National Scholar Updates

Question: May women recite Kaddish in the synagogue?

Response: A contemporary compendium on mourning practices is the anthology written by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg (P'nai Baruch, first published in 1986) and translated into English under the ArtScroll title, "Mourning in Halachah". Concerning the issue of women reciting Kaddish, Rav Goldberg notes the following: "If the deceased left only daughters, although some have permitted a daughter to recite Kaddish at a prayer service in her home, virtually all other Poskim disagree and rule that a daughter should not recite Kaddish even in her home." (Mourning in Halachah, chapter 39:21, p. 359) Thus it would appear that halakhic authorities are generally opposed to women reciting Kaddish whether at home or in the synagogue.

The difficulty with this pervasive negative halakhic orientation is that it fails to take into consideration the rulings of the three most influential halakhic sages in America. Indeed, it is openly recognized that the rulings of the following three rabbis permeated the essence and formed the standards of synagogue life in America: namely, Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Rav Moshe Feinstein and Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik.

Rav Henkin (1880-1973) was the Director of Ezrat Torah, a relief organization for needy rabbis. Each year, he authored and published the popular "Luach" for synagogue life wherein he detailed halakhic practices. He was deemed the "Posek haDor", the decisor for issues impacting on synagogue life. Concerning women saying Kaddish, he wrote: "The question as to whether a [bereaved] daughter may recite the Kaddish is bound up with her observance of the Sabbath, kashruth, and the laws of family purity. If she does keep these basic mitzvoth, it is permissible for her to say Kaddish in the women's gallery while the men are doing so in the synagogue proper." (Teshuvot Ivra. The entire text of the teshuva is translated by David Telsner, The Kaddish, p. 301.)

Subsequent to Rav Henkin, the halakhic arbiter for American Orthodox synagogues was Rav Moshe Feinstein, of blessed memory. In a posthumous publication of his responsa, the following is reported. Rav Moshe was concerned with whether it was necessary to have a Mehitza separating the men and women sections for prayer, in the event that there were only one or two women . He notes: "Throughout the generations the common custom was for a poor woman to be in the Bet haMidrash to receive charity, or as a mourner to recite Kaddish." His response was that a Mehitza was necessary even for one woman [who attended] on a regular basis. On an occasional basis, it was not necessary, should only one or two women be present. (Iggrot Moshe, Vol. 8, O.H. 5:12b) Note the terminology and the concern. Rav Moshe does not question the propriety of the woman who comes to the Bet haMidrash to recite Kaddish. He seems to assume that there are no halakhic qualms at all with such a function of women at religious services. The only problem is whether there need be a Mehitza during her recital. Indeed, it is apparent that Rav Moshe accepts a woman reciting Kaddish as a normal, unquestionable practice.

For many thousands of students of Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, of blessed memory, (former Rosh haYeshiva of Yeshiva University, and halakhic authority for the Rabbinical Council of America) a halakhic ruling from him was deemed authoritative. It is reported that Rav Soloveitchik ruled that is was permissible for women to recite Kaddish in synagogue. (cited by Joel Wolowelsky in a letter to the editor of HaDarom, vol. 57, Ellul 5748/1988, pp. 157-158.)

Thus, while it may be true that the overwhelming majority of halakhic scholars have ruled negatively concerning women reciting Kaddish in synagogue, it cannot be discounted nor overlooked that the three greatest decisors of halakha for American Torah Judaism appear to permit such a practice. Accordingly, those who permit this practice certainly have great halakhic scholars upon whom to rely. Of concern is the rationale for both the lenient as well as the stringent view pertaining to women reciting Kaddish.

In a note clarifying the ruling that women should not say Kaddish, Rav Goldberg notes the following: "See Pit-hei Teshuva Y.D. 376:3) citing Havot Yair (222) who answers a question about someone who died without leaving a son. The father commanded that his daughter should recite Kaddish. Havot Yair states: "According to the basic law, she should recite Kaddish, for [the recitation of Kaddish] by a daughter gives benefit and satisfaction to the soul [of the departed]. Nevertheless there is danger that the practice would weaken the customs of the Jewish people. And since it is a conspicuous matter (pirsum) one should protest against it." (Mourning in Halachah, p. 359, footnote 36) In other words, the saying of Kaddish by women does not intrinsically violate any halakha of prayer. The negative view is a form of a rabbinic statute (gezeirah) to sustain customs and prevent a possible future infringement of customs. It is as if the rabbis are saying that should this matter be permitted, it may lead down the road to a step-by-step whittling down of safeguards. The prohibition is, therefore, a "fence" to safeguard the Torah.

