National Scholar Updates

Book Review: The Art of Jewish Pastoral Counseling

Review of

The Art of Jewish Pastoral Counseling:

A Guide for All Faiths

Michelle Friedman and Rachel Yehuda

Routledge, 2016, 208 pp.

(Reviewed by Dr. Seth Aronson, Director of Training, Training and Supervising Analyst at William Alanson White Institute)

 

In a remarkable midrashic passage on the power of empathic listening, illuminating the words  in   Shemot  2,11,  Vayar besivlotam, Moshe understands and feels the suffering of the children of Israel as they struggle  with the impossible work conditions imposed upon  them by the Egyptians. In observing Moshe’s empathy, God decides that just as Moshe left his royal abode to go and be with the suffering people of Israel, God will take leave of the heavenly realm and descend to reveal Himself to Moshe from a lowly burning bush in the arid desert, setting in place the events leading to redemption and exodus. God’s act not only reveals empathy (the midrash teaches us in choosing a lowly bush rather than a lofty tree, for example, God lowers Himself, as it were, to be  with the people in their suffering), but even more remarkably, the Divine learns empathy from Moshe’s human act of compassion.

Michelle Friedman and Rachel Yehuda’s comprehensive book demonstrates the power and significance of empathic listening for clergy of all faiths as these spiritual leaders engage in the divinely inspired work of pastoral counseling.

To truly be with the individuals they serve—and being with involves listening and being attuned to-- pastoral counselors must learn and develop key elements of the process, elements illuminated in careful detail in this book.  

Some of the important topics covered in the book include discerning between a value neutral and religiously informed approach. Mental health professionals are trained to relieve suffering, while the[rabbi] “ may underscore traditional values above and beyond personal joy…..a pastoral approach assumes desire on the part of the congregant to remain connected to religious tradition” (p.24-25). No easy task, especially when the pastoral counselor is him/herself caught in a personal conflict over the very same issue.

The authors also caution counselors to know how and when to recognize true psychiatric conditions and when there is a need to refer to trained mental health professionals. Knowing one’s limitations is just as important as being comfortable in the role of attuned, sensitive and compassionate listener.

Questions to help structure the pastoral interview are described and include:  Where should the meeting occur? How long should the meeting be? Should the pastoral counselor be compensated? 

The authors also frame the listening process and the counselor’s (and congregant’s) response in a model that draws upon transference and countertransference. The counselor is often viewed to be in a position of power, authority and expertise, and the congregant’s feelings about someone in such a position come into play. The counselor will, of course, have her own set of feelings/responses to each congregant and situation, based on her own life history and experiences. To be a sensitive pastoral listener is to know one’s self as well as one can, e.g. how one feels to be elevated to such a position of spiritual authority, so one’s personal issues can have as minimal impact as is possible in the interaction.

“Pastoral boundaries are difficult to establish, confusing to negotiate and easy to transgress”(p.53). For this reason, the need for clear boundaries and confidentiality is emphasized throughout the book. “The very nature of pastoral counseling lends itself to boundary blurring. Disclosure of personal information may lead to a transient but powerful sense of closeness that [in some cases could easily] slide into physical intimacy” (p.153).  The counselor must be keenly aware of the powerful emotional role she/he plays in the individual’s life by dint of the pastoral responsibility.

Throughout the book, to illustrate their points, the authors provide thoughtful and detailed case examples that are clearly drawn from Dr. Friedman’s experience in training rabbis in pastoral care for nearly twenty years. In these down to earth and easily relatable case examples, readers will find so many of the issues that arise in the day to day life of the pastoral counselor. To name just a few:  socializing with congregants, whether or not to personally disclose, dealing with a mentally ill congregant, a halakhic question in the context of a traumatic life event, and conflicts between halakhic and personal feelings.

If there is one topic missing from this important addition to the field of pastoral counseling, it is framing the issue of pastoral care in a distinctly Jewish voice. There are many sources underscoring the importance of sensitive listening (such as the midrash noted above)  as well as  the imperative to heal. But perhaps this may be left for their second volume!

 In his “Daily Prayer of a Physician”, Maimonides wrote:

“In the sufferer let me see only the human being. Illumine my mind that it recognize what presents itself and that it may comprehend what is absent or hidden”(Rosner, 1967).

In their comprehensive work, Drs. Friedman and Yehuda  have helped counselors of all faiths recognize what  might  present itself and learn to discover what may be hidden, so they can better help those in their spiritual care.

 

References

 

Rosner, F. (1967). The physician’s daily prayer attributed to Moses Maimonides. Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 41, 5, 440-446.

 

The Genius and Limitations of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik z"l

Thoughts to Ponder 529

The Genius and Limitations of Rabbi Joseph Ber Soloveitchik z”l *

Nathan Lopes Cardozo

Based on an introduction to a discussion between Professor William Kolbrener and Professor Elliott Malamet (1)

Honoring the publication of Professor William Kolbrener’s new book

“The Last Rabbi” (2)

Yad Harav Nissim, Jerusalem, on Feb. 1, 2017

Dear Friends,

I never had the privilege of meeting Rav Soloveitchik z”l or learning under him. But I believe I have read all of his books on Jewish philosophy and Halacha, and even some of his Talmudic novellae and halachic decisions. I have also spoken with many of his students.

Here are my impressions.

No doubt Rav Soloveitchik was a Gadol Ha-dor (a great sage of his generation). He was a supreme Talmudist and certainly one of the greatest religious thinkers of our time.

His literary output is incredible.

Still, I believe that he was not a mechadesh – a man whose novel ideas really moved the Jewish tradition forward, especially regarding Halacha. He did not solve major halachic problems.

This may sound strange, because almost no one has written as many novel ideas about Halacha as Rav Soloveitchik (3). His masterpiece, Halakhic Man, is perhaps the prime example.

Before Rav Soloveitchik appeared on the scene, nobody – surely not in mainstream Orthodoxy – had seriously dealt with the ideology and philosophy of Halacha (4).

In fact, the reverse is true. While many were writing about Jewish philosophy, the Bible, the prophets, and universalism, no one touched the topic of Halacha and its weltanschauung.

Halacha was ignored as an ideology, and the impression is that most Orthodox scholars were embarrassed by the strange and incomprehensible world of halachic thought and argument, and chose to disregard it. Its highly unusual way of thinking, its emphasis on the most subtle details – often comprised of farfetched arguments, hairsplitting dialectics and casuistry – made it something that no one wanted to approach and it was consequently a non-starter.

I once argued that Halacha is the art of making a problem out of every solution. Its obsessive need to create obstacles where no difficulties exist is well known to all Talmudists. Its constant fixation with creating life-and-death situations out of the grossest trivialities is typical.

Rav Soloveitchik, however, saw the need to deal with this problem head-on and undertook the extremely difficult task. For him, Halacha was the supreme will of God, and behind its strange disposition lay a fascinating and highly original world that needed to be revealed in a society that increasingly tried to undo it. As far as he was concerned, there was nothing to be embarrassed about. In fact, there was no greater and more sophisticated ideology than the world of Halacha.

Single-handedly, he turned the tide and made Halacha the center of philosophical discussion. Not even Rambam, the greatest of all halachists, had done anything like that.

His classic work, Halakhic Man, is highly sophisticated and full of deep insights using general philosophy, psychology and epistemology, which place the philosophy and theology of Halacha not only on the map but at the center of all discussion concerning Judaism. No doubt it took time before this essay had any impact. It was first published in Hebrew in 1944, as Ish ha-Halakhah, in the journal Talpiot (5). When it appeared in English in 1983, as Lawrence Kaplan’s translation Halakhic Man (6), it slowly became the object of serious debate and contemplation.

It may be argued that Halakhic Man forced the Conservative, Reform, and even Reconstructionist movements to give much more attention to Halacha, which grew to be the norm to the extent that general Jewish philosophy almost became of secondary importance. For Rav Soloveitchik, Jewish theology had to be an outgrowth and expression of the normative halachic system. A great example of this would be his teshuva drashot (sermons) where the laws of teshuva and the lamdanut (Talmudic analytic learning) of tzvei dinim become the basis of two dinim and concepts in Jewish philosophy (7).

*****

And here is where we encounter one of the greatest and most tragic paradoxes in Rav Soloveitchik’s legacy.

In complete contradiction to his philosophy of Halacha, Rav Soloveitchik did not move Halacha forward in areas that most urgently needed it. He did not innovate a new, practical halachic approach to major problems confronting the larger Jewish community. While brilliantly explaining what Halacha essentially is, he made no practical breakthroughs (8).

This is true about issues such as the status of women in Jewish law (with the exception of women learning Talmud) (9); the aguna; the mamzer problem; the application of Halacha in the State of Israel; and similar crucial halachic issues. 

In that sense he was not at all a mechadesh but rather a conservative halachist.

He did, however, stand out as a highly gifted exponent of the ideology of Judaism and Halacha. He had no equal – perhaps with the exception of the renowned Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel. In his work God in Search of Man, Rabbi Heschel laid out a theology of Judaism and Halacha, which, while dramatically different from Rav Soloveitchik’s, was also a tour de force explaining what Halacha is really all about (10).

*****

When it came to Talmudic learning, Rav Soloveitchik was an old-fashioned Rosh Yeshiva (in Yeshiva University), whose brilliance was not different from that of my own Roshei Yeshiva in Gateshead, England, and later in Yerushalayim’s Mirrer Yeshiva. He was the proponent of the Brisker method of Talmudic learning, which is widespread in many of today’s yeshivot, and from which I personally have greatly benefited, although I doubt its real value.

*****

Rabbi David Hartman, in his book The God who Hates Lies, rightly criticizes Rav Soloveitchik for his refusal to find a way to allow a kohein to marry a giyoret (convert) (11). While Rabbi Hartman uses purely ethical reasons to oppose the negative response of Rav Soloveitchik, it was Rabbi Moshe Feinstein z”l, the most important halachic authority in America in those days, who often found halachically permissible ways to allow these people to marry (12). This no doubt must have been known to Rav Soloveitchik, and I am utterly astonished that he did not discuss it with or take advice from Rabbi Feinstein. It’s even more mind-boggling when one takes into account that Rav Soloveitchik did not see himself as a posek (halachic authority and decisor) but only as a melamed (teacher).

*****

Rav Soloveitchik’s famous argument with Rabbi Emanuel Rackman – renowned Talmudic scholar and thinker, later to become Dean of Bar-Ilan University – is another example of the former’s sometimes extreme halachic conservatism. In several places, the Talmud introduces a rule that states: Tav Lemeitav tan du mi-lemeitav armelu It is better to live as two than to live alone (13), which refers to the fact that a woman would prefer to marry almost any man rather than remain alone.  

Rav Soloveitchik sees this as a “permanent ontological principle,” which is beyond historical conditions, and that even in our day needs to be applied and cannot be changed. This principle operates under the assumption that even today’s women prefer to stay in a marriage, no matter how unfortunate the circumstances may be. To be alone is worse. This means that a woman cannot claim that had she known what kind of person her husband is, she never would have married him. If she could make this claim, her marriage would be a “mistaken marriage,” which would not even require a get (bill of divorce), since the marriage took place on a false premise and the woman would never have agreed to it had she known. In that case, she was never considered lawfully married and could leave her partner without receiving a get. Since this obviously has enormous repercussions for today’s society, it could help thousands of women (14). Rav Soloveitchik was not prepared to take that approach and thus blocked the possibility for many of them to leave their partners without a get.

Rabbi Rackman (15), who had the greatest respect for Rav Soloveitchik, strongly disagreed and claimed that a Talmudic presumption such as this depends on historical circumstances, as in the days of the Talmud when women had no option to live a normal life if they were not married. They were often abused and would suffer extreme poverty and other misfortunes. Understandably, women in those days would prefer to remain married; but none of this is true in modern times when women have great freedom and are able to take care of themselves, both financially and physically. If so, there would be good reason for a woman to claim that had she known her husband’s true nature, she would never have married him and she would be able to leave her husband without the need for a get.

There is little doubt that Rabbi Rackman was right in this matter. Interestingly, he noted that Rav Soloveitchik told him: “Rackman, you may be right and I may be wrong. You view the Halacha historically and I like to view it meta-historically” (16) I have heard statements from other students that Rav Soloveitchik admitted this. Even stranger is the fact that, like all his predecessors, Rav Soloveitchik considered Rambam the ultimate halachic authority and defended him whenever possible. Professor Menachem Kellner points out that Rambam viewed Halacha in a historical context and clearly not in an ontological one (17)! So one wonders why Rav Soloveitchik didn’t follow in Rambam’s footsteps and agree ab initio with Rabbi Rackman; unless one argues that Rav Solovietchik didn’t follow Rambam’s philosophical approach to Halacha. 

This observation is astonishing. If Rav Soloveitchik was not even sure himself, and all evidence was against him, he could have singlehandedly liberated many women. No doubt he must have been worried that such a ruling might be misused. But this is an extremely weak justification for his conservatism, considering the immense suffering of so many women whose husbands refused to grant them a get. He could have made a major contribution in this field had he accepted Rabbi Rackman’s compelling argument (18).

*****

It is even more perplexing when we compare Rav Soloveitchik’s highly conservative stand with other great halachists of his day, such as Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, the most famous student of Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg, author of the responsa Seridei Eish and one of the greatest halachic luminaries of the post-Holocaust era. Rabbi Berkovits was of the opinion that with the establishment of the State of Israel, and the radical changes that had taken place among modern-day Jewry, there was a need to liberate Halacha from its exile status. According to Rabbi Berkovits, the        unfortunate conditions under which the Jews had lived for nearly 2,000 years created a “defensive halacha,” which now had to be liberated. It had been in waiting mode and now had to return to its natural habitat. In his important work HaHalacha: Kochah VeTafkidah, Rabbi Berkovitz shows how we can solve many serious problems related to the status of women, agunot, mamzerim, conversion, and even the shemitta year with its enormous burden on modern Israeli society and its often inconsistent and paradoxical application (19).

In many ways he reminds us of Rabbi Chaim Hirschensohn (1857-1935) who, as a first-class halachist, also realized these new conditions and, in his responsa Malki BaKodesh (20), suggested new approaches that would solve many problems.

It was especially in the Sephardic world that two outstanding halachic luminaries – Chacham Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel (1880-1953), Sefardic Chief Rabbi of Mandatory Palestine from 1939-1948, and of Israel from 1948-1953; and Rabbi Yosef Mashash (1892-1974), rabbi of the city of Tlemcen in Algeria and, later, Chief Rabbi of Haifa – demonstrated ways to overcome halachic problems. Their courage is mind-boggling and proves what can be done when one has an approach to Orthodox Halacha that in so many ways is completely at odds with that of Rav Soloveitchik and other traditional Ashkenazic halachists (21).

*****

Most remarkable are the observations of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel when he was asked to give his opinion about Rav Solovietchik’s book Halakhic Man. According to his students, he said the following:

“Ish Ha-Halakha [Halakhic Man]? Lo hayah velo nivra ela mashal hayah [There never was such a Jew]! Soloveitchik’s study, though brilliant, is based on the false notion that Judaism is a cold, logical affair with no room for piety. After all, the Torah does say, ‘Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and might.’ No, there never was such a typology in Judaism as the halakhic man. There was—and is—an Ish Torah [a Torah man], who combines Halakhah and Aggadah, but that is another matter altogether” (22).

While I wonder if these are the exact words of Rabbi Heschel – since there are, after all, some emotional and not only logical dimensions to Halachic Man – it cannot be denied that this work depicts an image of an ideal halachic human being who in many ways lives a mathematical and almost stony life, although various parts of the book paint different if not contradictory images. The book is definitely poetic.

It is interesting to note Rav Soloveitchik’s observations concerning Heschel’s famous book The Sabbath (23). After praising it, he said: “What does he [Heschel] call Shabbat? – A sanctuary in time. This is an idea of a poet. It’s a lovely idea. But what is Shabbat? Shabbat is lamed tet melachot, it is the thirty-nine categories of work and their toladot, and it is out of that Halacha and not of poetry that you have to construct a theory of Shabbat” (24). These are remarkable words, because Rav Soloveitchik was constantly trying to lift the “harsh” Halacha out of its own confines and give it a poetic, perhaps even romantic dimension.

****

The earlier-mentioned poskim thought out of the box when it came to Halacha, and introduced creative and new halachic approaches to major problems. With few exceptions, we see little of that in Rav Soloveitchik’s methodology.

It seems that he did not realize, or did not want to accept, that Halacha had become defensive and was waiting to be liberated from its exile and confinement.

In many ways, this is an extraordinary tragedy. With his exceptional standing in the Modern Orthodox halachic community, Rav Soloveitchik could have made breakthroughs that would have given Orthodoxy – especially Modern Orthodoxy – much more exposure and influence in the Jewish world and would probably have been a major force against the growth of Reform and Conservative Judaism, of which he was so afraid. In many ways, Modern Orthodoxy was unable to develop naturally, because it had become too dependent on Rav Soloveitchik’s conservative halachic approach.

Exactly where Rav Soloveitchik put Halacha on the map, in all its grandeur (without denying its possible shortcomings), and transformed it into the most dominant topic of discussion on Judaism, there is where he seems to have been afraid of his own thoughts and withdrew behind its conventional walls. Had he taken the road of Rabbis Berkovits, Hirschensohn, Uziel, Mashash and others, Orthodoxy would have become a driving force in contemporary Judaism, able to show the way and lead all other denominations.

It seems to me that the above-mentioned rabbis were talmidei chachamim no less than Rav Soloveitchik was. Their disadvantages were that they didn’t occupy a central role in Modern Orthodox and Yeshiva University circles, and above all they didn’t belong to renowned Ashkenazic rabbinical families. Had they been called Soloveitchik, their Torah would have received far more attention and would probably have been much more effective.

*****

Finally, I am deeply disturbed by the almost unhealthy obsession with Rav Soloveitchik within Modern Orthodox circles. It borders on avodah zarah and has almost transformed into a cult, something he would not have liked. In all my years in the Chareidi Gateshead and Mirrer Yeshivot, I never saw such exaggerated admiration for our great Roshei Yeshiva.

There is, however, a very good reason for this. Modern Orthodoxy has always been insecure with its own philosophy and halachic approach. Over the years, it has looked over its shoulder to see what the Chareidi community had to say. As a result, it hid behind Rav Soloveitchik, the only figure who equaled the Chareidi Talmudists in their level of Talmudic learning; and only he could protect them against the onslaught of the Chareidi community.  

What Modern Orthodoxy did not realize is that Rav Soloveitchik himself was a Chareidi, who combined that ideology with religious Zionism and tried very hard to give it a place in the world of philosophy and modernity. He therefore wavered and showed signs of a troubled man who was unable to overcome the enormous tension between these two worlds and turned into a “lonely man of faith,” with no disciples but with many students, each one of whom claimed their own Rav Soloveitchik. The truth is that the real Rav Soloveitchik was more than the sum total of all of them – a man of supreme greatness who was a tragic figure. May his memory be a blessing.    

