National Scholar Updates

Question: A person is an essential member of a United States governmental committee to resolve the current economic crisis.Of concern, Is whether the crisis is deemed a form of Pikuach Nefesh(a danger to life) This classification grants one permission to violate the Shabbat in order to extricate oneself (or a group of people)from this dangerous status.
Response:The following actual case took place.
In a dialogue between Rabbi Asher Lopatin and the Religion News Service pertaining to the religious sensitivity of Rahm Emanuel, President -elect Barack Obama's White House Chief of Staff', the following was reported. The Rabbi recalled that Rahm Emanuel informed him that he was requested to be part of a very important conference call on Rosh HaShana dealing with the financial bailout bill.Mr. Emanuel was concerned whether being part of such a conference call was a violation of Rosh HaShana."He wanted to know what I thought. I asked him,is the crisis as serious as they portray it.And he said , that according to the information that he had there was a potential for financial meltdown.I said that under those circumstances we have a law of "pikuach nefesh" , of saving lives and almost any ritual law may be pushed off for the sake of saving a life.I wouldn't say this with every piece of legislation, but if this bailout did not happen, it could lead to a question of life and death for certain people,"
The above was e-mailed to me with the following halachic question:- "Can a financial emergency rise to the level of Pekuach Nefesh to be docheh (overrule/annul)Shabbat?"
Though the Rabbi did not provide any rabbinic source for his decision, it may be shown that his position has merit and is supported by Chazal.
The Talmud states(Yoma 82a) R. Eliezer says (in reference to the verse: and you shall love Hashem your God with all your soul and with all your resources[D'varim 6:5] if it is stated with all your soul why was it necessary to state with all your resources?-and if it is stated with all your resources, why was it necessary to state with all your soul?Rather the explanation is that if you have a person whose body is more precious to him than his money,for this reason it is stated with all your soul,so that he be prepared to give up that which is most precious to him.And if you have a person whose money is more precious to him than his body,for this reason it is stated with all your resources, so that he be prepared to give up that which is precious to him.(Artscroll translation)
HaRav Moshe ibn Chaviv, in his classic commentary on Mesechet Yoma, titled "Tosafot Yom HaKippurim" posed the following question. It is a well known fact that the overwhelming number of people would deem life more important than monetary resources. Very few , if any, would consider monetary resources more precious than life. Accordingly, the behavior of such a minute minority should not be of concern to the Torah. Would not the rare person who values money more than life be so insignificant and abnormal that no one would even reckon with this person at all? HaRav Chaviv's response is that the Torah is not dealing with the view of a minute minority. It, rather, relates to different stages of life. A young, healthy person generally would value life more precious than resources. As long as a person was alive and well he could once again through effort regain the resources he lost. An older person, especially one who is ill,lacks the ability to in any way regain his financial assets. Such a person would value his funds more than his life; for any loss of his resources would signify his inability to sustain his life. The Torah, therefore, relates to two distinctly different classes of people; those who have the ability to recoup resources and those without such ability.
Accordingly, an economic meltdown to the infirm and elderly may truly generate a realistic Pikuach Nefesh.
In a discussion of the decision of the Rabbinate in Israel to sell the land to a gentile prior to Shmitta so that its produce may be marketed, HaRav Herzog, former Chief Rabbi of Israel contended that in contemporary times the nature of the prohibition was merely rabbinic, not biblical.In addition, he noted that the issue may be a form of "pikuach nefesh" [ karov l'pikuach nefesh] to sustain the Jewish population in Israel.( "Kuntras:Al D'var HaShmitta", p.51-52, by HaRav Issac HaLevi Herzog,in a memorial volume dedicated to HaRav Dr.Shaol Weingart titled Yad Shaol)
Thus a communal economic crises may be classified as a case of pikuach nefesh.
The prophet rebukes King David for his behavior with Batsheva.He tells a tale of a wealthy man with countless flocks of sheep who steals and slaughters the one calf and beloved pet of his neighbor rather than use any of his own flocks.The king was horrified by the immoral act and cries out "Ben Mavet ha'eesh haoseh zot"[the person who did this deserves to be killed](2 Shmuel 12:5) Of concern is why such a theft deserves the penalty of death. It was merely a monetary sin. Rashi says that stealing from a poor person is comparable to killing him. The meaning must be that if you take away the last resource of a person it is deemed as if one killed him.
The above sources appear to sustain the view that an economic meltdown crises is a form of pikuach nefesh.Accordingly, coupled to this would be the general approach to manifest a kilacher yad activity.Namely, any Shabbat violation is to be performed in an irregular manner.
It is vital to note that though a total loss of resources is a form of pikuach nefesh there are major Halachic distinctions between cases of life threatening circumstances and cases of loss of resources.
1. In life threatening situations, one may violate Shabbat observances even if the pikuach nefesh is not certain but merely a doubt. (Yoma 84b)There is no such leniency recorded in matters of a loss of resources. Also, there must be a total loss of resources, not a partial loss.
2. In life threatening situations even biblical restrictions of Shabbat may be violated to save lives.(ibid.,)In a loss of resources there is no source sustaining violation of biblical rules.(Note Harav Herzog utilizes the concern for pikuach nefesh of the Jewish community only after he rules that Shmitta is only a rabbinic observance in modern times.)
3. In life threatening situations, an individual may violate Shabbat to save one Jew's life.In a total loss of resources the status of pikuach nefesh,perhaps, is only utilized to prevent an economic meltdown that impacts a large number of Jewish households. Accordingly, no individual Jew may violate Shabbat to prevent personal loss of resources.As such, the pikuach nefesh of a loss of resources is a means of sustaining the viability of the Jewish community.It, therefore is an Halachic decision that may require a rabbinic P'sak and may not be unilaterally assumed
4. Custom has it that the non Jewish poor were required to be sustained by the Jewish community.(Gittin 61a) This appears to suggest that a Jewish governmental leader may be mandated to act in behalf of a gentile community to prevent an economic meltdown just as he would to prevent such a drastic crises to Jews.