It is important to note that the ruling of the Havot Yair (1638-1702) cited by the Pit-hei Teshuva and the ArtScroll translation is not an accurate rendition of the actual position of the Havot Yair. The following is a full translation of the responsum of Havot Yair:

"A strange matter took place in Amsterdam and is well known there. A person died who had no son. He left instructions that in the event of his death, ten people should be paid to learn [Torah] every day throughout the year of mourning, in his home. And subsequent to the learning session, his daughter should recite Kaddish. The rabbinic sages and leaders of the community did not protest her recitation... It may be that a woman is also required to observe the Mitzvah of Kiddush Hashem (sanctifying God's name). This occurs by the fact that there are ten men present. Though the original source for the recitation of Kaddish is the story of Rabbi Akiva informing a youngster to recite Kaddish and that case deals with a male, not a female, logic would dictate that [a woman's recitation of Kaddish] would be beneficial and bring satisfaction to the soul [of the departed] in that she is the seed [of the departed]. Yet, one should be concerned that this would weaken the customs of the people of Israel, which are also deemed [an integral aspect of] Torah. [One must prevent] everyone attempting to build an altar for himself according to his personal reasons and thus make a mockery of rabbinic laws....[In conclusion] since the matter relates to a public gathering, one should protest it." (Responsa Havot Yair, no. 222, free translation)

The actual text generates a number of interesting observations. First is the fact that the sages of Amsterdam had no qualms over the matter at all. Indeed, it is necessary to discern the real reason why the Havot Yair felt that the case in Amsterdam might lead to a disdain and disintegration of customs. Why was there such a fear? Note the concern that people would build a personal altar. What was so unique about the case?

I suggest that many may have misread the concerns of the Havot Yair. He was not perturbed by a woman reciting Kaddish at a regular minyan. Note that the case was not dealing with a regular minyan for daily services, but related to a very unique request. It was for a minyan to learn Torah in a home and for a woman to recite Kaddish subsequent to the learning. It was, therefore, an unusual request. It was as if it was not important for the daughter to recite Kaddish at a normal minyan for morning, afternoon and evening services. The only concern was for the daughter to say Kaddish after a special Torah learning session. This was deemed a denigration of the normal recitation of Kaddish. To permit this and not be concerned with saying Kaddish after a regular daily prayer was tantamount to giving people the right to make new customs and disdain the old. Accordingly, the Havot Yair opposed such a practice. However, should a daughter pray in a regular synagogue and recite Kaddish together with the other mourners, perhaps even the Havot Yair would permit such a practice for the reasons he himself articulated: 1) it was a form of Kiddush Hashem; 2) It brings satisfaction to the soul of the departed. Also, rather than promote a disdain for customs, the recitation of Kaddish in a synagogue generates a firm dedication to the traditional reverence given to the departed by the Jewish people. In addition, it may have been a long-standing practice for women to say Kaddish in synagogues after services.

As such, I believe that women who wish to attend daily religious services and to recite Kaddish should be encouraged and acknowledged as faithful adherents of our heritage, not as innovators seeking to restructure or liberalize halakhic practices. The recitation of Kaddish generates a sense of respect to loved ones. Not all women seek such a process; but those who do should be treated with respect and honor.

The Shulhan Arukh, composed by rabbi Joseph Caro in the 16th century, is a canonical code of Jewish Law. In this work, rabbi Caro writes that a ceremony of Giyyur (=‘conversion') is valid only if it includes Qabbalat Mitzvot. Rabbi Caro does not explain what this phrase means. The so-called "conversion crisis" results from the attempt to pressure all rabbis to adopt a specific interpretation of this requirement, i.e., to agree that Qabbalat Mitzvot means a whole-hearted commitment by the Ger (="convert" =‘proselyte') to fully observe all of the Mitzvot (commandments). On this view, if a person applying for giyyur intends to be a secular Jew, or even a ‘traditional' Jew who observes many (but not all) commandments, that person cannot be allowed to undergo a giyyur ceremony, because Qabbalat Mitzvot is lacking. This position has been strongly supported by ultra-orthodox haredi rabbis as the one-and-only correct interpretation of Qabbalat Mitzvot.

In fact, the meaning of this phrase in the context of Giyyur was not agreed upon during the 1000 years before rabbi Caro employed it, and was not agreed upon afterwards. As did many rabbis before them, leading Sephardic rabbis in the 20th century held other interpretations of this phrase. In the following text, the views of three such great Sephardic rabbis are discussed. In their view, Qabbalat Mitzvot means an acknowledgement by the Ger, that after they become a Jew they will be liable before G-d (as are all Jews) for their actions: if they sin, they may incur Divine punishment, while performance of mitzvot will earn merit and reward. According to this view, a valid halakhic giyyur is fully possible for persons who do not intend to subsequently follow a religious lifestyle.

The following is an excerpt from chapter 12 of a book entitled Transforming Identity, forthcoming in late 2007 from Continuum press. Written by Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar (both are professors at Bar Ilan University), it has been characterized thus by rabbi Irving ‘Yitz' Greenberg:

This book is a tour de force, a rare combination of comprehensive scholarship, insight, fresh thinking and wisdom. This is by far, the best book on this topic in the English language.

