National Scholar Updates
Retroactive Annulment of Giyyur (Conversion)?
I will begin by presenting a fictitious case, closer perhaps to current halakhic
reality in certain circles than many would like to believe:
18-year-old Mary undergoes giyyur in an Orthodox Beit Din and becomes Miriam. Soon
after, she marries Reuven, a biologically-born Jew, and they have a son Yehuda
and a daughter Sarah. Yehuda grows up, studies in Israeli yeshivot, settles in Israel
and becomes a rabbi. While still a yeshiva student, he is invited to serve as a
witness at marriages of quite a few friends – sometimes signing the ketubba,
sometimes witnessing the kiddushin, sometimes, both. After getting semikha,
he not infrequently serves as a member of a court conducting giyyur (as
son of a giyyoret, he relates positively to people choosing to be
Jewish). He studies for dayyanut, and then begins sitting as dayyan (rabbinical
judge) on various cases. Meanwhile, Sarah gets married early, at 17, to a
Cohen. They have three boys, who grow up as Cohanim, bless the congregation,
get called up for the first aliyya, etc. When the boys are in their
teens, Sarah and her husband decide to move to Israel
to be near Yehuda and his family. Under Yehuda’s influence, the three boys are
sent to yeshivot; they too serve on occasion as witnesses for various halakhic
matters, receive pidyon for first-born infants of their peers, and the
like.
Miriam, now nearing sixty, has been working secretly for
several years on an autobiography – and it is accepted for publication. When
published, the public is informed about matters that her husband and close
friends have known all along: Miriam opted for giyyur because of Reuven,
whom she wanted to marry. She declared acceptence of mitzvot during her giyyur
procedure, but was never really convinced that the commandments were
ordained by G-d and revealed to Moses, and her observance of halakha, never
consistent even at the beginning, soon become spotty, then totally haphazard.
She has no problem with the fact that her son Yehuda has adopted a religious
lifestyle, and indeed keeps a kosher home for his sake, and when Yehuda and
his family come to visit in the U.S.,Miriam and Reuven make sure that everything
is halakhically meticulous. But when they are alone, they are not religiously observant.
Miriam’s good friend Maureen knows someone at the New York Times, and Miriam is
interviewed. She tells the reporter how happy she is to be Jewish, and how she really identifies
with the Jewish People and the Jewish values of social justice, warm community
and family ties, etc. However, she confides, the ritual parts of Judaism – such
as Shabbat, kashrut, taharat hamishpaha – never really attracted her,
and she doesn’t personally observe them. The interview is picked up by HaAretz,
and published in Hebrew in Israel.
Rabbi Axeman, a well-known rabbi who has authored several
volumes of responsa, hears about Miriam’s interview. He obtains a copy of
HaAretz, and after reading with his own eyes what Miriam said, he immediately
concludes that Miriam is really not, and has never been, a Jew. He calls up
Yehuda’s Rosh-Yeshiva, whom he knows well, and reveals to him the facts about
Yehuda’s mother. They both realize, that since Miriam is not Jewish, neither
Yehuda nor Sarah are Jews. Therefore, they have never been married to their
spouses. Sarah’s children are not Cohanim – indeed, they are not Jewish at all.
Even should Sarah now undergo giyyur, she can never remarry her husband,
because he is a Cohen. Halakhically, her children are not related at all to
their ‘father’, whether or not they choose giyyur. All those times they
were called up to the Torah for the first aliyya – were in vain; all the
first-born for whom they received pidyon now have to be located and have
the ceremony re-performed – this time, with a ‘real’ Cohen. Kiddushin and
Ketubbot witnessed by Sarah’s children, and by her brother Yehuda are invalid;
the relevant couples must be located and informed, the marriages re-performed
(and what if one of the parties now refuses to do so?). And what of those gerim
who became Jews under the auspices of a court in which Yehuda was a member?
Well, they are not Jewish, of course, because a giyyur that was not
conducted by a court is invalid, and a gentile cannot serve as a dayyan.
Similarly, matters of divorce etc. decided by a court in which Yehuda
participated are now lacking halakhic validity; if he was witness to a divorce,
the marriage may never have been terminated, the woman still eshet ish.
If she remarried, her children are deemed to be illegitimate.
Indeed, the more rabbi Axeman and his peers think about
this, the more they realize that the possibilities of discreditation are
unlimitted. True, the rabbis of old seem to have been unaware of these options;
thus, they allowed Jews by birth to marry a woman proselyte, and permitted a
Cohen to knowingly marry the daughter of a female proselyte and a Jewish man.
They relied upon the testimony of proselytes for all halakhic matters,
including marriage and divorce; counted proselytes for minyan … they were
seemingly oblivious to the notion that giyyur might be revealed to be
invalid. But this gives Axeman et.al. no pause: makom heinihu lanu raboteinu
le-hitgader bo. The rabbis of earlier times left room for us to discover
and apply novel halakhic rulings, and the well of halakhic creativity has not
dried up. And if someone were to object: what of the Torah’s repeated
injunctions to treat a ger with great consideration, and to refrain from
distressing him in any way?#_ftn1" title="_ftnref1" name="_ftnref1">
[1]
The response would be clear and swift: our ruling with regard to annulment of giyyur in
no way contradicts these supremely important commandments! Rather, all we said
relates to persons who are not really proselytes at all, but were only posing
as such; while the commandments of Torah relate to authentic, true proselytes –
whom we too would treat with great respect and kindness. That is: if such a
person should ever be discovered to exist in our times.
[2]
But is all this possible? Of
course -- if one accepts that giyyur can be retroactively annulled.
Indeed, if it is possible to retroactively annul even one giyyur based
upon subsequent conduct of a ger, then we can NEVER rely upon the
Jewishness of ANY person who underwent giyyur, nor upon the Jewishness
of any descendent of a female proselyte. The Jewishness of all such persons is
eternally contingent, always liable to being undermined by some future
revelation. Knowing this, other Jews should always refrain from having gerim
or the descendents of female giyyorot serve as witnesses, rabbis,
Cohanim … they cannot be counted for a minyan, for a zimmun etc… and of course,
no one will ever agree to marry them. In fact, the most reasonable conclusion
for any Orthodox rabbi to draw is that it is better never to accept anybody for
giyyur – for who can really know what is in a person’s heart, and how
he/she will behave in the future? And of course, once it gets around to persons
who have been planning to undergo Orthodox giyyur that they and their
children will always be only conditionally Jewish – they will surely revise
such ill-considered plans. Who would knowingly place themselves and their
families in such a terrible bind?
However, there is no justification
for anyone to hold, that halakha enables retroactive annulment of giyyur based
upon the proselyte’s future conduct. This determination is based upon several
grounds. One is that the normal position of halakhic tradition is, that ritual
acts (in general) and ritual acts affecting an individual’s personal status (in
particular) are valid, irrespective of the subjective intent of the parties
involved and irrespective of their subsequent conduct. Another is, that the
central and major halakhic sources go out of their way to stress the point,
that giyyur is valid immediately and irrevocably, however the proselyte
subsequently chooses to conduct himself.
The Autonomy of Ritual
In western culture, especially in the context of Protestant Christianity, the autonomy of
ritual may seem strange; is not religion a matter of belief, a matter of the
heart? However, in many cultures and many religions, performance of certain
prescribed acts in the proper way results in an outcome possessing validity and
force. This is true also within many areas of western culture, e.g., law,
economic transactions – even in artistic and dramatic contexts. Focusing on
Judaism, the general rule within the framework of halakha is, that commandments
performed without conscious religious intent are valid (mitzvot einan
tzerikhot kavvana).#_ftn3" title="_ftnref3" name="_ftnref3">
[3]
By way of illustration, let us consider the case of Jewish marriage.