(Logic would indicate that action on Shabbat would include all of the above factors.)

People familiar with the Sabbath laws know that the Torah does not list the activities prohibited on the Sabbath. However, rabbis in the Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 49a, state that the Torah hints at the activities that are banned.
These hints are based on two rabbinical teachings that are applied by the rabbis at times: (1) When facts or incidents are placed near one another in the Bible, one can derive a lesson from the juxtaposition. (2) A halakhah can be learned from such things as counting the number of times an item appears in the Torah.
Thus the rabbis stated:
• Because the Sabbath is mentioned near the laws of the building of the Tabernacle, we are informed that those labors necessary to construct the Tabernacle are forbidden on the Sabbath.
• Since the term melakhah is found in the discussion of the Sabbath and appears thirty-nine times in the Bible, Scripture is teaching that there are thirty-nine categories of proscribed work on this holy day.
Some scholars who attempt to find reasons for the commandments, such as Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, suggest that the thirty-nine categories are comprised of melekhet machshevet, a phrase found in Exodus 35:33 which they translate as "creative acts." Creative acts, they say, are forbidden on the Sabbath to remind Jews that God created the world, ceasing to perform acts of creation on the first Sabbath.
Critics of these views point out that no hint of the thirty-nine labors exists in the Torah itself, and that the register of prohibitions is clearly rabbinical in origin. If the Torah wanted to teach that work performed in the Tabernacle or creative acts should not be done on the Sabbath, it would have stated this clearly. Furthermore, the claim that the word melakhah appears only thirty-nine times in the Bible is incorrect. The word appears more than thirty-nine times - it is present in 166 verses throughout the entire Bible, including sixty-five in the Pentateuch alone.
Additionally, hundreds of jobs were performed by Tabernacle workers but were not included in the thirty-nine categories listed by the rabbis, such as carrying work instruments and other items in the Tabernacle structure, washing before and after work and before and after eating, setting the table to eat, using utensils in eating and drinking, cleaning the table after the meal, and clearing work areas when work were completed. Why were these activities not listed as acts prohibited on the Sabbath?
Many "creative acts" in the building of the Tabernacle are also not on the list of forbidden Sabbath activities, such as measuring boards and cloths and placing them in their proper places in the Tabernacle based on the measurements, as well as counting, reading, studying, giving directions to subordinates, and other activities for which a specialist is generally consulted.
Even rabbis who contend that the list of prohibited Sabbath labors was derived from the Torah recognize that there are more than thirty-nine categories of work that are disallowed on the Sabbath. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, for example, adds, in its concluding paragraph, acts unbecoming the tone of the Sabbath day, as well as buying, selling, loaning, placing an article in deposit, legal judgments, legal claims, appeals, other court activities, marriage, divorce, and accounting - eleven more. The Midrash cites what it considers to be scriptural proof for each of these items.
Why, then, if the sages themselves recognized that more than thirty-nine activities were prohibited on the Sabbath, were thirty-nine banned behaviors chosen and not another number? Also, why did the rabbis (in such places as Mishnah Shabbat 73a and the Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 49b) call the number arba'im chaser achat, "forty minus one"? Why did they not simply say thirty-nine?
The Significance of the Number Forty
The number forty is a symbolic figure associated in Jewish thought with a long period or large number of difficulties. It reminds Jews, for example, of the forty years of struggle, exertion and challenges faced by the Israelites as punishment for accepting the wrong-headed assessment of the ten spies sent to evaluate the land of Canaan and for the Israelites' refusal to rely on the divine assurances and advance in armed battle to conquer the land.
The number also recalls the forty days and nights when the flood raged and destroyed all earthly inhabitants; only Noah, his family and the animals he sequestered on the ark were saved.