Qabbalat Mitzvot as recognition of liability

According to this position, the content of a proselyte's declaration with regard to commandments does not relate to performance. Rather, she is required to acknowledge that as a Jewess, she will be subject to the halakhic system, and therefore be liable for the consequences of her future commissions and omissions. One scholar who holds this view is Rabbi Raphael Aaron b. Simeon,#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title="_ednref1">[1] who writes as follows:

The judges immersing the proselyte must be three... and they must immerse him in the daytime. While he is in the water, they notify him again about some of the more lenient and some of the harsher commandments. And it is our wont to ask him these questions briefly, after informing him of some of the lenient and harsher commandments, as he stands in the water:

- Are you are entering the religion of Israel wholeheartedly? And he says 'yes.'

- Is it the case that you have no ulterior motive, and you are undergoing giyyur only for the sake of Heaven? - 'Yes.'

- Do you willingly accept punishment for transgressing the lenient and harsher commandments we have explained to you when you accepted the religion of Israel? - 'Yes.'

... And he fully immerses before the judges. Once he has immersed and come up, he is like a Jew in every respect.#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title="_ednref2">[2]

This detailed dialogue between the court and the proselyte was composed by Rabbi Ben Shimon, and to the best of our knowledge it is the first time that such a detailed format is presented in halakhic literature. The proselyte is questioned with regard to his general attitude toward the Jewish religion, his motivation, and his acceptance of the negative consequences that might result from obligation to the commandments. He is not questioned as to whether he intends to observe the commandments and abide by them. Moreover, despite the unprecedented detail in this text by Rabbi Ben Shimon, he does not require subjective religious intent on the proselyte's part. When explaining the policy of the Egyptian rabbinate with regard to the giyyur of Gentile women living with Jewish partners, he writes that although the women's motivation is not religious:

We overlook this and accept them... and this is what we do in such cases. We make a condition and explain to the woman proselyte that her intention must be that even if her husband does not wish to marry her after this, and abandons her, she voluntarily accepts the religion, and that the reason for her giyyur is not contingent upon her [interest in] marriage to him. And she says 'yes'. And although we know what is in her heart, we are not very meticulous.#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title="_ednref3">[3]

Rabbi Ben Shimon is clearly not pleased with the significant discrepancy between the proselyte's declaration and her inner intention. However, he holds that the validity of her giyyur is not thereby impaired, as long as her verbal pronouncements conform to halakhic requirements and she accepts her liability for punishment if she transgresses any commandment.

Another scholar who identifies acceptance of commandments in the same way is Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uzziel.#_edn4" name="_ednref4" title="_ednref4">[4] He begins his discussion of this issue by noting that the Talmud holds that most proselytes will not observe the commandments after their giyyur. This is the assumption underlying the dictum: 'Proselytes are as hard for Israel [to endure] as a sore',#_edn5" name="_ednref5" title="_ednref5">[5] as understood by Rashi and Maimonides.#_edn6" name="_ednref6" title="_ednref6">[6] Uzziel therefore states:

Although we know that most proselytes do not observe the commandments after circumcision and immersion; nevertheless, they [the rabbis] did not refrain from accepting them because of that. Rather, they inform them about some of the harsher commandments, namely, the punishment for transgressing them, so that 'So that if he wants to withdraw - he can withdraw.' But if they do not withdraw, they are accepted, and each proselyte will be responsible for his [future] sin[s], and the people of Israel are not liable for his behaviour. All we have said, then, makes the following absolutely clear: if a proselyte has accepted the commandments and their punishment, then, even when it is known he will not observe them, he should be accepted after being notified about the lenient and harsher commandments, their reward and punishment.#_edn7" name="_ednref7" title="_ednref7">[7]

According to Rabbi Uzziel, the requirement that a proselyte should accept the commandments does not mean that he is required to commit himself to observe them. Rather, it means that he recognizes that after becoming a Jew, he will be under the jurisdiction of the halakhic system. Therefore, he alone will bear responsibility for the consequences of non-compliance. The proselyte's assumption of responsibility for the consequences of his giyyur enables the court to accept him without hesitation, even if the court has good reason to assume that after becoming a Jew he will not observe the commandments. This leads Rabbi Uzziel to conclude:

It follows, that according to Torah, we are allowed and commanded to accept male and female proselytes even when we know that they will not observe all the commandments... and if they do not observe the commandments, they will bear their sin and we are not liable. #_edn8" name="_ednref8" title="_ednref8">[8]

This view is also advocated by Rabbi Moshe HaCohen,#_edn9" name="_ednref9" title="_ednref9">[9] who writes concerning the possibility of accepting proselytes who would subsequently follow a secular lifestyle in Israel. He writes that prima facie it seems:

quite simple that he should not be accepted for giyyur, [because] the explicit halakhah in Bekhorot (30b) is: 'A proselyte who agrees to take upon himself all matters of Torah, excepting one thing, should not be accepted.'#_edn10" name="_ednref10" title="_ednref10">[10]