*****

  • With thanks to Yehuda DovBehr Zirkind and Channa Shapiro.

 

  1. We hope to publicize a video of this event in the near future.
  2. William Kolbrener, The Last Rabbi: Joseph Soloveitchik and Talmudic Tradition (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016). While there have been many books and articles on Rav Soloveitchik’s life and thought, Professor Kolbrener’s book is groundbreaking and entirely novel. It offers a much richer, yet more complicated reading of his life and thoughts. It can be purchased at https://www.amazon.com/Last-Rabbi-Soloveitchik-Tradition-Philosophy/dp/025302224X
  3. See, however, notes 10 and 19.
  4. See: David Singer and Moshe Sokol, “Joseph Soloveitchik: Lonely Man of Faith,” in Modern Judaism 2, 3 (1982) pp. 232-239. For an Introduction to Halakhic Man, See: David Shatz, “A Framework for Reading Ish ha-Halakhah,” in Turim: Studies in Jewish History and Literature: Presented to Dr. Bernard Lander, ed. Michael A. Shmidman (New York: Touro College Press, 2008) vol. 2, pp. 171-231.
  5. Vol. 1, nos. 3-4 (New York, 1944) pp. 651-735.
  6. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983.
  7. “Two dinim” is a term that is widespread in the lexicon of the yeshiva world. It refers to a method of Talmudic analysis whereby a Talmudic law or concept is divided into two constituent elements. One common example is the distinction between gavra and cheftza (subject and object). This method is the hallmark of the Brisker approach to Talmudic study, championed by Rabbi Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk, Lithuania (1853-1918), the grandfather of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik. For an analysis of the Brisker method, see: Norman Solomon, The Analytic Movement: Hayyim Soloveitchik and His Circle (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1993); Yosef Blau, ed., Lomdus: The Conceptual Approach to Jewish Learning, The Orthodox Forum Series (Newark, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 2006).
  8. For an evaluation (perhaps one-sided) of Rav Soloveitchik as a posek, see: Walter S. Wurzburger, “Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik as Posek of Post-Modern Orthodoxy,” in Tradition vol. 29, no. 1 (Fall 1994) pp. 5-20. We see a similar phenomenon in the writings of Rav Avraham Yitzchak Kook, where he suggests the most novel ideas about Halacha but refuses to use them in his responsa.
  9. Ibid. – for a few more unusual decisions by Rabbi Soloveitchik.
  10.  Abraham Joshua Heschel, God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1955) chs. 22-33. The other person who proposed a philosophy of Halacha was Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits in God, Man and History: A Jewish Interpretation (Middle Village, NY: Jonathan David Publishers, Inc., 1959) Part 2. 
  11.  David Hartman (with Charlie Buckholtz), “Where Did Modern Orthodoxy Go Wrong? The Mistaken Halakhic Presumptions of Rabbi Soloveitchik” in The God Who Hates Lies: Confronting & Rethinking Jewish Tradition, (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2011) ch. 5, pp. 131-157.
  12.  Rabbi Feinstein was of the opinion that if a family of kohanim was no longer observant and was assimilated, their claim to be kohanim could not be relied upon. I received this information by personal correspondence from one of his students. See his Igrot Moshe, Even Ha’ezer, vol. 4, nos. 12, 39. See also: Rabbi Mordechai Tendler (grandson of Rabbi Feinstein), Masoret Moshe: Hanhagot HaGaon Harav Moshe Feinstein (Jerusalem 5773) p. 396.
  13.  See, for example: Talmud Bavli: Ketubot 75a; Yevamot 118b; Kiddushin 7a and 41a; Bava Kama 111a.
  14.  For Rav Soloveitchik’s view on this matter, see the transcript of his talk delivered at the RCA convention in 1975, published as “Surrendering to the Almighty,” in Light, no. 116 (17 Kislev 5736) pp. 13-14. A full transcript of this lecture, “Talmud Torah and Kabalas Ol Malchus Shamayim” is accessible online at: http://arikahn.blogspot.co.il/2013/03/rabbi-soloveitchik-talmud-torah-and.html. Remarkable is the fact that some assumptions of the Talmud were definitely lifted in later days. See for example the assumption that a woman would not be so bold as to declare in front of her husband that he had divorced her unless it was in fact true. But Rabbi Moshe Isserles, quoting others, states that nowadays this is no longer true and most of the time can’t be relied on!! (Rema, Even HaEzer 17:2)  See, Rabbi Dr. Nathan Slifkin, The Rav and the Immutability of Halacha in, Rationalist Judaism, 11.7.2011.         

For a comprehensive analysis of this complicated issue, see: Aliza Bazak, “The ‘Tav Lemeitav’ Presumption in Modern Halakhic Discourse,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bar-Ilan University, 2012; Moshe Be’eri, “Is the Presumption of ‘Tav Lemeitav Tan Du’ Subject to Change?” [Hebrew] in Techumin vol. 28 (2008) pp. 63-68; Aviad Hacohen, The Tears of the Oppressed – An Examination of the Agunah Problem: Background and Halakhic Sources (Jersey City, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 2004) chs. 6-8; Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, “’Tav Lemeitav Tan Du Mi-Lemeitav Armalu’: An Analysis of the Presumption,” in The Edah Journal 4:1, 2004, Iyar 5764, 1-24; Susan Aranoff, “Two Views of Marriage—Two Views of Women: Reconsidering ‘Tav Lemetav Tan du Milemetav Armelu,’” in Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women’s Studies and Gender Issues, no. 3, Spring/Summer 5760/2000, pp. 199-227; J.D. Bleich, “’Kiddushei Ta’ut’: Annulment as a Solution to the Agunah Problem,” Tradition–A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 33 (1), 1998, pp. 102-108. Many more articles in Hebrew have been written on this topic. 

  1.  Emanuel Rackman, Modern Halakhah for Our Time (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1995) pp. 71-73; Rackman, “From Status to Contract to Status: Historical and Meta-Historical Approaches” [Hebrew], in Marriage, Liberty and Equality: Shall the Three Walk Together, Tova Cohen, ed. (Bar-Ilan University, 2000) pp. 97-100; Rackman, “The Problems of the Jewish Woman in this Generation and the Ways to Solve Them” [Hebrew], in HaPeninah – Sefer Zikaron le-Peninah Refel (Jerusalem: Bnei Chemed, 1989) pp. 187-188. For a comprehensive treatment of Rabbi Rackman’s disagreement with Rabbi Soloveitchik, see: David Singer, “Emanuel Rackman: Gadfly of Modern Orthodoxy,” in Modern Judaism, vol. 28, no. 2 (May 2008) pp. 134-148; Lawrence Kaplan, “From Cooperation to Conflict: Rabbi Professor Emanuel Rackman, Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik, and the Evolution of American Modern Orthodoxy,” in Modern Judaism, vol. 30, no. 1, (February 2010) pp. 46-48.
  2.  Emanuel Rackman, “Soloveitchik: On Differing with My Rebbe,” in Sh’ma: A Journal of Jewish Responsibility, 15/289, (March 1985), p. 65.
  3.  Menachem Kellner, Maimonides’ Confrontation with Mysticism, (Portland, OR: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2007) Afterword: “Contemporary Resistance to the Maimonidean Reform,” pp. 286-296.
  4.  See also: Emanuel Rackman, One Man’s Judaism (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2000) and Modern Halakhah for Our Time (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1995).
  5.  Eliezer Berkovits, HaHalacha: Kochah VeTafkidah (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1981) A shortened version in English – Not in Heaven: The Nature and Function of Halakha (New York: Ktav Pub., 1983).
  6.  Chaim Hirschensohn, Malki BaKodesh, new edition of first two volumes (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University / Jerusalem: Shalom Hartman Institute, 2006, 2012). See also: David Zohar, “Rabbi Hayyim Hirschensohn – The Forgotten Sage Who Was Rediscovered,” in Conversations: The Journal of the Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals, 1 (2008/5768), pp. 56-62; Ari Ackerman, “Judging the Sinner Favorably: R. Hayyim Hirschensohn on the Need for Leniency in Halakhic Decision-Making,” in Modern Judaism vol. 22, no. 3 (2002), pp. 261-280; Marc B. Shapiro’s review of Jewish Commitment in a Modern World: Rabbi Hayyim Hirschensohn and His Attitude to Modernity, by David Zohar, in The Edah Journal 5:1 (2005).
  7.  On Chacham Ben-Zion Uziel, see: Marc D. Angel, Loving Truth and Peace: The Grand Religious Worldview of Rabbi Benzion Uziel (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1999); On Rav Joseph Mashash, see: Marc B. Shapiro, “Rabbi Joseph Messas,” in Conversations: The Journal of the Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals, 7 (Spring 2010/5770), pp. 95-102.
  8.  For all of Rabbi Heschel’s observations, see: Samuel H. Dresner, ed., Heschel, Hasidism, and Halakha (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002) pp. 102-104.
  9.  Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath: Its Meaning for Modern Man (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1951).
  10.  See: Rabbi Dr. Jonathan Sacks, “A Hesped in Honor of Rav Yosef Soloveitchik,” in Memories of a Giant: Eulogies in Memory of Rabbi Dr. Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt”l, ed. by Michael A. Bierman (Jerusalem/New York: Urim Publications, 2003) pp. 286-287. It is interesting to note, however, that in a very illuminating and telling statement, Rav Soloveitchik admitted that during his youth he experienced feelings of discontent toward the dry and rigid halacha-ism of his father and grandfather. “The rebellious son asks: Is it always necessary to live in accordance with Halacha, which appears to him to be dry and lacking emotion? Is it not possible for Judaism to contain more kindness and mercy, delicacy and beauty? Is it necessary for Shabbat to be expressed only through [the laws contained in the chapters of Tractate Shabbat] Ba-meh Madlikin and Klal Gadol?” (Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, Yemei Zikaron [Jerusalem: Elinor Library, 1986] p. 104).

****

Questions to Ponder from the David Cardozo Think Tank:                             (We suggest printing out and discussing at your Shabbat table, if you like.)

 

1) Rav Cardozo mentions several rabbis who had the courage to make serious changes in Judaism (he has also written articles about contemporary rabbis’ lack of courage http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/courage-rabbis-courage-the-need-for-mass-conversion). These rabbis did not become as accepted by the mainstream as R. Soloveitchik did, and Rav Cardozo attributes this to their lack of a famous name or simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time. But couldn’t the opposite be true: having too much courage, and not picking their battles correctly, might have influenced their lack of acceptance by the larger community?

 2) In general, what do you think causes certain rabbis to become gedolei hador over others . Is    it knowledge, courage, politics, sheer luck or something bigger?

3) As Rav Cardozo mentions, R. Soloveitchik had many students, each of whom “claim their own Rabbi Soloveitchik”. This is true also of other great thinkers and early founders of Modern Orthodoxy such as Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg and Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch. Why do you think certain rabbis leave their students so confused about their worldview? Is their unclear worldview on certain matters possibly deliberate in order to maintain support among diverse groups of followers (Haredim, Modern Orthodox etc.), or simply reflective of their way of thinking? From your experience of Rav Cardozo, does he too seem to appeal to a range of people, and put forward contradictory views? How clear or unclear do you think his worldview is?

4) When studying Jewish history, it is difficult to determine if a rabbi’s halachic decision is a symptom of his greater vision or an outcome of that vision. For example, R. Soloveitchik strongly encouraged talmudic studies for women, but he did not push for female ordination. One can argue that (1) the outcome of R. Soloveitchik’s worldview might have been a society where women did exactly that: study Talmud and not strive to become rabbis. Or alternatively that (2) the Rav’s position on women and Talmudic studies was a symptom of his larger vision, in which women would eventually be able to become rabbis; it was only the circumstances of the mid-20th century Jewish world that prevented this greater vision from manifesting.

5)When we look at piskei halacha, do we regard them as a binding outcome of a rabbi’s worldview or rather as a symptom that opens the door to other possibilities in other circumstances? (Opposition to the latter view is generally made under the title of the “slippery slope” argument.)

6) R. Soloveitchik lived between worlds. This was not simply a philosophical position, but had practical outcomes too. For instance, together with Saul Lieberman (the then dean of the JTS Rabbinical school) he aimed to form an all-encompassing Orthodox Beth Din for both Orthodox and Conservative Jews. Though this initiative failed, it demonstrates that both rabbis aimed to keep the greater Jewish population/community together.  Do you support such ventures, or should each camp contribute to the Jewish people separately? Are all such ventures doomed to fail, as this one did? If so, what might constitute the endemic reasons for the impossibility of such collaborations?

If you find Rabbi Cardozo’s articles of value, please consider supporting the Cardozo Academy, go to: www.cardozoacademy. org and click on Donate tab.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ethics of the Agunah Problem

 

 

 

Introduction

 

It can be posited that the basis of Jewish ethics is the belief that God created the world, giving humans the gifts of time and of freedom of choice, while creating humankind in the divine image. Without freedom of choice and a sense of time, humans are but slaves, subjugated to a master who is in control of their time and actions.

Such is the agunah—the victim of get-refusal. When Jews marry in accordance with Orthodox tradition, their union cannot be dissolved through the vehicle of divorce in a manner other than the delivery of a valid get from the husband into the hands of the wife. In accordance with Torah law, for the get to be valid, ultimately it has to be given by the husband of his own free will. If it is his choice not to divorce his wife (even if she has been awarded a civil divorce in the Diaspora) he is depriving her of the choice to separate herself from her Jewish husband and forces her to maintain the status of an eshet ish and all that entails. Time stands still for her. She cannot forge ahead and form a new relationship with a free man—for she is not a free woman. Her biological clock continues to tick, her fertile years inevitably come to an end—while she has no opportunity to exercise her choice to bring children into the world and form a new family unit.[i] The estranged husband, through the abuse of the power given to him by Jewish law, chooses not to allow her to implement her choice of leaving him. The agunah is a victim of get-refusal, subjugated to her Jewish husband, without control of her time or life-choices.

On a rabbinic level, a man may find himself in a similar position of get-refusal. In accordance with Herem D'Rabbeinu Gershom, a woman likewise can be divorced "only in accordance with her will."[ii]  The situation that remains is that of the necessity for agreement on both sides in order to arrange a divorce. However, negative consequences of a man ignoring rabbinic dictates while going on with his life are for all practical purposes, non-existent. If he chooses to forge a relationship with a single woman, he can form a new family unit—even marry her through kiddushin. Indeed, he will be transgressing Herem D'Rabbeinu Gershom, but his new wife and children will enjoy complete legitimacy in Jewish law.[iii] Because of this difference, and as a result of the higher number of women who are victims of get-refusal—the iggun problem is considered to be one of our daughters and not of our sons. It has, perhaps incorrectly, taken on the form of an issue solely of women's status in Jewish society. In actuality, the problem of get-refusal is a general Jewish ethical problem, affecting both men and women. It is rooted in a disregard of kevod haBeriyot—a Jewish ethic of respect for all those created in the divine image.

 

A Contemporary Issue[iv]

 

The Jewish person in today's postmodern world lives simultaneously, to one degree or another, in two worlds—that of democratic Western values and thought while still steeped in, or at least influenced by, the 2,000-year-old Jewish tradition. These two distinct weltanschauungs can manifest themselves in the same individual or social group in accommodative parallelism or at times as a dichotomy.

The Orthodox Jew, more than others, is aware of this ongoing duality. It is brought into sharp relief at life-cycle events for the lay person who is an observant Jew. However, for the society of Orthodoxy as a whole, and for given individuals as well,  the potential conflict between our thousands-year-old tradition and law and our personal sensibilities erupts full force in the case of Jewish divorce.

An illustration of this point is the fact that if any Rabbinical Court today—anywhere in the world—were to rule for coercion of a get against a recalcitrant husband they could not use physical coercion under any circumstances—for fear of being charged with assault and battery. Although the halakha may allow the rabbis to beat or whip a disobedient person, human rights, societal norms, and most importantly civil law do not allow them to do anything of the sort in their court or out of it. The civil law ties the hands of the Jewish law-makers.

During the last century, the rabbinical establishment in the Diaspora[v] has been aware of the severity of the problem of the “modern-day agunah”—the victim of get-refusal. Individual rabbis or certain groups have attempted to address the problem.[vi] For example, in the United States the use of a prenuptial agreement for the prevention of get-refusal[vii] is not only accepted, but is recommended by recognized authorities within the rabbinical establishment.[viii] In December 1999, 11 roshei yeshiva of Yeshiva University’s Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary (RIETS) issued an open call, a “kol koreh,” which elucidated the agunah problem and called on rabbis to erase this blight on the Jewish community by means of signing marrying couples on a halakhic prenuptial agreement:[ix]

 

A Message to Our Rabbinic Colleagues and Students

The past decades have seen a significance increase in the number of divorces in the Orthodox Jewish Community. In the majority of these situations, the couples act in accordance with Jewish law and provide for the proper delivery and receipt of a Get. Each year, however, there is an accumulation of additional instances in which this is not the case.

 

We are painfully aware of the problems faced by individuals in our communities tied to undesired marriages. Many of these problems could have been avoided had the couple signed a halakhically and legally valid prenuptial agreement at the time of their marriage. We therefore strongly urge all officiating rabbis to counsel and encourage marrying couples to sign such an agreement.

 

The increased utilization of prenuptial agreements is a critical step in purging our community of the stressful problem of the modern-day Agunah and enabling men and women to remarry without restriction. By encouraging proper halakhic behavior in the sanctification and the dissolution of marriage, we will illustrate that all of the Torah’s paths are peaceful.

 

(Signed by: Rabbi Norman Lamm, Rabbi Zevulun Charlap, Rabbi Herschel Schachter, Rabbi Moshe Dovid Tendler, Rabbi Mordechai Willig, Rabbi Yosef Blau, Rabbi Michael Rosensweig, Rabbi Yaakov Neuburger, Rabbi Yonason Sacks, Rabbi Meir Goldwicht, Rabbi Jeremy Weider – Roshei Yeshiva of the Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary, an affiliate of Yeshiva University, December 1999; Tevet 5760)

 

In recognition of this intolerable situation, much ink has been spilled in the past few decades regarding the modern-day agunah problem. Scholarly articles, both rabbinic and academic, have appeared in print and on the internet.[x] Despite the seeming proliferation of serious discussions as to the seriousness and pervasiveness of the problem—aside from the serious attempts at preventative measures made by some of the establishments of Modern Orthodoxy briefly described above, there exist no rabbinic solutions for the cases of agunot who are victims of get-refusal today. As far as preventative solutions go, although prenuptial agreements have proven to be successful in nipping recalcitrance in the bud, only specific sectors of Orthodox Jews routinely sign. The vast majority of Jewish women who will need to initiate divorce are unprotected from victimization within accepted parameters of Jewish law.