The number forty brings to mind the forty days and nights that Moses spent on Mount Sinai, with no one but God, without food and drink. This was a period of deep mental and physical exertion, in which he obtained the Decalogue from God, learned its meaning and brought it to the Israelites.
The Meaning of the Words "Forty Minus One"
The unusual phrase "forty minus one" appears to have special meaning, for if it did not, the number thirty-nine would have been used. Aside from being employed in reference to the Sabbath in Mishnah Shabbat 7:2, "forty minus one" is also utilized as the count for the lashes inflicted as punishment upon certain criminals for certain crimes in Mishnah Makkot 3:1-10.
The rabbis were conscious of the severity of the thirty-nine lashes and the enormous strain and bodily destruction it produced, as they stated in Mishnah Makkot 3:10. Only a few rather strong men, undoubtedly, could endure so many harsh beatings. It is, therefore, more than likely that they rarely inflicted the full count of thirty-nine lashes. Indeed, the rabbis required that a doctor examine and evaluate a prisoner's physical condition before lashes were inflicted, and, if the doctor determined that the criminal could not stand the large number of whippings, the amount was reduced. Thus, it should be clear that the number "forty minus one" is more symbolic than real. Why, then, did the rabbis choose the phrase "forty minus one"?
It seems that the rabbis wanted to say two things. First, as indicated by the symbolism of the number forty, the criminal deserved a harsh and unpleasant punishment because of his misdeed. Second, by reducing the number and making it clear that they were decreasing it by using the phrase "forty minus one," they were teaching that people must not act ruthlessly without sensitivity and consideration - even with criminals.
Applying This Concept to Shabbat
Consistent with the usage of the phrase with corporal punishment, it appears that the rabbis were teaching two lessons. First, by mentioning forty, which denotes difficulty, they made it clear that Shabbat should be a day when Jews scrupulously abstain from creative acts. The abstention should be more than symbolic; it must be noticeable, clear, obvious, unambiguous - an unmistakable demonstration of a fundamental Jewish idea, that Jews are thinking of God and recalling that He created the world and ceased creative acts on the Shabbat. This demonstration can only occur when a significant number of acts are noticeably disallowed on the Shabbat.
But the rabbis also stressed a second lesson. The Sabbath is not a sad negative day devoted to abstentions and ascetic behaviors, a time, as the ancient Sadducees insisted, when Jews sequester themselves in their homes, set themselves apart from company, and sit in the dark and cold without light and fire. The rabbis insisted that the Sabbath is a day of pleasures.
Beside thirty-nine seemingly negative certainly restrictive melakhot, the rabbis instituted sabbatical laws that emphasize the enjoyment and spiritual elevation of the holy day, such as eating delicious foods, imbibing tasty drinks, beginning meals with a blessing and wine, wearing one's best clothes, devoting time to study and self improvement, and starting the Sabbath with the lighting of candles, symbolizing the light, warmth and joy that mark the anti-Sadducean quality of the Sabbath.
Thus, the Sabbath labors are "forty minus one," marking a day in which Jews understand both the rigorous duty to remember God and the delightful duty to do so with joy.
Summary
The rule banning "forty minus one" types of activities on the Sabbath raises many questions, including why the rabbis selected thirty-nine labors and used the term "forty minus one" to describe this count when there are clearly more than thirty-nine prohibited categories of labor on the Sabbath.
Since many ancient arduous activities were associated with forty, the number came to symbolize difficulties and work performed with rigor. The rabbis may have used the word forty with the Sabbath as a symbol to challenge Jews to demonstrate the meaning of the Sabbath; the Sabbath reminds Jews that God created the world, and they mark it by abstaining from a list of creative activities, just as God ceased performing acts of creation on the original seventh day.
By reducing forty by one and phrasing the number of restricted Sabbath activities as "forty minus one" rather than thirty-nine, the rabbis were symbolically reducing the difficulties. They were emphasizing that despite the need to remember and demonstrate the fundamental lesson of the Sabbath, the Jew must also understand that the Sabbath is not a gloomy time, but a day of delights, joy and self improvement.