Yet, a detailed analysis of the meaning of the 'acceptance of the commandments' required from a proselyte led HaCohen to conclude that his prima facie analysis was incorrect, because:

[A]ccepting the commandments does not mean that he must commit himself to observe all the commandments. Rather, it means that he accepts all the commandments of the Torah in the sense that, if he transgresses, he will be liable for such punishment as he deserves... And if so, we do not care if at the time he accepts the commandments he intends to transgress a particular commandment and accept the punishment. This is not considered a flaw in his acceptance of the commandments.#_edn11" name="_ednref11" title="_ednref11">[11]

According to HaCohen, then, proselytes are required to acknowledge that after giyyur, the Torah's framework of reward and punishment will apply to them as it does to all Jews. Whoever agrees to this completely fulfils the halakhic requirement of acceptance of the commandments, even if in fact they subsequently fail to observe the commandments, and even if the court knew at the time of giyyur that they would act in such a manner.

In another Responsum, Rabbi HaCohen describes a fundamental problematic posed by the secular reality of Israeli society:

Many Jews married Gentile women after the Second World War and have fathered sons and daughters with them. According to the law, the children's status follows that of their Gentile mother [i.e. they are not Jewish]. When they come to Israel, the husband brings the children [to the court] for giyyur, sometimes with their mother and sometimes on their own. The trouble is that they reside in places in which the people do not observe the tradition: they eat forbidden foods and desecrate the Sabbath and the holidays. It is clear that after giyyur they will behave similarly to the Jews among whom they live, since it is almost impossible for them to be observant. #_edn12" name="_ednref12" title="_ednref12">[12]

Rabbi HaCohen explains that his interpretation of acceptance of the commandments as recognition of liability provides the grounds enabling giyyur in secular Israeli reality.#_edn13" name="_ednref13" title="_ednref13">[13]

Notes

#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title="_edn1">[1] Chief Rabbi of Cairo, 1891-1921 (died in 1929).

#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title="_edn2">[2] Rabbi Raphael Aharon Ben Shimon, Nehar Mitsrayim (Alexandria, Farag Hayyim Mizrahi, 1908), p. 113a.

#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title="_edn3">[3] Ibid.

#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title="_edn4">[4] Born in Jerusalem in 1880, he was Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Eretz Israel from 1939 until his death in 1953.

#_ednref5" name="_edn5" title="_edn5">[5] Yevamot 47b.

#_ednref6" name="_edn6" title="_edn6">[6] For Rashi see Yevamot ibid., s.v. de-amar mar. For Maimonides see Hilkhot Issurei Biah 13:18.

#_ednref7" name="_edn7" title="_edn7">[7] B.-Z. H. Uzziel, Mishpatei Uzziel (2nd edition, Jerusalem, 1950), Yoreh De'ah, Vol. 1, # 58, p. 205.

#_ednref8" name="_edn8" title="_edn8">[8] B.-Z. H. Uzziel, Mishpatei Uzziel, Even ha-‘Ezer, # 20; Piskei Uzziel B'shelot Hazman (Jerusalem, Mossad HaRav Kook, 1977), # 68.

#_ednref9" name="_edn9" title="_edn9">[9] Jerba 1906 - Israel, 1966. A leading rabbi in the community of Jerba, he immigrated to Israel in the 1950s and served as a dayyan (judge) in the rabbinical court of Tiberias.

#_ednref10" name="_edn10" title="_edn10">[10] M. Hacohen, Responsa Ve-Heshiv Moshe (Jerusalem, 1968), Yoreh De'ah, #50.

#_ednref11" name="_edn11" title="_edn11">[11] Ibid.

#_ednref12" name="_edn12" title="_edn12">[12] Ibid., # 51.

#_ednref13" name="_edn13" title="_edn13">[13] Rabbi HaCohen's position is further explicated in ch. 4 of Transforming Identity.

One of the great rabbinic sages of the 20th century was Rabbi Benzion Meir Hai Uziel (1880-1953). A profound scholar from a distinguished Sephardic rabbinical family, Rabbi Uziel served as Israel’s Sephardic Chief Rabbi from 1938 until his death in 1953.

He was a prolific author, having published many volumes of rabbinic responsa (Mishpetei Uziel), as well as studies in Jewish law and literature, rabbinic homiletics, and issues relating to contemporary Jewish life.
One of Rabbi Uziel’s areas of concern was the issue of conversion of non-Jews to Judaism. Since this issue continues to be a source of controversy in the Jewish community, it is important that we be aware of the intellectually sound, compassionate and inclusive views of Rabbi Uziel.

