National Scholar Updates

I rubbed my eyes in disbelief when I read that Sephardi Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef has extended the ban on television and computers by decreeing that anyone using the “abomination” of smartphones be prohibited from leading prayers. Like most Israelis, I felt profoundly ashamed that a “chief rabbi” could seek to impose such primitive views on the Israeli public. Under such circumstances, is it any surprise that Israelis have utter contempt for the Chief Rabbinate?

The time has come for the vast majority of us, including nonobservant Jews, who take pride in the fact that we represent a cultured people which was at the forefront of enlightenment and civilization from time immemorial, to stand up and say enough is enough.

The state has imposed upon the nation a Chief Rabbinate that is now dominated by the most extreme and obscurantist elements. We are not living in the Middle Ages when our sages were actually trailblazers in enlightenment and worldliness. Indeed, Maimonides, one of the greatest Jewish thinkers and halachists of all time, was an utter repudiation of what today’s ultra-Orthodox extremists symbolize. Steeped in Torah, he was nevertheless a worldly man, considered one of the great physicians of his time, and even wrote books relating to Greek philosophy. He called on Jews to adhere to the “golden path” of moderation and shun extremism. However, because of his worldliness, Maimonides today would be ineligible to teach in most haredi educational institutions.

It is clear that this obscurantism has no relationship with piety or standards of religious observance. Many ultra-Orthodox Jews, especially in the Diaspora, take pride in high academic and professional achievements. Few endorse the extremes of gender separation and inequality which have more in common with the Taliban than with traditional Jewish practice. Likewise, many haredim reject the approach of extremist Israeli-based rabbis that commitment to a Torah life necessitates eschewing a livelihood.

Under the mantle of the Chief Rabbinate, the extremists display contempt for and seek to undermine the Zionist state -- which pays their salaries. They prohibit their followers from serving in the army or performing national service.

If these elements merely sought to practice an obscurantist lifestyle, that would be their democratic prerogative. However, it is outrageous to seek to impose on the entire nation rigid and primitive lifestyles inconsistent with the Judaism that sustained our people throughout the millennia.

In the past, we were privileged to have chief rabbis who were spiritual giants -- Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Uziel and Rabbi Shlomo Goren -- whose piety and learning was unsurpassed and who sought to unify the nation, thus making Yitzhak Yosef’s edicts sound like the ravings of a troglodyte.

The current Chief Rabbinate and its courts are incompetent and corrupt and largely recruited on the basis of “jobs for the boys.” They lack a modicum of compassion and frequently transform what should be routine marriage applications into a bureaucratic nightmare, encouraging thousands of nonobservant Israelis to bypass the rabbinate and perform their secular weddings in Cyprus and elsewhere. Were it not for the admirable and courageous work of Tzohar, the rabbinical organization that provides a warm and friendly service for thousands of Israelis, the numbers would be even higher.

But the worst aspect of this abhorrent structure is the almost venomous approach toward converts which is disparaging, humiliating and usually forces them to withdraw in disgust.

There are over 300,000 Russian immigrants who regard themselves as Jews, are indistinguishable from other Israelis, and serve in the army but are not considered halachically Jewish. It is clearly in the national interest to encourage them to convert before the impending crisis when they will seek to wed and will be told that they are ineligible because they are not Jewish. This has potentially enormously divisive social implications and the makings of a long-term disaster for the state.

Instead of employing halachic precedents for easing conversions of Jews of mixed marriage -- especially from a society like the Soviet Union which denied Jews the right to a religious education and ruthlessly persecuted those seeking to practice their Judaism -- today’s Chief Rabbinate does the opposite.

Indeed, current Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi David Lau was only elected after pledging not to tamper with the prevailing conversion restrictions without the approval of the extremist elements such as those who sought to retroactively annul conversions authorized by religious Zionist Rabbi Haim Drukman.

In recent years, the Chief Rabbinate attempted to widen its influence and also sought to centralize control of rabbis in the Diaspora akin to the Vatican’s control of the Catholic Church. It demanded total subservience to its stringent and hostile approach toward conversion and rejected conversions undertaken by more enlightened Orthodox rabbis despite the fact that, according to Halachah, a conversion court can be convened by any three religiously ordained rabbis. If successful, this centralization would lead to a reign of zealotry unprecedented in Jewish history. From the Mishnaic era, there were disputes in halachic interpretations between the more stringent followers of Shammai and the more liberal disciples of Hillel, but the people could select the rabbi they chose to follow, and no one disputed their legitimacy.

The previous government, which excluded the haredi parties, intervened and tabled legislation to enable Israelis to select the rabbis of their choice for marriage, divorce and conversion. Unfortunately, under pressure from the haredi political parties, the current government turned the clock back, reverting to the totally centralized control by the Chief Rabbinate. This emboldened the Chief Rabbinate to further abuse its power by attempting to force the retirement of Rabbi Shlomo Riskin, one of the principal and highly respected Orthodox rabbis seeking to bring about conversion reform. Only due to a storm of protest did the attempt fail.

This led to a schism and the creation of a new conversion court, independent of the Chief Rabbinate, headed by a renowned scholar Rabbi Nahum Eliezer Rabinovitch, head of the Maaleh Adumim hesder yeshiva, Rabbi Riskin, and Rabbi David Stav, head of Tzohar.

This court, rather than seeking to impose the most stringent regime of observance on converts, will apply the more flexible solutions and interpretations of Maimonides reflected in the approach of former Chief Rabbi Uziel, who approved conversions without obsessing on the minutiae of observance.

This is an explosive situation, with the haredi groups in government pressing Netanyahu to compel the Interior Ministry to endorse the Chief Rabbinate’s refusal to recognize conversions by the new courts.

With a majority of one, Netanyahu is in an impossible position -- which he himself created by capitulating to all the haredi demands when he formed his government.

Yet, if the new conversion courts are not recognized by the Interior Ministry, we face a social disaster in which the most extreme elements of the ultra-Orthodox will further intensify their control of the nation.

The truth is that the current Chief Rabbinate -- which has no standing as an institution in Halachah -- alienates the nation from Judaism. No communal group accepts its authority. Despite having hijacked the Chief Rabbinate to exploit it as an instrument to impose their stringent interpretations, haredim themselves continue to despise the institution. Many also feel embarrassed by the primitive outbursts like those of Yitzhak Yosef, and recognize the need to educate their children so that they can earn a livelihood. Religious Zionists are obviously appalled with the abuse of an institution that was created to unite the nation and is now dividing it.

But it is the secular parties from both the Left and Right that created the haredi Frankenstein’s monster. Most nonobservant Jews are utterly ignorant and incapable of distinguishing between any varieties of Judaism and display contempt for all forms of religion. They fail to understand that the religious orientation of the state-sponsored rabbinical establishment is at the core of national identity.

The secular parties should have ensured that qualification for rabbinical leadership, at a minimum, involves loyalty to the Jewish nation state and its institutions. To have rabbis on a state payroll who refuse to permit the prayers for the welfare of the state and its armed forces in their synagogues, is an abomination. For secular parties, for the sake of political expediency, to endorse the appointment of a chief rabbi who has himself not served in the army and does not support the draft, is unconscionable.

Today we stand at a crossroads. In an ideal society, the prime minister and leader of the opposition would suspend political differences on this issue and either dissolve or restructure the Chief Rabbinate so that it provides a Zionist religious leadership, more in tune with the national need. But since this is unlikely to happen, the secular Zionist parties will bear the guilt for exploiting short-term political benefits to create generations of extremists and anti-Zionists who will ultimately undermine the Zionist state and devour them.

Isi Leibler may be contacted at [email protected]

The Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals has been co-sponsoring my ten-part series of weekly classes with Lincoln Square Synagogue in the First Book of Samuel (68th Street and Amsterdam Avenue in Manhattan). Ten Wednesdays from 7:15-8:15 pm from January 29-April 2. Registration for the entire course costs $150, or it costs $20 per class if you register in advance/$25 at the door per class. You can register at lss.org/RabbiAngel.

Some other teaching highlights from February include:

Shabbat Feb 7-8: scholar-in-residence at Yeshiva University. Shiurim on the interrelationship between traditional and academic methods of Tanakh study (this is primarily for students there)

Shabbat Feb 15: Shabbat morning class at Congregation Ohav Shalom after morning services (84th between Broadway and West End Avenue, NYC): "Hur and Pharaoh's daughter." Around 11:00am

Sunday Feb 23: class on Megillat Esther at the Kingsway Jewish Center in Brooklyn. 9:30-10:30 am, Kingsway Jewish Center 2810 Nostrand Avenue Brooklyn NY 11234

Shabbat Feb 28-March 1: scholar-in-residence program at Cornell University (for Cornell students). I will be giving a four-part series at Yeshivat Chovevei Torah in Riverdale, NY beginning March 5 on the Book of Jeremiah, for students at YCT.

Thursday March 6: I will be conducting a teacher training session on the Book of Jeremiah for Tanakh faculty at the Ramaz Upper School in New York.