Question: May women recite Kaddish in the synagogue?

Response: A contemporary compendium on mourning practices is the anthology written by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg (P'nai Baruch, first published in 1986) and translated into English under the ArtScroll title, "Mourning in Halachah". Concerning the issue of women reciting Kaddish, Rav Goldberg notes the following: "If the deceased left only daughters, although some have permitted a daughter to recite Kaddish at a prayer service in her home, virtually all other Poskim disagree and rule that a daughter should not recite Kaddish even in her home." (Mourning in Halachah, chapter 39:21, p. 359) Thus it would appear that halakhic authorities are generally opposed to women reciting Kaddish whether at home or in the synagogue.

The difficulty with this pervasive negative halakhic orientation is that it fails to take into consideration the rulings of the three most influential halakhic sages in America. Indeed, it is openly recognized that the rulings of the following three rabbis permeated the essence and formed the standards of synagogue life in America: namely, Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Rav Moshe Feinstein and Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik.

Rav Henkin (1880-1973) was the Director of Ezrat Torah, a relief organization for needy rabbis. Each year, he authored and published the popular "Luach" for synagogue life wherein he detailed halakhic practices. He was deemed the "Posek haDor", the decisor for issues impacting on synagogue life. Concerning women saying Kaddish, he wrote: "The question as to whether a [bereaved] daughter may recite the Kaddish is bound up with her observance of the Sabbath, kashruth, and the laws of family purity. If she does keep these basic mitzvoth, it is permissible for her to say Kaddish in the women's gallery while the men are doing so in the synagogue proper." (Teshuvot Ivra. The entire text of the teshuva is translated by David Telsner, The Kaddish, p. 301.)

Subsequent to Rav Henkin, the halakhic arbiter for American Orthodox synagogues was Rav Moshe Feinstein, of blessed memory. In a posthumous publication of his responsa, the following is reported. Rav Moshe was concerned with whether it was necessary to have a Mehitza separating the men and women sections for prayer, in the event that there were only one or two women . He notes: "Throughout the generations the common custom was for a poor woman to be in the Bet haMidrash to receive charity, or as a mourner to recite Kaddish." His response was that a Mehitza was necessary even for one woman [who attended] on a regular basis. On an occasional basis, it was not necessary, should only one or two women be present. (Iggrot Moshe, Vol. 8, O.H. 5:12b) Note the terminology and the concern. Rav Moshe does not question the propriety of the woman who comes to the Bet haMidrash to recite Kaddish. He seems to assume that there are no halakhic qualms at all with such a function of women at religious services. The only problem is whether there need be a Mehitza during her recital. Indeed, it is apparent that Rav Moshe accepts a woman reciting Kaddish as a normal, unquestionable practice.