Marriage is an event that entails a major change of status, with dramatic consequences for
both parties. Because of these consequences, it seems to be the case that in
all known societies, the decision to marry is regarded as a serious commitment,
not to be lightly undertaken. Indeed, we do our best to educate our children
that marriage should be undertaken only with the right person, for the right
reasons. The words harei att mequdeshet li kedat Moshe ve-Yisrael should
be uttered by the groom with heartfelt intention, love, and deep commitment –
and they should be heard and accepted by the bride in like spirit. Therefore,
no person should agree to witness an act of kiddushin if not convinced
that it is being undertaken by the bride and groom in the proper spirit.
Now, imagine a case in which Shimshon, a young Jew with rich parents, is seduced by Gomer, a
Jewish woman of low morals who is interested in his money. He was interested in
her only for sex, and never intended to continue the relationship. But she
threatens to sue him if he doesn’t marry her, and he agrees to do so. However,
he is afraid of his parents, and therefore agrees to betroth her only by
‘secret’ kiddushin. They call over two yeshiva teenagers loitering
nearby, who (foolishly) agree to serve as witnesses, and he hands her a ring
and recites the proper formula. The next day, they reveal to each other that
they never wanted to be married: he says that he only went through the motions
in order to appease her, and she says that she only wanted to hurt him, and
never intended to be his wife. Both of them agree to behave as if the kiddushin
never happened, and they have no more contact with each other. He moves to Israel and marries a suitable wife, and she moves to Australia and marries a rich Jewish barrister. They have no problem in
doing so, for the kiddushin were secret and each easily provides the
local rabbinate with confirmation that they are unmarried.
So: Shimshon
and Gomer say that they never really wanted to marry each other; they participated
in the ritual of kiddushin for really reprehensible reasons; and their
subsequent behavior confirms that they did not regard themselves as married to
each other. But the witnesses were kosher witnesses, the ring was his, they
heard him utter the words clearly and saw him put the ring on her finger – and
she kept the ring on, and even smiled. Would any rabbi say that the couple’s
subsequent behavior “reveals” that they did not have the proper intent when
performing the kiddushin and therefore the marriage is invalid and they
are both eligible bachelors? Is there any halakhic doubt that Gomer’s
“marriage” to the barrister is invalid, and that any child she has with him is
a mamzer? The answer to both questions is in the negative. Once kiddushin
has been performed ‘by the book’, the motivation that led each of the
partners to undergo that process is irrelevant. So too, the subsequent conduct
of one or both of the partners will have no effect upon their halakhic status
as husband and wife. Gomer has undergone a radical transformation of status
from penuya (an unmarried person) to eshet ish, with all that
entails: under Torah law, sexual relations she has with anyone but Shimshon is
adultery, and any child she conceives out of such relations is a mamzer,
who will face almost insurmountable obstacles in his/her quest for a Jewish
marriage. All because of an ill-considered decision to participate in a
one-minute ritual act!
The case of kiddushin,
so clear to anyone familiar with the halakhic tradition, illustrates the
autonomous power and force of ritual.
The sources
on giyyur cited below reveal the same ritual logic: Once giyyur has
been performed, the motivation that led the Gentile to undergo that process is
irrelevant. So too, the subsequent conduct of the proselyte will have no effect
upon his/her halakhic status as a Jew. The proselyte has undergone a radical
transformation of status from nokhri (a non-Jew) to Yisrael (Jew/ess),
with all that entails: as a Jewess, she is now party to the Jewish People’s
Covenant with G-d, and bound to obey that Covenant, whether or not she knows
anything about its contents (similar to a biologically-born Jew).#_ftn4" title="_ftnref4" name="_ftnref4">
[4]
She may not marry a Gentile, and if she does, the marriage is automatically
invalid; she may marry only a Jew, and if she does, her marriage is valid
however she behaves or regards herself. As a Jewess her status is
non-contingent upon her fulfillment of the Covenant, or upon her continuation
of any contact with Judaism or Jews. Let us now consider the sources themselves
– beginning with the rock-bottom definition of Jewishness as deriving from
birth.
Jewishness, Birth and Giyyur
According to halakha, any person born
to a Jewish mother is a Jew. To most Jews, that sounds quite reasonable.
However, such a determination is far from self-evident. Consider a
counter-example: if a person was born on a kibbutz, and her two parents are
members of the kibbutz, she is not automatically a member. Rather, upon
reaching a certain age, she must decide if she wishes to apply for membership.
If she applies, her application comes up for discussion by the kibbutz
assembly, who then decide the matter by a vote. While it is reasonable to
assume that a child born and raised on the kibbutz will be accepted for
membership if she applies, it is not automatic. The important point (in the
current context) is that her membership is contingent upon at least two
decisions: her decision to apply, and the assembly’s decision to accept her. By contrast, Jewishness is not contingent
upon any person’s decision, but is regarded by tradition as a ‘fact of birth’.
The sources of this self-understanding are very ancient: in the Bible, the
Israelites are the “Children of Israel”, i.e., the lineal descendents of the
Patriarch Jacob and his twelve sons. In the Bible, then, the People of Israel
are made up of persons born into a (very) extended family.
Some notions accepted in Biblical
times were abrogated or modified by the Oral Torah (Torah she-b’al peh);
significantly, the concept of the familial nature of Jewishness was not only
retained, but also even reinforced. Not only is Jewishness acquired by birth
according to Rabbinic tradition, but it is permanent and irrevocable. In other
words, if a person born as a Jew chooses to relinquish all contacts with his
Jewishness, and (furthermore) to join another faith community out of sincere
and deep belief in a totally non-Jewish theology (e.g., Hare Krishna) – that
person nevertheless remains a Jew, in the eyes of halakha. He is an apostate –
but, an apostate Jew. The main practical halakhic implications of this
are twofold.
First: If at
any point this person decides to join the Jewish community – all he has to do
is to recant, and resume Jewish praxis. No conversion is required, for in the
eyes of halakha he has ‘really’ been Jewish all along.#_ftn5" title="_ftnref5" name="_ftnref5">
[5]
Second: If our
devout Hare Krishna apostate places a ring on the hand of a Jewess in the
presence of two valid Jewish witnesses and while doing so recites the halakhic
formula: “You are betrothed to me by this ring according to the law of Moses
and Israel” – the couple is now halakhically husband and wife.#_ftn6" title="_ftnref6" name="_ftnref6">
[6]
As
Maimonides writes:
If an apostate
Israelite performs a betrothal, even if he has freely chosen an alien religion,
the betrothal is fully valid and [for the wife to be released from that union]
she requires a bill of divorce.#_ftn7" title="_ftnref7" name="_ftnref7">
[7]
This is also the clear-cut ruling of
rabbi Joseph Caro in his Shulhan Arukh.#_ftn8" title="_ftnref8" name="_ftnref8">
[8]
But … how do Maimonides and Rabbi
Caro know this? Surprisingly, it is nowhere stated directly in the Talmud that
an apostate Jew remains a Jew. Rather, both Maimonides and Rabbi Caro derive
the absolutely non-contingent Jewishness of a Jew by birth who willingly left
the fold, from the Talmudic ruling with regard to a Gentile who became a Jew
and immediately recanted.#_ftn9" title="_ftnref9" name="_ftnref9">
[9]
Rabbi
Shelomo Cohen writes,#_ftn10" title="_ftnref10" name="_ftnref10">
[10]
that
this is an a-fortiori (qal va-homer) inference: if a person who
was not born as a Jew, but became a Jew via giyyur and then reverted to
a Gentile life and faith, is nevertheless halakhically an apostate Jew and can
perform a valid betrothal – then surely a person who was born as a Jew and
chooses a non-Jewish life and faith is still halakhically Jewish (albeit, an
apostate).
But in fact,
postulating such a hierarchy is not logically or textually necessary. Rather,
what the Tannaitic text states is that immediately after giyyur the
status of the former Gentile is equivalent to that of a Jew by birth.