           

Halakha vs. Civil Law in the Diaspora

 

The decisors of Jewish law throughout the ages were the rabbis. They had, and still have, the authority within the Jewish community to adjudicate, to respond to specific halakhic questions, and to develop the halakha in response to change. From the rabbinic point of view, if one goes back far enough in Jewish history, the source of the rabbi’s authority is found “on-high.” Each successive rabbi is a link of this chain. However, the fact that the rabbi is an authoritative figure does not mean that he has the power to enforce his rulings. In the Diaspora the power that lies in the rabbi’s hands is the power of religious persuasion, leadership of followers, or perhaps social pressure within a defined social group. From the point of view of a congregant or litigant in the Rabbinical Court, neither the rabbi himself nor his court has any legal standing. The weakening of communal cohesion and the increase of an individual’s mobility, geographically and socially, have contributed to the lack of enforceability of a Bet Din’s rulings.

 On the other hand, every citizen of a state is under the jurisdiction of the judicial system of that state. The state not only has authority to rule regarding the individual within its borders, it also has the power to enforce those rulings. In many areas, the approach of the halakha and that of civil law will be similar, so as not to cause any discord within the individual or the society that attempts to adhere to both systems of law simultaneously. In some areas the two systems can live in harmony. However, in regard to divorce proceedings, there exist two major inherent differences between the halakha and civil law.

The first difference lies in the necessity to bring forth proof of fault before the court. In democratic countries, as a rule, there is a no-fault option when suing unilaterally for divorce, amongst other grounds. The no-fault divorce proceedings essentially means that the spouse who wants a divorce is not required to prove, or even mention, the other’s negative traits or acts. However, when suing for a divorce in a rabbinical court, and the spouse opposes a divorce, the suing party must convince the rabbinical judges that a divorce is necessary in this case by presenting fault in that spouse. Moreover, the faults that are considered acceptable as grounds for divorce must come from a limited list of legitimate grounds in accordance with the halakha. The fault of the spouse being sued must be proven to the rabbinical judges so that a ruling will be issued, in various degrees of severity, that the spouse must go ahead with the administration of a get.

The second inherent difference between the two systems lies in the power, or lack thereof, of the judge in his respective legal system to change the individuals' personal status. While a civil Family Court judge has the authority to rule that the parties in question must divorce, he or she also has the power to issue a decree that transforms both individuals’ personal status from married to divorced, or "remarriageable." The judge may do so even against one of the spouses' wishes. However, although a rabbinical court judge has the authority to rule that the parties in question must divorce, he does not have the power to change the individual's personal status through the vehicle of divorce. That power lies solely in the hands of the two parties themselves. In order for a get to be valid, Torah law (d’oraita) dictates that the husband must place the get in the wife’s hand out of his own free will;[xi] according to rabbinic ordinance (d'rabbanan) the wife must accept the get out of her own will.[xii] A rabbinic judge cannot divorce a wife in the husband’s stead. At most he can persuade or even coerce a husband to give his wife a get. However, the means at the disposal of today’s rabbi to do so are limited.

The combination of both these circumstances in the Rabbinical Court—that of the necessity to prove fault before the court and the inherent inability of the Rabbinical Court to actually put their own ruling into effect—gives rise to an impossible situation for one who is suing for divorce. Proving fault leads to angering the husband, while lack of proof would lead to the refusal of the Rabbinical Court to arrange the divorce proceedings! The plaintiff is forced to act against his or her own interests. The husband against whom negative claims have been made feels either that lies were perpetrated against him before a most venerable panel of rabbis, or he feels shame at having his unacceptable behavior brought to light. In any case, the husband would most likely retaliate with the ultimate tool he holds—a tool more powerful than the Rabbinical Court itself—refusal to grant the get to the wife who dared bring up his faults before the court.

Given the limited power of the rabbis in the Diaspora to ensure the giving of a get, the situation of the “modern-day agunah” has arisen. The husband may resort to naming a price for his acquiescence or he may simply refuse to give his wife a get. The fact that a civil divorce may be in place does not help alleviate this situation.[xiii] The complete imbalance of power—not only between the husband and the wife but also the husband's power over the Rabbinical Court—leads to the ethical problem of one individual limiting the freedom of another.

 

Ethical Concerns of the Sages

 

Throughout the generations, the sages were sensitive to the needs and rights of individuals. These were viewed through the prism of achieving and maintaining a strong Jewish society. Concerns of "public policy" weighed heavily when ruling—whether in a Responsum or in a takana. The ketuba, or  marriage contract, is a prime example. The explanation found in the Babylonian Talmud for the establishment of the ketuba, which was instituted to protect Jewish women as a group, was given as: Mai ta'ama takinu rabbanan lah ketuba? Shelo tehei kala b'einav l'hotsiah—For what reason did our sages ordain the ketuba? So that it will not be easy in his eyes to cast her out.[xiv]

A fascinating example of "public policy" can be gleaned from two thirteenth-century Responsa. The first was formulated by the sages of Provence,[xv] who refused to permit a man to divorce his wife contrary to her wishes, saying: “The relevant rules were determined for just such a case, that a man shall not divorce his wife without justification, so that he should not come with a complaint whether she is weak or unsteady … for otherwise one will not allow a daughter of Avraham Avinu to remain with her husband, for when he finds a more beautiful woman he will divorce her. And if this is the case, of what use are the rulings of the sages, when they ruled that one may not divorce his wife unless she acquiesces?”[xvi]

The second Responsum was composed by Rabbeinu Asher,[xvii] and it prevents a woman from getting a divorce when she sues for it, using almost precisely the same language: “If a woman is enabled to get a divorce from her husband, merely by saying: ‘I don’t want him,’ one will not allow a daughter of Avraham Avinu to remain with her husband, as she may well become infatuated with someone else and rebel against her husband.”[xviii]

The reason that both these mutually opposite suits are denied is the same. “One will not allow a Jewish woman (a daughter of Avraham Avinu) to remain with her husband,” that is, if one enables divorces to be easily attained, one will not have Jewish family units remaining intact. This is the approach that guides the dayanim to this day.

It is noteworthy that the Herem d'Rabbeinu Gershom was actually described by the Rosh in quite modern terms. In a Responsum of the Rosh, rule 42, the Rosh explains the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom as having been intended “to equalize the woman’s power with that of the man. Just as a man divorces his wife only of his own free will, so a woman can only be divorced in accordance with her will.”[xix]

In actuality the Herem leads us to a situation in Judaism that differs from postmodernism's standards of changing personal status. The situation in Jewish tradition today is that just as one cannot be coerced into entering a marriage (meaning that kiddushin do not take affect unless both the man and the woman enter into the marriage willingly), one cannot be coerced into leaving a marriage. Both the man and the woman have to agree to dissolve the union and only they have the power to do so. Today, Jewish divorce is enacted solely by agreement of both parties—as opposed to the sensibilities of civil rights and civil liberties.

Although there is evidence from the Responsa that the halakhic decisors did, at times, base their rulings on ethical and societal standards, none of the tenets listed directly above, or other concerns of "public policy" serve to alleviate or are even palliative to the problem today. In fact, selected "public policy" concerns serve to exacerbate the problem.[xx] In a Rabbinical Court, these established standards may outweigh any interest to preserve the individual's rights to a life unfettered by an unwanted personal status.

 

A Contemporary Rabbinic Problem

 

In this generation, Rabbi Moshe Boczko[xxi] identified the unethical situation of get-refusal from a rabbi's point of view:

Thus, from the point of view of general fairness, it is difficult to comprehend that Hazal created several halakhot that the husband is obligated to divorce his wife and the authority is not given to the Rabbinical Court to implement this rule (ruling). And anyone who does not want to listen to the words of the sages can ignore them (literally: whistle at them), and the woman is obligated to suffer [at the hands] of a bad man that does not obey the ruling…And specifically in a matter so important as is family life, the Rabbinical Court is powerless and every man shall do as he sees fit?! And how is it possible that the sages will rule regarding an individual that he is obligated to divorce and they will not compel him to fulfill that which was imposed upon him?

…Therefore, logic dictates that the Torah delivered the rules of gittin (divorce) and kiddushin (marriage) into the hands of the sages. In accordance with their rulings (literally—words of their mouths) they (the people) will marry and on their word they will divorce…Meaning, that the Rabbinical Court is given all the means necessary to execute the ruling so that family life in Israel will not be abandoned.[xxii]

 

Treatment

 

The ethic of guarding stable family units is still central to Jewish society. However, the criterion of the stable Jewish family unit has undergone somewhat of a metamorphosis in the last generation or two. With the rising incidence of divorce, the challenge is divorcing in a manner that will maintain all of the family members' mental and emotional health so that new family relationships can be formed—both between the former spouses as co-parents of joint children and in the building of new independent families.

In order to rectify the agunah problem and eliminate unethical behavior on the part of a recalcitrant spouse in a manner commensurate with Jewish law, the very root of the problem must be treated. That being the imbalance of power on two levels: between the husband and the wife as well as the husband's power over the Rabbinical Court.

Further halakhic solutions must be developed and accepted by responsible men and women of the halakha—those who understand the intertwining of the complexities of our dual existence as citizens of the postmodern world from within our strong beliefs as God-fearing Jews.

 

 

 

 

 

[i]  If a woman were to have intimate relations with a man other than the man still considered to be her husband, she would be committing adultery according to halakha. Any children born from such a union would be considered mamzerim and would be excluded from marrying within the general community of Am Yisrael.

[ii]  Decreed in Herem D'Rabbeinu Gershom (Enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom). See Shut HaRosh 42.

[iii]  Rabbeinu Gershom wisely included an "escape clause" from his own enactment: Heter Meah Rabbanim. In extreme cases, where it is agreed by 100 rabbis that it is warranted, a man may take on a second wife—thus diverting back to the original biblical law. (This would include situations where a wife lies comatose for years or suffers from a severe mental illness or committed adultery and was refusing to accept a get. No such arrangement exists for the opposite case (the taking on of a second husband), since it would be in transgression of biblical law.

[iv] The basis of this section was published previously in Rachel Levmore and Daniel Clarke,

 “The Prenuptial Agreement of Mutual Respect, Get and English Law,” Jewish Law (Dec. 2008); http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/getAndEnglishLaw.pdf.

[v] There is a misconception that since the Israeli Rabbinical Courts have power to levy sanctions against recalcitrant husbands, and that there is no agunah problem in Israel. Quite the contrary: Cases drag on for years. There is a policy of pacification of the husband on the part of the judges in the Rabbinical Court, and dayanim are reluctant to use their powers for fear of causing a get meuseh, a coerced get, which is invalid. Israeli ra’avads themselves have cried out portraying the problem as severe. See Rav Eliyahu Bakshi Doron, Kakh Nitan Liftor Et Be’ayat Mesuravot ha-Get,” Meimad (Av–Elul 5755): 8–9 (introduction); Rav Shear-Yeshuv Cohen, “Coercion of a Get in Our Times,” Techumin 11, pp. 195–202.

[vi] For an historical overview of the development in the greater Diaspora of prenuptial agreements for the prevention of get-refusal, which address the problem, see Rachel Levmore, Minee Einayikh MeDim'ah: Heskemei Kedam Nissuin L'Miniyat Seiruv Get, Mosdot Ariel and the Council of Young Israel Rabbis: Jerusalem 2009; Rachel Levmore, “Get-Refusal in the United States and One Method of Prevention: Prenuptial Agreements,” Women in Judaism [ed. Tova Cohen], Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 2001.

[vii] The agreement that is in most widespread use in the United States is that which is recommended by the Rabbinical Council of America and its affiliated Rabbinical Court—the Bet Din of America. The Binding Arbitration Agreement can be found on the Bet Din’s website at

http://www.bethdin.org/forms-publications.asp.

[viii] There have been various decisions made by rabbinic organizations to implement the signing of prenuptial agreements, such as several resolutions of the Rabbinical Council of America. See the latest resolution at http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=100772.

[ix] Published in The Jewish Press on Feb. 25th, 2000, p. 28; “Chained Women Could Have Used Prenuptial Pacts,” Forward, Feb. 25th, 2000; It appears on the site of the Rabbinical Council of America at http://www.rabbis.org/Prenuptial_Agreement.cfm.

[x] Note the publication dates of a selection of examples appearing in English:

Bleich, J. David, “The Device of the ‘Sages of Spain’ as a Solution to the Problem of the Modern-Day Agunah,” Tradition, Vol. 22 No. 3 (Fall 1986), pp. 77–87.

Breitowitz, Irving, Between Civil and Religious Law: The Plight of the Agunah in American Society, Greenwood Press, 1993.

Broyde, Michael J., Marriage, Divorce, and the Abandoned Wife in Jewish Law: A Conceptual Understanding of the Agunah Problems in America, Ktav, New Jersey 2001.

Dick, Judah, “Is an Agreement to Deliver or Accept a Get in the Event of a Civil Divorce Halakhically Feasible?" Tradition, Vol. 21 No. 2, (Summer 1983), pp. 91–106.

Greenberg-Kobrin, Michelle, “Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial Agreements," Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, Vol. 32 No. 4 (Summer 1999), pp. 359–399.

Globe, Leah Ain, The Dead End: Divorce Proceedings in Israel, Jerusalem 1981.

Haut, Irwin H., "A Problem in Jewish Divorce Law: An Analysis and Some Suggestions," Tradition, Vol. 16 No. 3, (Spring 1977), pp. 29–49.

Lamm, Norman, “Forward,” The Prenuptial Agreement, Halakhic and Pastoral Considerations, (ed. B. Herring & K. Auman), New Jersey, 1996.

Lamm, Norman, “Recent Additions to the Ketubah—a Halakhic Critique," Tradition, Vol.2, No.1, 1959, pp. 93–118.

Levmore, Rachel, “Conflict of Legislations?”  Shalom: The European Jewish Times, Vol. 41 (Spring 2004), http://www.shalom-magazine.com/.

Levmore, Rachel, "Rabbinic Responses in Favor of Prenuptial Agreements," Tradition 42:1 (Spring 2009), pp. 29–49.

Levmore, Rachel, "Get-Refusal and the Agreement for Mutual Respect: Israel Today," Hakirah 9 (Winter 2010), pp. 173–190.

Riskin, Shlomo, Women and Jewish Divorce: The Rebellious Wife, the Agunah and the Right of Women to Initiate Divorce in Jewish Law. A Halakhic Solution, New Jersey 5788/1989.

Weiss, Avraham, “The Modern Day Agunah: In Retrospect and Prospect,” The Prenuptial Agreement, Halakhic and Pastoral Considerations, (ed. B. Herring & K. Auman), New Jersey, 1996.

[xi]  B.T. Yebamot 112b ; Rambam Hilkhot Girushin 1:2.

[xii]  Herem d’Rabbeinu Gershom: see Shulhan Arukh, Even haEzer 119:6, Divrei HaRama.

[xiii] In fact, with a civil divorce in place the situation may be much worse. The man is then free to remarry civilly, while able to arrange a Jewish marriage, since according to Torah law he may have more than one wife simultaneously. The woman, in that situation may be able to remarry civilly, but is prohibited halakhically from joining in any kind of union with another man. Any children born of such a union would be categorized as mamzerim.

[xiv]  B.T. Yebamot 69a, and many others.

[xv] The vast majority of Responsa of the rabbis of Provence are the collection of responsa of the Sages of Provence in the period of the RaShbA in the thirteenth century and in the succeeding generation. The other Responsa are those of the geonim, the Rif, the Rabi (Ba’al Eshkol), the Ra’avad, and the RaShbA.

[xvi] The Responsa of the Rabbis of Provence, Part I, 63, section opening ‘od sha’al, and its continuation: “…who ruled that one shall not divorce his wife unless she and her relatives and the seven elders of the town agree,” etc.

[xvii]Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel, the Rosh, died in the year 1327 in Toledo, Spain. He had been appointed rabbi of the large city of Toledo. After the death of the RaShbA, the Rosh was considered the leading halakhic authority in Spain.

[xviii] Responsa of the Rosh, Rule 43, part 8, section beginning “Answer”: “Moreover I say that the geonim who formulated this regulation …  did so in accordance with that generation, when it seemed to them to meet current requirements for Jewish women. Now, the case seems to be the opposite, Jewish women in the present generation are conceited; if the wife can bring herself out from under her husband’s jurisdiction, saying: I do not want him, you will not leave a daughter of Avraham Avinu remaining with her husband, for they will prefer another man and rebel against their husbands; for this reason it is best to distance oneself from coercion.”

[xix] Shut HaRosh 42.

[xx] As an example see the Shach, Gevurat Anashim 49, where Rabbi Shabtai Cohen (Poland 1621–1662) explicitly ruled against the coercion of a get at any time, for fear of creating mamzerim by doing so. The Israeli Rabbinical Courts view this opinion as carrying great weight.

[xxi] Rav Moshe Boczko, former Rosh Yeshivat Heichal Eliyahu, which was founded in Montreux, Switzerland. In 1985 Rav Moshe Boczko, rosh yeshiva at the time, made aliya together with the yeshiva and turned it into a Yeshivat Hesder.

[xxii] Moshe Boczko, "Bedin get meuseh—siccum limudim b'yeshivat heichal eliyahu beperek af al pi v'hameidir."

 

Jewish Business Ethics in a Secular Society

 

 

 

            No single topic in contemporary society today elicits more concern, consternation, conflicting opinions, and simply outright indignation than the business ethics of modern-day “masters of the universe,” whom many view as ethically—if not directly—responsible for the current problematic economic plight of many people, countries and, by extrapolated consistency, the entire global financial system. If they had only followed basic Jewish business ethical principles and practices, so the argument goes, perhaps we would not be where we currently and precariously are within the turbulent and, to a rather extensive degree, virtually uncontrollable financial straits. Yet, what these precise prescriptive ethical practices are, drawn from times long ago, and how they apply to modern-day financial econometric systems and actors within those arenas is surprisingly elusive in the present seemingly vast corpus of Jewish business-related literature. The material, unstructured at best and obtuse at worst, leaves much to the financial imagination, deals only tangentially with situations of relevance today, and does little if anything to shine light on the interstitial tissue connecting the fragile financial joints upon which the world’s economic system is buttressed.

 

“If you can’t explain it to your grandmother, then you cannot understand it yourself.”

—Albert Einstein (1879­–1955)

            Setting what might be termed as parametric boundaries, to borrow an applied science expression for literary purposes, is really the very first task of formulating any exposé and, in the case of the what some might call the galactic financial shenanigans of the last few years (which need no further explication here), nothing could be more important to navigating us on the right strategic course for this article and, for argument’s sake, making it readily understandable.

            First and foremost, let’s set forth what we will not deal with herein, under the logical arguments that both less is more and excluding the questionable but obvious allows readers to quickly take stock of where we are headed. To begin, we will not deal with financial crimes: These are not ethical issues; they do not involve questions of judgment; they do not afford the perpetrator the protective penumbra of self-defense; and, more often than not, they have within them issues of psychiatric dimensions with which we are totally unprepared to deal, nor should we be. Finally, “You shall not steal,” in Jewish liturgy and absent a life-threatening situation, is a clear enough stricture for any functioning adult to understand. Need more be said?