For many thousands of students of Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, of blessed memory, (former Rosh haYeshiva of Yeshiva University, and halakhic authority for the Rabbinical Council of America) a halakhic ruling from him was deemed authoritative. It is reported that Rav Soloveitchik ruled that is was permissible for women to recite Kaddish in synagogue. (cited by Joel Wolowelsky in a letter to the editor of HaDarom, vol. 57, Ellul 5748/1988, pp. 157-158.)

Thus, while it may be true that the overwhelming majority of halakhic scholars have ruled negatively concerning women reciting Kaddish in synagogue, it cannot be discounted nor overlooked that the three greatest decisors of halakha for American Torah Judaism appear to permit such a practice. Accordingly, those who permit this practice certainly have great halakhic scholars upon whom to rely. Of concern is the rationale for both the lenient as well as the stringent view pertaining to women reciting Kaddish.

In a note clarifying the ruling that women should not say Kaddish, Rav Goldberg notes the following: "See Pit-hei Teshuva Y.D. 376:3) citing Havot Yair (222) who answers a question about someone who died without leaving a son. The father commanded that his daughter should recite Kaddish. Havot Yair states: "According to the basic law, she should recite Kaddish, for [the recitation of Kaddish] by a daughter gives benefit and satisfaction to the soul [of the departed]. Nevertheless there is danger that the practice would weaken the customs of the Jewish people. And since it is a conspicuous matter (pirsum) one should protest against it." (Mourning in Halachah, p. 359, footnote 36) In other words, the saying of Kaddish by women does not intrinsically violate any halakha of prayer. The negative view is a form of a rabbinic statute (gezeirah) to sustain customs and prevent a possible future infringement of customs. It is as if the rabbis are saying that should this matter be permitted, it may lead down the road to a step-by-step whittling down of safeguards. The prohibition is, therefore, a "fence" to safeguard the Torah.

It is important to note that the ruling of the Havot Yair (1638-1702) cited by the Pit-hei Teshuva and the ArtScroll translation is not an accurate rendition of the actual position of the Havot Yair. The following is a full translation of the responsum of Havot Yair:

"A strange matter took place in Amsterdam and is well known there. A person died who had no son. He left instructions that in the event of his death, ten people should be paid to learn [Torah] every day throughout the year of mourning, in his home. And subsequent to the learning session, his daughter should recite Kaddish. The rabbinic sages and leaders of the community did not protest her recitation... It may be that a woman is also required to observe the Mitzvah of Kiddush Hashem (sanctifying God's name). This occurs by the fact that there are ten men present. Though the original source for the recitation of Kaddish is the story of Rabbi Akiva informing a youngster to recite Kaddish and that case deals with a male, not a female, logic would dictate that [a woman's recitation of Kaddish] would be beneficial and bring satisfaction to the soul [of the departed] in that she is the seed [of the departed]. Yet, one should be concerned that this would weaken the customs of the people of Israel, which are also deemed [an integral aspect of] Torah. [One must prevent] everyone attempting to build an altar for himself according to his personal reasons and thus make a mockery of rabbinic laws....[In conclusion] since the matter relates to a public gathering, one should protest it." (Responsa Havot Yair, no. 222, free translation)

The actual text generates a number of interesting observations. First is the fact that the sages of Amsterdam had no qualms over the matter at all. Indeed, it is necessary to discern the real reason why the Havot Yair felt that the case in Amsterdam might lead to a disdain and disintegration of customs. Why was there such a fear? Note the concern that people would build a personal altar. What was so unique about the case?