Shabbat March 7-8: scholar-in-residence at Congregation Shaarei Orah in Teaneck, New Jersey. This Shabbat will feature several talks on Sephardic and Ashkenazic liturgy and philosophy and how a study of both deepens our appreciation of tradition. 1425 Essex Rd, Teaneck, NJ 07666

The Rhythms of Jewish Living
A Sephardic Exploration of Judaism’s Spirituality
By Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel
Reviewed by Rabbi Dr. Israel Drazin

Rabbi Angel demonstrates his well-known knowledge and writing skills in this very informative exploration Jewish practices. He offers details about and explains Jewish daily observances and holidays, the differences between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jewry, the unique Jewish use of time, halakhah, theology, history, sacred places, divine revelation and providence, confronting death with the right attitude and without fear, the significance of the State of Israel, the manner in which Jews highlight and celebrate family, how people can transcend themselves, and much more.

I’ll give some examples.

The rabbi stresses the importance of a sensitive relationship between humans and nature. The Bible emphasizes this relationship by speaking about creation in the beginning of the Bible. Additionally, all of the biblical holidays are related to nature: spring (Passover), summer (Shavuot), and fall (Sukkot). Many blessings do not focus on what is eaten but on the renewal of nature. Jews recite blessings when they observe natural phenomenon such as lightning, thunder, very strong winds, and rainbows. They approach God in a two-fold manner, through the divine creation of nature and the divine revelation of the Torah. But it is God that is the most important; therefore Jews turned to the west away from the sun as they left the temple.

He writes, “There has been a steady and increasing alienation between Jewish religious observance and the natural world, with a parallel diminution in sensing awe for God as Creator of the natural universe.” He points, for example, to the wide-spread current practice of placing stained-glass windows in synagogues, which obstructs outside views and “symbolize a changed sense of spirituality, a break from traditional outdoor religiosity.”

Rabbi Angel describes some Sephardic practices, such as the custom during the Passover Seder “of placing a piece of matzah in a sack and carrying it on their shoulders as though they were among the Israelites of old carrying their belongings as they escaped from Egypt.” This practice, as many similar Sephardic ones during Passover and other Jewish holidays, deepens the holiday, “we are sharing a historical national memory and we are attempting to identify ourselves with our redeemed ancestors.”

The Jewish meal is another example of our identification with our ancestors. “The table upon which one eats is considered symbolically to be the altar in the Temple in Jerusalem. It is consecrated. One is not supposed to treat the table with disrespect, to sit on it, to place one’s shoes on it. Before eating a meal, we ritually wash our hands as a sign of purification. Just as Jews in ancient Jerusalem had to purify themselves before coming to the altar, so we must do likewise. We recite the blessing over bread, but before eating it we dip it in salt. This is reminiscent of the practice in the Temple to add salt to the sacrifices offered on the altar.”

Rabbi Angel gives readers an extensive interesting historical account of the ancient great court in Jerusalem, popularly known as the Sanhedrin, comprised of seventy-one scholars. Readers may be surprised to learn that the Great Court “even had the power to overrule a law of the Torah (see, for example, the discussion in the Talmud, Yevamot 90b.” Maimonides wrote in his Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 2:1, that in ancient times the law was fluid and flexible. Each Court had the right and responsibility to use its own understanding in applying the word of God to the people of Israel. Each Court “ruled according to the way it seemed to them that the law should be – their judgment is the law. If a subsequent Great Court found a reason to refute their decision, it should refute it” for the Torah states we are “only obligated to follow the Court which is in your generation.”

This power to change laws was traditionally given only to the Great Court. Unfortunately, the Great Court ceased to operate when the Romans destroyed the temple in 70 CE. Several efforts were made to reestablish the authority of the Court, but these efforts failed. The latest call for the reinstitution of the Great Court was made by the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Benzion Uziel (1880-1953) in 1936, but his call went unheeded. Soon thereafter the dissolution of the Court in 70 CE, in the mid-second century, Rabbi Yehuda the Prince compiled the Mishnah, a record of the rabbinical teachings up to his time. From then on, the Mishnah and the subsequent discussions on the Mishnah in the Gemara, together called the Talmud, one composed in Israel and the more widely accepted one in Babylon, became, together with later composed law codes, the fixed laws. Rabbis no longer went to the Torah to determine the law. Today, the law, called halakhah, is no longer fluid.

Rabbi Angel discusses the different approach that Sephardic rabbis take to Jewish law and Judaism from that of Ashkenazic rabbis after the time of the Great Court. Ashkenazim primarily lived in Europe under Christian domination under harsh conditions and were generally unable to secure a secular education. It wasn’t until the eighteenth and nineteenth century that these Jews were westernized. In contrast, Sephardim had a far better life in Spain until they were expelled in 1492. They made great contributions to the Spanish culture in science, medicine, philosophy, and mathematics. Whereas Jews in Ashkenazic lands – France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, and Eastern Europe – lived a sober, melancholy life, and focused on piety because of their restraint, Sephardic Jews were on the whole a happy people. While they were quite observant of halakhah, their observance did not lead them to become sober or overly serious.

“Rather, the pleasures and aesthetics of this world were viewed in a positive light.
Sephardic holiday celebrations and lifecycle observances, for example, were characterized by the preparation of elaborate delicacies to eat, the singing of songs, and a general spirit of gaiety and hospitality…. This spirit carried itself even to the serious season of the High Holy Days, when self-scrutiny and repentance were expected…. The unstated assumption was that eating, rejoicing, and being happy of heart were not in conflict with piety, even in the serious season of penitential prayers.”

The effect of Christian persecution upon Ashkenazic Jewry also resulted in Ashkenazic rabbis being more stringent in their halakhic rulings. “H. J. Zimmels, in his book ‘Ashkenazim and Sephardim’…suggests that Ashkenazic inclination to stringency was largely the result of centuries of persecution suffered by German Jewry.” Rabbi Angel also cites Chief Rabbi Benzion Uziel who wrote that Sephardic rabbis “felt powerful enough in their opinion and authority to annul customs that were not based on halakhic foundations. In contrast, Ashkenazic rabbis tended to strengthen customs and sought support for them even if they seemed strange and without halakhic basis.”

Among much else, Rabbi Angel discusses how understanding how to die tells us how to live. He notes that the Midrash Genesis Rabbah interprets the divine statement in Genesis “Behold it was very good” as referring to death. He explains how both nature and the Torah provide paths to God and that God’s revelation through nature may be experienced today by all people, Jews and non-Jews alike.

Changing the Immutable

By Dr. Marc Shapiro

Since time began, since the more intelligent men and women realized they had ideas they could not share with others, yet they had to speak, they learnt to lie.

Highly respected philosophers did so. The pagan Greek Plato called what they said “noble lies.” The Jewish Maimonides named them “essential truths.” The Moslem Ibn Tufayl gave the lies no name, but wrote a book describing why it is necessary to hide the truth.[1] The Roman Plutarch hid the truth in his famed history “Parallel Lives,” and gave an idealized version the ancient heroes “with the intention of conveying moral examples to imitate or avoid.”[2] They knew that the lies they taught the masses were not facts, but teachings that advance what they considered to be good, what we could call “pedagogical truths,” focusing on education, or “orphaned truths,” unrelated to real truths, or “pious myths.”

As many other philosophers, Maimonides recognized that intelligent people, leaders, clergy, philosophers, and teachers of all kinds need to teach people lies – such as, God spoke to prophets, you will be resurrected, pray and God will help you, this is what God demands, God will punish you unless you do this, there will be a messianic time when all evil will cease – to make people feel good about themselves, feel secure, “know” that there will be a better time, behave properly, provide stability, preserve order, and teach and promote values. Maimonides told readers of his Guide that he will place both his true ideas and “essential truths” in his Guide so that the common people will find notions in it that support their beliefs while intelligent people will be able to sift the true teachings from the dross.[3]

Even the Bible seemed to sanction lies. Abraham told his servants and his son Isaac that he and Isaac will return from offering a sacrifice while he had every intention when he said this that he would offer Isaac as a sacrifice to God. Jacob misled his father Isaac claiming he was Esau the son that blind Isaac wanted to bless. Moses attempted to persuade Pharaoh to let the Israelites leave Egypt saying they would return after three days. The biblical book Chronicles suppressed the truth contained in the earlier biblical books; they retold the earlier-told tales in a manner that erased mistakes made by biblical heroes, such as King David’s adultery and murder of Bathsheba’s husband. The Chronicle version is “actually far from a detached recording of what happened in the past.”[4] And there are many more examples of dishonesty in the Bible. Abraham ibn Ezra states: “Our sages explained this beautifully, for ‘a prudent man conceals shame.’”[5]

The Talmud recognized a concept halakhah ve’ein morin ken, meaning that although something is technically permitted, the rabbis do not inform the masses of the leniency out of fear that using this permission could have negative ramifications. Nachmanides (1194-1270) contends that this concept is in the Torah which states “It is the glory of God to conceal a thing,”[6]

The rabbis lied and continue to lie for many reasons, such as the interest of peace, to stop people from sinning, to avoid embarrassment, to prevent injury, to collect money to support the study of Torah, to help feed a poor man, to improve a person’s chance of marriage, when one has a mental reservation that what he is saying is not true,[7] for educational reasons, and if the lie leads to a good result. Each of these reasons is subjective; one rabbi may feel that the lie is appropriate while another might strongly disagree. It is as if the rabbi is saying, I can lie if I think it is proper to do so and if I feel that it is better for the person to believe my lie rather than know the truth.