            Second, we will not fit the world of Jewish ethics, largely derived from biblical and talmudic edicts, situations, and commentaries, to the world in which we live today. This has been the schematic of virtually all research in the field done to date, and unfortunately, grafting arcane examples onto real-world situations results in two contemporaneous analytical problems.

Most objectively, on a quantitative basis, there are a finite number of business-related ethical issues dealt with in the vast amount of Jewish literature. For instance, of the 613 precepts in the Torah, only about 100 deal with economics or business, which may, in itself, seem like a statistically significant number, but for codifying Jewish business ethics within the behavioral crevices of, say, the financial community where so much attention has been directed—and no doubt deservedly so—these specific references do not really cover much applicable ground. Even if we distill what, at first blush, seems to be a mountainous amount of material related to the way we are expected to conduct ourselves, both in general commerce and in one-to-one business transactions, we still remain bereft of the most salient ethical issues in business and intra-office relations with which we are faced daily.

In a secondary sense and one that logically follows, the literature, as it is presently crafted, employs self-selected anecdotal material with little strategy and less structure as a venue to craft an overarching theory of Jewish business ethics. Making matters decidedly worse is the simple fact that helicopter rides with periodic landings on predefined biblically derived targets in an effort to illuminate the hard to make choices in contemporary business—which are often simply well beyond really tough calls in themselves—preordain additional problems. The approach taken in this article will be totally the obverse and, as a result, should be far more useful and decidedly more understandable, to come full circle in this section.

 

 

“If everyone is thinking alike, then nobody’s thinking.”

U.S. General George S. Patton, Jr. (1885–1945)

 

            Put differently, rather than fitting Jewish ethical theory to modern-day business fact (as those before us have done), we will reverse the trend here and do so in a historically business-like manner. Legendary Harvard Business School Professor Alfred Chandler got it right long ago, and his preeminent managerial dictum—often applied to a sweeping array of related situations—should also hold sway here. Propounding the proposition that the structure of a business enterprise must, of necessity, follow its strategy and more specifically, a company’s strategy must first be developed so the structure to carry out that strategy can then be effectively formulated, Chandler’s defining organizational principle will guide the construct of this article in the following way.1

            Our strategy here is simple one: to find a methodology, approach, process, procedure, and/or technique that will allow for the infusion of Jewish ethical principles into real-world business vistas so that—and here is the critically important part of the strategy—decision-making can be enhanced by those confronted with, and indeed often confounded by, ethical dilemmas that seem exceptionally, and at times excruciatingly, difficult to resolve. Moreover, they are also often aggravatingly intractable because, when viewed through the prism of a strict adherence to broad Jewish ethical principles, business or otherwise, Jewish members of the business community often feel left in the lurch of a Judeo-legal straitjacket of rules so broad and iconoclastic that they allow little room for the freedom of defense in business situations requiring fundamental ethical decision-making. This enigma gives appropriate rise to the structure of this article, to continue through on Chandler’s managerial paradigm.

            Strategy defining structure, or at the least, formatting it means that, in this case, we have to develop two fundamental but complex perspectives. The first structure is an overall compendium of what is and is not allowable under Jewish business ethical standards in broad terms, so that applications to contemporary situations can be readily made and prescriptive behavioral responses may more easily be pinpointed. The second structure is a real-world framework of business ethical pressure points that involve clients or customers and shareholders, on the one hand, and business colleagues in the workplace, on the other. In this way, we can view Jewish business ethical standards applied in real-time and in situations that are not constrained by a hodgepodge of self-selected biblical precepts—many contrived to a greater or lesser degree—for situations masquerading as real-world problems that do not come close to adequately reflecting the complexity inherent in the world as those who live in the trenches know it to be.

 

 “The test of a first rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.”

—F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896–1940)

 

            Somewhat surprisingly, an in-depth analysis of Jewish literature in all its forms leaves those operating within the confines of contemporary business situations in something of an ethical bind, as previously noted, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to amble through international business society without a conscious concern that doing “x” as opposed to “y” or vice versa—and we will later discern in great detail what these ethical alternatives could be—would leave one either defenseless or abrogating a major Jewish ethical principle. Here is where many of today’s writers, commentators, and self-described analysts of the material become somewhat unglued, and they do so in rather significant ways.

            For instance, we are taught not only what is ostensibly perceived to be right in all ethical matters, business and otherwise, but also and most importantly, that there is hardly anything remotely negative that we can do or say to and/or about our colleagues that is permissible. This is the clear impression with which one is left after any reading of what purports to be Jewish ethical law. Many of these familiar principles will be enumerated below so that we are able to develop a functional methodology of defining what these strictures are and how and in what ways with which they should be dealt. Once again, this will neither be done by a willy-nilly reiteration of ancient business situations with vague and often contorted applications to today’s world, nor will it be accomplished by a recitation in biblical proportions, no less, of talmudic dictums so alien to modern businesspeople that it requires an imagination of science-fiction dimensions to apply those concepts. What we will do, however, to hearken back to Chandler’s charge, is take major Jewish ethical principles for structural purposes and compare them against extreme cases where there is discernible leeway for executing correct ethical strategies in business without violating major Jewish behavioral prohibitions. To be sure, this requires the holding of opposed ideas in mind at the same time in order to provide a structural platform for decision-making under varying conditions of risk and uncertainty in ethical situations. Useful guideposts we need, fitting round pegs into square holes, we need not, so we are off to the ethical races here, at long last.

 

 

“The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small…”

Herbert Simon (1916–2001)

 

            As a result of this condition, argued Simon in his Nobel Prize-winning thesis, decision-making by human beings—most notably economically driven issues—are decided through what he termed an individual’s “bounded rationality,” namely, the cognitive limits of their own minds. Leaving aside for a moment the extraordinarily sophisticated applied non-linear mathematical models derived, over recent years, by systems thinkers such as John Sterman of M.I.T. to obviate the limitations of our neurobiological selves, we still must devise a structural framework here that deals with Jewish business ethics in ways that our human minds are capable of comprehending.3 In other words, we have to reduce the incredibly large number of business-related and ethically challenged situations to a digestible number and place them within a framework that we can understandably grasp.4 Consequently, and as alluded to above, we will bifurcate the concept into its basic two broad categories.

            The “do’s and don’ts” of Jewish ethical problems are legion, and we really do not need any further outpouring of talmudic examples to reinforce that overly apparent fact. Nevertheless, just for the record and for the purposes of this article, let’s outline the basics so that we can more fully comprehend what they are and how they break down into their two broad dimensional components: what is expected of us in our ethical lives and what is expected of us in business. Subsumed within these categories are overarching principles, but they engender incredible ethical decision-making problems if adhered to strictly. So basic, however, is fair dealing in business regarded in Judaism that it almost invariably, and to a very large extent, virtually overpowers all else in our personal lives, presumably because involved within it are highly personal interactions of the most fundamental sort. We should certainly start there first.

“Whoever conducts his business dealings honestly is liked by humankind, and it is considered as though he observed the entire Torah” (Mekhilta, Exodus 15:26). Business dealings coupled with honesty—what more in the Jewish world could be said? The follow-up is indeed appropriate. “The first question an individual is asked in the afterlife at the final judgment is ‘Were you honest in your business dealings?’” (B.T., Shabbat, 31a). So it goes on even after we’re gone! Honesty is everything here, but it is sculpted overall by its formidable counterpart in Jewish ethical life.

Indeed, the key and broader ethical principles over which we run afoul are also two in number. Inching up the pyramid is one critically important Jewish ethical stricture, so sweeping, so profound, and so abrogated in so many human interactions virtually all day long that it is hard to conceive of anyone actually towing the mark on this one for any reasonable length of time, let alone full-time in the often ruthless world of business. Some people, for instance, could hardly get by without hurdling over its high watermark anywhere on a daily basis. Yet here it is—a major Jewish ethical edit that seems almost impossible to live by. In all its forms, it is essentially lashon haRa, which has some strange prohibitions within it. Let’s explore this precept in all its encompassing aspects and apply it to real-world business situations, because that is where the Jewish ethical business rubber quite often hits the real-world business road.

The Torah states with great finality: “You shall not go about as a tale bearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16). As is generally perceived, a so-called tale bearer is an individual who essentially says anything about anyone, but who still transgresses this commandment even if what he or she says is true, and furthermore, this is so even if what is said is complimentary because this actually implies a true knowledge of what is good, i.e., a higher, grander, more knowledgeable level of perspective, if you will. Somewhat parenthetically, I suppose it is worth mentioning that, according to Jewish tradition, the spreader of falsehoods is regarded as right at the bottom of the moral barrel, as it were—a motzi shem ra, or a moral leper. So think twice before you twist things; it’s surely not worth it, but that is not why we are pursuing this line of thought.

Right at the Jewish pyramidal top, if you will, sit two inextricably linked prescriptions, so broad that, when taken together, they leave little wiggle room for advancing one’s cause in business or anywhere else for that matter. “You shall not take revenge” (Leviticus 19:18) is actually a commandment in the Torah. Even more transcendent is: “’What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow human’ that is the whole Torah, the rest is commentary,” (Hillel, B.T., Shabbat 31a), which implements, “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18).5

            These are our basic Jewish parameters. They are what the human mind can absorb and precisely what Jews the world over have come to believe as actually the minimum of behavioral standards upon which the platform of our lives are explicitly required to be built. In the Jewish world more than any other, there is very little authoritative differentiation between religious and societal norms, of which business is an inextricably woven composite part, and perhaps that is the way that it should be—at least in the opinion of this writer. To the extent that the thousands of examples of business dealing ethical parameters are, by example, embedded in Jewish liturgy and, by way of extension, so are related examples of a more general ethical dimension, they serve more as in-depth calling cards, to be employed when specific situations warrant them. Make no mistake, however, what we have isolated above are so fundamental that any further examples or principles would surely swamp our neuronal synapses, so we will happily stop here.

Nevertheless, the point to be made is that when squeezing these Jewish ethical prescriptions into the funnel of our behavioral pyramid, they cover such a vast array of activities and interfaces that a Jewish person often feels truly bereft of any reasonable recourse to defend him or herself against those seeking to advantage themselves in the competitive milieu of business today. Both what the intricacies of these situations entail and what some would consider normal behavioral responses that fly in the face of Jewish ethics, are our next tasks.

 

“Everyone takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the world.”

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860)

 

            In the complete spirit of reductionism and much like we distilled the principles of Jewish ethics—present business precepts included—down to an understandable and frankly usable format, we are compelled by an objective and comparative necessity, to do the same with contemporary business situational paradigms and the ethical dilemmas they pose. We do this so that we can see exactly what we can and cannot do within the confines of Jewish business ethical standards and, concomitantly, in what ways we can legitimately respond in such situations without demeaning our religious heritage, principles, practices, and moral standards that many have sacrificed dearly to preserve so that, often in a literal sense, we may have all lived to see another day—a theme to which we will return to hit head-on at the conclusion of this article.

            Moreover and in reference to the above captioned quote, we offer a real-world kaleidoscopic view of business situational difficulties from the trenches so that our readership can readily grasp the complex and intricate nature of these interpersonal relations in ways that were not apparent previously. In order to expand their vision of the business world on the one hand, we have to reduce, to an understandable format, a global perspective of the business world, on the other. This, as they say in some business sectors, is job one. Then, in order to precipitate out from the critical crevices where the most problematic ethical situations lie, we have to present real-world examples of these in the broad context of the previously described global business milieu. By necessity, we all need to be on the same page here and expand our vision to match that of the world, as noted in the above quotation.

 

“There is only one valid definition of business purpose and that is to create a customer.”

—Peter Drucker (1899–1995)

 

            These words of Peter Drucker, perhaps the world’s most celebrated management scholar ever, live on today and bear particular applicability not only to what we must explain here, but also to how we do it. (Of some consequential note, the November, 2009 issue of Harvard Business Review was dedicated to Drucker on the centennial of his birth, but quite circumspectly and in underscoring the financial crisis of the day, asked readers right on the issue’s cover and as its title: “What Would Drucker Do?”). Nonetheless, whether they are product or service companies, the creation of a customer is the sine qua non of business, and from both a purely managerial viewpoint and for our own organizational purposes, a global outline of the framework, functions, and factors impacting customer development is surely in order.

            There is really no managerial business scholar and/or management consultant who has better encapsulated the whole of competitive business strategy than Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter, so to rely on any other basic material for a bird’s-eye view of this complex subject is really quite silly. To be sure, all of this author’s opus-like compendiums are implicitly directed toward achieving Drucker’s foremost goal of customer acquisition, but what is generally involved in conducting a modern business enterprise certainly deserves a few sentences courtesy of Porter’s most well-known treatises.6 Furthermore, this information is required in order to build a foundation for our more formidable discussion of business ethics in the context of Jewish business principles.

            Porter captures industry competition along the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers, the threat of new entrants, and the potential for substitute products and/or services. All of these impact on the rivalry among existing firms, but the three key elements that drive the competitive strategies of companies are, by Porter’s analysis, products that have the lowest cost, greatest differentiation, and the sharpest focus on a given buyer group. These are the basics of the corporate form of organization and are the essential theoretical framework upon which strategy is developed and then structure is created. They define the internal order of things, as it were, that Porter underscores from an organizational standpoint, and we need to quickly get a sense of that organizational paradigm to deal with the ethical decisions that spew forth from its construct and “create a customer,” to coin Drucker’s most famous phrase.     

Digging deeper here and approaching this area from a somewhat oblique angle, it may be worth noting that we strive in many scientific disciplines, and presumably in virtually all aspects of our short-lived mortal days, to achieve a clarity of focus in what we both professionally and personally attempt to accomplish. There is surely no argument about this here. In the neuroscience field and more specifically in neuro-imaging, we are continuously trying to achieve greater image quality—clarity, if you will—through a scientific combination of better spatial and temporal resolution, which often means a balancing of one in favor of the other. By analogy then and to run through deeper still waters, Porter clarifies his organizational construct by disaggregating the modern company into a series of discrete activities along a value chain that gives rise to the company’s competitive advantage in the marketplace. In order to capture and sustain a company’s advantageous market position, its various divisions, from product development to marketing, from research and development to sales and service, and so forth, he argues, must operate as a cohesive whole, while at the same time, the project teams within those units must do the same. This sounds simple enough, but the execution of this charge presents all kinds of business ethical problems with which individuals and managers must inevitably deal. In order to attain greater clarity—to continue the analogy one logical further—of the entire corporate dimension, we therefore inexorably move one more step forward and divide our ethical business paradigms, for prescriptive analysis, into two comprehensible arenas: the company’s shareholders (the external dimension) and the company’s employees (the internal dimension).

If the single purpose of a business is to create a customer, as Drucker persuasively argued many years ago, one of the more recent market-related resultant effects that, not surprisingly, subsequently became a corporate goal in and of itself, was the focus on the creation of shareholder value as the primary motivating business force.7 We are talking about a company’s stock price here, regardless of the vicissitudes of the market itself, and this strategic goal was further refined to target the company’s quarterly financial performance, which would then, ipso facto, presumably be related to its stock price. Putting an even finer point to this ongoing financial saga is the simple fact that, over recent years, it appears by all accounts in the news that ethical transgressions occurred with a view toward bolstering profits and the resultant share price of a given company. Why is this so important? It is simply because bonuses, job longevity, and corporate bravado made it so. As an inevitable result, we find ourselves amidst the daunting modern-day challenge of hewing to Jewish ethical principles and practices so seemingly far-reaching while, at the same time, so behaviorally restrictive, that we feel discernibly pinched between the need cut quarterly corners for the good of the company and its shareholders, on the one hand, and adhering to our basic faith, on the other. Clear examples of the tension in this external dimension will follow the exploration of the internal workings of the modern corporation and the consequent effect on what is essentially human interaction and behavior.

Catapulting ourselves into the inner workings of corporate America—often even at its highest levels—is shockingly not unlike any other interpersonal situation where pay and recognition rule the day and, sometimes as we have all found, to the actual detriment of—and to tie in the framework described above—the company, its stock price, and the company’s shareholders. Indeed, we all acknowledge and know well how major corporate entities of all types have floundered as a consequence of questionable business ethical behavior sparked by nothing more than outsized financial rewards hung as bait for select scrambling employees to devour. It is right here, however, in the rush for personal gain amongst fellow workers (usually constructed around a project team orientation) and the prospect of increasing corporate profits in the most notable short-term—quarterly, for instance—that breaches in business ethics occur, and, more often than not, they involve ethical assaults on colleagues and, to wit, Jewish principles, which leaves us and our families wanting. It is therefore to this nexus of nothing more than money and politics that we direct our attention.  

 

“…the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841–1935)

 

            Crafting a series of representative scenarios involving compromising business ethical situations is a reductionist game, and we have to adhere to our basic outline, which includes making certain that the ultimately derived principles of behavior fall within our predefined framework. Broadly construed, this real-life paradigm remains bounded by both the external corporate dimensions of Americana and its internal project team counterpart as well as their resultant prescriptive nature, defined so that we can learn something useful when common-day ethical dilemmas are compared and contrasted with Jewish ethical standards as applied to the business milieu in which we all operate. And it should come as no surprise that, to a greater or lesser degree, we actually all do. Both dimensions intersect in that actions in one arena, say, inside the company and the sometimes derivative internecine warfare that results, affects shareholders and stock price alike, but bisecting them into discrete components should help in bringing the complexities of ethical decision-making into a more focused perspective. To borrow from the above quotation, each of these circumstances impacts on the character of each ethical decision when placed under the Jewish microscope.

            For starters, we begin with the well-spring of business today: the individual worker and those around him or her, or more notably termed, the project team. If there ever were seeds of ethical discontent planted, it was right here, and these teams—small to large, transient to ongoing, at the highest or lowest levels of the organization—is precisely where the damage is done to business ethics, sometimes on a grand scale and at almost incalculable personal and corporate cost. Few, however, see it that way, and for those making even the vaguest of attempts at staying under the rather wide umbrella of ethical Jewish behavior, life can become close to unbearably uncomfortable.

            Transcending the internal boundaries of corporate departments of all stripes—whether they are marketing, finance, information technology, legal, or even human resources—is the not too terribly transparent nature of the project team vis-à-vis the department or divisional head. Without being too thinly veiled about its driving force, at least from the standpoint of each team member, it is no doubt sufficient to state that individual input maximization in recognition form is surely the goal and making the division’s “top dog” aware of one’s input, however sometimes exaggerated, is clearly enough to begin turning the tables on one’s colleagues. One could argue that this is human nature, of course, but the often inevitable result is often the downplaying of contributions to the project made by other team members, which morphs into the demeaning of colleagues and, with that, so many basic previously enumerated Jewish ethical principles—business and otherwise—are crossed that it is almost pedantic to reiterate them. As a perpetrator, no further repudiation is warranted here; we know with whom we deal. As a defendant, however, we are up against a “hard break,” if you will, with the Jewish prescriptions cited so far in this article leaving us with little recourse. There is surely no room to maneuver if we cannot speak in any way about anyone, to cite just one restraining Jewish stricture. Moreover, if our income is at stake, if our employment is up for grabs, or if our self-esteem is continuously trodden, being on the short-end of the project team stick is a tough place for an observant Jewish person to find oneself—at least the way we know one generally to be. This is just one example, albeit an absolutely critical one, but time and space do not allow for the enumeration of others within the confines of the our present-day business world, so we will conclude the internal dimension here, if only to proffer some hopefully reasonable answers later.         