I suggest that many may have misread the concerns of the Havot Yair. He was not perturbed by a woman reciting Kaddish at a regular minyan. Note that the case was not dealing with a regular minyan for daily services, but related to a very unique request. It was for a minyan to learn Torah in a home and for a woman to recite Kaddish subsequent to the learning. It was, therefore, an unusual request. It was as if it was not important for the daughter to recite Kaddish at a normal minyan for morning, afternoon and evening services. The only concern was for the daughter to say Kaddish after a special Torah learning session. This was deemed a denigration of the normal recitation of Kaddish. To permit this and not be concerned with saying Kaddish after a regular daily prayer was tantamount to giving people the right to make new customs and disdain the old. Accordingly, the Havot Yair opposed such a practice. However, should a daughter pray in a regular synagogue and recite Kaddish together with the other mourners, perhaps even the Havot Yair would permit such a practice for the reasons he himself articulated: 1) it was a form of Kiddush Hashem; 2) It brings satisfaction to the soul of the departed. Also, rather than promote a disdain for customs, the recitation of Kaddish in a synagogue generates a firm dedication to the traditional reverence given to the departed by the Jewish people. In addition, it may have been a long-standing practice for women to say Kaddish in synagogues after services.

As such, I believe that women who wish to attend daily religious services and to recite Kaddish should be encouraged and acknowledged as faithful adherents of our heritage, not as innovators seeking to restructure or liberalize halakhic practices. The recitation of Kaddish generates a sense of respect to loved ones. Not all women seek such a process; but those who do should be treated with respect and honor.

The Shulhan Arukh, composed by rabbi Joseph Caro in the 16th century, is a canonical code of Jewish Law. In this work, rabbi Caro writes that a ceremony of Giyyur (=‘conversion') is valid only if it includes Qabbalat Mitzvot. Rabbi Caro does not explain what this phrase means. The so-called "conversion crisis" results from the attempt to pressure all rabbis to adopt a specific interpretation of this requirement, i.e., to agree that Qabbalat Mitzvot means a whole-hearted commitment by the Ger (="convert" =‘proselyte') to fully observe all of the Mitzvot (commandments). On this view, if a person applying for giyyur intends to be a secular Jew, or even a ‘traditional' Jew who observes many (but not all) commandments, that person cannot be allowed to undergo a giyyur ceremony, because Qabbalat Mitzvot is lacking. This position has been strongly supported by ultra-orthodox haredi rabbis as the one-and-only correct interpretation of Qabbalat Mitzvot.

In fact, the meaning of this phrase in the context of Giyyur was not agreed upon during the 1000 years before rabbi Caro employed it, and was not agreed upon afterwards. As did many rabbis before them, leading Sephardic rabbis in the 20th century held other interpretations of this phrase. In the following text, the views of three such great Sephardic rabbis are discussed. In their view, Qabbalat Mitzvot means an acknowledgement by the Ger, that after they become a Jew they will be liable before G-d (as are all Jews) for their actions: if they sin, they may incur Divine punishment, while performance of mitzvot will earn merit and reward. According to this view, a valid halakhic giyyur is fully possible for persons who do not intend to subsequently follow a religious lifestyle.

The following is an excerpt from chapter 12 of a book entitled Transforming Identity, forthcoming in late 2007 from Continuum press. Written by Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar (both are professors at Bar Ilan University), it has been characterized thus by rabbi Irving ‘Yitz' Greenberg:

This book is a tour de force, a rare combination of comprehensive scholarship, insight, fresh thinking and wisdom. This is by far, the best book on this topic in the English language.

Qabbalat Mitzvot as recognition of liability

According to this position, the content of a proselyte's declaration with regard to commandments does not relate to performance. Rather, she is required to acknowledge that as a Jewess, she will be subject to the halakhic system, and therefore be liable for the consequences of her future commissions and omissions. One scholar who holds this view is Rabbi Raphael Aaron b. Simeon,#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title="_ednref1">[1] who writes as follows:

The judges immersing the proselyte must be three... and they must immerse him in the daytime. While he is in the water, they notify him again about some of the more lenient and some of the harsher commandments. And it is our wont to ask him these questions briefly, after informing him of some of the lenient and harsher commandments, as he stands in the water:

- Are you are entering the religion of Israel wholeheartedly? And he says 'yes.'