Marc B. Shapiro[8] points this out and shows how this phenomenon continued from ancient time to righteous Jews today, including famed rabbis who lie to other Jews. His book is superb, scholarly, comprehensible, well-documented with copious supportive notes, very readable, and above all eye-opening. He shows that all too many rabbis in the Orthodox community rewrite the past by snipping out of books of prior rabbis and scholars, even well-respected ones, that which does not fit into their personal world-view. They “insist on viewing the past through the religious needs of the present,” erasing the liberal opinions of the past to obligate others to follow their personal notions of what is right. Organizations such as ArtScroll distort the interpretations of Bible commentators in their ArtScroll commentaries when what is said contradicts their understanding, as they deleted the “offending view” of Rashi’s grandson Rashbam on Genesis 1:5 that in the Bible the day began in the morning. These rabbis are turn their backs to what is true when they are convinced that what was said would lead readers to observances they dislike. Paradoxically, rabbis who make these changes consider themselves traditional, even hereidi, ultra-Orthodox, men who decry the changes wrought by the Reform movement; yet they too are uncomfortable with the past, the history of Judaism and its practices, and feel the need the revise what is most sacred to them, what the Torah actually says and Judaism.

They conceal the conviction of many sages that parts of the Five Books of Moses” were composed after Moses’ death, such as Abraham ibn Ezra and the famed pietistic Rabbi Judah HeHasid who held this post-Mosaic view. They hide the fact that the codifier Moses Isserles felt that it is permissible to drink non-Jewish wine. They censored Joseph Karo’s “Shulchan Arukh” where he states that the “kapporot” ceremony on the day before Yom Kippur in which people transferred their sins to a chicken was a “foolish custom.” They erased the opinion of Rabbi Hayim of Volozhin quoting the Vilna Gaon “that in matters of halakhah one should not give up one’s independent judgment, even if that means opposing a ruling in the “Shulchan Aruch.” They excised the statement of Rabbi Joseph Messas (1892-1974) from his “Mayim Chayim” where he ruled that married women have no obligation to cover their hair, a decision also held by Rabbi Joseph Hayim (1832-1909) and many others. They conceal the ancient decisions by respected rabbis such as Rabbenu Tam, Rabbi Solomon Ganzfred in his “Kitsur Shulchan Arukh,” and others that the “shekiah,” sunset for the purposes of when the Sabbath starts, takes place much later than what is usually regarded as sunset, that the Shabbat begins when it is dark about an hour after the current practice. They obscured the ruling of the highly respected codifier Rabbi Yehiel Mikhel Epstein (1829-1908) that one is allowed to turn on electric lights on festivals. They expunged the opinion of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch that everyone does not need to devote his life to Torah study and the opinion of Maimonides in his Introduction to his opus “Mishneh Torah” that Jews need not study the Talmud. They erased the Vilna Gaon’s belief that it is only a custom for males to cover their heads and that in Orthodox families in Germany, male Jews only covered their heads when at prayer or saying a blessing. They painted head coverings on the pictures of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneerson, and many others who did not wear a head covering in college. They hide that Rabbi Kook, the first Chief Rabbi of Palestine as well as Maimonides taught that people need to exercise.

Also, hereidi Jews as well as rabbis who are afraid to deviate from them will not mention the words breast, gay, homosexual, rape, or insert the words in their newspapers, and even exclude pictures of women, including that of Hillary Clinton, even though this is not prohibited in the Torah and was not the practice in ancient Judaism.

These are just some of the many examples that Dr. Shapiro gives in his excellent book (with a couple that I added) of how rabbis and others have changed and are continuing to change the immutable Torah.

We could, of course add many more to the couple of hundred example offered by Dr. Shapiro, for Dr. Shapiro notes that he is not giving a complete list of violations. For example, many rabbis today do not reveal that the behaviors they are advocating in their sermons is not taught in the Torah. Also, when these rabbis sermonize today and base their sermons on the “fact” that the “medrish” says such and such, the rabbis do not reveal that there are multiple Midrashim, each saying something somewhat different than the others, and the position they are advocating is not held by other Midrashim.[9]

[1] Plato’s “Nobel Lie” is discussed in his Laws 2.663d-e. He lived in Greece between 427 and 347 BCE. Maimonides’ “Necessary Truths” is in the Guide of the Perplexed 3:28. In essence, although people may consider this incredibly insulting, philosophers recognize that the vast majority of people need to be taught fraudulent notions and treated in a paternalistic fashion by those who are convinced they know what is best for them. Ibn Tufayl died in 1185. His book is Hayy ibn Yaqzan, University of Chicago Press, 2009.

[2] Donald R. Kelly, Faces of History, New Haven, Conn. 1999. Kelly notes that none of the Roman historians were objective in a modern sense.

[3] It is not easy for readers to identify the “essential truths” and as a result there are Maimonidean scholars who are convinced that Maimonides believed that prophecy is from God, angels exist, God controls people, etc.

[4] In a commentary attributed to Rashi, the Bible and Talmud commentator points to a number of times that the book of Chronicles has a goal to portray King David in a positive fashion.

[5] Proverbs 12:16.

[6] Nachmanides commentary on Numbers 30:2 referring to Proverbs 25:2.

[7] As in the somewhat ridiculous practice of some people of saying a lie while crossing one’s fingers.

[8] Changing the Immutable, How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History, By Marc B. Shapiro, The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2015, 347 pages.

[9] Many rabbis use the made-up word they heard in the Yeshivas, a Yiddish mispronunciation of Midrash.

I

1. Does Such a Possibility Exist under Torah Law?

The Torah (see Deut. 24:1) describes a divorce occurring through a “writ of [marriage] termination” (sefer kritut) given by the husband. Indeed, the Mishnah (Yevamot 14:1) states: “A woman can be divorced when she agrees and when she does not agree; but a man divorces only at his will.” Thus, there seems to be no way in which a woman can receive a divorce if her husband is recalcitrant.

However, our most ancient rabbinic sources state that such a possibility exists. In vaYikra 1:3, the Torah notes that in certain circumstances, a person must bring a sacrifice, and he is required to do so willingly (yakriv oto lirtzono). This seems to be an oxymoron: Either an act is mandatory and one is obligated to perform it, or one is free to act at one’s own personal discretion; can these seemingly contradictory elements be reconciled? The ancient halakhic Midrash answers in the affirmative: “We apply pressure upon him, until he says ‘it is my will to do so.’”[1] In other words, an act that is mandated by the Torah will be considered as having been performed willingly even if such “will” was formed under pressure by legitimate agents of Torah. The Sifra does not extend this principle beyond the issue of sacrifices, but the Mishnah (‘Erkhin 5:6) does. After stating that a sacrifice is considered as brought willingly after the person was pressured until he says, “It is my will to do so,” the Mishnah adds: “and the same is true for women’s bills of divorce.” [2]

Several explanations may be offered for this principle. One explains this in light of the general halakhic principle, “What a person harbors in one’s heart is halakhically irrelevant.” [3] Thus, when the Mishnah refers to “will,” it is not relating to an internal psychological disposition, but rather to an externally verified condition. Thus, if a person declares: “I do not want to do X”—we hold that performing X is against his will, and are not concerned with his internal thoughts. Conversely, if he declares: “I want to do X”—we hold performing X to be in accordance with his will.[4] Others suggest that if a husband refuses to divorce a wife who hates him and will in no case remain with him, he is acting only out of spite in order to deny her to others.[5] Such behavior, denying to others something that in any case cannot bring the individual any benefit, is halakhically unacceptable; we can therefore apply the general principle kofin ‘al middat Sedom. A third explanation was given by Maimonides:

Since he was compelled, why is this divorce not invalid? … Because a person who was overcome by his evil inclination to desist from performing a positive mitzvah or to commit a transgression, and who was then coerced [by the authorities] until he did what he ought to do or desisted from what he was forbidden to do, is not considered to be acting under compulsion …since he does want to be a Jew, he ipso facto wants to fulfill the commandments and to refrain from sin, but his evil inclination overcame him. When he was beaten, his evil inclination weakened, and so when he says “I want [to divorce]”—the divorce is in accordance with his will. (Laws of Divorce, 2:20)

Maimonides has a theory of human personality that recognizes several “levels” of will that can be in simultaneous conflict. The “will” required for divorce is not a subjective feeling but an objective mental position, which is assessed according to the overall context of a person’s life choices. A person who wants to be a Jew, surely consents at heart to what is entailed by being a Jew. If according to Torah he should in the case at hand divorce his wife, his refusal to do so is in conflict with what he deeply assents to. By physical coercion, the court is merely enabling him to overcome a powerful urge that conflicts with his own deeper and more serious will.