Neatly wedged between the internal infrastructure of the modern-day corporate form of enterprise and that which directly effects corporate profits and shareholder price, but has within it ethical dilemmas so fundamental to our way of life that it is comparably hard to extract similarities between it and anything else that we may do in business, are the functions that involve direct client and/or customer contact in a sales capacity. These activities, by their very existence, are almost always incentivized by remunerative arrangements that tag sales performance to pay; how could it be otherwise? More specifically, clients, across the board are of two intellectual stripes: those who are individuals and who are generally expected to know far less about the product or service being purveyed and those who are institutional or corporate purchasers, a group generally perceived to have the knowledge to make reasoned sales decisions or, at the very least, to have access to sources of information that will ultimately allow them to make decisions of a fully informed nature. Time has shown, however, that this intellectual dichotomy is not universally the case, so that if a salesperson were to be ethically consistent—reasonably guarding against any buyer’s lack of product knowledge so that taking advantage for a sale’s sake was obviated—sellers would treat all buyers as individuals without the knowledge and/or resources to do the kind of in-depth due diligence of the institutional professional. That said, it actually becomes more incumbent on those sales professionals interfacing with any buyer to position the product or service for sale as exactly what it should be: a customer need, absent the remuneration and/or commission for the sale. Now ethically, this is one tough nut to crack, especially when the salesperson’s livelihood depends on the sale and the internal organizational pressures encouraging the sale itself loom large—hopefully, a delicate, but realistic way to put the latter premise. For the moment, we will leave this business ethical predicament in abeyance; we have our hands full as it is, and the character of the act in each of the attendant circumstances is done needs to be addressed accordingly.

            The signature ethical impasses encountered in business today, however, have their genesis in actions that affect the company in visible ways—namely, its profits, share price, shareholder value, and as we have learned throughout this decade, the financial viability of the company itself. We have termed this the external dimension, but unmistakably, the seeds of these conundrums are sown internally within the same organizational frameworks that define the parameters of project teams at any corporate level. The difference is that these decisions, together with their ethical counterparts, involve the allocation of corporate resources on a grand scale, with the final go-aheads made at high levels of the organization, and as we have found sometimes, without all of the facts illuminated or with a shading or burying of the potential, but somewhat less apparent, risks—all in the name of potential pecuniary gain for the proposers. At times, it apparently seems that the use of what is commonly described as “other people’s money” knows no bounds.

            What business actions could possibly precipitate such a wholesale problematic effect on a company of any notable size? A merger decision for one, a strategy to sell a division for another, or the purchase of a major company, the leveraging of a firm’s capital base, the marketing launch of a major product, or the research investment of a drug, for instance, and the list goes on. They are not subsumed within the body corporate, nor are they enveloped within the recesses of the corporate hierarchy. Rather, they are front and center, standing astride the upper level project teams and the company’s most senior executives. Every corporate player has some stake in the decision-making process here, but throwing caution to the wind, while not the rule but rather the exception, is so often shrouded in minimizing the risks inherent in the process while emphasizing the potential gains if all goes according to an optimistic plan that one often wonders whether the ultimate decisions are so biased in favor of potential and personal monetary gains that corporate risk parameters have been diffused into oblivion. Given the input from the usual suspects of sources and the committee-like nature of the decision-making process—project teams writ large, to be sure—it is comparatively easy understand how exculpatory rationales, coming the wake of some unintended consequences, afford major corporate decisions, in effect made by top-level teams, seem not only well reasoned, but also unanticipated, given what could be termed the arguably sound research and analysis that went into the deficiently executed strategy.

Let’s put a somewhat different spin on the ball here because this topic is vitally important, and indeed has been, and continues to be, the notorious focus of business practices from the standpoint of ethics evaluations in the recent past simply because so many companies have either financially collapsed as a result or have come so perilously close that emerging unscathed has been almost miraculous. What we are saying here is that ethical lapses have occurred by those who have turned the other cheek in the face of possible catastrophic results coming from decision-making at the highest levels of the organization, and further and most profoundly, those hypothetically involved may actually, and somewhat insidiously, have transgressed Jewish ethical principles and differentially insulated themselves from the process. After all, who wants to get skewered by a firm’s top-level management committee? Nevertheless, how and in what ways this could have been avoided will be handicapped in the next section.

 

“It’s hard to beat a person who never gives up.”

—Babe Ruth (1895–1948)

 

            Rather than throw in the towel and walk away from our ethical dilemmas that, in reality, only serve to magnify the encountered problems sometimes often well beyond our ability to cope with them through Jewish strictures or even otherwise, we shall meet them head-on, but this requires navigating the labyrinth of Jewish principles, fortunately distilled down, by at least one notable writer, in ways that we can prescriptively apply in business. To refresh our memories here, it may be wise to recall some of the most basic principles of ethical behavior in the Jewish tradition, both generally and as applied to business, appeared to leave us handcuffed in situations involving our need to defend ourselves, point out ethical conflicts to others, and on a much larger scale, take positions that would protect the sanctity of the firm, its value, and the investment of its shareholders, whether they be public or private. We, as Jewish people and for some millennia, never gave up, and so, of course, we will not do so here under the premise, and in the presumptive hope, that somewhere, someplace in our literature, there are allowable formulations that fit business situations of modern-day society. To be sure, and with some statistical reference points, this writer assumed going into this project that there had to be. After all, our literature, as vast and comprehensive as it is, must have produced some broad parameters affording us guidance for today’s business ethical conflicts—it did for everything else.

            With that premise as an accurate backdrop, we developed three representative microcosms of ethically challenged situations in business that covered the corporate organizational gamut of possible root causes stemming from both where the pressure points were located and to where they would have the greatest effect. These were, just for review, the internal project team, the somewhat related salesperson-client relationships, and finally, the top-tier management level where macro decisions potentially affecting the global firm could, and indeed, do occur. To make life interesting here, let’s tear through them and, with the help of one reputable secondary source8 on Jewish ethics as applied to business, see just where we come out in our ability to tilt the windmills of Jewish strictures such that we, at once, adhere to our most basic principles, while at the same time defend both ourselves and the company itself from ethical assaults.

            Flying in the face of Jewish principles against speaking ill of others is the need, as explicated earlier, to defend oneself essentially in the office—when on the project team, such that it is—and when one’s efforts, input, and successful contributions are being minimized, demeaned, or simply ignored by those seeking to better themselves, financially more than anything else, at our expense. This happens all day long, all the time, virtually everywhere, and most especially when the financial remunerative stakes are highest. Concomitantly, however, someone once said that “academic politics are so ruthless because the stakes are so petty,” which gave credence to the inherently false notion that one need not be a multi-million-dollar-a-year Wall Street universe master to suffer the indignities inherent in the everyday working world. Whether one’s job is at stake or whether one’s income is at risk, one of the stranger, and surely sadder, results is that people in those very tough spots implicitly turn their backs on religion, particularly Judaism in which societal and religious ethical principles are so entwined, because of an overwhelming but unstated opinion that stepping up to the plate in self-defense and, as we shall see later, in defense of the corporation itself, is mutually exclusive with obeying and adhering to the basic principles of faith. One key message of this article is simply that nothing can be further from the truth.

            Consider this frontal assault, for example. Famed author Rabbi Joseph Telushkin, whose references will form the skeletal framework for this discussion states simply that “…in at least six circumstances, Jewish law permits, or even obligates us to lie, exaggerate, or otherwise mislead one another,”9 but these are for defensive purposes only it seems, and although rightly so, this does afford us some unusual, useful, and previously unrecognized ethical exemptions—and thankfully they do. “Lying in order to right a past wrong done to you”10 is permitted and “it would also seem to be permitted to deceive someone who has deceived you, in order to undo the damage.”11 He continues further that, “You may lie to people who have defrauded or stolen from you, in order to get your property returned.”12 For argument’s sake, then, it would seem more than obvious to even the most partisan observer that there are, in fact, protective measures we can apply in any business setting that, when taken together, afford us more than enough tools to deal with whatever ethical violations that have been thrust our way. We surely need not be shrinking violets in the competitive world of business for the sake of religion, because, strangely, our Judaism would not condone that response, to think through the problem with a kind of philosophical confirming inverse logic.

By far, the toughest road to hoe is in the sales-related spectrum of activity largely because that realm of interaction has within it a wide set of behavioral norms with greatly varying opportunities for ethical disagreements. Nonetheless, if we take as a given our previous position—namely, that we should treat each customer as an unknowledgeable client to avoid the exploitation of persons who simply do not know better—things begin to rapidly fall into the right ethical space. Indeed, “The Talmud says one may alter the truth or, if necessary, lie to save a person from being exploited.”13 Presumably, executing this dictum may involve turning the tables on oneself and one’s firm from a monetary standpoint, once in a while and in some form, in order to restrict the sales of unnecessary products and/or services, but making things far more palatable in this scenario may be the combinatorial overarching Jewish concept of not fostering on your colleague what you would not like done to you. Now, as a conceptual whole, this process seems to work as it was intended to do so long ago.

Cruising up the business ethical food chain, we have finally arrived at a point where those sweeping company-wide decisions of probable momentous magnitude collide with ethical boundaries that seem to be in a constant state of managerial flux. It is not really that the ethical parameters have been altered; rather, it is that the human mind tends to minimize the risks inherent in any course of action. Thus, the more comprehensive the strategic change is, the greater the attendant risk becomes—but the risk does not expand arithmetically. In statistical reality, its consequences increase exponentially. In other words, we can fool ourselves into thinking that the worst case scenario will be far less dramatic than would otherwise be the case, especially if we have something to gain if the best case comes to pass—a virtual universally accurate assumption. With the high-level project team in place, we are seemingly insulated from singular blame, but this cocoon-like existence can come home to ultimately roost—big time, as we have all witnessed over recent years. Indeed, this is one of the most far-reaching business-related ethical problems that those with the responsibility face, and some have abrogated their ethical obligations to a startling degree. However, adopting a lower-risk profile here is both doable and ethically critical.

What do Jewish strictures on business ethical behavior teach us about how to handle these more global implicated situations? Actually, a great deal, much of which has gone largely unnoticed in Jewish ethical business literature. However, at least one writer of repute has pinned this down to a concise degree. Apparently, correcting the ethical behavior of colleagues, in a group situation or otherwise, is incumbent on us all and actually trumps the basic Jewish stricture on public retribution, of all things. Rooted in the commandment that “You shall rebuke, yes rebuke, your fellow, and not bear sin because of him” (Leviticus 19:17), which implies that, when observing others behaving badly, we should, and indeed cannot, remain silent.14 Surely, compromising the financial stability of an organization eminently qualifies as such a condition. Even more interesting and infinitely more prescriptive is the second part of the commandment that implies we share in the that person’s misdeeds if we do not act to influence a change in behavior or decision-making.15 By way of useful explication, Rabbi Telushkin argues that this often overlooked commandment in Leviticus “is so significant that the Talmud teaches, ‘Jerusalem was destroyed because its citizens didn’t rebuke one another’ (Shabbbat 199b). Thus, no matter how elevated a society is—and Jerusalem has long been regarded as its premier city—if people don’t effectively critique each other’s ethical lapses, the society will deteriorate quickly.”16

 

“The business of America is business.”

President Calvin Coolidge (1882–1933)

 

            Touting the high business ethical standards demonstrated by Jews during the early years of the American Republic, Rev. Ezra Stiles, then President of Yale College, singled out Sephardic Jewish merchant Aaron Lopez (1735–1782) as one: “In honor and aptitude of commerce, there was never a trader in America equal to him. In business, he dealt with the highest degree of seriousness and clear-sightedness, showing always an affability in manner, a calm urbanity, and agreeable and sincere courtesy of manners.”17 Indeed, representative of a long-standing tradition in American Jewish business history running back to the time when the first Jewish pilgrims—23 of them in all—set foot on the soil of New Amsterdam in 1654 (about 120 years before the first shots were fired signaling a war that would give birth to the most powerful business-driven capitalist society ever on this earth), Jewish businessmen of great social standing and impeccable ethical credentials actually, when one examines modern business systems in an historical perspective, set the standards for today’s business context in Jewish terms. Consequently, we would be remiss in our responsibilities, both as historians and as analysts seeking prescriptive answers to the all-too-common ethical enigmas permeating business in our most modern society, if we did not pay at least some respect, however modest and in literary form, to those of our great Jewish American predecessors who, by dint of high character and fair business dealings, did so much for so many of us who came to the business and commerce tables long after them.

            Lopez was surely not a Jew alone in such stature during those early years as many others of similar character and prodigious but fair-dealing business acumen either preceded him or came soon in his wake. Isaac Moses in 1768, for instance and who later became Parnas of Congregation Shearith Israel—the first Jewish congregation in North America that was born from the small band of early settlers—was a founder of the New York Chamber of Commerce, while Sampson Simson, later a Parnas of the same synagogue, was instrumental in drafting the constitution of the Chamber of Commerce. Most notably, the New York Stock Exchange, America’s premier institution for the global trading of the securities of companies whose operations transcend its shores, had among its founders three prominent persons of Jewish descent and impeccable ethical reputations—Benjamin Mendes Seixas, Ephraim Hart, and Alexander Zuntz. Crossing business lines into the founding of the Republic, Haym Salomon, also of Shearith Israel, was a key financier of the American Revolution, raising money for George Washington and later helping to keep the new government financially afloat after it was created. There are many others who had a major hand in the early years of America’s business development, but the overall and significant input by Jews of celebratory business character into the incipient stages of a burgeoning free economy is a dynamic worthy of note: It set the stage for a melding of business, education, and scientific research leading to discoveries that now afford more than a modicum of protection for ourselves, our country, other countries that rely on us, and people of the Jewish faith.

Nowhere did early Jewish Americans of impeccable stature have more of a providential impact than in the founding of what would become Columbia University and that gave birth almost 200 years later to perhaps the most celebrated research department ever housed in one institution and one that would have the most profound impact on global history and, in reality, Jews the world over. The story, extracted here and stitched together in brief summary, begins with Rev. Gershom Mendes Seixas (1746–1816) of Congregation Shearith Israel who was one of the signatory incorporators of Kings College (later called Columbia College coinciding with the nation’s independence from Great Britain), and who served on its Board of Trustees from 1984 through 1815. While almost equally worthy of a consolidated note is the fact that Sampson Simson, mentioned above, graduated from Columbia in 1800, delivering the commencement address in Hebrew and underscoring the generally most conspicuously unrecognized importance of that language to members of the Colonial establishment.

Interesting though these historical tidbits may be, the gargantuan impact that this university had on the fate of the world did not come until the storm clouds of World War II emerged, when literally tens of the world’s most renown physicists, many of Jewish descent who, some having known each other in Europe’s high-powered universities and research centers, fled the rising tide of anti-Semitism in their home countries and huddled together in the basement of Pupin Physics Laboratory at Columbia University, while some there at the time had already received degrees in physics from that university. Nevertheless so astonishingly preeminent was Columbia’s Physics Department during the two decades or so, from the early 1930s to the 1950s, that we have to pause here just to digest a couple of intellectually overwhelming statistics. First and foremost, Columbia related physics faculty members accrued a galactic 13 Nobel prizes, and overall, the number of researchers hauling down Nobel prizes in physics who worked in the Department of Physics at Columbia at one time or another came to a mind-numbing total of 29. On top of those almost outrageous numerical facts, one has to consider that focusing on Nobel Prize recipients totally obscures the incalculable amount of ongoing ground-breaking research attendant to the success of all those individual efforts and the outlying research generally. Recounting all of these great physicists, especially the many who were of Jewish descent, is surely beyond the scope of article, but what most certainly is not, is the telling tale of the handful Jewish nuclear pioneers, with essentially pacifist scientific ethical values, who labored at Columbia and changed the face of the world as we know it to be today.

Although not as yet published, word leaked out to Columbia physicists—including the Jewish and future Nobel Prize winner, I.I. Rabi, working at Princeton University—that German chemists had concluded an experiment in “nuclear fission.” Returning to Columbia with the news, the physicists there conducted their own nuclear fission experiment, which was the first in the United States. The potential catastrophic possibility of what this force could engender was not lost on anyone, particularly if Germany found a way to harness its power before the United States. One Columbia research physicist, Leo Szilard—yet another Jewish refugee who held patents with both Einstein (Nobel, 1921) and Enrico Fermi of Columbia (Nobel, 1938) and is credited with many key physics-driven inventions of the twentieth century, but who never took home a Nobel because many others went on to finish his work—sought to influence the President to pursue research on nuclear weapons. Underscoring his predilection for the preservation of human life, Szilard nonetheless advocated that, once developed, the full-scale destructive power of the bombs should be demonstrated to the enemy first because of their potential to be employed against civilian populations. Szilard was advised to seek the help of Alexander Sachs, himself a Columbia College graduate, member of Congregation Shearith Israel, chief of the economic research division of the National Recovery Administration, and unofficial advisor to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but that the aid of the world’s most celebrated scientist of its time, the Jewish Albert Einstein, would be required. Einstein, also a life-long pacifist and opposed to the making of weapons, signed a letter in August 1939—drafted by Szilard and delivered by Sachs to the President—which referred to work done by Fermi and Szilard suggesting that the construction of bombs through a nuclear reaction could destroy vast areas. This apparently convinced President Roosevelt of the need to develop these weapons before Germany did. Eventually, the Manhattan Project was born to that end, the President appointed the Jewish physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer as its director of scientific research, and we all know how the story ended.

Lost to many observers of the nuclear research scene through to this day are the flagrantly positive scientific values and ethical underpinnings of the weapons story. Business as form of war is really where we begin to get into ethical trouble. Science here was pursued for the sake of scientific values and knowledge until it was found that we could also be staring death in the face—a reasonable way out of these specific ethical dilemmas according to every Jewish religious source that we know. No better tribute to these Jewish scientists of super-human talent could there be than that paid to Leo Szilard on the centenary of his birth in his native Hungary when he was hailed as “having an enduring passion for human life” and that he “personified the moral and ethical responsibilities of science,” especially having spent much of his time, in the wake of the war, attempting to diffuse, in metaphorical terms, the arms race itself.18

 

 

“And this is our motto: ‘In God is our trust.’”