- Is it the case that you have no ulterior motive, and you are undergoing giyyur only for the sake of Heaven? - 'Yes.'

- Do you willingly accept punishment for transgressing the lenient and harsher commandments we have explained to you when you accepted the religion of Israel? - 'Yes.'

... And he fully immerses before the judges. Once he has immersed and come up, he is like a Jew in every respect.#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title="_ednref2">[2]

This detailed dialogue between the court and the proselyte was composed by Rabbi Ben Shimon, and to the best of our knowledge it is the first time that such a detailed format is presented in halakhic literature. The proselyte is questioned with regard to his general attitude toward the Jewish religion, his motivation, and his acceptance of the negative consequences that might result from obligation to the commandments. He is not questioned as to whether he intends to observe the commandments and abide by them. Moreover, despite the unprecedented detail in this text by Rabbi Ben Shimon, he does not require subjective religious intent on the proselyte's part. When explaining the policy of the Egyptian rabbinate with regard to the giyyur of Gentile women living with Jewish partners, he writes that although the women's motivation is not religious:

We overlook this and accept them... and this is what we do in such cases. We make a condition and explain to the woman proselyte that her intention must be that even if her husband does not wish to marry her after this, and abandons her, she voluntarily accepts the religion, and that the reason for her giyyur is not contingent upon her [interest in] marriage to him. And she says 'yes'. And although we know what is in her heart, we are not very meticulous.#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title="_ednref3">[3]

Rabbi Ben Shimon is clearly not pleased with the significant discrepancy between the proselyte's declaration and her inner intention. However, he holds that the validity of her giyyur is not thereby impaired, as long as her verbal pronouncements conform to halakhic requirements and she accepts her liability for punishment if she transgresses any commandment.

Another scholar who identifies acceptance of commandments in the same way is Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uzziel.#_edn4" name="_ednref4" title="_ednref4">[4] He begins his discussion of this issue by noting that the Talmud holds that most proselytes will not observe the commandments after their giyyur. This is the assumption underlying the dictum: 'Proselytes are as hard for Israel [to endure] as a sore',#_edn5" name="_ednref5" title="_ednref5">[5] as understood by Rashi and Maimonides.#_edn6" name="_ednref6" title="_ednref6">[6] Uzziel therefore states:

Although we know that most proselytes do not observe the commandments after circumcision and immersion; nevertheless, they [the rabbis] did not refrain from accepting them because of that. Rather, they inform them about some of the harsher commandments, namely, the punishment for transgressing them, so that 'So that if he wants to withdraw - he can withdraw.' But if they do not withdraw, they are accepted, and each proselyte will be responsible for his [future] sin[s], and the people of Israel are not liable for his behaviour. All we have said, then, makes the following absolutely clear: if a proselyte has accepted the commandments and their punishment, then, even when it is known he will not observe them, he should be accepted after being notified about the lenient and harsher commandments, their reward and punishment.#_edn7" name="_ednref7" title="_ednref7">[7]

According to Rabbi Uzziel, the requirement that a proselyte should accept the commandments does not mean that he is required to commit himself to observe them. Rather, it means that he recognizes that after becoming a Jew, he will be under the jurisdiction of the halakhic system. Therefore, he alone will bear responsibility for the consequences of non-compliance. The proselyte's assumption of responsibility for the consequences of his giyyur enables the court to accept him without hesitation, even if the court has good reason to assume that after becoming a Jew he will not observe the commandments. This leads Rabbi Uzziel to conclude:

It follows, that according to Torah, we are allowed and commanded to accept male and female proselytes even when we know that they will not observe all the commandments... and if they do not observe the commandments, they will bear their sin and we are not liable. #_edn8" name="_ednref8" title="_ednref8">[8]

This view is also advocated by Rabbi Moshe HaCohen,#_edn9" name="_ednref9" title="_ednref9">[9] who writes concerning the possibility of accepting proselytes who would subsequently follow a secular lifestyle in Israel. He writes that prima facie it seems:

quite simple that he should not be accepted for giyyur, [because] the explicit halakhah in Bekhorot (30b) is: 'A proselyte who agrees to take upon himself all matters of Torah, excepting one thing, should not be accepted.'#_edn10" name="_ednref10" title="_ednref10">[10]