2. Who May Coerce a Husband to Divorce?

Having seen that Torah law contains the option for coercing a husband to divorce, the question arises: Who may do so? It should be pointed out that today, with a get regarded as a document required only because of adherence to a religious tradition, physical coercion to give a get flies directly in the face of the principle of freedom of religion. When we discuss today physical coercion of a get, we are therefore arguably doing something analogous to discussing the death sentence as a punishment for adultery, i.e., marking certain actions as worthy of extreme censure. With this in mind, let us return to the question: When physical coercion was a real operative option, who might be involved in this? The upshot of the talmudic discussion in Gittin 88b seems to be that physical coercion of divorce is not a matter that should (or may!) be undertaken by individuals. No matter how much I personally may be convinced that Zalman (for example) should really divorce his wife Rivka, I am not allowed to take matters into my own hands and beat him up in order to get him to agree to do so. Indeed, if he does give a divorce after being manhandled by self-appointed guardians of Torah (or by thugs they employ), the get thereby produced may well be halakhically invalid. Rather, it is only legitimately appointed communal leaders who were authorized to decide to apply such physical coercion. Having reached such a decision, they could appoint agents—whether Jews or non-Jews—to actually do so (in much the same manner that civil courts today direct law-enforcement officials to act against those who refuse to follow court rulings).

3. What Circumstances Justify Coercion of a Husband to Divorce His Wife?

If in general a husband divorces his wife only at his will, but in certain cases legitimate community leaders may coerce him to do so, the question arises: What are those “certain cases”? The Mishnah (Ketubot 7:10, cited at Bavli Ketubot 77a) gives a very specific and very short list of men whose extreme objective physical repulsiveness justifies coercing them to divorce if their wife demands a get. The more interesting case, however—not discussed by that Mishnah—is when a wife declares that her husband is subjectively repulsive to her and demands a get. This matter comes up with regard to a “rebellious” wife, i.e., a wife who openly refuses to have intimate relations with her husband. The Mishnah (Ketubot 5:7 cited at Bavli Ketubot 63a) states, that the communal authorities are not allowed to physically force her to change her mind, but that economic sanctions may be employed to cause her to reconsider, i.e., they may sanction her by impairing her right to payment of ketubah, thus threatening her with a situation in which her husband can divorce her not only against her will, but at no cost to himself. However, in the talmudic discussion Ameimar (c. 400 CE) states, that the above does not apply to a wife who justifies her refusal to remain with her husband by explaining that she finds him repulsive (ma-ees ‘alai). Well then, what is to be done when a woman so declares? Here the picture becomes really interesting, because we have at least three variant wordings of the talmudic phrase defining what is to be done in such a case. The printed text of the Talmud (based of course on manuscripts the first printers had before them), states:

But if she says ma-ees ‘alai—we do not coerce her.

On this version, it is not the business of the court to in any way pressure such a woman to have sex with her husband. If he is fed up with such a situation, he can divorce her. Of course, in those times, polygamy was also an option: if he was sufficiently well to do, the husband could simply take a second wife. But the court will take no sides in this marital crisis. This version seems to have been the one known to most rishonim, including Rabbenu Hananel (d. 1055), Rabbi Yitzhak AlFasi (1103), and many others.
However, a second version exists, in a talmudic manuscript known as ms. Firkovich-Leningrad. In that manuscript, the Talmud states:

But if she says ma-ees ‘alai—we coerce him.

On this version, the court will actively intervene on behalf of the rebellious wife who declares her husband repulsive, and coerce her husband to divorce her! Thus, in addition to the short list in the Mishnah of physically repulsive men who are coerced to divorce, a husband who is subjectively repulsive to his wife is also so coerced. Rabbenu Gershom, “Light of the Exile” (c. 960–1028), the greatest scholar of Ashkenazic Jewry of his time, ruled that if a woman found her marriage so unbearable that she was willing to totally forfeit her ketubah if only her husband would divorce her—the court is required by Torah law to coerce her husband to do so. As he writes (Teshuvot Rabbenu Gershom Meor haGolah, #42):

If she wants to be divorced and forfeits her ketubah, and he does not want to divorce her, the authorities must coerce him to give her a get. As the rabbis taught […] “We apply pressure upon him, until he says ‘It is my will to do so.’” And such is the actual halakha.

Note that the Mishnah stating that a husband could be coerced to give a get when the Torah mandates this, did not state when the Torah so mandates a divorce; it is Rabbenu Gershom who determined that Torah so requires whenever a woman is so desperate for a divorce that she is willing to forfeit her ketubah!

Another great authority who held this to be Torah law was Maimonides, who ruled that coercion of a divorce when a woman declared ma-ees ‘alai was mandated by the Torah (Hilkhot Ishut/Laws of Relationships, 14:8; note that at 14:14 he rejects post-biblical legislation on this issue):

If a wife declares “I find him repulsive, and am unable willingly to have sex with him”—the authorities immediately coerce him to divorce her. For she is not a captive of war, who must have sex with a man she despises.

This brief ruling reflects Maimonides’ assumptions about the basics of marriage. He holds that the status of a married woman is not like that of a captive enemy, and that she is under no obligation to submit to the sexual advances of a man she finds repulsive—even if that man is her lawful husband. He also clearly assumes that sex is an essential component of marriage, that a woman cannot be expected to be bound in a sexless marriage, and that divorce is therefore an absolute necessity in such situations. Now, the Torah never expressly states either of these things about marriage. While some biblical passages might seem to support such views of marriage, others might be cited against them, as in Psalms 45:11 where the bride is enjoined, “He is thy lord, and do homage to him.” Clearly, Maimonides’ decision that the Torah here requires an immediate, forced divorce is dependent upon his value-laden understanding of what marriage is all about—an understanding that informs his reading of the Torah no less than it derives from such reading. And such an understanding may well have been what led Rabbenu Gershom to also mandate coercion in such cases—and what informed the talmudic author of ms. Firkovich-Leningrad, who wrote: “But if she says ma-ees ‘alai—we coerce him.”

A third variant of this talmudic phrase was proposed by Rabbenu Yaakov ben Meir (also known as Rabbenu Tam, France c. 1100–1171), but it can be understood only after tracing developments in the halakhic history of coerced divorce from the time of Ameimar to the twelfth century.

4. Waiting 12 Months—and What Then?

The talmudic discussion of the rebellious wife concludes with the following cryptic sentences: “And we delay her reception of the get for 12 months. And during those 12 months, she receives no financial support from her husband” (Bavli Ketubot 64a). This seems to be referring to a rebellious wife whose husband has not been coerced to divorce her, and a strange situation is thereby created. On the one hand, unlike other husbands who under talmudic halakha may divorce their wife whenever they want, the husband whose wife has rebelled against him may not do so until 12 months have passed. On the other hand, unlike other married women whose husbands must support them, the husband of a rebellious wife is free of that burden. Their marriage is thus in limbo for 12 months. To what end? Some say (e.g., Rashi): This time period is designed to give the wife further cause to reconsider if she indeed wants to find herself divorced with no ketubah. And some say: The 12-month wait would prevent a husband who wants to be quickly and cheaply rid of his wife from mistreating her (thus causing her to rebel) and then being able to immediately divorce her without a ketubah. Knowing that he will have to wait 12 long months will (in this view) deter him from choosing such an option.

Whatever the purpose of this 12-month delay, the question arises: Once that time has passed—what then? Specifically, may the husband (whether or not he has taken a second wife in the interim), who can now divorce without paying any ketubah—decide not to do so, holding the rebellious wife in eternal limbo as an agunah? The Talmud itself says nothing on this matter. However, it seems that the interpretive tradition of the Babylonian academies was that such an option is a moral non-starter, and therefore the Talmud must have held that any husband attempting to do so is coerced to change his mind. As Rev Sherira Gaon explained: “After these 12 months, the authorities physically coerce the husband and he gives her a get.”[6] However, for Rav Sherira Gaon, as well as for almost all other rabbis until Rabbenu Tam, the interpretation of the talmudic view on this matter was a purely intellectual exercise, as all knew that talmudic halakha on this matter had been superseded by a post-talmudic takanah (rabbinic legislation).