In 1943, Rabbi Uziel responded to a question from Rabbi Raphael Hayyim Saban, Chief Rabbi of Istanbul. (Mishpetei Uziel 5724, no. 18). Rabbi Saban inquired about the permissibility of conversion of a non-Jew whose primary intention for conversion was to marry a Jewish spouse. Rabbi Uziel noted that in the ideal case, a would-be convert should indeed be motivated by purely religious aspirations. Yet, we do not live in an ideal world. Intermarriage is a reality, and such marriages are recorded in civil courts. If we did not convert the non-Jewish spouse, then children from intermarriages would be lost to the Jewish people, and the Jewish partner in an intermarriage would be guilty of the sin of intermarriage. Rabbi Uziel ruled that if we are faced with a de facto mixed marriage, we are permitted to convert the non-Jewish spouse and, when applicable, the children. If this is true when the couple is already married, it is obviously true before they have begun a forbidden marriage relationship.

Rabbi Uziel argued that the rabbinic courts should not take the haughty position that it need not help such couples. On the contrary, he stated that not only may the rabbinic courts do such conversions, but they were morally obligated to do so in order to prevent intermarriage, and in order to ensure that children born from such unions will be raised as Jews.

In 1951, Rabbi Uziel wrote a responsum to Rabbi Yehudah Leon Calfon of Tetuan (Mishpetei Uziel 5724, no. 20) in which he argued that rabbinic courts should convert even those who did not intend to be fully observant of Jewish law and custom. Our responsibility is to inform would-be converts of the obligations of the Jewish religion; but there is no requirement that the converts promise to observe all the details of Judaism. A person may be accepted for conversion, even initially, even if he/she gives no indication that he/she will observe all the mitzvoth. “From all that has been stated and discussed, the ruling follows that it is permissible and a mitzvah to accept male and female converts even if it is known to us that they will not observe all the mitzvoth; because in the end, they will come to fulfill them. We are commanded to make this kind of opening for them. And if they do not fulfill the mitzvoth, they will bear their own iniquities and we are innocent.”

Rabbi Uziel’s attitude is reflected in another of his responsa (Mishpetei Uziel, 5698, no. 26): “It is incumbent upon us to open the door of repentance; our sages of blessed memory did much for the benefit of those who would repent….I admit without embarrassment that my heart is filled with trembling for every Jewish soul that is assimilated among the non-Jews. I feel in myself a duty and mitzvah to open a door to repentance and to save [Jews] from assimilation by invoking arguments for leniency. This is the way of Torah, in my humble opinion, and this is what I saw and received from my parents and teachers.”

If you would like to know more about the life and teachings of Rabbi Uziel, including an elaboration on his views on conversion, please go to our online store where you can order a copy of Rabbi Marc Angel’s book, “Loving Truth and Peace: The Grand Religious Worldview of Rabbi Benzion Uziel.”

“Rabbi, this is hard to talk about but…

…. our son has a non-Jewish
girlfriend.”

….I’m
feeling really shaky. My ex-husband abused me for years and now our daughter is
getting married. I don’t know if I can make it through the wedding.”

…either
that pervert leaves the community or I do. And I’m taking my family, my money
and my friends with me.”

From
the start of their careers, rabbis are bombarded with profound human dilemmas.
Congregants, friends, and even complete strangers ask them for help navigating
difficult religious and personal situations. The observant Jewish community
should be grateful for this phenomenon—we know that our mesorah, our religious tradition, has
guided generations before, and we hope, in this increasingly complex era, that
Jews turn to traditional sources of wisdom for counsel. The best community
rabbis have always been those who could make the transition from intellectual
scholarship to practical wisdom in real time and with real people. Steeped in halakha, such rabbis influence
Jewish life not only by answering the specifics of questions posed, but by
reaching beyond the manifest she’elot (halakhic questions) and
going to the emotional and psychological core of questions. Pastoral
arts of yesteryear were honed through mentorship and example. As is true in all
areas, some rabbis were more talented than others in the raw skills of
listening and advising.

The
contemporary rabbinate faces the challenges of an increasingly porous and
diverse society. Rigorous classical education in halakha remains bedrock. At
the same time, rabbinic training of today can benefit from training in
psychology and counseling. In this essay, I explain how Yeshivat Chovevei
Rabbinical School (YCT) prepares its students for pastoral counseling.
Interspersed throughout are several cases culled from real-life situations and
presented in a variety of settings. Please note that all identifying
information has been changed.

CASE #1
from “R. Shlomo,” a YCT musmakh and current
Hillel rabbi at Penn State University, wrote this email on YCT’s private
listserv in order to get feedback from colleagues and teachers.
Hi all
I hope everyone is good and enjoying their summer. I wish that I would have
been able to attend one of the summer retreats but we were working at camp
until yesterday.
Over the summer I fielded a question that I
would like to hear other people's input on. The phone call came from the mother
of a young man, a yeshiva high school graduate. He lives in the Harrisburg area. The son never attended Penn State but has a serious girlfriend who is a graduate student here. The
girlfriend is not Jewish. The mother, who is frantic, wants me to reach out to
the girlfriend to help convince her to convert (though she didn't put it so
explicitly). Neither the son nor the girlfriend is aware that the mother called
me.
At Penn State Hillel we have very little to do with graduate students, unless
they approach us. So regarding a non-Jewish grad student—I have absolutely no
reason to reach out to her.
Thanks,
Shlomo

Questions to consider:
This email query
raises several issues with which all rabbis are familiar. These include:
1.