Here is the entire text, a Baraita cited in Yevamot 47b:#_ftn11" title="_ftnref11" name="_ftnref11">
[11]
Our
Rabbis taught: If a prospective proselyte comes to undergo giyyur in the
present era, we#_ftn12" title="_ftnref12" name="_ftnref12">
[12]
say to him: “What did you
see that made you come to seek giyyur? Do you not know that nowadays the
Jewish people are afflicted, oppressed, downtrodden and harassed and that
hardships come upon them?” If he responds: “I know, and I am unworthy [of
joining them],” we accept him immediately. And we inform him of some minor
commandments and some major commandments. And we inform him of the sin [of the
neglect of the commandments] of Gleanings, of the Forgotten Sheaf, of the
Corner, and of the Poor Man's Tithe#_ftn13" title="_ftnref13" name="_ftnref13">
[13]
. And we
inform him of the punishment for the transgression of the commandments. We say
to him: “Be aware, that before you reached this situation, if you ate
[forbidden] suet you were not punishable by Karet [extinction by Heaven]; if
you profaned the Sabbath, you were not punishable by stoning; but now [after giyyur],
if you eat suet, you will be punished by Karet, and if you profane the Sabbath,
you will be punished by stoning.” Just as we inform him of the punishments for
[transgressing] the commandments, we inform him of the rewards [for
observance]. We say to him: “Know, that the world to come is not made except
for the righteous. And, in the present era the Jewish people cannot receive an
abundance of good or an abundance of calamity.” We do not overwhelm him, nor
are we strict with him. Once he received,#_ftn14" title="_ftnref14" name="_ftnref14">
[14]
we
circumcise him immediately. If shreds that impede a valid circumcision remain,
we circumcise him again. Once he has healed, we immerse him immediately. And
two rabbinic scholars stand over him, and inform him of some minor commandments
and some major commandments. Once he has immersed and come up, he is like a Jew
in every respect.#_ftn15" title="_ftnref15" name="_ftnref15">
[15]
The
Talmudic sages ask with regard to the phrase “Once he has immersed and come up,
he is like a Jew in every respect” – “What is the implication of this
statement?” and answer:
[The implication is], that if the proselyte reverts [to a
Gentile life], and performs a ceremony of kiddushin [halakhic betrothal]
with a Jewish women, we regard him as an apostate Jew, and the kiddushin
are valid.#_ftn16" title="_ftnref16" name="_ftnref16">
[16]
Kiddushin
is a ceremony in which a Jewish woman becomes betrothed to a Jewish man, a
condition that continues until the death of one of the partners or their
divorce. According to Talmudic halakha, if one of the partners to such a
ceremony is not Jewish, the ceremony has no effect whatsoever. To state that a
person following a totally Gentile lifestyle can be a partner to a valid kiddushin
is equivalent to stating that she is unconditionally a Jewess. The Talmud
thus indicates that our Baraita is a statement about membership in the Jewish
collective. Any person who has undergone a process of giyyur is
irrevocably a member of the Jewish collective, and is equal to a person
biologically born as a Jew; both remain a Jew regardless of how they behave.
A similar position is found in
Bekhorot, in the framework of the Talmudic interpretation of a Baraita
originating in Tosefta Demai. The Tosefta states:
A proselyte who took upon himself all matters of Torah, and
is suspected [of non-observance] with regard to one matter, even with regard to
the entire Torah – behold, he is like an Israelite apostate.#_ftn17" title="_ftnref17" name="_ftnref17">
[17]
And
how is he like a Jewish apostate? The Talmud answers thus: “If he performs kiddushin,
his kiddushin is valid”.#_ftn18" title="_ftnref18" name="_ftnref18">
[18]
On the
basis of Bekhorot alone, one might imagine that perhaps some minimal period of
time must elapse between the giyyur and the apostasy, for the person to
be considered irrevocably Jewish. However, Yevamot makes it very clear, that
Jewishness becomes irrevocable immediately upon the completion of the giyyur
ritual: “Once he has immersed and come up, he is like a Jew in every
respect”. In other words, if upon emerging from the waters of the mikveh our
newly-Jewish acquaintance resonates to the drumbeat of an idolatrous procession
in the adjacent thoroughfare, rushes outside, joins the procession and
disappears from our view never to be seen again – he remains a Jew for
evermore.
Maimonides illustrates this by referring to the case of
King Solomon’s idolatrous wives. He explains, that (pace the plain
meaning of the biblical text#_ftn19" title="_ftnref19" name="_ftnref19">
[19]
),
Solomon never married non-Jewish wives. Rather, every time he found a Gentile
woman whom he wished to marry, he convened an ad hoc ‘court’ of three
laymen who conducted a giyyur ritual through which the woman became a
Jew – and he then married her. True, her only motivation for giyyur was
for the sake of marriage, she knew nothing about any of the commandments, and –
furthermore – devoutly believed in alien gods before, during and after
undergoing giyyur. Her subsequent behavior confirmed this, for after her
giyyur she continued to worship these gods, using her husband’s
resources to construct and maintain sites of idolatrous activity. Nevertheless,
she was a Jewess, and therefore her marriage to King Solomon was completely
valid. Here is how Maimonides puts it:
Do not imagine that Samson, the savior of Israel,
or Solomon, king of Israel,
who was called “the beloved of the Lord,” married foreign women while they were
still Gentiles. Rather, the secret of this matter is as follows… since Samson
had women undergo giyyur and them married them; and Solomon had women
undergo giyyur and then married them. And it is known that they became
Jewish only for a purpose, and their giyyur was in defiance of the
[official] court. Therefore, Scripture considered them as-if Gentiles. In
addition, their subsequent behavior revealed their original mindset, that they
worshipped their alien gods. And they constructed high-places for those gods,
and Scripture attributed to Solomon as-if he had built them, as it says (Second
Kings XI:7): “Then did Solomon build a high-place”.#_ftn20" title="_ftnref20" name="_ftnref20">
[20]
According
to Maimonides, it is worse to be involved in an intermarriage than to be married
to an apostate Jewess. Therefore, giyyur of a person who never even
considered abandoning pagan belief and worship and who becomes a Jew only for
the sake of marriage is preferable, if the concrete alternative is a Jew living
with that same person without giyyur. Clearly, this entire scenario is
possible only if a ritual of giyyur performed under such circumstances is
efficacious – and Maimonides stresses that such is indeed the case:
A proselyte whose motives were not
investigated or was not informed about the commandments and their desserts, but
was circumcised and immersed in the presence of three laymen, is a proselyte.
Even if it was known that his becoming a proselyte is for some utilitarian
purpose, he has exited from the Gentile group once he was circumcised and
immersed. However, he should be regarded with reservation until his
righteousness becomes apparent. Even if he once again worships idols, he is as
an apostate Israelite, whose betrothal is valid. And we are commanded to return
his lost property to him. Because he immersed, he is an Israelite. That is why
Samson and Solomon kept their wives, even though their wives’ secret was
manifest.#_ftn21" title="_ftnref21" name="_ftnref21">
[21]
It is obvious from this text that once a person
underwent giyyur, her Jewishness is completely non-contingent upon her
subsequent praxis or beliefs, or indeed, upon her praxis and beliefs at the
very moment of giyyur. It is therefore clear that whatever the phrase
“he should be regarded with reservation” means,#_ftn22" title="_ftnref22" name="_ftnref22">
[22]
it does not refer to the existence of any doubt regarding the validity of the giyyur
itself: if such doubt were to exist, no valid kiddushin could have
occurred, and Maimonides would have failed to rescue Samson and Solomon from
the charge of intermarriage. Indeed, if the validity of the giyyur of these
women was in any way contingent upon on their behavior or beliefs during or
after their giyyur, they would have been considered Gentiles because
“their secret was manifest” namely, at no stage did they forsake their
idolatry.