Yet, a detailed analysis of the meaning of the 'acceptance of the commandments' required from a proselyte led HaCohen to conclude that his prima facie analysis was incorrect, because:

[A]ccepting the commandments does not mean that he must commit himself to observe all the commandments. Rather, it means that he accepts all the commandments of the Torah in the sense that, if he transgresses, he will be liable for such punishment as he deserves... And if so, we do not care if at the time he accepts the commandments he intends to transgress a particular commandment and accept the punishment. This is not considered a flaw in his acceptance of the commandments.#_edn11" name="_ednref11" title="_ednref11">[11]

According to HaCohen, then, proselytes are required to acknowledge that after giyyur, the Torah's framework of reward and punishment will apply to them as it does to all Jews. Whoever agrees to this completely fulfils the halakhic requirement of acceptance of the commandments, even if in fact they subsequently fail to observe the commandments, and even if the court knew at the time of giyyur that they would act in such a manner.

In another Responsum, Rabbi HaCohen describes a fundamental problematic posed by the secular reality of Israeli society:

Many Jews married Gentile women after the Second World War and have fathered sons and daughters with them. According to the law, the children's status follows that of their Gentile mother [i.e. they are not Jewish]. When they come to Israel, the husband brings the children [to the court] for giyyur, sometimes with their mother and sometimes on their own. The trouble is that they reside in places in which the people do not observe the tradition: they eat forbidden foods and desecrate the Sabbath and the holidays. It is clear that after giyyur they will behave similarly to the Jews among whom they live, since it is almost impossible for them to be observant. #_edn12" name="_ednref12" title="_ednref12">[12]

Rabbi HaCohen explains that his interpretation of acceptance of the commandments as recognition of liability provides the grounds enabling giyyur in secular Israeli reality.#_edn13" name="_ednref13" title="_ednref13">[13]

Notes

#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title="_edn1">[1] Chief Rabbi of Cairo, 1891-1921 (died in 1929).

#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title="_edn2">[2] Rabbi Raphael Aharon Ben Shimon, Nehar Mitsrayim (Alexandria, Farag Hayyim Mizrahi, 1908), p. 113a.

#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title="_edn3">[3] Ibid.

#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title="_edn4">[4] Born in Jerusalem in 1880, he was Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Eretz Israel from 1939 until his death in 1953.

#_ednref5" name="_edn5" title="_edn5">[5] Yevamot 47b.

#_ednref6" name="_edn6" title="_edn6">[6] For Rashi see Yevamot ibid., s.v. de-amar mar. For Maimonides see Hilkhot Issurei Biah 13:18.

#_ednref7" name="_edn7" title="_edn7">[7] B.-Z. H. Uzziel, Mishpatei Uzziel (2nd edition, Jerusalem, 1950), Yoreh De'ah, Vol. 1, # 58, p. 205.

#_ednref8" name="_edn8" title="_edn8">[8] B.-Z. H. Uzziel, Mishpatei Uzziel, Even ha-‘Ezer, # 20; Piskei Uzziel B'shelot Hazman (Jerusalem, Mossad HaRav Kook, 1977), # 68.

#_ednref9" name="_edn9" title="_edn9">[9] Jerba 1906 - Israel, 1966. A leading rabbi in the community of Jerba, he immigrated to Israel in the 1950s and served as a dayyan (judge) in the rabbinical court of Tiberias.

#_ednref10" name="_edn10" title="_edn10">[10] M. Hacohen, Responsa Ve-Heshiv Moshe (Jerusalem, 1968), Yoreh De'ah, #50.

#_ednref11" name="_edn11" title="_edn11">[11] Ibid.

#_ednref12" name="_edn12" title="_edn12">[12] Ibid., # 51.

#_ednref13" name="_edn13" title="_edn13">[13] Rabbi HaCohen's position is further explicated in ch. 4 of Transforming Identity.