authority for Jewish Zionist Education, Department for Torah and Culture in the Diaspora, 2001); reprinted in Angel, Through an Opaque Lens (New York: Sephardic Publication Foundation, 2006), pp. 56–76; revised second edition (New York: Kodesh Press, 2013), pp. 39–59; Angel, Peshat Isn’t So Simple (New York: Kodesh Press, 2014), pp. 36–57.

I thank my students Shlomo Koyfman and Yehuda Kraut for reading earlier drafts of this essay and for their helpful comments. I am also indebted to my teachers Professor David Berger and Rabbi Shalom Carmy, who read later drafts of the essay and recommended several important revisions.

[2] Limmud Parshanei ha-Torah u-Derakhim le-Hora’atam: Sefer Bereshit (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: The Joint Authority for Jewish Zionist Education, Department for Torah and Culture in the Diaspora, 1975), introduction, p. 1.

[3] Several writers in Pirkei Nehama stress Nehama’s emphasis on evaluating earlier opinions against the biblical text. See, for example, Gavriel H. Cohn, pp. 26–27; Moshe Ahrend, p. 36. Moshe Sokolow devotes much of his essay to this theme as well (pp. 297–306), quoting Nehama’s remark to a student: “We are not Catholics; we do not have a pope to rule who is correct” (p. 297).

[4] Nehama preferred to accentuate the multidimensionality of the biblical text, rather than limiting herself to finding only one peshat. See, for example, Gavriel H. Cohn, p. 28.

[5] In this review, we will consider the following essays: Gavriel H. Cohn, “How I Love Your Torah” (pp. 25–30); Moshe Ahrend, “From My Work with Nehama, of Blessed Memory” (pp. 31–49); David Zafrany, “Nehama Leibowitz z’l’s Methodology in Adducing Rabbinic Statements” (pp. 71–92); Gavriel H. Cohn, “Midrashic Exegesis in the Torah Enterprise of Nehama Leibowitz” (pp. 93–108); Yitzhak Gottlieb, “‘Why is it Juxtaposed’ in Rashi’s Commentary” (pp. 149–175); Shemuel P. Gelbard, “Aggadah Explains the Bible” (pp. 177–185); Avraham Grossman, “Religious Polemic and Educational Purpose in Rashi’s Commentary on the Torah” (pp. 187–205); Rivka Horowitz, “Nehama Leibowitz and the 20th Century German Jewish Exegetes: Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, and Benno Jacob” (pp. 207–220); Elazar Touitou, “Between ‘The Plain Sense of the Text’ and ‘The Spirit of the Text’: Nehama Leibowitz’s Relationship with Rashbam’s Commentary on the Torah” (pp. 221–240); Uriel Simon, “The Exegete Is Recognized Not Only Through His Approach But Also Through His Questions” (pp. 241–261); Moshe Sokolow, “Authority and Independence: Comparisons and Debates in Nehama’s Teaching” (pp. 297–306); Amos Frisch, “A Chapter in Nehama’s Teaching: Regarding ‘Repeating Structures’ in Biblical Narrative” (pp. 313–323). All page references to their articles refer to the pagination in Pirkei Nehama.

[6] See, for example, Nehama’s treatment of Rashi and Rashbam to Exod. 3:10–12, in Iyyunim Hadashim be-Sefer Shemot (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, Dept. for Torah Education and Culture in the Diaspora, 1969), pp. 54–57. Surveys of traditional understandings of the term “peshat” can be found in Menahem M. Kasher, Torah Shelemah, vol. 17 (1956), pp. 286–312; David Weiss-Halivni, Peshat and Derash: Plain and Applied Meaning in Rabbinic Exegesis (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 52–88; Moshe Ahrend, “Towards a Definition of the Term, ‘Peshuto Shel Mikra,’” (Hebrew), in Ha-Mikra be-Re’i Mefarshav: Sara Kamin Memorial Volume, ed. Sara Japhet (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1994), pp. 237–261.

[7] In her article on Ramban’s methodology, Ruth Ben-Meir (“Towards the Exegetical Approaches of Ramban” p. 125, n. 2) notes that Nehama quoted Ramban second only to Rashi.