5. Dramatic Change: Whenever a Wife Requests a Divorce, Her Husband Is Coerced to Give a Get

Around the year 650 CE, a dramatic legal enactment (takanah) was instituted by the halakhic leaders of Babylonian Jewry, immediately following the Muslim conquest of that area in 637–650:

When our masters in the times of the Sevora’im saw that Jewish women were going to the Gentiles and with their assistance were obtaining forced divorces from their husbands, and the husbands were writing bills of divorce under compulsion and these were illegally forced divorces—and this resulted in disaster—they enacted, with regard to a woman who rebels against her husband and demands a divorce, that … we compel her husband to divorce her immediately. [7]

In contrast to the policy of the Sassanid Persian kingdom that previously ruled in Babylonia, Muslim legal authorities provided succor to Jewish women seeking divorce, and forced their husbands to acquiesce and issue a writ of divorce. However, as we saw above (section 2), if a husband is unlawfully forced to write a bill of divorce, it is invalid. Therefore, the Muslim coercion resulted in divorces that were halakhically invalid but at the same time made it impossible for the rabbis to prevent the women from re-marrying, because doing so would enrage the Muslim authorities who had validated the procedure. The result was a disaster, because since the divorces were invalid, the women’s second marriages were adulterous, and children born from such unions were mamzerim who would never be able to marry legitimate Jews. Since the rabbis could not change the political-legal reality of Muslim rule, they decided to institute a change in halakha via the mechanism of takanah. From then on, any Jewish woman demanding a divorce (not only on the grounds of sexual repulsiveness) would get it immediately—no questions asked—from a Jewish court! And since a writ of divorce lawfully imposed upon the husband by a Jewish court was valid, any subsequent marriage of the divorcee would be lawful, and children born by her after receiving such a coerced get would be fully “kosher” according to halakha.

The Sevora’im knew full well that the persons directly benefitting by their dramatic takanah were specifically those women who knowingly acted against the Torah and against halakha by refusing to rely upon Jewish rabbinical authorities and instead relying upon Gentile courts—as well as those Jewish men who disregarded the (in)validity of those divorces and married women of such questionable status. But it was precisely for such halakhically deviant/marginal women and men that the rabbis needed to provide a viable alternative—for the good not only of these sinners themselves, but of the entire Jewish community.

The decision of these rabbis to enact such a takanah rested upon an underlying premise that it is important to explicate, that is to say, the premise that within the realm of values recognized by the Torah, it is possible for rational human beings to recognize a hierarchy and to prioritize accordingly, and that the responsibility to do so rests primarily upon rabbis. While the Torah generally granted a husband the prerogative of not issuing a divorce against his will, it also regarded the prevention of adultery and mamzerut as a major value. It was crystal-clear to the rabbis at that time that if historical conditions required prioritization of one of these values, then prevention of adultery and mamzerut should be given preference—even if this meant denying a privilege explicitly granted to husbands by the Divine Lawmaker, and granting to women a privilege He had denied to them. Obviously, the fact that they knew that in certain cases the Torah itself had extended to women the privilege of a coerced divorce enabled them to enact the extension of such privilege to a new range of cases.

For half a millennium after the institution of this takanah (from the mid-seventh to the mid-twelfth centuries), a de facto equality had been obtained between men and women with regard to unilateral divorce: A husband could divorce his wife unilaterally, and a woman could unilaterally achieve freedom from her marriage, since the court would immediately coerce her husband to divorce her.

It is important to note, that this legislation superseded talmudic halakha not only in Muslim-ruled Babylonia but throughout most of the Jewish world, including not only the Middle East, North Africa, [8] and Spain, but also countries where the Gentiles never considered intervening on the side of a women to compel her husband to divorce. Thus, in Catholic Germany, where divorce was anathema to the Christian authorities, Rabbenu Gershom knew of the Babylonian takanah and declared it to be binding in his time and place, i.e., although Torah law allowed coercion of the husband only when a wife was willing to forfeit her ketubah, praxis in Ashkenaz should (and did) follow the takanah, so that the Jewish authorities would coerce the husband of any wife demanding a get to give her a divorce (see his responsum cited above). A century later, in Catholic France, Rashi’s grandson Shmuel ben Meir and other members of the Paris Bet Din also followed suit, demonstrating that such coercion was standard operating procedure in all of Ashkenaz (see Sefer haYashar, responsa, beginning of responsum #24). But all this was to change, because of an almost single-handed effort embarked upon by none other than Shmuel ben Meir’s brother Jacob, known as Rabbenu Tam.

6. Reversal of the Tide: Rabbenu Tam’s Campaign against Coercing Divorce

Rabbenu Tam heard of an incident in which a woman demanded a divorce, and his brother Shmuel and other rabbis in Paris ruled (in line with generally accepted praxis) that the husband should be coerced to do so. In a lengthy halakhic epistle (Sefer haYashar, responsa, beginning of responsum #24), Rabbi Jacob ben Meir critiqued their action. Beginning in a minor tone, he first expressed concern lest “the enemies” claim the get was invalid, because the Bet Din in Paris had not waited for 12 months as required by the Talmud. At this point it seems to the reader that he is not contesting the validity of coercion after the 12 months are over (i.e., he seemingly accepts Sherira Gaon’s tradition, that already in talmudic times the husband was forced to divorce after that interim period). But he is definitely contesting immediate coercion—in other words, he is contesting the Sevora’ic takanah.

Indeed, Rabbenu Tam proceeds to state that there could never have been such a takanah. Why? Because the power to enact takanot contrary to Torah law in matters of marriage and divorce existed in talmudic times—but not after that. Thus, talmudic rabbis were authorized to decide that a get could be coerced in circumstances where the Torah had not allowed that.[9] But if post-talmudic rabbis were to enact such a takanah, they would be acting ultra vires. However, the post-talmudic rabbis were very great, and would never have so acted. Something that could not have happened, obviously never happened. Therefore, such a takanah had never been enacted. The conventional view in Ashkenaz (and wherever else it might be held), that such an enactment had indeed been made, was simply a counterfactual myth.

The only possible source that could authorize rabbis to coerce the husband of a rebellious wife to divorce her was, therefore, the Talmud itself. Rabbenu Tam writes to his brother: “I will now explicate for you; line by line, the talmudic sugya in Ketubot about the rebellious wife,” and proceeds to do so. In the course of that explication, he explains that the Talmud recognizes two types of rebellious wives. Both want to terminate the marriage and receive a divorce. The difference between them is this: Do they also demand payment of their ketubah? The rebellious wife who says ma-ees ‘alai is willing to receive a divorce without any payment of ketubah. It is with regard to her that Ameimar states (according to Rabbenu Tam’s citation of the Talmud):

But if she says ma-ees ‘alai—we do not coerce him.

Rabbenu Tam explains that this means that we do not coerce the husband to wait before divorcing her. Rather, he may immediately divorce her, as she in any case has waived payment of her ketubah. But what if despite her waiver of ketubah, the husband does not want to divorce her? Rabbenu Tam is very clear on this: “In the entire talmudic discussion, there is no mention at all of coercing the husband to divorce, and no other interpretation of the sugya has any validity.” Since, as Rabbenu Tam argues, there never was a post-talmudic takanah enabling coercion, and the Talmud itself does not authorize coercing the husband of a rebellious wife to divorce her, the upshot is clear: Any Jewish court that applies such coercion is acting illegally, and the resulting get is invalid. If the wife remarries, she and her new partner will be adulterers, and their children will be mamzerim. Therefore, “It is better that she remain an agunah, than that aspersion be cast upon the status of her children.” And if the rabbis of Paris were to respond, that for hundreds of years the custom had been to coerce husbands to divorce, and that a general maxim in Ashkenaz was “custom overrides halakha (minhag ‘oqer halakha)—Rabbenu Tam is not impressed: “Heaven forbid that we follow this maxim, when the result will be forbidden adultery and mamzerut.”

Rabbenu Tam is known for his bold reliance upon his own best understanding of the sources, even when this flies in the face of accepted halakhic praxis. Thus, he argued that the conventional arrangement of the four biblical passages inside the tefillin was mistaken, thereby ruling inter alia against his own grandfather Rashi. He also explained that the conventional view that Shabbat begins at sunset was completely mistaken, and that it began only when darkness had fallen. However, his overturning of the ancient tradition that when a woman demands a divorce her husband is coerced to do so—was certainly his most dramatic reversal of halakhic praxis. What could have been the reason for him to do so? Why would he want once again to place the wife at a disadvantage vis-à-vis her husband?

Having phrased the question thus, the answer is immediately obvious. In twelfth-century Ashkenaz, the enactments attributed to Rabbenu Gershom (herem de rabbenu Gershom) had become totally accepted. These enactments had deprived men of two of their major marital advantages vis-à-vis women: They could no longer be married to more than one wife, and they could no longer divorce their wife against her will. However, Rabbenu Gershom had not deprived the woman of her right to have the court force her husband to divorce her! The situation was therefore asymmetrical—to the advantage of the wife! It was this asymmetry that Rabbenu Tam effectively cancelled … by denying that women had ever legitimately possessed such a right.
Post-Rabbenu-Tam, neither the husband not the wife could opt out of a marriage by imposing a divorce upon the other. Divorce was only possible by mutual consent.