To
make my argument as strongly as the sources warrant: at no point between the
Talmudic period and the 19th century did any rabbi rule that an
individual proselyte’s sinful behavior or pagan beliefs after immersion for giyyur
would invalidate his Jewishness. Furthermore, at no point between the
Talmudic period and the 19th century did any rabbi rule that an
individual proselyte’s inappropriate motivation, inner disposition or beliefs
during the process of giyyur itself – would invalidate the
efficacy of the ritual.#_ftn23" title="_ftnref23" name="_ftnref23">
[23]
Giyyur as Birth
As I
noted above, the irrevocability of giyyur is consonant with the general
halakhic position regarding the autonomy of ritual acts affecting personal
status. According to all major halakhic sources, the halakhic efficacy of any specific ritual process of giyyur
is dependent only upon the empirically verifiable performance of certain
acts (or: occurrence of certain events).
Furthermore, I noted that with regard to giyyur all major
halakhic sources posit the irrevocability of the Jewish status of a ger and
the Jewish status of a Jew-by-birth. Therefore, there is an inseparable
halakhic link between the (irrevocable) Jewishness of a proselyte and the
(irrevocable) Jewishness of a Jew by birth, whatever they believe and however
they act.#_ftn24" title="_ftnref24" name="_ftnref24">
[24]
This inseparable link is not merely a formal correlation, but
derives from the core metaphor of Jewishness as kinship, in which membership is
acquired in only one way: birth. For a person to be a Jew, he must be born into
that status. That is the basis for the religious-cultural halakhic logic, of
considering giyyur as equivalent to birth. Indeed,
the rabbis explicitly compare a ger to a newly-born Jew, stating: “A proselyte who has undergone giyyur is
as a newborn child.”#_ftn25" title="_ftnref25" name="_ftnref25">
[25]
This
equivalence of giyyur with birth applies not only to the irrevocability
of a proselyte’s Jewishness – but also to other very basic aspects of his
identity. As a newly-born person, all the proselyte’s prior kinship ties are
regarded as dissolved from the moment of giyyur. If several members of a
Gentile family underwent giyyur, each one is now regarded as a discrete,
unrelated individual. This entails powerful halakhic consequences, such as:
1) The [newly
unrelated] proselytes were allowed by Torah law (de-Oraita) to marry one
another: the [biological] father might marry his daughter, the mother her son,
a brother his sister, and so forth. #_ftn26" title="_ftnref26" name="_ftnref26">
[26]
2) If a father and son both underwent giyyur, the
son does not inherit his father upon the
latter’s death.#_ftn27" title="_ftnref27" name="_ftnref27">
[27]
3) While
according to halakha the testimony of relatives is not acceptable in court,
persons who were related prior to giyyur may [after undergoing giyyur]
testify in court on behalf of each other.#_ftn28" title="_ftnref28" name="_ftnref28">
[28]
The
radical implications of these laws can hardly be overemphasized, for they subvert
the most basic foundations of social order and of morality by upsetting family
ties ostensibly grounded in biological reality. Undoubtably, this is a high
price to pay. But since Torah regards Jewishness as deriving only from birth,
the only other avenue open to halakha would be, total rejection of the
possibility of giyyur. But the G-d of Israel
loves proselytes; indeed, G-d is characterized as Ohev Ger (Deuteronomy/Devarim
10:18). Therefore, giyyur
IS possible – and it is possible only as birth into the Jewish kinship. Thus, a former Gentile who immerses
in water for the sake of giyyur is
transformed and recreated. Emerging from the waters of the mikveh, he is newly-born, as an infant emerging from a mother’s
womb – a Jewish mother’s womb. That is why he is as irrevocably Jewish
as is a Jew by [biological] birth: “Once he has immersed and come up, he is like a Jew in every
respect”. Birth cannot be retroactively annulled.
#_ftnref1" title="_ftn1" name="_ftn1">
[1]
Bava
Metziah 59b, Mishne Torah Hilkhot Mekhirah 14:15-17, Shulhan Arukh
Hoshen Mishpat 248:2
#_ftnref2" title="_ftn2" name="_ftn2">
[2]
But the
existence of such a person would be a rare event, indeed, because “in our times the presumption is that
the intention of those seeking to undergo giyyur
is, to mislead the court when they say that they will observe the
commandments, while in their heart they are far from such intent”. Rabbi
Gedalya Axelrod, 'Observance of Commandments as a Condition for [Valid] Giyyur' (Hebrew), in Shurat ha-Din (The Letter of the
Law), Vol. 3 (Jerusalem, Sha’ar
ha-Mishpat Institute of the
Directorate of Rabbinical Courts, 1995), pp. 175–90. The quote is from p. 189.
#_ftnref3" title="_ftn3" name="_ftn3">
[3]
There
are certain specific exceptions to this general rule, but that is what they
are: exceptions. One exception: Fulfillment of the mitzvah of prayer requires
one to recite the ‘amida, consisting (on normal weekdays) of 19
benedictions. One should attempt to attend to the meaning of the words of the
prayer, however, if one failed to do so, one has nevertheless fulfilled the
mitzvah of prayer – if at least during the first benediction one did attend to
it’s meaning. I.e., reciting the ‘amida with attention to the first 5%
of the words is fulfillment of intention required for the mitzvah. Cf. Shulhan
Arukh Orah Hayyim 101:1.
#_ftnref4" title="_ftn4" name="_ftn4">
[4]
Cf.
Shabbat 68a where the Talmud refers to a Gentile who underwent giyyur
without ever hearing of the existence of Shabbat.
#_ftnref5" title="_ftn5" name="_ftn5">
[5]
This is
the original halakha. In medieval times it became customary in Europe
for returning apostates to undergo a ceremony analogous to giyyur,
although this was not formally necessary. Cf. Shulhan Arukh Yoreh De’ah 268:12.
#_ftnref6" title="_ftn6" name="_ftn6">
[6]
A Jewish
marriage can be contracted only between a man and a woman, both of whom are
Jewish.
#_ftnref7" title="_ftn7" name="_ftn7">
[7]
Hilkhot
Ishut 4:15.
#_ftnref8" title="_ftn8" name="_ftn8">
[8]
Shulhan Arukh Even HaEzer 44:9.
#_ftnref9" title="_ftn9" name="_ftn9">
[9]
Cf.
Yevamot 47b. For this being the source of Maimonides’ ruling, cf. Maggid
Mishne ad.loc. For this being the source of rabbi Caro’s ruling, cf. the
following commentators ad.loc. : Be’er HaGolah #90; Beiur
HaGra #16 (who concurs and adds a second source, Bekhorot 30b, that also
relates to a recanting ger). Interestingly, rabbi Moshe Feinstein holds
that the impossibility of a born Jew changing his identity and becoming a
Gentile requires no source text at all, as it is absolutely self-evident
(Responsa Iggerot Moshe Even HaEzer IV:83). However, an examination of
the history of halakha reveals that the matter was not regarded as
self-evident. Rather, it was seriously debated in early medieval times and
there were Geonic authorities who held that if a born Jew abandons Torah to the
extent of joining another religion and publicly desecrating the Shabbat, he is
no longer a Jew even for purposes of marriage (cf. Responsa of Rashi #169;
Responsa Tashbetz III:43; Responsa Yakhin
uBoaz II:31).
#_ftnref10" title="_ftn10" name="_ftn10">
[10]
Responsa MaHarShaKh, 3:102. Rabbi Cohen lived in the 16th
century Ottoman Empire.
#_ftnref11" title="_ftn11" name="_ftn11">
[11]
Translated
by Sagi and Zohar in Transforming Identity (Continuum Press, London
and New York, 2007).
#_ftnref12" title="_ftn12" name="_ftn12">
[12]
The
grammatical structure of the talmudic text is ambiguous regarding the subject
addressing the prospective proselyte: the phrase Omrim lo [say to him]
is in present tense plural, but the subject can equally be translated as we or
you (pl.), or they. Our use of “we” is not definitive.
#_ftnref13" title="_ftn13" name="_ftn13">
[13]
These
are commandments instructing farmers to leave portions of the crop for the
poor. Cf., e.g., Leviticus 19,7 and 23,22.
#_ftnref14" title="_ftn14" name="_ftn14">
[14]
The
Hebrew word kibbel is ambiguous. We translate it here as “receive,” but
it can also be translated as “agrees” or “accepts.” This ambiguity enables
multiple interpretations, as Avi Sagi and I discuss in Transforming Identity.