[8] Several writers in Pirkei Nehama make reference to Nehama’s citation of non-Orthodox scholars. See Mordechai Breuer (“Prof. Nehama Leibowitz, a’h”), p. 18; Gavriel H. Cohn, p. 28 (in n. 9, he notes that of the non-traditional sources Nehama used, they still generally were Jewish); Moshe Ahrend, p. 36. See also Aviad HaKohen, “‘Hear the Truth from the One Who Says It,’ This is the Great Principle of Nehama Leibowitz’s Torah” (Hebrew), Alon Shevut 13 (1999), pp. 71–92.

[9] See pp. 657–658 for the text of Nehama’s response to Rabbi Yehuda Ansbacher from 1980. In that letter, Nehama defended her drawing from the work of non-Orthodox scholars, including the fact that she was more impressed by Benno Jacob’s rebuttals of Higher Biblical Criticism than even those of R. David Zvi Hoffmann. Although some have insisted that Benno Jacob and Martin Buber were more traditionally oriented because Nehama cited them, Nehama’s letter makes it clear that she used their works because she learned from them. The final section of Pirkei Nehama contains primary sources and personal reminiscences that do not constitute a biography of Nehama, but do contribute toward seeing her work in the context of her life.

[10] “The Religious Significance of the Peshat,” Tradition 23:2 (Winter 1988), p. 52.

[11] See Ish ha-HalakhahGalui ve-Nistar (Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization—Dept. for Torah Education and Culture in the Diaspora, 1989), p. 232; cf. Al ha-Teshuvah (Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization—Dept. for Torah Education and Culture in the Diaspora, 1978), p. 296.

[12] Yisrael Rozenson, “The Exegete, the Interpretation, and History: An Observation on Nehama Leibowitz’s Exegetical Approach” (Hebrew), in Al Derekh ha-Avot: Thirty Years of Herzog College, ed. Amnon Bazak, Shemuel Wygoda, and Meir Monitz (Alon Shevut: Tevunot Press, 2001), pp. 434, 437.

[13] The article first appeared in Iyyunim Hadashim be-Sefer Shemot, pp. 497–524. It was translated into English by Alan Smith, in Torah Insights (Jerusalem: Eliner Library, The Joint Authority for Jewish Zionist Education, Department for Torah and Culture in the Diaspora, 1995), pp. 101–142.

[14] Elazar Touitou, “Between Interpretation and Ethics: The Worldview of the Torah According to Rashi’s Commentary” (Hebrew), in Ha-Mikra be-Re’i Mefarshav: Sara Kamin Memorial Volume, ed. Sara Japhet [Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1994], pp. 322–329) cites examples where Rashi drew from a Midrash, but altered the rabbinic formulation, probably to fit his own educational agenda. Cf. David Zafrany (pp. 71–92), who analyzes Nehama’s citation of Midrashim including instances when she purposefully altered rabbinic formulations.

[15] “Rashi’s Criteria for Citing Midrashim,” in Torah Insights, pp. 101–105.

[16] Nehama agreed that Rashi’s quoting a Midrash when there is a text difficulty is not the same as his asserting that this Midrash is to be considered the peshat. See her essay on Rashi’s citing Midrashim (Torah Insights, p. 132): “We will bring one further eminent example to support our thesis that Rashi only cites a Midrash when he encounters a difficulty in the verse which he cannot explain in a simple (peshat) fashion.” Cf. Yitzhak Gottlieb (p. 149, n. 3).

[17] See Yitzhak Baer, “Rashi and the Historical Realities of His Time” (Hebrew), Tarbiz 20 (1949), pp. 320–332; Elazar Touitou, “The Historical Background of Rashi’s Commentary on Parashat Bereshit” (Hebrew), in Rashi: Iyyunim be-Yetzirato, ed. Zvi Aryeh Steinfeld (Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1993), pp. 97–105; Elazar Touitou, “Between Interpretation and Ethics: The Worldview of the Torah According to Rashi’s Commentary” (Hebrew), in Ha-Mikra be-Re’i Mefarshav: Sara Kamin Memorial Volume, ed. Sara Japhet (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press of Hebrew University, 1994), pp. 312–334.