How does the rabbi respond to the needs of distressed persons (in this
case, parents) who want the rabbi to act as their spokesperson when they feel
helpless, alienated, or otherwise unable to reach their loved one?

2.

How is pastoral counseling different over the phone, via email, or in
person? Given limited contact, how does a rabbi establish realistic goals?

3.

How does the rabbi balance religious/communal concerns with issues of
autonomy, privacy, and/or confidentiality?

4.

Should/how can a rabbi intervene in situations of inter-religious
dating?

My Response:
Hi “Shlomo,”

While I sympathize with the mother's
distress, her proposition is almost guaranteed to backfire and to alienate both
her son and the girlfriend. Rabbinic training is not suited for covert
religious operations, and unsolicited third-party interventions are very tricky.
But rabbis, especially campus rabbis, get requests such as this frequently—basically
“save my child (but I don't want him/her to know that I called you).”
I suggest that in this situation you call back the mother and tell her that you
have given the matter thought. You understand that her son’s serious
involvement with a non-Jewish woman is upsetting and you feel that the best
approach is for her to tell her son (and possibly the girlfriend if she has a
cordial relationship with her) that she wants to/has already called you. You
would then be available and open to meeting the young woman (who is the Penn
State
student) and the son. You could then explore the situation and take it from
there.

Let me know what happens.

Discussion

The original email involves Rabbi
Shlomo in a pastoral situation with several “congregants,” none of whom he
knows. They are the mother (and possibly the father by extension), her son, and
finally, the non-Jewish girlfriend who is the student at Penn State. Rabbi Shlomo understands that there is
much history behind the mother’s email and that there are many sides to the
current story. He is mindful of situations in his own past with relatives and
friends that involved interfaith relationships. Rabbi Shlomo’s awareness of the
painful feelings experienced in those personal situations help him empathize
with the current counseling situation and at the same time to maintain
professional boundaries. He might wonder if the parents have consulted with
their own rabbi. Rabbi Shlomo realizes that he can only make a limited
intervention.

I
encouraged Rabbi Shlomo to convey to the mother that he honors her concern and
that he is committed to Jewish continuity. At the same time, Rabbi Shlomo
should not carry out her strategy of contacting a student (the girlfriend), who
is not a member of Hillel and has not contacted him herself. Instead, he should
encourage the parents involved to directly express their distress to their son
and tell him that they want him and his girlfriend to meet with the Penn State rabbi. By offering his services once the
son or the girlfriend contact him, the rabbi conveys his respect for privacy
and confidentiality. Such an atmosphere of trust is more likely to facilitate
deeper discussion between them and the rabbi. Hopefully, this talk would evolve
over several in-person sessions and would include an exploration of the
couples’ relationship, their commitment to Judaism, and their mutual
expectations of the future. Only after time is spent constructing such a
dialogue can a significant conversation about conversion possibly begin.

YCT
makes pastoral counseling a mandatory course of study throughout all four years
of the program. The program rests on a three-part foundation: 1) didactic
instruction in the classroom, 2) practical experience in hospitals and rabbinic
internships, and 3) individual awareness through special group work and
supervision. Our goal is to prepare our graduate rabbis to listen to
congregants and/or students with rigor and compassion, to do competent basic
assessment by knowing what additional information is needed and tactfully
asking appropriate questions, and to bring the issue to resolution or refer the
congregant to a more expert resource.

Throughout,
we emphasize the sensitivity of the pastoral counseling encounter. Divulging
personal matters evokes powerful emotions on both sides. Rabbis need to be
aware of feelings and issues touched off within them and to monitor the
boundary between themselves and their congregants. Such awareness allows them to
chaperone the vulnerability and stigma congregants may experience.

The
didactic component of the YCT pastoral counseling program begins with a weekly
skill-building course in the first year. Through classroom instruction, reading
assignments, and role-play, students learn interview techniques. The students
explore challenges inherent in the rabbinic encounter—specifically, how to meld
the role of compassionate, non-judgmental listener with that of halakhic authority. The course
goes on to introduce classic signs and symptoms of emotional distress, such as
anxiety and depression, which rabbis are likely to come across in their
communities. Also covered are highly emotional personal and community
situations that rabbis more uniquely encounter. The psychology of ba’alei
teshuva and converts and the impact of trauma and catastrophe are but two
examples.

The
second year didactic curriculum is devoted to two pastoral areas that rabbis
deal with extensively—bikkur holim (visiting the sick) and marital and family counseling.
All of our students rotate through an intensive chaplaincy course run by
the Jewish Health Care Chaplaincy of New York. These hours are divided between
classroom instruction and hospital visits. Group sessions provide a forum for
students to discuss and process the powerful experiences evoked sitting by the
bedsides of ill and dying patients.