#_ftnref15" title="_ftn15" name="_ftn15">
[15]
Yevamot 47b. Our translation here is based on
the Schottenstein edition of the Talmud Bavli, New York,
Mesorah Publications, 1999. However, we have emended the translation in several
places to give what we see as a better rendition of the sense of the original
text.
#_ftnref16" title="_ftn16" name="_ftn16">
[16]
Yevamot
47b.
#_ftnref17" title="_ftn17" name="_ftn17">
[17]
Tosefta
Demai 2:4 (p. 69 in the Lieberman edition). Our translation.
#_ftnref18" title="_ftn18" name="_ftn18">
[18]
Bekhorot 30b.
#_ftnref19" title="_ftn19" name="_ftn19">
[19]
Cf.
Second Kings XI.
#_ftnref20" title="_ftn20" name="_ftn20">
[20]
Mishne
Torah, Hilkhot Issurei Biah, XIII:14-16.
#_ftnref21" title="_ftn21" name="_ftn21">
[21]
Ibid.,
XIII:17.
#_ftnref22" title="_ftn22" name="_ftn22">
[22]
Much
ink has been spilled by rabbis in recent times to explain this. For our
interpretation, see Transforming Identity pp. 168-169.
#_ftnref23" title="_ftn23" name="_ftn23">
[23]
For the sake of clarity: this is true not only with
regard to those rabbis who held that a valid giyyur is possible without kabbalat
mitzvot, but also with regard to those rabbis who held that kabbalat
mitzvot is a sine qua non for a valid giyyur. This is so
because, however those rabbis understood that phrase, they never identified it
as an internal disposition but as an event that is empirically verifiable at
the moment it occurs.Some understandings of that event were: the proselyte’s
reception of information about the commandments, as conveyed to him by the
court; the proselyte’s willingness to become a Jew; the proselyte’s commitment
to proceed with the giyyur ritual (= circumcision and immersion) after
hearing about the commandments; the proselyte’s declaration of commitment to
observe the commandments. See: Transforming Identity, chapters 9, 10,
11, 12.
#_ftnref24" title="_ftn24" name="_ftn24">
[24]
Undermining the status of a person who underwent giyyur because of how
he conducts himself logically entails undermining the status of a person who
was born to a Jewish mother, because of how he conducts himself. Indeed, it is
my personal opinion that this is the ‘deep logic’ that underlies the common
custom in haredi circles to reject the propriety of marriage between
“frum from birth” haredim and Jews who were born to non-haredi families
and later chose to adhere to a haredi lifestyle.
#_ftnref25" title="_ftn25" name="_ftn25">
[25]
ger she-nitgayyer ke-katan she-nolad --
Yevamot 22a, and parallel texts.
#_ftnref26" title="_ftn26" name="_ftn26">
[26]
It
should be noted that such marriages between relatives of the first degree have
been forbidden by rabbinic enactment. However,
marriages between relatives of lesser closeness are permitted to proselytes,
although they are forbidden between Jews born to a Jewish mother. On all this see
Code of Maimonides, Laws of Forbidden Intercourse, 14:11 and ff.
#_ftnref27" title="_ftn27" name="_ftn27">
[27]
See Code of Maimonides, Laws of
Original Acquisition and Gifts 1:6.
#_ftnref28" title="_ftn28" name="_ftn28">
[28]
See Code of Maimonides, Laws of
Evidence 13:2.
Conversions, Covenant and Conscience
The current conversion crisis that is searing the larger Jewish community in general and the Orthodox community in particular is grounded in politically and ideologically driven doublespeak. Orthodox Judaism teaches that the Jew is sanctified by obeying God's commandments. Honest people may disagree over details. When agendas replace conscience and the halakha is superseded by policy, we are not being honest to God or to each other. The organization that sees itself as the "Eternal Jewish Family"wants the world Jewish community to adopt its own conversion standards that are "universally acceptable." This seemingly innocent idiom makes the immodest claim that unless the standards of the most strict, who by implication are the most fervent, religious and authentic Orthodox, are adopted, the Jewish people will be hopelessly divided. It makes the implicit assumption that the hareidi conscience is inviolable and other Orthodox standards, which are asked to define itself as Judaism lite, must defer to its dictates and dictators.
The hareidi so-called Eternal Jewish Family standards are not the standards of red letter Jewish law. As long as the norms of the plain, simple and logical reading of the Oral Torah canon are observed with regard to conversion, the eternal Jewish standard has been satisfied, and dissenters must be ignored. If Jewish legal standards are observed with regard to conversions, the invalidating of kosher converts without evidence invalidates the invalidators precisely because eternal Jewish standards are superseded by social and political considerations.
Jewish values are based upon laws, not standards. Standards not required by Jewish law may be practiced as personal piety gestures but may not be imposed on all Israel as God's unchanging law. Jewish law actually does allow conversion for the sake of marriage! Consider the fact that the female captive has a month after capture and mourning before she can be taken as an Israelite wife, [Dt 21:10-13]. The Talmudic view of R. Nehemiah, that conversions for marriage are improper, is reported but rejected.[bYevamot 24b]. And consider the narrative of bMenahot 44b that describes a prostitute whose "client," a student of R. Hiyya, was slapped by his tsitsit tassels upon undressing in her presence, reminding him that amongst the Torah's commands is the admonition not to succumb to improper temptations. The student concedes that the woman is beautiful but he loves Judaism more. Taken by her client's poignant piety, she asks for his biographical particulars and confronts the student's mentor, the insightful, knowing, wise, and kindly R. Hiyya, who told her "that very bed that you made for him [her recalcitrant client] illicitly, make that very same bed for him properly, i.e., by becoming a pious Jewess by choice.
Authentic Jewish law allows the presiding rabbi almost unqualified discretion regarding the acceptance of converts. "Standards" not recorded in the Jewish legal canon are not Jewish law. In Responsum Pe'er ha-Dor 132, Maimonides permits a conversion as the better alternative to intermarriage. A rabbinical court of three observant lay people, i.e., non-rabbis, may not be ideal but its conversions are nevertheless kosher once accomplished [Maimonides, Laws of Forbidden Relations, 13:17!]. Requiring extra "expertise" for converting rabbis on the part of hareidi Judaism is a disingenuous ploy intended to disqualify those rabbis who disagree with the extra-legal standards of extremists and who believe that Torah law is in no need of reformulation. Since a convert who was accepted by a halakhic rabbinic court consisting of three observant males is kosher, the rejecting of that convert, whom we are required to love, [Dt 10:19, Maimonides, Positive Commandments, 207] we cause
good Jews by choice to be tempted to sin. If we are not really certain that the conversions of non-hareidi rabbis are kosher, we would, it would seem, accept the conversion candidate cautiously in order to assure that these candidates for conversion be properly integrated into the Jewish community. By claiming the right of veto of converts of Orthodox rabbis who obey Jewish law, hareidi Judaism advances the claim that Judaism is based on rulers, not rules, and standard bearers, not standards, and deference to men and not devotion to Jewish law.
Jewish standards are defined in the Talmudic canon, and not councils, conventions, or conclaves of policy makers. Torah is the Judaism of all Israel. The so-called Orthodox Right has here wrongly misrepresented Jewish law. Individual rabbis may suspend the law in emergency situations [Maimonides, Laws of Dissenters, 2:4].This discretion is given not to a self-select rabbinic elite; it is given to the local rabbi, who is authorized to apply humanity, uncommon common sense, and what is deemed to be appropriate in the circumstances as they appear at that moment [bSanhedrin 6b].