7. How to Justify Rabbenu Tam’s Ruling: Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel’s Portrayal of Women

Some 200 years later, Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel (also known as as Rosh) re-located from Ashkenaz to Spain. In Ashekenaz, Rabbenu Tam’s denial of a coerced get to women had by then become totally accepted. In Spain, however, coercion of the husband to divorce was still quite widely practiced. This was apparently especially so in cases where the woman stated that she found her husband repulsive and declared ma-ees ‘alai. How indeed could one go against Maimonides’ value-judgment that a woman may not be compelled to have sex with a man repulsive to her? Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel responded:

Is this a reason to force a husband to divorce, and thereby permit a married woman [to other men]? Let her not have sex with him, and remain a straw widow to the end of her days! In any case, a woman is not commanded to have children. Can it be, that because she wants to follow her headstrong desires, and has fastened her eyes on another man and desires him more than the champion of her youth, that we should fulfill her lust and force the man, who still loves the woman of his youth, to divorce her?! God forbid that any rabbi should rule thus! [...] In this generation, the daughters of Israel are cheeky, and if a wife will be able to extricate herself from under her husband by saying “he repulses me,” not a single daughter of Abraham will remain with her husband; [rather] they will fasten their eyes on another and rebel against their husbands! [10]

According to this view, women are not interested in marital stability but in following their lust and desire. Indeed, if given the choice, not a single woman would remain married to her present husband! One might argue that if that is truly what women want, perhaps they should be freed from their current unwanted state? But this is not the view of Rabbi Asher. His analysis reflects a deeply-held understanding of the purpose of marriage. Marriage is a bulwark against socio-sexual chaos. Such chaos will occur if women will be able to follow their desires for men other than their husbands by forcing him to divorce against his will. Therefore, it is only by absolutely closing such options that social stability can be ensured.

This does not mean that Rabbi Asher is in favor of forced sex. If a wife claims that she finds her husband repulsive, she need not have sex with him. But that does not entitle her to a divorce. Better that she remain without sex for the rest of her life, he argues, than that her husband be forced to capitulate and give her up, against his will! Unlike Maimonides, who holds that a sexless marriage is a moral oxymoron and must be terminated by divorce, Rabbi Asher holds that if such a divorce will enable a woman to seek sexual satisfaction with another man, it is absolutely preferable morally that she remain married against her will—and if she will not have sex with her husband, let her not have sex at all.

However much a contemporary reader may be turned off by this view—and whether or not Rabbenu Tam himself held such a view of women—it is very important to note that this is not a formal-authoritative presentation of halakha. Rather, Rabbi Asher bases his position on what he holds to be central Torah values: the sanctity and stability of marriage, the suppression of social chaos, the preference for marriage without female sexuality over an alternative of lust and licentiousness. And while it is quite probably true that today very few Jews (of either gender) agree with the Rosh’s view of women, the halakhot of divorce remain as they were formulated in twelfth-century Ashkenaz: A husband or a wife who seeks divorce is effectively hostage to his or her marital partner, without whose consent he or she cannot become divorced.

8. Conclusion

When I was growing up, I was taught that the holiness of Jewish marriage is based on the serious commitment of man to woman and of woman to man, expressed (inter alia) in their entering a relationship in which neither party can cast off the other against his or her will. Later, when I leaned in the Yeshiva, I became aware that such had not always been the case: Originally, “in the time of the Torah” (and indeed, also the time of Hazal and the first millennium of the Common Era), a husband could arbitrarily be rid of his wife whenever he wanted. Only later, in the eleventh century CE, did Rabbenu Gershom decide to come to the aid of Jewish women and defend them against such a possibility by forbidding divorce without the woman’s consent. From time to time, a strange question would pop up in my head: Did Torah and Hazal not know that a true Jewish marriage means a serious commitment that cannot be unilaterally terminated by one of the parties?

Subsequently, I became more acquainted with the sources, and realized that over the course of time, holy Jewish marriage with huppah and kiddushin has undergone many metamorphoses. Originally, a husband could divorce a wife against her will, but a wife could not be divorced without her husband’s agreement (pace, e.g., Rabbenu Gershom and Rambam, who hold that under original Torah law any woman really fed up with her husband could forfeit her ketubah and receive a coerced divorce). Later, at the end of the talmudic period or at least from the seventh-century Rabbanan Sevora’ei, halakha moved to a symmetrical situation: Not only the husband but also the wife could unilaterally end the marriage. Then, after Rabbenu Gershom forbade the husband to unilaterally divorce his wife, the pendulum swung to the opposite pole: For about a century, only the wife could coerce the husband to divorce her, while he was forbidden to do so against her will. At this time, halakha (at least in Ashkenaz) was directly contrary to Torah law. After that, Rabbenu Tam restored symmetry between the spouses—but in a manner opposite to what had been the case until Rabbenu Gershom: Now, not only the man but also the woman could not exit the marriage unless the partner concurred. For the first time since Mount Sinai, both partners entering a Jewish marriage knew that they might become hostage to the other.

In recent years, the ideal of no-fault divorce has become prevalent in many societies around the globe: Marriage should not be a prison in which each side holds the only key to the other’s freedom. Hearing rabbis speak (nay, sermonize), one gets a clear message: Such is not the way of the Torah. Our marriage is holy, and that is why it is called kiddushin. And marriage cannot be holy unless it is a total, unconditional commitment that can be abrogated only after much travail and by mutual consent. No-fault divorce is thus a halakhic non-starter.

After reading this article, one thing should be clear: Whatever this or that rabbi may think of no-fault divorce, such was exactly the character of Jewish divorce for a very long time. According to Rabbenu Gershom and Maimonides (et al.), this was original Torah law from the time of Moshe Rabbenu (and according to many others, from the sixth or seventh century until Rabbenu Tam, i.e., for at least half a millennium). Was Jewish marriage not holy then? Similarly, if today, or in several years, halakhic authorities find the will and the courage to (re)institute halakhic no-fault divorce, this will not at all undermine the holiness of marriage under huppah and kiddushin. In fact, the opposite may well be true.

[1] “Kofin oto ‘ad she-yomar rotze ani.”Sifra, ad loc. (Dibbura di Nedava, 3).
[2] “veKhen b’gittei nashim.”
[3]“Devarin she-baLev einam devarim.”
[4]See e.g., Tosafot on Gittin 32a s.v. mahu de-teima.
[5]See Rashbam on Bava Batra 48a s.v. hatam nami neima.
[6]Responsum of Rav Sherira Gaon, Otsar HaGeonim to tractate Ketubot, no. 478. This responsum was known to the rishonim. See e.g. Rabbi Yesh’aya di Trani (thirteenth-century Italy), Tosfot RID on Ketubot 64a–b.
[7]Responsum of Rav Sherira Gaon, Otsar HaGeonim to tractate Ketubot, no. 478.
[8]Rabbi Yitzhak AlFasi (Morocco and Spain, 1013–1103) ruled that the takanah was in force throughout the Jewish world. Rabbenu Hannanel (d. 1055) does not mention the takanah, and thus some have held that he rejected its validity. But this is not self-evident.
[9]To prove the categoric difference between talmudic and post-talmudic authority, Rabbenu Tam cites the talmudic statement (Bava Metzi’ah 86a) “Ravina and Rav Ashi are the termination of instruction (sof horaah).” However, the notion that these words teach that after the Talmud no enactments authorizing coerced divorce are possible—may well be an original interpretation of Rabbenu Tam.
[10]Responsa of Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel section 43:8.

Certainly the study of Kabbalah(esoteric literature) is authentic and part of the Torah. We know that the great Rabbis that we all revere—the Ramban, Rav Moshe Cordovero, the Ramchal, the Wilna Gaon, Rav Shneur Zalman (Chabad), the Malbim, Rav Chaim Wolozhin, Rav Yosef Hayyim of Baghdad--and many other luminaries spent many hours in its study and produced brilliant literature. Beyond that, didn't Chazzal (Chagiga 13a) themselves deal with these subjects?

However, in our day and age we are faced with the problem of Pseudo-Kabbalists, people who are really ignorant of the true Kabbalah but nevertheless make it into a profitable business. These imposters are photogenic, very impressive in beard and garb, and make a show of great piety. Many who have some problem or worry and who wish to find an anchor of security, feel relieved to have the blessings of these pseudo-kabbalists; although to achieve that "blessing" we must grant them a sizeable amount of money.

Some of these pseudo-kabbalists deal in giving "Divine" advice. When a prospective bride or groom ask for divination whether the match is "lucky", the imposters check the Gimatria of the names, which of course has no practical bearing on the suitability of the match. (So said the Steipler Rabbi, his words recorded in "Tamim Tiyeh" page 13). Who can count how many unfortunate people had their wedding hopes dashed due to the false advice given by such kabbalists? Some imposters claim that the cause of marriage unhappiness and bickering is due to some fault in the letters of the Ketuba document. These pseudo-kabbalists are willing to re-write a new Ketuba, of course for a sizeable sum. Others check the Mezuza, and finding some fault in its legality, claim that this was the cause for illness or financial loss. (And of course rewrite a new Mezuza, for a "nice" sum). Those people who took such advice didn't go to doctors, or to financial advisors, since they relied on the occult advice of these imposters.

Others were advised to change their place of domicile, or change their profession, due to some whim or inner hunch of the "Kabbalist". This implicit reliance on "soothsayers" is negated by Sefer Tanya (of Chabad, page 134).

The question which many readers might ask is "why claim that these "Rabbis" are imposters? I answer: For two reasons. First, all of the famous Kabbalists of yore, all the ancients, didn't deal with these "meddlings" aforementioned. Not the Arizal, not the Ba-al ShemTov, nor any great Gadol of note. And of course there is no mention of such matters in the Zohar literature. These shenanigans are innovations of our present century!