The
third- and fourth-year program blends counseling and practical halakha around a life-cycle
curriculum. We alternate didactics with fieldwork experience. We start with
parenthood as a development. We consider issues such as the impact of having a
disabled child and the spiritual life of young children. Other topics further
along the life cycle include adolescence, dating, courtship, and the creation
of mature intimate relationships. Pre-marital counseling is a priority; we
expect that prior to serving as mesader kiddushin at a wedding, a YCT
rabbi has spent several sessions with the couple helping them prepare for
marriage. The challenges of non-traditional individual and family life as
experienced by older singles, widowed, divorced, and homosexual persons are
discussed. Class time is allocated for infertility, adoption, infidelity, and
domestic violence. Aging, end-of-life issues, and involvement of caregivers
create increasingly complex questions in our society. While not all areas can
be covered, the goal is to give the students a basic comfort in the halakhic parameters and broad
psychological issues of major practical topics.

Fieldwork
offers a range of opportunities. Students discuss the pastoral counseling
component of their rabbinic internships in a seminar. In addition they elect
rotations through prisons, specialized hospital units, retreats for Jewish
alcoholics, and support groups.

CASE #2

a series of phone conversations between
“Rabbi Stone” (RS) in Florida
and me (MF)

Conversation #1

RS: There's a woman, Chana, who is about 47
years old and who recently left an abusive marriage. She lived here in Miami
years ago and has maintained a few close friends in the community. Chana is
temporarily living with Nancy and Jack, who are terrific people. She moved to
my community this past summer and she is doing somewhat better, but her friends
are concerned because Chana will sometimes say things like “I don't know if I
will be around in two weeks,” implying that she may commit suicide.

I think
that this may be severe depression. Nancy told
me that Chana wakes up in the middle of the night frightened about a
recipe that she is preparing for the next night, because she is worried about
missing an ingredient, and she'll stand over the kitchen table all night.
Chana’s husband used to severely criticize her cooking. Nancy
suspects that he also hit Chana.

I have only known Chana for
the past two months. She usually comes to shul Shabbos day, but hardly
talks. She rarely smiles or shows other emotion, but she recently started
coming to some of the Torah classes that I offer at the shul. I notice
that she is looking haggard and not too well groomed.

MF: This really sounds like a psychiatric
crisis—hospitalization might be warranted. But getting her to a good
psychiatrist is the critical first step. Find out from Chana if there is a
mental health professional already in the picture. If so, ask permission to
contact him/her. If she has no psychiatric care, you need to help her get some.

Conversation #2, a few days later

RS: Your last impression was on point. Chana
had no therapists or doctors, so I found two psychiatrists by calling the local
UJA/Federation office and also asking the other rabbi in town. When I called
Chana and her friend to give them the doctors’ names and numbers they told
me that Chana is already in the hospital! To make a long story short, last
night, when Nancy and Jack were asleep, Chana left the house and walked to the
hospital in the middle of the pouring rain. She left the door wide open to the
house, but left a message on Nancy and Jack’s phone that she couldn’t get back
in, so she's going to the hospital. She's currently in the hospital being
evaluated in the psychiatric ward.

MF: What a story. Thank God that even in her
impaired state the woman had the right idea—to go to a hospital. Your support
and competence continue to be invaluable to this woman. Great work.

RS: Thank you. At this point, I’m kind of
worried about Nancy and Jack. This is a huge responsibility for them. I doubt
they expected any of this when they offered their home to Chana. How much can
they be expected to do?

MF: You are wise to be thinking of them.
Supporting the caregivers is always a key factor. It can be quite impressive
how people will rise to occasions of human need. It can also be disappointing.
But your staying in close touch with Jack and Nancy
has already and will continue to mean a great deal to them. You are recognizing
and validating their effort as well as giving them practical advice.

Conversation #3, the next day

RS: I spoke to Nancy
today. Chana is doing okay in the hospital. I asked if she would like me to
visit, but Nancy
said that Chana is so embarrassed and ashamed that she doesn't want anyone to
know. I asked Nancy
to tell Chana that there is nothing to be ashamed about and that she did
the right thing by going to the hospital.

MF: Try calling Chana directly. Tell her the
same thing, how wise and protective it was of her to go to the hospital—you
admire her instincts, even in her distressed state she knew to do the right
thing. Ask her if you might drop by for ten minutes, take it from there.
Mitigating shame is the most important thing here. Self-respect and honor are
the most important ingredients in helping this woman stay in the long-term
treatment that she needs.

Conversation #4, a few months later

RS: You remember that woman we spoke about in
the winter? She has been doing much better. She has her own apartment, is
working part-time and volunteering. The problem is now that her daughter is
getting married in London
and Chana is feeling really shaky. She asked me what her religious obligations
are vis-a-vis attending the simha.
The thought of being in the presence of so many people, in an unfamiliar place,
and in such close proximity to her ex-husband terrifies her. How can I help
her?