[18] For documentation of Rashi’s polemical interpretations outside of the Torah (especially on Isaiah and Psalms), see Yehuda Rosenthal, “The Anti-Christian Polemic in Rashi’s Commentary on Tanakh” (Hebrew), in Rashi: Torato ve-Ishiyuto, ed. Shimon Federbush (New York: World Jewish Congress, and the Department of Education and Torah Culture of the Jewish Agency, 1958), pp. 45–59; Avraham Grossman, “Rashi’s Commentary to Psalms and the Anti-Christian Polemic” (Hebrew), in Mehkarim be-Mikra u-be-Hinnukh: In Honor of Moshe Ahrend, ed. Dov Rappel (Jerusalem: Touro College, 1996), pp. 59–74; Avraham Grossman, “The Commentary of Rashi on Isaiah and the Jewish-Christian Debate,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish Intellectual and Social History: Festschrift in Honor of Robert Chazan, ed. David Engel et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 47–62. See also Avraham Grossman, “The Jewish-Christian Polemic and Jewish Biblical Exegesis in Twelfth Century France” (Hebrew), Zion 51 (1986), pp. 29–60, which deals primarily with Kara’s involvement in polemics (see p. 29, n. 1 for further bibliography of scholarly literature). Shaye J. D. Cohen maintains that although Rashi certainly polemicized against Christianity in his commentary on Nakh, there is no evidence that he did so in his commentary on the Torah (“Does Rashi’s Torah Commentary Respond to Christianity? A Comparison of Rashi with Rashbam and Bekhor Shor,” in The Idea of Biblical Interpretation: Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel, ed. Hindy Najman and Judith M. Newman [Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004], pp. 449–472.)

[19] It is noteworthy that in her article, Nehama dealt exclusively with Rashi’s commentary on the Torah, and specifically not on Nakh (see Torah Insights, p. 108, and p. 136, n. 5).

[20] For further discussion of Jacob’s deception in medieval polemics, see David Berger, “On the Morality of the Patriarchs in Jewish Polemic and Exegesis,” in Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah: Contributions and Limitations, ed. Shalom Carmy (New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc., 1996), pp. 131–146. Prof. Berger (private communication) adds that it is not always easy to distinguish a “polemical” motive from a more general visceral dislike of Esau and his descendants.

[21] For discussions of the origins of the Edom-Rome-Christianity link in Jewish literature, see Gerson Cohen, “Esau as Symbol in Early Medieval Thought,” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 19–48; Yair Hoffmann, “Edom as a Symbol of Wickedness in Prophetic Literature” (Hebrew), in Ha-Mikra ve-Toledot Yisrael (Festschrift Yaakov Liver), ed. Binyamin Uffenheimer (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 1972), pp. 76–89; Moshe Sokolow, “Esav: From Edom to Rome,” in Mitokh Ha-Ohel: From within the Tent: The Haftarot, ed. Daniel Z. Feldman and Stuart W. Halpern (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2011), pp. 65–77; Solomon Zeitlin, “The Origin of the Term Edom for Rome and the Roman Church,” Jewish Quarterly Review 60 (1970), pp. 262–263.

[22] Grossman has since published a book-length study on Rashi’s educational objectives: Emunot ve-De’ot be-Olamo shel Rashi (Hebrew) (Alon Shevut: Tevunot, 2008).

[23] Shemuel P. Gelbard, “Rashi’s Objectives in His Commentary to the Torah” (Hebrew), Megadim 33 (2001), pp. 59–74.

[24] See also Elazar Touitou, “The Meaning of the Term ‘Teshuvat ha-Minim’ in the Writings of Our French Rabbis” (Hebrew), Sinai 99 (1986), pp. 144–148.

[25] Iyyunim Hadashim be-Sefer Shemot, pp. 395–397.

[26] Iyyunim Hadashim be-Sefer Shemot, pp. 428–429.

[27] Touitou elaborates on Rashbam’s treatment of the Golden Calf episode in “Peshat and Apologetic in Rashbam’s Commentary to the Moses Narratives in the Torah” (Hebrew), Tarbiz 51 (1982), pp. 236–237. Prof. David Berger (private communication) considers Touitou’s explanation attractive, but is unsure that the Christological understanding of the breaking of the tablets is prominent enough to account for such a radical departure from peshat. One must at least consider the possibility that Rashbam was troubled that Moses would destroy the most unique, holy, and apparently irreplaceable object in the world just because Jews were sinning.