The Israeli rabbi, Abraham Sherman, not only invalidated Rabbi Haim Drukman's conversions, he called the latter rabbi a wicked man. Slander is a sin that invalidates Sherman's rabbinic credentials. Yet most Orthodox rabbis hesitate to make this necessary, logical, and undeniable recourse because modern Orthodox rabbis wish to be "accepted" by all Orthodox parties. When fully observant converts, who are even observing the family purity rules, [See Maimonides, Forbidden Relations, 13:8] are being disqualified, the disqualifiers are acting wrongly. When Orthodox Judaism is defined by political standards and not by Jewish law, then God's view is silenced. Rabbi Shelomo Amar invalidated Diaspora Judaism's Orthodox converts without doing research. By not accepting a kosher convert, one tempts a Jew, the kosher convert, to sin. Rabbi Amar is not applying "strict construction" Jewish law; he feels that he is answerable to that block of Orthodoxy that sees itself as the salvation and life of all Israel, and whose intuition trumps what the written and oral Torah actually require.
A local rosh yeshiva in Springfield, New Jersey became very angry with me for supporting the Neeman proposal as advanced by Rabbi Lamm of YU. Rabbi Lamm was denounced by a zealot as a" Hater of God." bQiddushin 79a teaches that whoever invalidates the bona fides of another projects the flaw in oneself. The fact that many within Modern Orthodoxy, including the Rabbinical faculty of Yeshiva University, did not invalidate the bona fides of those who slandered Rabbis Drukman and Lamm, but protested weakly, begs the existential question as to whether this brand of Orthodox Judaism is loyal to God and conscience or compulsion and consensus.
Rabbi Isaac Schmelkes claimed 150 years ago that a kosher conversion is invalid if the person converting is insincere, and if the convert at a subsequent date was not observant, the convert is deemed to be insincere. This view is without precedent in the Jewish legal literature and must be rejected as such. The oral law at bSota 44b requires military service in Israel for both men and women. The very rabbis who impose these "innovative" conversion standards also outlaw military service for yeshiva men and for its women. Jewish law must be enforced consistently and appropriately and not spun sociologically.
I have recently experienced a case where an Orthodox rabbi's conversion was not accepted by another Orthodox rabbi ordained by the same yeshiva. The converting rabbi is modern Orthodox; the rejecting one is hareidi. On one hand, we define ourselves by proclaiming who we are not. The Jewish laws of conversion are rather clear, are not difficult to master, and are in no need of alteration, from either the Left or from the Right.
The quest for "universal conversion standards" de-authorizes Jewish law by misrepresenting Judaism as a religion of standard bearers and not of objective standards.
Authentic Orthodoxy advances principles and not politics. Torah is about rules and not rulers, it is about the law of Torah and not standards of self-selecting elites. There is room for vigorous and public discussion. We undermine our own bona fides when we succumb to incivility and when we put up with put downs. Judaism is about the fear of Heaven and not the fear of people. In order to restore its existential credibility, Orthodox Judaism must affirm Jewish law honestly, because this alone is our eternal Jewish standard.
The Impact of Tearful Prayers
Question: The Talmud contends that "from the day that the Beit HaMikdash was destroyed, the gates of prayer were locked...but the gates of tears were never sealed". (Bava Metzia 59a-Berakhot 32b) The implication is that tears have an impact upon prayers. Or better yet, tearful prayers are always in order. How are tearful prayers more significant or potent than simple prayers without tears?
Response: The Talmud states (Sotah 11a) that prior to the enactment of the evil decrees which enslaved the Jews in Egypt, Pharaoh sought the counsel of three sages. Job was silent at this meeting and subsequently was punished by the Almighty for his silence by the affliction of pain. Yet punishment in the Bible generally relates in some form to the nature of the crime. In this situation the punishment of pain in no way relates to the sin of Job. Also, it is necessary to determine the nature of Job's immoral behavior. What sin did he commit by being silent? Yes, his silence may be construed as a form of acquiescence to the slavery of the Israelites promulgated by Pharaoh. But is it not possible that Job firmly believed that any action or statement on his part would be to no avail? What impact would his demurral have upon Pharaoh? How could one individual go against the mighty legions and the powerful Egyptian military machine? Sensing, therefore, the futility of any contrary position, Job merely was silent. Was this silence such a grievous crime that Job was subsequently punished by the agony of constant physical pain and sickness?
Our sages contend that the punishment of pain was a divine lesson to Job, and through him to all mankind, that the argument of futility is not morally adequate to sustain silence in times of danger. Job was afflicted with such severe ailments that he cried out constantly because of the unbearable agony of the pain. Why did he cry? Why did he publicly bemoan his physical pain? Did he not know that screaming and moaning do not help the condition? Is it not futile to moan when one is in pain? The answer is that it is the nature of man to cry out when he hurts. Crying does not stop the pain, but, rather, gives evidence that the pain exists. It is the manifestation that something internally is wrong. The silent person is basically the one who does not poignantly feel pain. All is well - there is no reason to cry. Job's reaction to his own plight, and his silence in the face of impending danger to the Israelites, proved that Job felt no internal pain when Israelites were killed. Job cried over his personal problems, not over pogroms to Israelites. The enslavement and the possible ultimate destruction of the Israelite people did not disturb Job's emotional tranquility. Had Job been a friend to the Israelite people, then the silence would have been impossible. The natural human strands of emotions would have evoked a verbal crescendo of pain. Silence was, therefore, evidence of no concern and no personal involvement. For this reason, Job's silence was marked as a message of immorality. (Sihot Musar; Rav Hayyim Shmuelevitz, Rosh HaYeshiva, Mir, Jerusalem - 5733, Ma'amar 5)
Rabbi Eliyahu Benamozegh: Israel and Humanity
Many Jews in our day, like many of our brethren of other tribes, are seeking
to mend the fractures that divide us from ourselves and from others, and to
find ways to heal the wounds that afflict us only six decades after the
Holocaust and the rebirth of Israel. Amid these efforts, an idealistic,
scholarly nineteenth-century rabbi from
to some, to provide a beacon of hope and humanity.
Elijah ben Abraham Benamozegh (1822-1900) was highly respected in his day as
one of
most eminent Jewish scholars. (See Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v.
"Benamozegh"; Elijah Benamozegh,
Humanity, trans. and ed. Maxwell
31-38, 378-402. I have drawn in several instances from material in the
Translator's Introduction to this volume.) He served for half a century as
rabbi of the important Jewish community of
(
Benamozegh now commemorates his name and distinction. R. Benamozegh was (and
remains) celebrated as
articulate proponent of Kabbalah, at a time when Jewish mysticism was widely
disdained. In Gershom Scholem's opinion, he and Franz Molitor were "the
only two scholars of the age to approach the Kabbalah out of a fundamental
sympathy and even affinity for its teachings."
(Gershom Scholem, Kabbalah ,
1974, 202. Cited by Moshe Idel
in his Appendix to
and Humanity, 397.) Later, owing
significantly to the effective advocacy of his student
and posthumous editor Aime Palliere, it was Benamozegh's persistent
support of the Noahide idea and its implications for the
spiritual life of all people that brought him most attention, and has
encouraged the translation and republication of his works. (See
and Humanity, 18-21 et passim.) Most recently, however, it is the scope of his human
sympathy and religious tolerance --- the
seemingly effortless way in which Kabbalah's cosmic universality and Noahism's religious universality are
somehow linked up in him alongside a scrupulous Orthodox rabbinism --- that have attracted
particular attention, and identified him not only as a rare
Orthodox rabbi --- "the Plato of Italian Judaism," as he was sometimes called
(see Palliere in Israel and Humanity, 31), and "incontestably in the
great line of the Sages of Israel" (Emile Touati, quoted by Luria in
Israel and Humanity, 8) --- but as a timely and useful thinker as well.