—Francis Scott Key (1779–1843)

 

            Concluding any piece of exposition does not call for, and indeed should not entail, recapitulation in the classical sense of the term for many reasons. High on the list is the simple fact that what has been said has, in fact, been so, and as a result, there is no presumptive need for reiteration. Far more importantly, however, the way in which any argument has been laid bare for any readership inevitably entails linearity, that is to say, each section forms a composite whole, and when strung together, where we started often has little to do with where we ended up, so that to use terms employed in the systems dynamics field of thinking, there is no room for the rich information afforded by feedback loops, multiple interconnections, and other elements related to the complexities inherent in dynamic systems and, by analogy, literary discourse. Consequently, it is incumbent upon authors to put meat on the skeletal bones of an article, for instance, and rather than summarize—which many writers do—present the threads of commonality within the piece that not only hold the facts together in linear form, but also help the reader embrace the underlying non-linear linkages in the ongoing sections, which could not be done previously because the sections were, to argue in a somewhat uncharacteristically obvious fashion, linearly ongoing. This is an important major point, so we will come at the simultaneously entwined themes of Jewish business ethics in a secular society, as herein described, in a somewhat oblique way in order to precipitate out its fully formed meaning.

            As an inherent part of this methodology, we used a translational approach that entailed, as it normally does, attacking the problem from multiple angles or, more precisely, through a multi-disciplinary approach. As pure scientists in the burgeoning fields of nanotechnology, systems biology, computer science, electronics, and telecommunications—to name a few—will tell you, with little hesitation, that no complex problem was ever solved without the input of a diversely disciplined group. We even acknowledge this today in finance, economics, and its applications to the world’s capital markets. There is very little argument here. Its ethical counterpart in business and as it relates to Judaism, was approached in a similar way, not through rabbinical eyes, but rather from the standpoint of those who were, to coin a phrase, in its multitude of trenches and were there for a long time. This does not insure against bias, any more than any observer and/or participant can, but neither could rabbis and Jewish educators avoid their own innate predilections when studying whatever was served up on their research table. In this case at least, business ethics was seen from the perspective of those involved in business today or from a long term composite series of interactions in that medium of existence, and this attests, in some semi-scientific way, to its experimental validity. Although management by walking around is not the position advocated here, talking the talk while you are walking the walk certainly adds an unquantifiable measure of credibility.

            On both the religious and business sides of the ethical equation, we adapted a reductionist paradigm that allowed for the minimizing of ethical configurations to a definable number that could be completely envisioned by the human mind. This took into account, on the religious side, what we believe to be the ethical foundations of our faith that are basically rooted in how we should treat each other, simply stated. On the business side, we reduced the number of ethically challenged situations to those that involved our co-workers, our clients, and our firms. This approach stands in rather stark contrast to couching studies in Jewish business ethics by rooting them in specific biblical or talmudic examples of enormous numbers and multiplicity of circumstances, all barely replicable today. The framework that we employed echoes that of business scholars of great repute, while at the same time, it takes into account what neuroscientists have long since known and economists—from a behavioral standpoint—have now proven to be true, namely that there is a limit on what we our brains can process. Consequently, most of us are guided only by the most basic of religious strictures, and the ethical implications of that in business suggest that the application of religious, and in this case, Jewish ethical standards, are only useful when we can concretely define the business environments wherein they should apply.

            Cutting to the Jewish ethical business chase, we found a curious pattern. Instead of what would normally be considered rational ethical conduct from which we, as Jewish people, should derive more than a measure of sustenance in today’s widely acknowledged “dog-eat-dog” business world, what many have come to know as, and believe to be, the foundations of Jewish ethical behavior—business or otherwise—have built-in limitations of redress, to be rather pointed about it. This is when individuals stop believing, and it is here where religion falls off the proverbial cliff. People in business look no further in the literature to find countervailing principles and practices that would allow for some defense of themselves, their clients, and the companies for which they work. The reality is, however, that Jewish ethical business practices—whether they be biblically derived or otherwise—actually work, and do so surprisingly well, in contemporary society, when and if given the explanatory chance. Conveyance is the key to understanding first and application second.

We are also not sitting idly and prescriptively by in this article. If we cannot figure out what to do in ethically challenged situations as Jewish people in business, then we undoubtedly have many more problems than initially thought. From the top down, showing how minimizing risk is in the interest of company shareholders is one major part of the prescriptive puzzle as it has uniformly always been, but it appears never more so than today when its effect on the foundations of some of the largest financial institutions in the world was, and continues to be to some extent, at stake. Client focus with an emphasis on acknowledging what the client does not know rather than what our own or our firm’s ultimate interest is, in each instance and quite often, ends up to be not usually viewed as dichotomous as it should be. Finally, business project teams of all sorts and at all levels give rise to the kinds of corporate political power plays that often demand some type of defense, and we have found that we need not be defenseless while adhering to Jewish ethical principles of the most fundamental sort.

            In threading the translational needle even further, we also found that the waves of Jewish immigrants landing on America’s shores, beginning in the late nineteenth century, had predecessors with as deep roots in the country as any individuals who came before them, and they excelled in business and commerce, while still maintaining, and further attaining, the highest of ethical business standards. Through this contingent, which staked its claim in New Amsterdam in 1654, arose Congregation Shearith Israel—the only Jewish Congregation in New York until 1825—and that carried something of a mantle of responsibility in both disseminating information relating to the country’s distinguished Jewish heritage and also setting standards of worship and fair business dealings for which so many of its early members were so widely known. Moreover, if the system of research silos has long since been a concept restricted to distant memories, then the convergence of financial and scientific meltdowns is surely in the forefront of our ethical concerns, and here is where Jewish genius in the science of physics made sizable strides in balancing the greater of gains for the greater good, as discussed at length herein and for sound reasons. Rather than being interlopers onto American society, the reality is that Jewish Americans were inextricably entwined in its most early history, its development, and much later, in helping retain its standing in the world, both in terms of economic and military power—all of which has, and will continue to, go far in protecting us and our heritage. Much of this has stemmed from the ability to carry on ethical fair dealings in business, which has, by and large, kept the American capital system on a steady course, with the requisite and expected mid-course corrections for which human beings bear the ultimate responsibility.

            One of the truly unusually accepted aspects of about roughly one-half of the year’s Monday mornings in America—the location of the world’s business heartbeat—is that one can quarterback with a clarity of focus unbeknownst to the Western world or to any world for that matter, and for many, the same activity also takes place during the remainder of the year with a continuing certainty. No ethical prescription is failsafe, to be sure, and requesting forgiveness, especially in business ethical transgressions, is as natural a part of Judaism as any other rite, and its pervasiveness is as sweeping as are the business-related underpinnings of virtually every society on earth today. However, the world’s accumulated pantheon of logic dictates that we look for answers to ethical paradoxes in the totality of Jewish literature when they are not in easy reach in order to avoid giving sway to what may be most financially beneficial to us in the immediate term. At the same time and in many cases, we should seek Jewish prescriptive practices that prevent ourselves and our families from being vulnerable to what many would consider to be patterns of business conduct that are not as ethical as they could notably be. In any event and to conclude, perhaps the most appropriate coda to this article and one that helps to hammer home some of its more salient points is a line in the fourth verse of the American National Anthem—often song, while standing and at the close of select dinners in Jewish homes, because the verse includes the words: “In God is our trust,”19 and indeed, it should ultimately be.

 

Notes:

 

1Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise (Boston: M.I.T. Press, 1962), 1–17.

2Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 198.

3John D. Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000).

4The reason that our behavioral reductionism may be mathematically well-founded is noted here in oppositely conjoined sentences. For example: “The possible ranges of behavior [for physical, biological, and social systems (inserted by author’s reference)] even for a simple system of three equations is enormous…The most general three-dimensional differential equation system with quadratic right-hand sides has 30 parameters, so graphs or tables of its eigenvalues for Jacobian matrices at the fixed points is utterly impractical.”

From: Foster Morrison, The Art of Modeling Dynamic Systems: Forecasting Chaos, Randomness, and Determinism (Dover, 1991, 2008), 268.

5For a broad discussion of these principles, see: Rabbi Hayim Halevy Donin, To Be A Jew: A Guide to Jewish Observance in Contemporary Life (Selected and Complied from the Shulhan Arukh and Responsa Literature and Providing a Rational for the Laws and Traditions) (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

6See: Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980), and Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

7Alfred Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value: The New Standard for Business Performance (New York: Free Press, 1986). (No known relation to the author of this article.)

8Rabbi Joseph Telushkin, A Code of Jewish Ethics: Volume 1—You Shall Be Holy (New York: Bell Tower, 2006).

9Ibid., 423.

10Ibid.

11Ibid., 435.

12Ibid.

13Ibid., 434.

14Ibid., 380.

15Ibid.

16Ibid.

17For a complete review of Jewish American history as seen through the eyes of the members of Congregation Shearith Israel, see the following remarkably well-done book from which some of the material in this section is drawn: Rabbi Marc D. Angel, PhD, Remnant of Israel: A Portrait of America’s First Jewish Congregation—Shearith Israel (New York: Riverside Book Company, Inc., 2004.

18William Lanouette, quoted in The New York Times, March 20, 1998, “Hungarian Fingerprints All Over the 20th Century,” from the Budapest Journal. See also: William Lanouette and Bela Silard, Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard: The Man Behind the Bomb (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992).

19An acknowledgement is due here to the Neumarks: Debby and Mel, and Susan and Avery.

The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of any institution or individual, named or unnamed with which the author has been, is now, or will be affiliated, and these opinions can change over time. The information and examples used here are hypothetical, employed for illustrative purposes only, and do not represent the views, activities, or organizational arrangements of any particular firm, division, department, employee, or former or prospective one or individual. Any similarity discerned is a matter of coincidence.

 

 

 

Truth and Consequences: A Talmudic Tale on Interpersonal Ethics

 

 

Introduction

 

Truth is a core ethical value in Judaism; indeed, it is God's seal.  Yet, as most people know from their own experiences, the consequences of remaining loyal to the ideal of truth are not always comfortable and often involve sacrifice and suffering.  One such talmudic tale illustrates this well.  It is worth bringing it together from its scattered sources to understand not only the importance of truth, but the hierarchy of some of the ethical values that compete with each other.

 

R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus (Pirkei d'Rabbi Eliezer 1)

 

Our story involves four main characters, all prominent among the second generation of Tanaaim (about 90-130 CE).  The chief protagonist is R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, and we are best acquainted with him via a story concerning his intro­duction to Torah study. 

 

His father Hyrcanus was a very rich man with many arable fields, but his son appears on stage weeping as he ploughs a stony plot.  His father tries to comfort him by offering an arable plot to cultivate but Eliezer finds no solace in the offer.  He tells his father, "All I want is to study Torah."

 

Hyrcanus, ever the businessman, is not inspired by his son's career goals: "Please," he tells him.  "You're twenty-eight years old!  It's time to get married, have children, and take them to school."  Yet Eliezer is not deterred and goes off to Jerusalem to study Torah with Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai.

 

Eliezer's brothers are resentful that Eliezer will spend his productive time in the beit medrash while they will continue to generate wealth through their work. They therefore encourage their father to go to Jerusalem to disinherit the young Torah scholar.  Sharing their disdain, Hyrcanus goes to Jerusalem to make the necessary legal arrangements.  When he gets there, he finds everyone crowded around a young scholar dazzling the audience with his erudition and scholarship. Discovering that it was his son Eliezer who was the subject of such acclaim, he reassesses his position and offers to disinherit his other sons in favor of Eliezer.

 

R. Eliezer declines the offer, proclaiming that he never desired wealth. 

 

 

I asked the Holy One, Blessed Be He, only that I be worthy to learn the Torah, as it is said, "Therefore I esteem all precepts concerning all things to be right; and I hate every false way" (Psalms 119:128).

 

This abhorrence of falsehood will trail R. Eliezer throughout the rest of his life.

 

Rabban Gamliel and R. Yehoshua (Mishna Rosh HaShanna 2:8-9)

 

The next two dramatis personae are R. Gamliel (successor to Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, Nasi and head of the Academy) and R. Yehoshua.  We meet them as the court is meeting to set the date of the new month.

 

Nowadays, we know if a Jewish month has twenty‑nine or thirty days by looking in a calendar.  Originally, though, the new month was proclaimed by the Court based on the testimony of witnesses who reported seeing the new moon.  If they appeared on the twenty-ninth of the month, the next day was Rosh Hodesh; otherwise, the month would have thirty days.

 

The rabbis were competent astronomers.  They were well prepared to examine the witnesses, knowing in advance where in the sky the sliver of the new moon should have appeared.  One month, Rabban Gamliel accepted the testimony of witnesses whose description was faulty but R. Yehoshua thought that they should have been rejected.  Thus R. Gamliel and R. Yehoshua differed on when the new month had begun.  And because it was the month of Tishrei, they therefore had different views on which day the tenth of the month --Yom Kippur-- would fall.

 

Sensing a challenge to his authority, R. Gamliel ordered R. Yehoshua to appear before him with his walking stick and moneybag in hand on the day R. Yehoshua thought to be Yom Kippur.  R. Akiva, sensitive the moral dilemma faced by R. Yehoshua, sought him out and argued that what was at stake was not the truth of the date of Yom Kippur but the integrity of the judicial system as a whole.  R. Yehoshua was convinced by his argument that there was a value more important then the simple truth.  He therefore R. Yehoshua complied with R. Gamliel's order, and was received by the latter with respect and affection.

 

R. Eliezer's student Akiva (Sanhedrin 101a)

 

It was characteristic of R. Akiva‑‑the final actor in our drama‑‑to bring people around.  He knew he was able to say what he thought had to be said in a manner that made it possible for him to be heard‑‑and he was bold enough to use his talents in conversation with anyone, including his teacher.

 

 

When R. Eliezer took ill, his students went to visit him.  He said to them, "There must be great [divine] anger in the world."  [Otherwise, there is no other explanation for R. Eliezer's suffering, as he felt that he could not have committed any sin the punishment for which include such pain.]

 

The students started to cry, but R. Akiva laughed.  They said to him, "Why are you laughing?"  He said to them, "Why are you crying?"  They replied, "Can we see a sefer Torah suffering so and not cry?"  He answered them, "But that is why I laugh! As long as I had seen our rebbe suffer no ill in this world,  I feared that, God forbid, he had received all of his reward in this world. But now that I see him suffering, I am glad [because he will receive his full reward in the world to come]."

 

R. Eliezer understood well the significance of R.Akiva's comment.  What seemed to be an attempt to comfort him for his suffering was also a reprimand for his hubris.  There was a cause for his suffering, and it was neither divine wrath nor premature reward for his many merits.

 

He said to him, "Akiva, is it really possible that I have not fully observed the whole Torah?"

 

He responded, "Our master, you yourself have taught us, 'There is not one righteous man on earth who does [only] good and does not sin' (Ecclesiastes 7:20)."

 

R. Akiva is prepared to confront even his teacher with the truth, and he had the diplomatic facility to do so in a way that could be accepted.  But such skills are laudable only when used in the service of truth, as we shall soon see.

 

Thus the stage is set and we know our characters well.  R. Eliezer will countenance no untruth.  He holds everyone, including himself, to this standard and allows himself to be criticized even by his student when it is appropriate.  R. Gamliel, on the other hand, will tolerate no challenge.  If necessary, even truth must bend to his authority.  R. Yehoshua is willing to submit to that authority, even at the expense of his own public persona.  R. Akiva too will champion halakhic policy, and he is convinced that his interper­sonal talents will enable him to bring others along.  Each is ready to play his part in one of the most dramatic of Talmudic scenes.

 

The Oven of Achnai (Bava Metsia 59b)

 

The curtain rises on our four protagonists as they are arguing whether or not an oven built in a particular fashion can become ritually impure.  The majority felt that it could--and therefore should be destroyed so that it not defile others‑‑ but R. Eliezer felt that they were wrong.

 

 

That day R. Eliezer answered all of their challenges but he could not convince them.  He said to them, "If I am right, this carob tree will prove it."  The carob tree got up and moved a hundred ammot --some say it was four hundred ammot.  They said, "One cannot bring a proof from a carob tree."

 

He said, "If I am right, this stream of water will prove it."  The waters flowed backward, but they replied, "One cannot bring a proof from a stream of water."

 

He came back at them and said, "If I am right, let the walls of the beit medrash prove it."  The walls started to cave in, but R. Yehoshua stepped in.  "If talmidei hakhamim are arguing a point," he said, "why are you butting in?"  The walls would not fall out of respect to R. Yehoshua but would not straighten out of respect to R. Eliezer.  And they remain standing that way to this very day!

 

Finally, R. Eliezer said, "If I am right, let the heavens prove it."  A heavenly voice --a bat kol-- declared, "What do you want with R. Eliezer?  The halakha is like him in every matter!" 

 

But even this divine confirmation of the truth of R. Eliezer's position was not convincing.  R. Yehoshua stood up and proclaimed that the verse "It is not in heaven" rebuts the authority of the bat kol.  Once the Torah was given we follow the majority rule even if it is incorrect! 

 

R. Yehoshua, of course, was demanding of R. Eliezer only what he himself had conceded long ago: the integrity of the halakhic system is of paramount importance, not the abstract truth of any particular ruling.  And, in our story, none other than Elijah the prophet confirms that this is the divine will.

 

R. Natan met Elijah and asked him, "What was the Holy One, Blessed Be He, doing then?"  He replied, "He was laughing with satisfaction, saying, 'My children have defeated me.'"

 

This part of the story, which establishes the democratization of the halakhic process and the rejection of the oracle, is well known and needs no elucidation here.  What concerns us, though, is the sequel to the incident, after R. Eliezer has apparently left without conceding.

 

The Aftermath (Ibid.)

 

That day they burned everything [that had come into contact with the oven and] which R. Eliezer had declared to be pure.  Then they excommunicated him.

 

 

R. Akiva was sure that he could finesse this situation as he had when R. Yehoshua had differed with the majority and R. Eleizer could not see past his own self-righteousness.  He offered to inform his teacher of the situation "lest someone else go and elicit a violent reaction."  No doubt he thought he could help R. Eliezer see the necessity of submitting to the will of the majority and by that set the stage for his return to the community of scholars.

 

He dressed in black and sat four ammot away from R. Eliezer, as required when meeting an excommunicated person.  R. Eliezer sensed that something was wrong, and in answer to his question, R. Akiva informed him of the situation.

 

If R. Akiva thought he had the savoir‑faire to either bring R. Eliezer along or at least calm him, he was wrong.

 

R. Eliezer's eyes filled with tears and one third of the crops of olives, wheat and barley disappeared.  Some say the dough that women were kneading soured.  Everything that R. Eliezer stared at that day burned!

 

R. Eliezer might have been wrong, but he sensed he had been wronged --and he knew who was responsible.

 

R. Gamliel was in a boat and a tidal wave threatened to drown him.  He said, "This is all because of R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus."  He stood up and declared, "Ribbono shel Olam, you know that I acted not out of concern for my honor or that of my family, but only for Your honor, that there not be disagreements in Israel!"

 

The waters settled in divine confirmation that R. Gamliel was right.  But R. Eliezer's pain was not settled.

 

R. Eliezer was married to R. Gamliel's sister, and she understood the situation well.  She watched over her husband, making sure that he not add his personal prayers --tahanunim-- after the daily Amida. She knew what would be the content of those prayers, and she was out to protect her brother.