[28] Iyyunim be-Sefer Bereshit (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, Dept. for Torah Education and Culture in the Diaspora, 1966), pp. 279–288.

[29] Cf. Nehama’s sympathetic treatment of Abarbanel’s deviation from peshat in Iyyunim be-Sefer Devarim (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, Dept. for Torah Education and Culture in the Diaspora, 1995), pp. 60–61.

[30] Iyyunim be-Sefer Bereshit, pp. 325–328.

[31] For a survey of medieval approaches to the historical aspect of Torah, see Uriel Simon, “Peshat Exegesis of Biblical History—Between Historicity, Dogmatism, and the Medieval Period” (Hebrew), in Tehillah le-Moshe: Biblical and Judaic Studies in Honor of Moshe Greenberg, ed. Mordechai Cogan, Barry L. Eichler and Jeffrey Tigay (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1997), Hebrew section, pp. 171*–203*.

[32] Moshe Sokolow relates that “when invited by Da’at Mikra to prepare their commentary on Bereishit, Nehama declined. When I asked her why, she replied: Because I don’t know the ancient Near East! When I pointed out that she always hastened to eschew ancient Near Eastern texts, she clarified: One can understand Bereishit without the ancient Near East, but one cannot write a commentary on Bereishit without it” (Studies in the Weekly Parashah Based on the Lessons of Nehama Leibowitz [Jerusalem: Urim, 2008], pp. 274–275). For an article discussing some implications of the use of ancient Near Eastern sources in Orthodox biblical scholarship, see Barry L. Eichler, “Study of Bible in Light of Our Knowledge of the Ancient Near East,” in Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah: Contributions and Limitations, ed. Shalom Carmy (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1996), pp. 81–100.

[33] “The Exegete, the Interpretation, and History,” pp. 448–449.

[34] Iyyunim Hadashim be-Sefer Shemot, pp. 183–188.

[35] For a biography of Nehama that also explores trends in her thought, see Yael Unterman, Nehama Leibowitz: Teacher and Bible Scholar (Jerusalem: Urim, 2009).

[36] Menahem Ben-Yashar, “Psychological and Educational Dimensions in Nehama Leibowitz’s Exegesis” (pp. 341–355); Menahem Ben-Sasson, “Repentance in Nehama Leibowitz’s Iyyunim: A Study in the Educational Purpose of the Iyyunim” (pp. 357–368); Erella Yedgar, “Personal and Interpersonal Responsibility in the Writings of Nehama Leibowitz: A Study in Her Value-Educational Agenda” (pp. 377–406).

[37] Avraham Grossman (“The Jewish-Christian Polemic and Jewish Biblical Exegesis in Twelfth Century France” [Hebrew], Zion 51 [1986], pp. 50–52) addresses medieval rabbinic defenses of biblical heroes in light of polemical considerations. Cf. David Berger, “On the Morality of the Patriarchs in Jewish Polemic and Exegesis,” in Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah: Contributions and Limitations, ed. Shalom Carmy (New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc., 1996), pp. 131–146.

[38] Iyyunim be-Sefer Bereshit, pp. 185–192.

[39] After dismissing Rashi’s interpretation of “Anokhi. Esav bekhorekha,” Ibn Ezra (on Gen. 27:19) defended Jacob’s behavior on the grounds that the ends justify the means in this instance. This interpretation leads to a remarkable irony: Ibn Ezra’s rejection of Rashi’s explanation was based on his (correct) assumption that Rashi was compromising peshat learning. But Rashi (at least according to Grossman) made this “compromise” in order to save Jewish souls—the ends of saving souls justified the means of “deceitfully” providing an unsound interpretation. Rashi’s greatest supporter, then, would be Ibn Ezra’s justification of Jacob’s behavior! For Nehama, however, neither approach was acceptable. Jacob himself was wrong in his deceit (see Iyyunim be-Sefer Bereshit, pp. 185–192), and Rashi likewise would never (in her judgment) deviate from peshat for non-textual religious agendas.