Secondly, this is a false understanding just what Kabbalah is about. The great Ramchal teaches in his book (Sha-arei Ramchal, pages 36, 62, 404) that all of the Kabbalah is built on parables and proverbs and if one doesn't know how to unravel the parable, he really knows nothing. This fundamental approach was said too by Rav Moshe Cordovero (in his Shiur Koma, article Mashal), so too by Rabbi Chayim Volozhin (Nefesh ha-Chayim, part three chapter seven) and others. The pseudo-kabbalists mumble words of the externals, the words of Zohar and Arizal like a fetish, without understanding the inner import. How do we know this? It is because they display publicly their knowledge, they flaunt their "connections" with the occult world. And the Wilna Gaon writes (at the beginning of his commentary to Sifra Di-tzniuta) that Proverbs (11, 2) writes "Et Znu-im , Chochma" those who are modest and don't reveal their expertise, they are those who attain Chochma. As written in Chagiga 13a "Dvash ve Chalav Tachat Leshoneich" wisdom which is sweeter than honey mixed with milk, keep under your tongue! See also the Gaon's teaching on Mishlei 12 verse 28, the real Tzaddikim conceal their inner knowledge. See too the words of Maharal, Avot beginning of chapter six, Ve-he-vai Tzanua (page 285).

In the recent period, several of these fakers have been caught doing sinful sexual actions with female applicants. This causes great Chillul Hashem. The mis-step was already foreseen by the great Rav Nachman of Breslav, who says (Chayei MoHaran 526) that the word "Kabbalah" is the numerical equivalent of "No-eif" (137). Certainly he doesn't intend to say that ALL kabbalists will fall under that category. He only says that those who are not fitting will "slip". This I found in the Zohar (book three, page 123a) that those faulty people unworthy of learning Kabbalah, will be misled by snakes and scorpions, which is a figure of speech for the evil inclination.

Who is fitting to undertake the real study of Kabbalah? Rabbi Chaim Vital, the major student of the Arizal, notifies us (on page 23 of his Introduction to the Etz Chayim) of twenty four conditions. To be sexually pure of sin. To beware of conceit. To be chary of idle chatter. Never to get angry. To love all Jews (in other words not to have a riff with anyone). To have proper intention for all of the 100 benedictions uttered each day, etc., and many other conditions which are very difficult for most people to practice properly. So how can we give the mantle of Kabbalistic authority to just anybody who has impressive dress or mode of speech?

The problem is that some of these imposters sometimes seem to have clairvoyant abilities. Some of them are good at telepathy, or at foreseeing future events, or even for grasping private personal details of the person asking for their blessing. Isn't that a sign of Kedusha? Not So! Researchers at Duke University are presently studying the matter of para-psychological abilities. There are people who are born with that knack, without being holy at all. The Rambam in his Introduction to Perush HaMishna, admits that some people have wonderful ability (despite the fact that they sometimes err). However, it is no sign at all of holiness or of connection with the Almighty. To the contrary, this prowess is a Nissayon (spiritual test) to the person born with that ability, that by misusing his talents he will have control over other people's minds, get their money and dedication, and even establish a cult.

A century ago, the giant ship called "Titanic" hit an iceberg and sank with over 1,500 voyagers. The tragedy was foreseen by Morgan Robertson and depicted in his book "Futility" four years before the tragedy! So too the terrible assassination of John Kennedy was foreseen several years in advance by Jean Dixon. She depicted the month, the place of ambush, the physical description of the murderer. It was uncanny.

Knowing in advance, or knowing secret and personal details of our lives, is no sign of sanctity nor of connection with the Almighty.

We must be wary of these people. Kabbalah, the true Kabbalah, is something else entirely. It is to understand the inner meaning of the Mitzvot, it is to fathom greater understanding of Holy Scripture. It is to understand Aggadot Chazzal (So says the Wilna Gaon, writing on Mishlei 24 verse 30. And so too says the Sefer Tanya of Lubavitch , page 137). It is to get the real appreciation of Ahavat Hashem ve-yir-ato.

Kabbalah is not be a hatchet to be used for bettering our temporal situations (Kardom lachpor bah - Avot, chapter four). And people relying on the "advice" of these charlatans may bring upon themselves considerable physical, spiritual, emotional and financial sufferings.

At around the time that the State of Israel was being recognized by the United Nations, the Chief Rabbis of Israel wrote a letter in Arabic to the Arab world. The Sephardic Chief Rabbi Benzion Uziel, who was fluent in Arabic, likely wrote this letter that was signed by him and the Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi Yitzchak Herzog.

Although so many years have passed since the formal establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the message of peace conveyed in this letter has largely been eclipsed by the ongoing hostilities and warfare.

Yom Ha'Atsma'ut, Israel Independence day, is observed this year on Wednesday night April 22 and Thursday April 23. It's worthwhile to review the words of Rabbis Uziel and Herzog, and pray that the message of peace will prevail...sooner rather than later.

21 Kislev, 5708
"A Call to the Leaders of Islam for Peace and Brotherhood."

To the Heads of The Islamic Religion in the Land of Israel and throughout
the Arab lands near and far, Shalom U'Vracha:

Brothers, at this hour, as the Jewish people have returned to its land and
state, per the word of God and the prophets in the Holy Scriptures, and in
accordance with the decision of the United Nations, we approach you in peace
and brotherhood, in the name of God's Torah and the Holy Scriptures, and we
say to you:

Please remember the peaceful and friendly relations that existed between us
when we lived together in Arab lands and under Islamic Rulers during the
Golden Age, when together we developed brilliant intellectual insights of
wisdom and science for all of humanity's benefit. Please remember the sacred
words of the prophet Malachi, who said: "Have we not all one Father? Did not
one God create us? Why do we break faith with one another, profaning the
covenant of our ancestors?" (Malachi 2:10).

We were brothers, and we shall once again be brothers, working together in
cordial and neighborly relations in this Holy Land, so that we will build it
and make it flourish, for the benefit of all of its inhabitants, without
discrimination against anyone. We shall do so in faithful and calm
collaboration, so that we may all merit God's blessing on His land, from
which there shall radiate the light of peace to the entire world.

Signed,
Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel
Yitschak Isaac Ha-Levi Herzog

Maimonides (d. 1204) tolerated no idea that failed the test of reason. An ancient and robust tradition of superstition among the Jews did not deter him. Maimonides either ignored or rationalized scores of Talmudic halachot based on astrology, demonology, and magic.

Maimonides denounced astrology passionately, despite its popularity, calling the belief “stupidity” and its practitioners “fools.” His argument bears emphasis: Maimonides opposed astrology primarily on scientific rather than religious grounds. The Torah prohibits divination from the sky, he ruled, not because it displays a lack of faith in God, but simply because it is false.

But Nahmanides (d. 1270), pointing to Talmudic sources and consistent with his intellectual milieu, wrote a correspondent that it would be halachically unacceptable to ignore an inauspicious horoscope, because “one should not rely on miracles.”

Though a student of Kabbalah, Nahmanides also worked within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy. He was no anti-rationalist. He was worlds apart from today’s magic-remedy-dispensing “mekubalim” (miracle workers).

Medieval philosophers relied on reason to explain nature, but reason had practical limitations. Even the most confident rationalist could not explain all natural phenomena. Philosophers were forced to distinguish between “manifest” qualities — clearly understood properties such as size, shape, and color — and an “occult” or hidden property unique to a particular object (“segula” in medieval philosophical Hebrew).
The attractive force of the lodestone, a naturally occurring magnet, was the most commonly cited example of an occult quality.

The ancients knew that a magnet draws iron, but the cause of the attraction eluded explanation. Medieval scholastics viewed such “action at a distance” as an occult property; no manifest quality of the lodestone could explain its power. Likewise, the stars and planets were thought to influence the daily affairs of human life by means of emanations penetrating the cosmos — an even more impressive example of action at a distance.

Occult remedies were a problem for halachists and Jewish philosophers. The issue came into sharp focus in the early fourteenth century, during the Maimonidean Controversy.

Rabbi Shlomo Ben Aderet (“Rashba,” d. 1310), a student of Nahmanides, played a major role in this episode. Like many of his contemporaries, Rashba revered both Maimonides and Nahmanides.

Rashba was asked for his decision: Was it permissible to use a medallion engraved with the image of a lion — after the zodiac constellation Leo — to treat kidney stones? (Ironically, the radical Maimonidean rationalists were using this talisman; the anti-Maimonideans objected).

Rashba deliberates carefully, and takes great pains to address Maimonides’ broad prohibition of magic. He notes that Maimonides himself, following the Talmud, allowed for an exception: He permitted any empirically effective remedy, even if it was poorly understood and attributed to an occult virtue. Does this exception, Rashba wonders, cover the Leo medallion?