 

One day she was diverted from her mission.  Some say it was because she mistakenly thought it was Rosh Hodesh (when tahanunim could not be said) and some say she went to give bread to a poor beggar who appeared at her door.  And whether it was ‑‑ironically‑‑ confusion over the date of Rosh Hodesh or the hessed demands of feeding the poor that allowed her to be distracted, when she returned she found her husband saying tahanunim

 

"You've killed my brother," she said.  And at that instant they heard the shofar sound from R. Gamliel's house announcing his death.

 

 

"How did you know," he asked her.

 

She replied, "We have a family tradition that all the gates of prayer may be closed, except the one for those who cry out in anguish."

 

Truth must sometimes give way to the integrity of the halakhic process.  But nothing permits creating unnecessary anguish.  R. Gamliel may have been justified in insisting on the rule of the majority, but he had apparently reacted cruelly in confronting R. Eliezer.  R. Akiva could not smooth this over.  R. Eliezer could not overlook it. 

 

The Visit (Sanhedrin 68a)

 

Our story has an interesting epilogue, one that adds a penetrating dimension to the interrelationship of the protagonists.

 

When R. Eliezer took ill, R. Akiva and his colleagues came to visit him.  He was lying on his canopied bed, and they stood outside.

 

While the group, as we shall soon see, included R. Yehoshua (who was older than R. Akiva), the delegation is referred to as "R. Akiva and his colleagues,"  not "the students of R. Eliezer," as was the case years before when the ill R. Eliezer was visited by his students.  Here, R. Akiva has organized this visit and we --as will R. Eliezer-- might well wonder as to its purpose.

 

It was just before Shabbat and Hyrcanus his son came in to remove his tefillin [which cannot be worn on Shabbat].  He yelled at Hyrcanus, who left in anger, telling the awaiting group that his father had apparently grown senile. 

 

Hearing this, R. Eliezer retorted, "It is you and your mother who are senile!  You worry about a rabbinic violation [wearing tefillin on Shabbat] and ignore a biblical violation [by putting off lighting the candles until the last minute when Shabbat itself may be violated]."

 

Seeing that he was in possession of his faculties, the group of rabbis went in, but sat four ammot away from him, as he was in excommunication.

 

"Why have you come," he asked.

 

"To learn Torah," they replied.

 

"And where have you been until now?"

 

"We had no time," they answered.

 

 

Such a feeble response must have angered R. Eliezer, as he quickly retorted in what was something of a curse and not simply prophecy, "I think you all shall not die a natural death!"  He was right, and the description of the torturous end these rabbis suffered is incorporated into the Ashkenazic Yom Kippur Musaf.

 

R. Akiva, however, still seems sure of his special relationship with R. Eliezer.

 

R. Akiva said, "But what shall be my end?"

 

"Yours shall be the worst of all," was the curt reply.

 

R. Eliezer then falls into a lament filled with pathos.

 

He took his two arms and put them over this heart and said, "Woe to these arms that are like a closed sefer Torah.  I learned much Torah and taught much Torah.  I learned much Torah and yet acquired only as much as a dog does when it laps up water.  I taught much Torah but gave over only as much as the brush picks up from the palate.  I knew three hundred halakhot in the abstruse area of negaim and no one ever asked me about them!  And I knew three hundred halakhot ‑‑some say he said three thousand-- in the area of planting cucumbers and no one ever asked me about them except Akiva ben Yosef."

 

Continuing to reminisce about a time long ago when Rabbi Akiva was simply his student "Akiva ben Yosef," he recalls:

 

Once I was walking with Akiva and he asked me, "Rebbe, teach me about planting cucumbers [through magic]."  I said a few words and the field filled with cucumbers.  He said, "Rebbe, teach me how to harvest them [by magic]." I said a few words and all the cucumbers were collected in one place.

 

The visitors regain their composure and try to take control of the conversation:

 

"What is the law regarding hakadur vehaimus, vehakameia, utsror hamar­galiyot, umishkolet ketana?"  [We shall not explicate these various categories here, because their significance lies not in their details but in something else to which we shall momentarily turn.]  He replied, "Impure."  "And what about the minal she-al gabei haimus," they continued. "Pure," he replied.  And when he said "Pure," he died.

 

R. Yehoshua then stood up and said, "Hutar haneder.  The excommunication is lifted."

 

 

The key to understanding the purpose of their visit is found in the questions that they posed.  As Rashi comments, these issues are the very ones that divided R. Eliezer from the rabbis in previous debates before the final break over the Oven of Achnai.  And the answers he gave here are the very same ones he had given years ago in disagreeing with his colleagues.

 

Why did they ask these questions?  Could they have thought that R. Eliezer, after suffering so much because he "hated every false way," would change his position at the end of his life and adopt a decision he thought to be false?  They could not possibly have hoped that he would reject his whole way of life in exchange for lifting his excommunication.  And if he did not recant, why did they lift the excommunication?  After all, "If an excommunicated person dies while still excommunicated, a stone is placed on his coffin" (Mishna Eduyot 5:6).

 

It must be that the Rabbis had come to realize that they had erred in the way they treated R. Eliezer.  They therefore had come to apologize and lift the excommunication.  Indeed, it is not surprising that it was R. Yehoshua, he who had originally urged R. Eliezer to conform, who lifted the excommunication.  R. Yehoshua had apparently been transformed by the uprising against R. Gamliel and his tactics.

 

The Deposing of R. Gamliel (Berakhot 27b-28a)

 

It happened that a student once asked R. Yehoshua if the evening prayers are obligatory or voluntary in nature.  "It is voluntary," he replied.  He then went to R. Gamliel with the same question and he answered that is obligatory.  "But," responded the student, "R. Yehoshua told me it was voluntary."  R. Gamleil did not respond but told him to wait until the rabbis come in to the beit medrash and sit down.

 

When they came in, the student asked his question again.  R. Gamliel replied as before.  "Is there anyone who disagrees," he asked his colleagues.  "No," replied R. Yehoshua. 

 

"But," R. Gamliel challenged him, "I heard you said it was voluntary."

 

"Yehoshua," he commanded (omitting the honorific "Rabbi"), "stand up to face your accuser!"  R. Yehoshua stood up and admitted that he cannot deny an accuser who was present and able to testify.

 

R. Gamliel sat and continued his lecture while R. Yehoshua remained standing ‑‑until the assemblage demanded that Hutspit the Meturgamin stop translating R. Gamliel's discourse.

 

"How long shall we allow R. Gamliel to torture R. Yehoshua," they demanded.  And they removed R. Gamliel from office.

 

 

This event no doubt transformed R. Yehoshua.   He had allowed himself to be humiliated by R. Gamliel because he thought that was what the halakha required of him.  It took his colleagues to bring him to the realization that R. Gamliel was no longer acting in support of the system but in support of his ego.

 

The uprising humbled R. Gamliel and emboldened R. Yehoshua.  When R. Gamliel subsequently went to him to apologize, he noted in surprise that R. Yehoshua's walls were blackened with coal, indicating that R. Yehoshua was a poor coalman.  "Woe to the generation that has you as a leader," he retorted, "because you never took the time to learn how hard your colleagues have to work to earn a living!"

 

R. Gamliel manages to mollify R. Yehoshua, and when R. Akiva realizes that R. Yehoshua had in fact been appeased, he offers to go with him to inform R. Gamliel that he was to be reinstated. 

 

In planning this final visit to R. Eliezer, R. Akiva, true to character, must have seized the opportunity to organize a delegation to lift the excommunication ‑‑and he understood that now R. Yehoshua would be willing to go along. 

 

R. Akiva realized that R. Eliezer was too principled to either abandon his position or accept anything other than a fully honest retraction on their part. 

We can well imagine R. Akiva mapping out the meeting in his mind.  R. Eliezer is eager to teach Torah; that is his whole life.  "We have come to learn Torah," they shall tell him, and then ask him about his old areas of disagreement.  He undoubtedly will maintain his position, and they will then apologize for tormenting him for his principled stand and lift the excommunication.

 

But God has a special punishment for those who wait too long to apologize.  R. Eliezer had grown mordant for having been deserted by his colleagues --and especially by his close student Akiva.  They could not respond quickly enough to his acidic reaction to their visit.  When they finally can pull themselves together, it is too late.  When he answers "Pure," he dies before they can have their say.

 

The Curtain Falls (Sanhedrin 68a)

 

One can imagine R. Akiva's response.  He had waited too long and his teacher had died bitter, thinking he had been forsaken by all his colleagues and his student too.  The gates of prayer are never closed to those who cry out in anguish.  Truth is important.  Halakha is important.  Loyalty is indispensable.   

 

That Saturday night R. Akiva met R. Eliezer's funeral procession as it was going from Casearea to Lod.  He was beating himself until blood flowed.  He stood to eulogize him and said [as Elisha said of Elijah], "'Oh father, father! Israel's chariots and horsemen!' (II Kings 2:12).  I have many coins but no moneychanger to turn them into currency."

 

Afterword

 

So ends the Talmudic tale of Torah giants trying to balance the competing ethical demands of dedication to truth, commitment to collegiality, modesty in communal leadership. faithfulness to halakha, and loyalty to ones teachers… a challenge to them and an ever-present challenge to us.

 

 

This event  no doubt transformed R. Yehoshua.   He had allowed himself to be humiliated by R. Gamliel because he thought that was what the halakha required of him.  It took his colleagues to bring him to the realization that R. Gamliel was no longer acting in support of the system but in support of his ego.

 

The uprising humbled R. Gamliel and emboldened R. Yehoshua.  When R. Gamliel subsequently went to him to apologize, he noted in surprise that R. Yehoshua's walls were blackened with coal, indicating that R. Yehoshua was a poor coalman.  "Woe to the generation that has you as a leader," he retorted, "because you never took the time to learn how hard your colleagues have to work to earn a living!"

 

R. Gamliel manages to mollify R. Yehoshua, and when R. Akiva realizes that R. Yehoshua had in fact been appeased, he offers to go with him to inform R. Gamliel that he was to be reinstated. 

 

In planning this final visit to R. Eliezedr, R. Akiva, true to character, must have seized the opportunity to organize a delegation to lift the excommunication ‑‑and he understood that now R. Yehoshua would be willing to go along. 

 

R. Akiva realized that R. Eliezer was too principled to either abandon his position or accept anything other than a fully honest retraction on their part. 

We can well imagine R. Akiva mapping out the meeting in his mind.  R. Eliezer is eager to teach Torah; that is his whole life.  "We have come to learn Torah," they shall tell him, and then ask him about his old areas of disagreement.  He undoubtedly will maintain his position, and they will then apologize for tormenting him for his principled stand and lift the excommunication.

 

But God has a special punishment for those who wait too long to apologize.  R. Eliezer had grown mordant for having been deserted by his colleagues --and especially by his close student Akiva.  They could not respond quickly enough to his acidic reaction to their visit.  When they finally can pull themselves together, it is too late.  When he answers "Pure," he dies before they can have their say.

 

The Curtain Falls (Sanhedrin 68a)

 

One can imagine R. Akiva's response.  He had waited too long and his teacher had died bitter, thinking he had been forsaken by all his colleagues and his student too.  The gates of prayer are never closed to those who cry out in anguish.  Truth is important.  Halakha is important.  Loyalty is indispensable.   

 

That Saturday night R. Akiva met R. Eliezer's funeral procession as it was going from Casearea to Lod.  He was beating himself until blood flowed.  He stood to eulogize him and said [as Elisha said of Elijah], "'Oh father, father! Israel's chariots and horsemen!' (II Kings 2:12).  I have many coins but no moneychanger to turn them into currency."

 

Afterword

 

So ends the Talmudic tale of Torah giants trying to balance the competing ethical demands of dedication to truth, commitment to collegiality, modesty in communal leadership. faithfulness to halakha, and loyalty to ones teachers.  A challenge to them and an ever-present challenge to us.

 

 

February Report of our National Scholar, Rabbi Hayyim Angel

To our members and friends,

We have a very exciting winter semester of classes with the Institute. Here is a brief schedule:

 

Wednesday, February 15, 7:00-8:00pm: Double book reception for my two new books:

Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi: Prophecy in an Age of Uncertainty (Maggid Press): A systematic and readable commentary on Israel's last prophets in their historical setting. The commentary integrates the best of classical rabbinic and contemporary academic scholarship. Gain insight into these Second Temple prophetic works, as well as Ezra-Nehemiah and Esther. This commentary is part of the acclaimed Maggid Press Tanakh series that presents high-level traditional commentary in a manner that is accessible to people of all backgrounds.

 

Increasing Peace Through Balanced Torah Study. Conversations 27 (Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals): Our newest issue of Conversations contains essays by Rabbi Hayyim Angel on some of the central religious values promoted by our Institute. The diversity of traditional opinions pertaining to critical religious matters such as dogma and taking the Bible literally, the wisdom of Sephardic and Ashkenazic teachings and how they enlighten all Jews, contemporary approaches to afterlife and religious extremism, conversion, the integration of tradition and scholarship, and many other issues are developed in this new volume.

 

The book reception will be held on Wednesday evening, February 15, from 7:00-8:00 pm, at Congregation Kehilath Jeshurun (125 East 85th Street, between Park-Lexington Avenues in Manhattan). Free and open to the public.

Copies of the commentary on Haggai-Zechariah-Malachi will be available for purchase and signing.

Everyone who attends will receive a complimentary copy of the new issue of Conversations.

 

Navigating Nach: A Survey of the Prophets

Winter session (Proverbs, Job, Five Megillot) February 1, 8, 22; March 1, 8, 15, 22.

Co-sponsored by the Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals and Congregation Kehilath Jeshurun

Wednesdays from 7:00-8:00pm, at Congregation Kehilath Jeshurun, 125 East 85th Street (between Park and Lexington Avenue)

Previous lectures from this series are on our website, jewishideas.org, at Online Learning.

The course is taught at a high scholarly level but is accessible to people of all levels of Jewish learning. Newcomers always welcome. Free and open to the public.

 

Yeshiva University Community Beit Midrash: “Prophecy in the Second Temple Era”
 

Six Wednesdays 11:45-12:45: February 8, 15, 22, March 1, 8, 15, at Stern College for Women in midtown (classes are for adults).

This series will examine themes in the biblical books of the Second Temple Period. Insights into the critical period of restoration and the simultaneous decline of prophecy will be developed. Learn how strikingly relevant these books are to our modern age. Topics include: 

 

Ezra: A Miracle of History

Haggai:  Imminent Potential for Redemption

Zechariah: God is Hidden, but Ready to Reveal Himself

Esther - What They Didn’t Teach Us in Day School

Ezra and Nehemiah: Different Models of Leadership

Malachi: The End of Prophecy and Transition to the Rabbinate. 

 

For registration information, contact Rabbi Aryeh Czarka ([email protected]).

 

Lamdeinu Teaneck: Megillat Esther and the Haggadah

Six Mondays, 1:00pm-2:15pm: February 6, 13, 27 on the Megillah. March 20, 27, April 3 on the Haggadah.

Megillat Esther: As one of the biblical texts most familiar to us, the Megillah actually is one of the most difficult books to learn in depth. Precisely because of our prior education, it is challenging to look at the text to see what it is teaching. In this three-part mini-series, we will critically examine several assumptions that often accompany us as we learn the Megillah, and then attempt to uncover the messages of the text.

Haggadah: We are accustomed to treating the Haggadah as a text, when it is in fact a compendium of many texts. In this three-part mini-series, we will consider the various texts that comprise the Haggadah in their contexts, and then see how they are woven into a spectacular tapestry that helps convey the story of Pesah.

Classes are held at Congregation Beth Aaron, 950 Queen Anne Road in Teaneck. For registration information, go to http://www.lamdeinu.org/.

 

Teacher Training

I am teaching a ten-part series to the Honors Rabbinical Students at Yeshiva University, on Teaching Bible in Synagogues. The goal is to expose students to some of the challenges and opportunities in synagogue education, and to bring traditional Bible study to a contemporary, educated audience.  

I also have been working with the Bible faculty at the Community Hebrew Academy of Toronto (CHAT) on developing a new curriculum that integrates traditional and contemporary scholarship in a manner that is relevant and meaningful to High School students.

 

College Campus

On Thursday evening, February 9, I will speak to students at New York University on the interrelationship between traditional and academic Bible study. This program is sponsored by the Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals.

 

On January 14, I presented the third and final installment of the History at Home lectures at Congregation Kehilath Jeshurun. All three lectures are on our website at Online Learning.

On January 15, I presented at the “Torah in the City” program at Citi Field hosted by the Orthodox Union. Nearly 1500 people were in attendance at this remarkable day of learning. They intend to post videos of all the lectures over the coming weeks at ou.org.

 

As always, I am grateful to our members and supporters who enable us to carry out our educational programs, teacher trainings, campus lectures, and publications to disseminate our Institute’s vision far and wide.

Rabbi Hayyim Angel

National Scholar

Book Review: "Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi: Prophecy in an Age of Uncertainty"

Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi: Prophecy in an Age of Uncertainty, By Hayyim Angel, Maggid Books, 2016.

Reviewed by Rabbi Dr. Israel Drazin

Very few people know much about the three final prophets Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi. They do not know when they lived, what they said, what kind of contribution they made to the Jewish people, if their impact is still felt today, did they work together, what was their relationship to Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Mordechai, and Daniel, did they work with any of these people, when did these latter people live? Many know that the three prophets functioned during the second temple period, but do not know exactly when. Was it around 516 BCE when the second temple was built or a century or two later. Some people know the tradition that they were the last of the prophets even though the Bible itself does not say this, but what was prophecy, why did it end, what impact did the end of prophecy have upon Judaism when it stopped, and what is the end of prophecy’s impact today? Did these three prophets or any of the three prophesy that a messiah would come? What did they say about the future, and did they say what they said clearly? What was the role of the Torah in the second temple period?

Rabbi Hayyim Angel answers these and many more questions in his very informative, easy to read, relatively short, but to the point book. Rabbi Angel is a highly respected teacher, lecturer, and author. I have read many of his articles and books and enjoyed everything he has written. I have quoted him often in my own books and people told me they liked his ideas, his insights, and the way he presented them. I think that everyone will have this reaction to this book.

Rabbi Angel had a difficult task before him as he wrote this book because certain sections of Zechariah are nearly impossible to decipher. Rashi, ibn Ezra, and Radak preface their commentaries by stating how challenging it is to understand what the prophet is saying. Even parts of the other prophets’ words are unclear. But, as I wrote, Angel fulfills his task, and does so with verve. He integrates traditional and contemporary scholarship. He tells us that to better understand the three prophets, we need to understand what occurred to Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Mordecai, and Daniel, and especially the general history of the time.

He writes: “Many of the issues the prophets dealt with are also strikingly relevant in the modern period.” We read that many Jews chose to remain in the diaspora after being expelled from Israel when the temple and the country was destroyed in 586 BCE. They did not return to Zion in 538 BCE when the Persian king allowed the return. Only 42,360 people came home. “In the medieval system of chapter breaks in our printed Tanakhs, there are 929 chapters. Of these, 129 – or roughly one eighth – are comprised of Second Temple books.” The books of Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi have only nineteen chapters. This is one reason why we need a scholar such as Rabbi Angel to explain what is happening during this period.