A brief glance at the Internet reveals how widely R. Benamozegh's ideas are
being discussed, in Noahide and Christian as well as in Jewish circles, and how
much research is currently being devoted to him. In recent decades, the book of
his that has received most attention, Israel et l'Humanite (Israel and
Humanity), has been published in Hebrew (1967), Italian (1990), and English
(1995) translations (see Luria in Israel and Humanity, xii), and has made a
deep impression on the contemporary Noahide movement. His other major work in
French, La Morale Juive et la Morale Chretienne (Jewish and Christian Ethics),
whose English translation had been
had long since gone out of print, was reissued in
on R. Benamozegh are appearing, especially in
of the most important recent essays in English is Moshe Idel's "Kabbalah
in Elijah Benamozegh's Thought," which appears as an Appendix in
Humanity, 378-402.) Alessandro Guetta's study Philosophie et Cabale dans la
Pensee d'Elie Benamozegh (Padua, 1993), has recently been translated by Helena
Kahan as Philosophy and Kabbalah: Elijah Benamozegh and the Reconciliation of
Western Thought and Jewish Esotericism, and is scheduled for publication in
October 2008 by the State University of New York Press in Albany.
Some current rabbinical literature, too, discloses
an awareness of R. Benamozegh. One must note in this
connection Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz's remarkable paper, "Peace Without Conciliation: The
Irrelevance of 'Toleration' in Judaism" (Common Knowledge , 2005: 11:41-47).
Steinsaltz here affirms his opinion, perhaps without parallel in Orthodox
rabbinical writings, that the Noahide criterion of monotheism -- the first
of the seven universal mitzvot -- is satisfied not only by Islam (an embarras
de richesses) but by modern Christianity as well: "By the standards
of the Noahide laws, the doctrine of the Trinity is not an idolatrous belief
to which Judaism can express an objection." And even, mirabile dictu,
by contemporary Buddhism and Hinduism. To be sure, Steinsaltz hedges
his revolutionary assertion with a discouraging title and subtitle, and
with significant qualifications, especially with respect to what he sees
as the difference between "Noahide monotheism" and "Jewish
monotheism". But no matter -- the Noahide cat is out of the bag, and this article has ---
properly and expectably --- attracted a good deal of attention.
Steinsaltz's reference to R.
Benamozegh comes in his last paragraph: ¿Even
Elijah Benamozegh, who was perhaps the rabbinic figure most open toward, most appreciative of, Christianity and Islam, viewed the relation between Judaism and those other religions in hierarchical terms.¿ His acknowledgement here of R. Benamozegh's exceptional appreciation of other religions, even while his Torah
perspective unsurprisingly obliges him to perceive these religions as
imperfect, is, I think, symptomatic of the current perception
of him.
More debatable, perhaps, is Rabbi Steinsaltz's attempt to invoke R. Benamozegh to support his contention that even an authentically realized Noahism must remain "hierarchically" inferior to Judaism. His discussion of the relation between the two is not altogether clear,
but he seems to diminish what he calls "the Noahide model" in
a way that would be alien to R. Benamozegh --- I shall discuss this
matter presently -- though perhaps congenial to a more conventional rabbinical
perspective.
He concludes his article with that most familiar of
rabbinical strategies for explaining or excusing Jewish concessions, the "shalom
bayit" formula: "Basically, [Noahism] does not
require most religions to give up, or modify the meaning of,
such words as 'true' and 'truth'. It provides
a basis for conversation among religions without the expectation of
compromise. . . . The Noahide approach, in other words,
is a formula for no more than peace."
The decisive difference between Rabbis Benamozegh and Steinsaltz on this
matter evoked a paper by Alick Isaacs, "Benamozegh's Tone: A Response to
Rabbi Steinsaltz" (Common Knowledge, 2005: 11:48-55). Isaacs expresses
gratitude for the distinguished
"extraordinary if not absolutely exceptional" assessment of
contemporary religions as "adequately monotheist, adequately
non-idolatrous, and at least adequately ethical to qualify as compliant with
the Noahide laws." But he points out that Rabbi "Benamozegh went well
beyond the uninterested recognition that Rabbi Steinsaltz recommends. What is
most exceptional, and, for us today exemplary, is Benamozegh's tone."
II
In point of fact, even Benamozegh's undoubtedly "hierarchical"
conception of the relation between Judaism and the other nineteenth-century
religions is informed by the "tone" to which Isaacs refers: its
expressions are affection, respect, regard, even embrace, at least when he
speaks of those gentile religions which he believes to be nearest to the
fulfillment of Noahism, and to which he therefore feels most akin: Islam and
(especially) Christianity. "And now we turn to the followers of the two
great messian- isms, Christian and Moslem. It is to Christians in particular
that we wish to address a frank and respectful word, and God knows that it is
with fear in our heart lest our advances be taken for hypocrisy. No! No
impartial and reasonable man can fail to recognize and appreciate, as is
appropriate, the exalted worth of these two great religions, more especially of
Christianity. There is no Jew worthy of the name who does not rejoice in the
great transformation wrought by them in a world formerly defiled. . . .As for
ourself, we have never had the experience of hearing the Psalms of David on the
lips of a priest without feeling such sensations. The reading of certain
passages of the Gospels has never left us unresponsive. The simplicity,
grandeur, infinite tenderness, which these pages breathe out overwhelms us to
the depths of our soul. . . ."
(
Humanity, 50-51.)
In the same astonishing spirit is a remark by Aime Palliere, who knew Benamozegh well:
"In the last days of his life, Rabbi Benamozegh enjoyed a reclusive
retirement in a verdant quarter of
dawn, bound in tefillin and wrapped in his ample tallit, he said his prayers,
the sound of the bells in a nearby church reached him with a melodious
sweetness which gave all of nature a religious voice, and it seemed that as he
heard this call of Catholic bells, the great thinker prayed with a more intense
fervor. . . . [Benamozegh] felt in spiritual communion not only with all his
Jewish brethren in all countries, worshiping at the same hour, but also with
all believers, spread all over the surface of the earth, who, in choosing the
first hours of the day for prayer, showed themselves without knowing it to be
faithful disciples of the ancient masters of Israel."
(
Humanity, 36.)
III
R. Benamozegh's impressive, indeed startling, tolerance and his altogether
universal perspective seem in a sense to reflect the ancient Jewish culture of
Italy into which he was born and in which he lived his long life. The famous
Latin motto "Nihil humanum me alienum puto" --- "Nothing human
is unimportant to me" --- could have been his own. (The saying is
ascribed to Terence.) His family were from
included distinguished rabbis as well as prosperous merchants.
major centers of Jewish life in
as one of the most creative, dating only from the sixteenth century. (By
contrast, the Jewish settlement in
antedating the Christian presence there.)
Benamozegh's time was one of the most tolerant places in this relatively
tolerant country. It never had a closed ghetto, and by 1800 its population of
5,000 Jews constituted an eighth of its population. Its magnificent synagogue
was admired for its beauty throughout
its destruction by the Germans, was thought to rival the great synagogue of
Humanity, 2; David Ruderman, "At the Intersection of Cultures: The
Historical Legacy of Italian Jewry," in Gardens and Ghettos, ed. Vivian B.
Mann,
is where R. Benamozegh lived and ministered. One may suppose that the
comparatively liberal spirit of the place, together with the millennial
acculturation of the Italian Jews, helped him avoid the hostilities as well as
the vulnerabilities that afflicted men of comparable rabbinical culture in less
favored lands. But, of course, we must not imagine that the genial Italian
environment could by itself account for R. Benamozegh's liberal spirit. That
was undoubtedly his own.
grow and flourish.
As a boy, we are told, R. Benamozegh was an exceptionally brilliant student
of Torah. He was instructed by his uncle, Rabbi Yehudah Coriat, who initiated
him into Kabbalah. But he had also a keen interest in secular studies, which he
seems to have nourished by self-study -- there is no record of his having
attended a university. "His exceptional intelligence," suggests
Palliere, "compensated for the lack of any precise method in his
self-instruction." (Palliere in
Humanity, 31.) His precocity is attested by his having, at the age of sixteen
or seventeen, contributed a preface in Hebrew to Rabbi Coriat's Ma'or
Va-Shemesh (Livorno, 1839), a collection of kabbalistic treatises (Palliere in
Israel and Humanity, 31-32).