Rashba ultimately allows the practice. He skillfully argues that the medallion’s healing property, though occult, is as natural as magnetism (the following is the earliest description of a magnetic compass in Hebrew literature):

“Consider the occult property of the magnet, at which iron leaps, and furthermore, the common practice of sailors: They insert a needle into a floating piece of wood and magnetize the needle, which navigates on the water’s surface until it points to the pole. Not a single philosopher comprehends this in terms of natural philosophy. Likewise, all occult properties are natural — in the manner of drugs and herbs — and include no element of paganism.”

This chapter in the history of three intersecting fields — philosophy, science, and halacha — remains relevant today. How should a modern traditional Jew respond to magical cures, astrology, and the variety of “segulot” (talismans, in its current usage) increasingly promoted by Jewish charismatics?

We may be tempted to fall back on the old debate between Maimonides and Nahmanides and decline to take a stand. It would be presumptuous, so the argument goes, to come down on either side.

But there is a better approach, which takes historical context into account. An example from another area of halacha may help disentangle the issue.

Centuries ago, several prominent halachists permitted smoking on non-Sabbath holidays, based on its presumed health benefits. The rationale was that smoking fell into the halachic category of kindling for a universally appreciated pleasure (e.g., a healthful activity), which is permitted on holidays.

No halachist today would tout the health benefits of smoking simply because this (erroneous) idea is part of the halachic record. Thankfully, scientific progress makes such a prospect laughable.

Needless to say, science has evolved considerably since the fourteenth century: The Renaissance, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and the Enlightenment; not to mention Darwin and Einstein.

We have known for some time that magnetism is not an occult force. We also know that astrology is a pseudo-scientific fantasy (on this score, Maimonides was far ahead of his time). Much of what was fact to the medievals may be of interest to historians of science, but is no longer scientific reality.

Nahmanides and Rashba were no fools. If they were active today, they no doubt would mock practitioners of magical cures and those who would read fortunes from molten lead or coffee grinds. Maimonides likewise would abandon his own outdated science.
On scientific questions, religion must follow the very latest science. To settle for anything less is to invite a return to a darker, occult age.

Good morning. I would like to thank Tom Severson, Michael Davis, David Nelson for inviting me to speak to you this morning and the many of you for allowing me to talk with you today.

"It's 2:00 in the morning. We are at Hackensack University Medical Center in Northern Jersey and are grieving beyond tears and words. Our younger son, Daniel, hasn't been feeling well for a couple of days, complaining of back pain and shortness of breath.

“Two hours ago, what we thought was perhaps a virus or something tied to the heat and humidity was something much worse. Our little boy has cancer.

“Just two days ago, Daniel had scored two goals in a street hockey game at camp, a performance more impressive when realizing he was playing with a collapsed left lung.

“For whatever reason, we have been hit with a challenge we never sought. But with God's help and the strength of friends and family and a terrific medical team, we fully expect Daniel to celebrate his Bar-Mitzvah in three years and hopefully to marry and raise a family.”

I wrote this for CSP Daily News on July 5, 2013 – 9 days after Daniel fell ill -- as I prepared to take a short leave of absence.

Today, nearly 2 ½ years later, I am speaking publicly for the first time about the trials, challenges and the profound appreciation of a faith that had to transcend its routine.

For much of my life I have prayed every day. I grew up in Boston – and as many of you know I’m a devout Red Sox fans. I was raised with an Orthodox Jewish upbringing, one imbued with a sincere pride in our religious faith, coupled with a deep love of people of all backgrounds.

More recently, I have come to appreciate a certain insight. It is one thing to go to Church or Temple or a Mosque and recite the daily or weekly prayers when there is little at stake. Oftentimes, in this scenario, it is we who define God – what He means to us, the role He plays in our daily lives.

It is another thing to cry in our prayers, to wonder if God is truly listening and whether we will receive the favorable answer that we seek. In this relationship it is God defining who we are, who I am and the relationship that God and I share.

This has been my life over the past two years. I pray three times a day, every day. Prayer has always served as my spiritual food much as breakfast, lunch and dinner provide the nutritional source to empower us through our day and evening.

With Daniel’s cancer, prayer took on an additional role – that of medicine, my cure, my hope.

There is a beautiful and yet complex story in the Bible. It occurs in Chapter 20 of Genesis. We have just completed the story of Lot and his two daughters and how after the destruction of Sodom and Gemorra. Thinking that the world had been destroyed, Lot’s two daughters intoxicate their father and have relations with him in order to bring new life. That’s the last we read about Lot and his life.

The story now moves to Abraham and Sarah. He is 99 and she is 89. For decades they try to have a child but without success. Time is certainly NOT on their side.
Living in the Near East, they travel South to the city of Gerar and as they do, Abraham notices that Sarah is still attractive. He suddenly fears that the people of this community may kill him if he is truthful about his marriage. So he tells Sarah to “lie,” to reply that she is his sister if asked about their relationship.

And indeed, such happens. The King – known as Abimelekh – literally “takes” Sarah. But before any hanky panky can happen, God appears to Abimelekh in a dream and says Sarah is married and that her husband Abraham is a Prophet.

God then punishes not only Abimelekh but his entire palace by blocking their orifices. After Abimelekh apologizes to Abraham and returns Sarah to him, Abraham prays for the King and his Court to be healed. God answers and Abimelekh and his crew are able to conceive and bear children.

It is this prayer of Abraham – of praying for others for the very thing that he and Sarah lacked – a child – that prompts God in the following chapter to reveal that he has remembered Sarah and that he’ll restore her youthfulness – V’HaShem Pakad et Sarah.
Interestingly, the Hebrew root PKD means more than just “remember,” it suggests that God took an accounting of the lives of Abraham and Sarah and affirmed their worthiness to be blessed with a child. Only then does Sarah bear her first and only child -- Isaac.

[Parenthetically, it is striking that the 3 vignettes of Lot, Abimelekh and Abraham/Sarah all deal with fertility and perpetuating or obstructing life.]
In the stories of Abimelekh and then Abraham/Sarah, there are inspiring lessons. The first is the power of prayer, of Abraham’s ability to intercede on behalf of Abimelekh and his Palace. The second is the altruism to place someone’s needs ahead of your own even when you share that very need. [Rashi]

This is where you come in. In the days after our discovery, you extended yourself and embraced me and my family. In less than one week after we learned of Daniel’s cancer, I received more than 150 emails from you – the leaders who make up our convenience-store industry.

Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus and Jews, as well as many who do not associate with a particular denomination, prayed for my son. And some of you – nearly 2 ½ years later – continue to pray for Daniel. How amazing. In the depths of my greatest pain you have been a source of salvation.

I’m happy to share that the daily medications of Mercaptuperine, the scheduled intake of Prednisone, Pentamadine, Methotrexate and countless other multi-syllabic, tongue-twisting drugs ? are nearly over. By next month, Daniel’s regular treatment ends.
We then embark on what is basically a six-month wait with intermittent treatment. If he is cancer-free, that portends well for his future. If cancer is found…

The shift from daily doses of medications to a certain hiatus is personally very frightening. The idea of meticulously preparing his medication has given us a sense of empowerment, a partnership between medicine and prayer; Man and God.

In just weeks, our partnership will change. In lieu of pills, prayer will be our sole representative, faith our lone agent. Truly the next six months will rest in the Hands of God.

One stage is nearly done, another soon to follow. What I know is what we all know –
Life truly is a Gift from God and it’s our mission to appreciate it each and every day.
When I wake up in the morning I recite a little prayer as soon as I open my eyes. It is called the Modeh Ani. It is a prayer of gratitude to God for restoring our soul – for giving us a new day. It is up to us to make each and every day a worthy gift from God.

Thank you so much and Bless you.

The Jewish Ideas Campus Fellowship Spring Semester has begun! We are happy to welcome three new fellows joining us this month. From New York University fellow Danielle Panitch, from University of Texas Elan Kogutt and from Yeshivat Chovevei Torah, Eli Yoggev. Each brings a unique brand of Modern Orthodoxy and we wish them success in their important work.

Before mentioning some of our plans for this semester we have to take a second to look back on the wide range of ways our students expanded the influence of Modern Orthodoxy for their fellow students. Our biggest event was the Shabbaton in the Boston/Cambridge area with special thanks to the Rabbi Arthur A. Jacobovitz Institute. Students also heard from Rabbis Chaim Rapaport and Rabbi Menachem Leibtag at Brandeis University and Queens College respectively. We had various classes, chaburahs and coffee shop discussions and classes ranging from the nature of God to Feminism to the Age of the Universe and the Future of Jewish Education.

Coming up in February we have a few great events already planned

Feb 3-Rabbi Aryeh Klapper will speak at the University of Massachusetts
Feb 8- Rivka Hia and Sarah Robinson will lead a Jewish identity discussion at Stern College
Feb 20-There will be a Pluralism discussion at the University of Texas
Feb 20-University of Maryland will host a Modern Orthodox PartnerUp session

If you would like more information about these programs and updates about others, please email me at [email protected]. University students are encouraged to register for our University Network. It is a free service to students. More information and registration details are available on the bottom right of our homepage at jewishideas.org