This was a time when Israel was impoverished, the rebuilt temple was small and far from lavish, the ark was missing, Jews had understood that a messianic redemption would return. They read this promise into past prophecies. But what they saw and felt was far from what they expected. Judea, as the land was called at this time, was only a tiny vassal state in the vast, powerful, and pagan Persian Empire. Tosaphot Yevamot 50a and Malbim explain the failure of the prophecies to be fulfilled: “Prophecy predicts what should happen, but not necessarily what will happen.”

Hagai focused his prophecy on encouraging his nation to build a temple despite the existing problems. Zechariah, speaking to the people when they resumed building the temple, consoles his disillusioned co-religionists and calls upon them to act properly and cease behaving as their ancestors. He addressed a broad range of issues pertaining to the new harsh political reality with eight difficult to understand visions. He answered questions such as, since we returned to Israel, should we continue the fasts we instituted to remember the destruction of Israel and its temple; and is God continuing to reject us because of our bad behavior?

The traditional view contained in commentaries such as Radak and Abarbanel, which is not clearly in the Bible, is that Malachi was the last of the prophets. There is also no biblical statement that prophecy no longer exists. Angel writes, “it is likely that he was [the last prophet].” Angel states “it appears he prophesied one or two generations after Haggai and Zechariah.” We do not know if Malachi was the prophet’s name. The word means “messenger” and may describe the man’s mission. The Babylonian Talmud Megilah 15a, identifies him as Mordecai. The Targum states he was Ezra. And there are other opinions. Be this as it may, it is fascinating and insightful to read Angel’s discussion of this issue since it enhances our understanding of the history of the time and how prophets functioned.

Malachi condemned the behavior of the priests who were leading Israel away from God. He also condemned intermarriage, a subject not mentioned by Hagai and Zechariah, although mentioned by Ezra and Nehemiah. Malachi’s final prophecy, which is the Bible’s final prophecy, is “I will send the prophet Elijah to you before the coming of the awesome, fearful day of the Lord.”

Who is this Elijah? Is he the man who existed centuries before Malachi? Is he the person who the book calls Malachi? What is his mission? What is the “awesome, fearful day of the Lord”? Is this a prophecy of the messianic age? As with much else spoken by the three prophets, these final words are opaque, but we learn much by reading Angel’s interpretation of the final prophet’s last words, and all that he and the other two said before, why they said it, and its meaning for us today.

 

 

 

 

Syria and the Scandal of our (Orthodox) Synagogues

Thoughts to Ponder 524

Syria and the Scandal of our (Orthodox) Synagogues

Nathan Lopes Cardozo

 

“Lord of the Universe, I beg You to redeem Israel; but if You do not want to do that, then I beg You to redeem the gentiles.”

Rabbi Yisrael Hopstein, Maggid of Kozhnitz

 and legendary Chassidic leader in Poland (1733-1814)  (1)

 

When Rabbi Professor Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907-1972), the famous American Chassidic thinker who lived a fully Orthodox life, was once asked by a journalist “why he [as a religious leader] had come to a demonstration against the war in Vietnam,” he said “’I am here because I cannot pray’.…Confused and a bit annoyed, the journalist asked him, ‘What do you mean, you can’t pray so you come to a demonstration against the war?’” Rabbi Heschel replied, “’Whenever I open the prayer book, I see before me images of children burning from napalm’” (Susannah Heschel, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Essential Writings [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011] p. 17).

On another occasion, while walking with Martin Luther King Jr. in Selma, Alabama, at the famous Civil Rights March against racism, he felt a sense of holiness that reminded him of his younger years when he would walk with the great Chassidic rebbes in Poland. For him the march was a deeply religious undertaking, a mitzvah. “I felt my legs were praying,” he said (Ibid p. 35).

His message was clear: We forfeit our right to pray when we become indifferent to the atrocities done to our fellow men (2).

*****

Indeed, how dare we come before the Lord of the Universe with our personal prayers asking Him for His kindness and gifts, when we ignore the enormous atrocities done to other human beings?

“Prayer” said Rabbi Heschel, “must never be a citadel for selfish concerns but rather a place for deepening concern over other people’s plight” (Susannah Heschel, idem page 17).

To this very day, we Jews are justifiably outraged beyond description when we remember how the world was silent as six million of our brothers and sisters – including more than one million Jewish children – were slaughtered during the years of the Holocaust. We feel great animosity toward Pius XII, Hitler’s pope, for failing to call on millions of his Catholic followers to protect the Jews and stand up against this ferocious murderer.

This came to my mind when I read about the terrible atrocities that are now being committed against hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians, including tens of thousands of children, who are being killed and mutilated (not to mention the savagery and barbarity in so many other countries). No, this cannot be compared to the Holocaust, but the brutalities in Syria defy all description.

Fortunately, the Government of Israel and members of the larger Jewish community in and outside of the State of Israel have not sat idle in the face of this crisis. They have arranged medical and financial help for the victims, organized solidarity marches and have been taking to the streets, and much more. What Jew would not join these noble acts?

*****

Yet, one place that seems to be totally indifferent to what is happening in Syria and in other parts of the world is the Orthodox synagogue, the most Jewish place of all, and of which I am a proud member.

While I have been informed that synagogues of different denominations have introduced special prayers, it seems, as far as I have been able to investigate (and I hope I’m wrong!), that most Orthodox synagogues (including those in yeshivot) have failed to introduce any prayer, or even the reciting of tehillim for the Syrian victims. These terrible atrocities have, in general, not even been mentioned. All we hear is thundering silence.

Orthodox Rabbi Yuval Cherlow of Petach Tikva, Israel, whom I consider to be a Gadol Hador (a great religious and halachic leader of our generation), wrote a special prayer (https://kavvanah.wordpress.com/2013/08/29/rav-yuval-cherlow-composes-prayer-for-the-situation-in-syria/) related to the Syrian catastrophe, but it seems to have been ignored by most if not all Orthodox synagogues.

*****

Several months ago, a prayer for world peace was sent to thousands of people and hundreds of Orthodox synagogues, which, except for some hesder yeshiva students, was totally ignored by those Orthodox synagogues, including the Modern Orthodox. This prayer is a plea to God to have mercy on all victims of war, terror attacks, tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes, raging fires, tornadoes, starvation, homelessness, and population displacement. (http://www.cardozoacademy.org/thoughts-to-ponder/against-indifference-prayer-for-the-world/) (3)

The only communities that responded were Reform and Conservative synagogues and, to the great surprise of many, several churches, the leaders of which said they would include the prayer in their services. (This prayer takes no more than a minute to recite.)

*****

In the introduction to his magnum opus, Ha’amek Davar on the Torah, Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Berlin (1817-1893), the last Rosh HaYeshiva of the famous Volozhin Yeshiva, makes the powerful point that the greatness of our patriarchs Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, and no doubt the matriarchs, was the fact that they cared about the well-being of the gentiles in their day, even if they were idolaters. One example is the famous story of Avraham arguing with God to save the people of Sedom, who had fallen to the lowest possible level of moral behavior. Nothing stopped him from trying to save these people, even when it meant having to fight with God Himself (Bereishit 18: 23-33). No doubt this is why Avraham is called the “father of a multitude of nations” (Ibid 17:5). But this is not merely a compliment; it is a deeply religious mission for all the People of Israel. To be an example to the world, and to stand up for all those innocents who have fallen victim to the unspeakable evil of others.   

It is for this reason that Rabbi Yosef Karo, in his monumental codex, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 576:1), legislated the law that in times of catastrophe one should fast and lessen one’s pleasures (including sexual intercourse), based on the Talmudic statement:

“When the community is in trouble, a person should not say: I will go to my house, I will eat and drink and all will be well with me” (Ta’anit 11a).

This is not Reform or Conservative; it is Orthodox law. So why ignore this important ruling?

*****

The worst sin toward our fellow human beings is not to hate them but to be indifferent to them. People are not aware of their own insensitivity. Conscious insensitivity is almost a contradiction in terms. But one begins to sincerely wonder whether that’s true when there is a call to our synagogues that is completely ignored.

Sure, the members of Orthodox synagogues are generally sensitive people, but they don’t seem to realize that as a community that believes in prayer, and constantly prays for its own welfare, they cannot stand idly by and fail to pray when great evil is heaped upon their fellow humans. I cannot think of a stronger form of narcissism.  

The point is not whether our prayers for all these victims will be answered. This is left up to God. But the message we send to ourselves and our children is that we’re not even prepared to take the time during our synagogue service to draw our attention to the plight of thousands and thousands of children who are being killed, who have lost their arms and legs, and whose bodies have been burned beyond recognition.  

How can we be outraged by the world’s silence in the face of six million of our brothers and sisters being murdered in the Holocaust when our synagogues can’t even take a moment to say a prayer for other human beings, especially children, who are suffering beyond imagination? Do we, the Orthodox, start praying only when the atrocities are as bad as the Holocaust? Or only when it relates to our fellow Jews? 

Millions of people are occupied with physical pleasures, the need for honor and comfort, their hates and loves, all of which are for the most part not worth our time and energy. Yet synagogues refuse to take time for the real issues, which will determine the well-being of hundreds of thousands of innocent people.

As Jews, we realize that since the world has “failed to fight for right, for justice, for goodness; as a result we must fight against wrong, against injustice, against evil” (Abraham Joshua Heschel, I Asked for Wonder: A Spiritual Anthology, Samuel H. Dresner (Ed.) [New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1983] p.95).

*****

In all honesty, as an Orthodox Jew, I wonder how anyone can believe that God will listen to our prayers when we can’t spare even one minute to pray for the women and children of Syria and the millions of others living in unimaginably devastating circumstances.

Maybe it would be more honest to stay at home and forfeit our right to pray. When we become indifferent to the atrocities done to our fellow humans, then, as Rabbi Heschel teaches us, we had better be silent and live in shame.

As American actor and author William Redfield (1927-1976) once said, “To try may be to die, but not to care is never to be born” (The Book of Bill: Choice Words, Memorable Men, Tom Crisp (Ed.) [Kansas City, MO: Andrews McMeel Publishing, LLC, 2009] p. 72).   

******************

1 Martin Buber, Tales of the Hassidim, vol 1, p.289, New York Schocken, 1961. 

2  See also the powerful poem by Chief Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Kook, “Shir Meruba” (The Fourfold Song), in which he pleads to pray for all human beings and all of creation. Orot HaKodesh (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1985) pt. 2, sec. 3, essay 30.

3 It was suggested to say this prayer Shabbat morning after the prayers for the State of Israel, the Israeli soldiers on the battlefields, and those who are missing in action.

 

Standing up for Israel

The Talmud posits an important principle: the Heavenly court deals with us by the exact same standards that we use to deal with others (Sotah 8b). If we are kind and compassionate, we can expect to be judged by God with kindness and compassion. If we are cruel and unfairly critical of others, we can expect the Heavenly court to deal with us with the same qualities we have shown to others.

"Midah keNeged Midah"--being judged measure for measure--can be applied to political leaders and nations who act and speak hypocritically and hatefully. They may appear to be powerful now, but they will one day stand before the Heavenly Court. The standards they use to judge others are the same standards that will be used by the Heavenly court to judge them.

Sometimes, people think they can advance themselves politically or economically by engaging in immoral behavior. They may seem to "prosper" in this world. But, in fact, they are condemning themselves to stand before God with blood on their hands. They do not understand that their immorality will come back to haunt them.

During the past weeks, we have seen and heard abuse, malice and violence perpetrated against the State of Israel and against the Jewish People. Various world "leaders" and media figures have maligned Israel in the grossest, most malicious ways. Other world "leaders" and media figures have remained silent, or tepid in their support of Israel. Demagogues have fomented anti-Israel and anti-Semitic hatred; the UN has played its traditional role as the world's foremost agency for promoting anti-Semitism. Few, if any, even ask to hear Israel's side of the story. They aren't interested in hearing Israel's side: they are interested in harming the Jewish State. The active and vocal anti-Israel, anti-Semitic forces are a curse on the world and a curse on themselves. Those who stand by quietly and who "abstain" are accomplices in the crime.

We cannot expect miracles these days, where the forces of evil are simply swallowed up by Divine command.

We can remind the world, though, that there is a God, that there is ultimate justice, that evil does not and cannot prevail. We can remind the world that those who demonstrate injustice, cruelty, and moral depravity in their attacks on Israel--they will be judged by the Heavenly court with these very same standards of harshness. People who are infected with hatred and treachery, live ugly and distorted lives. They destroy the "image of God" within themselves, and cause suffering to all humanity. But their day of judgment will come.

Although we fully believe in the ultimate justice of the Heavenly court, this doesn't solve our problems here on earth. Even if all the evil people will face a horrible fate when they stand before the Divine court, in the meanwhile they are doing a lot of damage to us here and now.

What is our response to this wave of hatred, hypocrisy, and violence against Israel and the Jewish People? Here are some suggestions.

First, we need to pray, to turn to the Almighty for strength and guidance, to draw on our spiritual resources. We need to come together as a community.

We also need to be alert to the dangers, to be articulate spokespeople for the House of Israel, to let our elected officials know that we want loud and clear support of Israel, and loud and clear condemnation of those who threaten the very existence of Israel.

We need to let Israel know that we genuinely care, and that our fate is inextricably bound with the destiny of Israel. We need to travel to Israel, to invest in Israeli companies, to buy Israel bonds, to contribute to UJA and to educational institutions in Israel, to human services agencies in Israel. We need to buy Israeli products. We need to support those agencies that fight on behalf of Israel and on behalf of the Jewish People.

The world is filled with many hateful and cruel voices. It is filled with many who prefer to stay "neutral". Let the Almighty deal with these people according to the standards by which they themselves act.

We need to do our best to demand justice and righteousness, to promote love and harmony among humanity, to fight against the forces of evil that threaten to undermine human civilization.

We need to remind ourselves that the Heavenly court will deal with each of us by the same standards with which we deal with others. Let those standards be the standards of honesty and goodness, fairness and compassion, integrity and strength of character. May God who brings peace in the heavenly spheres bring peace to us, to all Israel, and to all good people everywhere.

Recognition Hunger--blog by Rabbi Marc D. Angel

In his book, “Games People Play,” Dr. Eric Berne wrote of a phenomenon that he described as recognition hunger. Humans have a deep psychological need to be recognized, to be validated. It is a natural desire to want to be loved and appreciated. These signs of affirmative recognition convey a message: your life matters, you are good, you make a difference. When someone sincerely praises or thanks us, we feel better about ourselves.

While all people have recognition hunger, it manifests itself in different ways. Dr. Berne notes: “A movie actor may require hundreds of strokes each week from anonymous and undifferentiated admirers to keep his spinal cord from shriveling, while a scientist may keep physically and mentally healthy on one stroke a year from a respected master.” (p. 15)

While all humans need affirmation from others, different people have different sorts of recognition hunger. Some are so internally weak, they need constant validation and applause. They seek publicity for themselves. They want to be noticed, and they ache when they are not noticed. The hungrier they are for recognition, the weaker they are within themselves. They don’t think their life matters unless they receive constant attention, however superficial or ephemeral. It may seem odd, but it is often very true, that the most “popular” and “powerful” people are also the most lonely and insecure people.

There are others, like the scientist in Dr. Berne’s statement, whose lives are validated by affirmation from an esteemed master. Such people are very strong within themselves. They don’t pander to the crowd, they don’t strive to call undue attention to themselves. They work diligently and humbly without seeking the limelight. They feel personally validated if one respected person loves them, admires them, or compliments their work. They don’t measure their internal success and happiness by how many people praise or clap for them; rather, they find contentment and validation from the love, admiration and respect of a few--or even one—special individuals.

Generally, the saddest human beings are those who receive little or no recognition from anyone. They are ignored, unloved, unappreciated. Others see them as being inconsequential; they come to see themselves as being inconsequential. Perhaps this is why the Torah constantly reminds us—and commands us—to care for the widow and orphan, to treat the poor with kindness and charity, to respect the elderly. The Torah wants us to be sources of validation for those who might otherwise feel neglected and abandoned.

People with excessive recognition hunger are so worried about their own egos, that they are callous when it comes to caring about others. They want praise aimed at themselves; they are self-centered and self-serving. They will step on anyone and do almost anything in order to advance themselves and gain more recognition. The Torah urges us not to be this kind of person.

It is precisely the psychologically strong people who are best able to care for others. Only the most secure people can give generous compliments. Only those who receive admiration, respect and love can properly convey admiration, respect and love for others. The Torah guides us to become this kind of person.

The outstanding figure in the Torah is Moses; what do we know about his recognition hunger?

The Torah describes many episodes in the life of Moses. It seems that he received very little positive validation from others. In one story after the other, Moses is rebuked, threatened, betrayed, and challenged. Jethro appreciated Moses’ kindness to his daughters, but we never find an Israelite who says to Moses: thank you, you’ve done a good job, you’ve been a strong leader, you’ve helped us live better lives. If Moses had recognition hunger, he must have been starving if he had depended on the Israelites. It is truly amazing that a man could have served his people so long and so effectively…and yet receive next to no gratitude, appreciation or words of kindness.

So how did Moses maintain his inner strength and composure?

The book of Vayikra begins: “And He called to Moses, and God spoke to him from the tent of meeting.” The classic rabbinic commentators note that first God called Moses and then He spoke to him. God called Moses as a sign of love and respect, extending an invitation to Moses before simply giving him commandments. Thus, it was God—not human beings—who validated Moses’ life. Rashi cites the Talmudic statement: God’s voice reached Moses’ ears alone; none of the Israelites heard God’s voice when He addressed Moses. This is a way of saying that God and Moses had a unique relationship unshared by anyone else. If Moses ever lost heart or if he ever wondered whether his life meant anything, God’s voice reassured him: I love you, Moses, you are accomplishing great things, don’t lose heart, don’t give up on yourself.

Moses, of course, was in a category of his own. He is the only one to have spoken with God “face to face” and to have had such a close relationship with God. And yet, his example can inspire all of us even though we are on much lower spiritual levels.

The example of Moses is a reminder that recognition hunger can be satisfied to a great extent by our own internal validation. When we feel that our work is meaningful, we feel validated even if others do not praise us. When we feel that we act righteously, we feel strong even if no one knows of our righteousness. Our validation does not ultimately come from others, but from our own inner sense of meaning, goodness and idealism. When our own consciences validate us, we can live happily and securely even without receiving applause and public recognition.

This does not preclude our psychological need for being loved, appreciated, and thanked. Recognition hunger is a real factor in human life. Yet, the finest and most secure people are those who are internally validated, who understand that ultimately the validity of their lives is a matter between themselves and God. It is as though God speaks to them and no one else hears.

Without that validation, life is empty. With that validation, life is a blessing.