He was eventually to compose his own works in
three languages, chiefly in Italian but also in Hebrew and French. Moshe Idel
has described him as "a very erudite and prolific writer, whose domains of
creativity were broad and multifaceted. . . .He was well acquainted with many
of the available texts of antiquity, in their Greek or Latin originals and also
in translation, and his writings constitute a sui generis type of erudition in
Judaism, not only in the nineteenth century." (Idel in
Humanity, 379.)
His bibliography is extensive, but according to Palliere,
writing in 1914, there remained at that time even more works still in
manuscript than had been published. (Palliere in
Humanity, 32.) His principal publications include biblical commentaries (most
importantly 'Em La-Mikra, 1862, a five-volume commentary on the Torah);
polemical works on the authenticity and importance of Kabbalah ('Eimat Mafgi
'a, 1855, and Ta'am Le-Shad, 1863); comparative ethics (La Morale Juive et La
Morale Chretienne, 1867); and historiography (Storia degli Esseni, 1865), among
many others. Of a projected work in theology (Teologia Dogmatica e Apologetica)
one volume only was published (Dio, 1877) as well as excerpts from other
portions of his manuscript, in 1904. Among his unpublished works is a study on
the origins of Christian dogma, which the French scholar Josue Jehouda regarded
as "of exceptional importance." (Luria in
Humanity, 8-9, and 333, n. 10.)
This partial survey of his writings reveals
abundantly both R.Benamozegh's very wide range of scholarly interest, and his
willingness to treat what might seem improbable subjects for a rabbi of
Livorno, despite the special features of Italian-Jewish culture to which I have
already referred. Indeed, his importance in the Italian rabbinate
notwithstanding, his writings were not always welcomed by less unconventional
colleagues. Rabbi Benamozegh's Torah commentary 'Em La-Mikra was in fact
condemned for heterodoxy by the Orthodox rabbinical establishment of Jerusalem
and Damascus, though defended by the author at once in a public letter
addressed to these rabbis. (Palliere in
Humanity, 334-335, n. 5.) His situation recalls that of a comparably
unconventional, mystically oriented successor two generations later, Rabbi
Abraham Isaac Kook. Such exceptionally independent rabbis and thinkers seem all
too likely sooner or later to agitate their less daring contemporaries.
IV
Israel et l'Humanite (1914), R. Benamozegh's posthumous
summa of Jewish thought, is undoubtedly his book
which speaks most directly to our own time, and is the principal source of his
current, and apparently growing, reputation. It has a curious history. Its editor
Palliere, who was in a position to know, tells us that R. Benamozegh worked on it for
many years and left, when he died, some 1900 "large pages of compact
writing, without paragraphing, editing, or division of any kind."
(Palliere in
and Humanity, 37.) Yet a very important part of the work,
its Introduction, had been published as early as 1885, well before the author's death in
1900, and sets out concisely the plan as well as the theme of the entire
work as it ultimately appeared: " We propose, then, to seek out
the universal character of Judaism, in both the speculative and practical domains. Our scheme calls
for three principal divisions: God, Man, and Law." (
and Humanity, 59.)
The title of this 1885 Introduction is equally revealing of R. Benamozegh's perspective: "
and Humanity; Proof of the Cosmopolitanism in Judaism's Principles, Laws, Worship,
Vocation, History, and Ideals." (Israel et l'Humanite;
Demonstration du Cosmopolitanisme dans les Dogmes, les Lois, le Culte, la
Vocation, l'Histoire, et l'Ideal de l'Hebraisme. Introduction,
1885.) In his epithets
"universal" and "cosmopolitan," R. Benamozegh adumbrates the central theme of the book.
Judaism (or Hebraism, as he usually prefers to call it) often seems
parochial and self-absorbed, and has been so perceived by others, but this is altogether misleading: "[Its particularism] has always deceived, and still
deceives, so many persons of good faith, to the point that they are
able to see in the religion of Israel only a purely national cult.
But they can easily turn from their error if they will accept our invitation to inquire, with us, whether Judaism does not possess the elements of a universal religion. They will then
recognize that it indeed contains at its heart, as the flower conceals the fruit, the religion intended for the entire human race, of which the
Mosaic law, which seems on the surface so incompatible with that high destiny, is but the husk or outer cover. It is for the
preservation and establishment of this universal religion that Judaism has endured, that it has struggled and suffered. It is with and through this
universal religion that Judaism is destined to triumph." (
and Humanity, 44.)
The same
idea appears near the end of the book, embodying a corollary metaphor:
serves a "priestly" function for "lay" Humanity: "Judaism is really two doctrines in one. There
are two laws, two codes of discipline -- in a word, two forms of
religion: the lay law, summarized in the seven precepts of the sons of Noah,
and the Mosaic or priestly law, whose code is the Torah.
The first was destined for all the human race, the second for
alone. . . . It is one Eternal Law, apprehended from
two perspectives." "Priestly" Israel
is regarded as fulfilling its mission, as justifying its very existence, by serving the spiritual needs of "lay"
Humanity, even as its prototypes, the Kohanim, were essentially exalted
functionaries, but functionaries nevertheless, who existed to serve their people. "Such is the Jewish conception of the world.
In heaven a single God, father of all men alike;
on earth a family of peoples, among whom Israel is the
"first-born", charged with teaching and administering the true religion
of mankind, of which he is priest. This "true
religion" is the Law of Noah: It is the one which the human race will embrace in
the days of the Messiah, and which
mission is to preserve and propagate meanwhile." (
and Humanity, 53-54.)
This "priestly" function explains the elaborate cultic
obligations of Mosaism: "But as the priestly people,
dedicated to the purely religious life, Israel has special
duties, peculiar obligations, which are like a kind of monastic
law, an ecclesiastical constitution which is Israel's alone by
reason of its high duties." (
and Humanity, 54.)". " We shall show
that in Judaism, universality as ends and particularism as means
have always coexisted, and that particularist Judaism has the very special
function of serving as trustee and voice for the universal
Judaism." (
and Humanity, 58.) This service is, perhaps,
raison d'etre: "Far from feeling obliged to convert non-Jews to his practices, [
confines himself to preaching to them that universal religion whose
establishment on earth was, in a sense, the purpose of his own existence."
(
and Humanity, 327.) Rabbi Benamozegh rejects
categorically the notion that
"The image of divinity on earth, the partner of the Creative Spirit, is not the Jew:
it is man." (
and Humanity, 325.)
V
This passionate
perception of the unity (which implies the essential equality) of all mankind, including Israel, is
at the heart of R. Benamozegh's vision. To articulate this vision in traditional Jewish terms, he
moved the Noahide doctrine of
relation with Humanity from the margin of Jewish thought to the center. What had been a self-flattering
and, in practice, largely conceptual obligation for Jews became, in his powerful conception, the
reason for Jewish existence. What had been a God-given but, in practice, largely
theoretical obligation for ancient "heathens" became an urgent
desideratum for modern "Gentiles".
Rabbi Benamozegh
was certainly cognizant that his grand vision was far from universally understood (let alone embraced) by the
Jews of his day, or perhaps of any other. He puts the matter with delicacy: "No doubt, the entire multitude of
were not able to grasp with equal understanding these truths which,
even in our own day, remain inaccessible to so many.
In the comprehension of every religion, there is a natural gradation, corresponding
to the intellectual and spiritual development of the
believers. This must be particularly true with respect to Judaism, whose
doctrines rise infinitely above the plane of mere intellect. . .
.It is enough for the eternal honor of Judaism that this ideal, incomparably
superior to all that surrounded it, had been preserved
at its heart, and that the voice of its Prophets and sages
did not stop proclaiming it, despite all hostile
circumstances." (
and Humanity, 325.)
Plato, too, acknowledged that
his vision of the just city was an ideal that never was and might well never be. If Rabbi Elijah
Benamozegh, the "Plato of Italian Judaism", affirmed his ideal
of the way that Israel and Humanity should relate to one another on an equally
visionary level, the ideal is not less valuable for that reason. His influence
today upon persons of both kinds would seem to justify the vision.