MF: First, sit down with Chana and go through
all the events involved in the wedding. This will establish some order and then
you can work from there as to what she can reasonably tolerate. Will there be
an aufruf, for example? What about
the wedding itself—who is doing the planning? What do Chana’s daughter and her
fiancé expect? What about sheva berakhot?
The more you can help Chana anticipate the major components of the event, the
more she can make a plan as to her attendance and participation in the wedding
events. This will give her a sense of control. It will also be very helpful to
make sure that Chana has a relative or friend that she can count on for support
during what is sure to be a challenging event. Are Nancy and Jack able to
attend and be with Chana? Finally, check in that Chana has discussed all of
this with her therapist/doctor. You can ask if she is on medication and if
there is some kind of contingency plan if her anxiety or depression flares.

Discussion

Acute emotional distress is not
subtle. However, in order to recognize states such as depression or severe
panic, a rabbi has to be familiar with key signs and symptoms of these
syndromes. This does not mean that he should attempt to treat the congregant
himself. He can help a vulnerable person who might be too ashamed or
disorganized to get needed professional care. Rabbi Stone’s attention to
Chana’s appearance as well as the alarming comments reported by her friends
mobilized his concern. While her own alarming behavior actually got her to the
hospital, the rabbi’s steadfast involvement with Chana and her friends
established ongoing trust. Support of caregiver(s) is a key component of a
longer-term picture, as is follow-up over time. The rabbi needs to check in,
even with a brief chat or quick phone call, to let congregants know that he
cares and is available for consultation. Similarly, the rabbi needs to have
trusted mentors with whom he can reveal his own uncertainty and get advice.
Hopefully, his own rabbis and
teachers will be such advisors. Classmates from yeshiva as well as local clergy
who also grapple with complex pastoral matters might also be persons with whom
a rabbi can talk through such situations.

Practice and judgment are needed to
figure out what a congregant is asking when he or she poses a religious
question to a rabbi. In Chana’s case, she had not discussed her massive anxiety
regarding her daughter’s wedding with her hospital assigned outpatient
psychiatrist who she saw once a month. Instead, she sought out Rabbi Stone and
asked him a “rabbinic” question. Because of the respect and trust built
earlier, Rabbi Stone could intervene in a situation that threatened to
destabilize Chana’s fragile mental health.

In addition to class and
experiential learning, YCT incorporates a unique forum for personal
development—the process group. One of the most difficult challenges for rabbis
is the inherent loneliness of the profession. In order to be effective, rabbis
need to be simultaneously available, charismatic, and slightly separate from
their congregants.
Negotiating these boundaries requires preparation. We believe that the process
group experiences help our students encounter these issues individually while
also strengthening the bonds of trust and support between their fellow
students. Every week, throughout the entire program, each student class meets
with a process group leader, a mental health professional who makes a
commitment to work with that group for the full four years. Discussions of the
process group are entirely confidential between leaders and students. They may
explore personal, academic, religious, or any other issues that they choose. The
process group is a template for life outside the yeshiva. Undoubtedly, tension
and confrontation between group members occurs. The students need to learn how
to mediate moments of crisis in the process group and how to live with
conflicts that cannot be resolved. These skills will serve them well in their
future work as community rabbis.

Based
on the enthusiasm that the rabbinical students have for their process groups,
we provide a monthly support group for spouses. The yeshiva realizes that the
role of the rabbi’s wife is
complex. Women come from varied personal and professional backgrounds. They
anticipate different degrees of engagement in their husband’s work. The support
group, facilitated by a rebbetzin who is also a mental health
professional, allows study and exploration of these issues.

CASE #3

YCT pastoral counseling class discussion
of the following vignette

A prominent congregant,
Max, comes to speak with Rabbi Smith, who took over the synagogue a few months
earlier. Several weeks ago, another congregant, Dr. Paul, a surgeon, returned
to the community after serving six months in prison for sexual impropriety with
younger female patients. Dr. Paul is in court-mandated psychotherapy and has a
parole officer. During Dr. Paul’s prison term, his wife attended shul rarely,
but their two children came to groups and are students in the local day school.

Max demands that Dr. Paul
be ejected from the kehilla. He
states that Dr. Paul is a danger to the community. Max’s tone gets belligerent
as he threatens to switch his membership and his very generous building fund
pledge to the other synagogue in town. He hints that some of his friends may go
with him.

Students reacted
to the vignette in many ways:

Student #1: Max is out of bounds. While Dr. Paul’s
offense is reprehensible, he has been tried and convicted, and he served his
sentence. I would want to make sure that Dr. Paul has no contact with shul
youth, but neither he nor his family should be barred from the synagogue.

Student #2: I wonder if Max or anyone in his family
was ever abused? Do you know if Max used Dr. Paul or anyone in his family used
Dr. Paul for their own medical care? Perhaps Rabbi Smith can ask a few
questions to try and understand where Max’s outrage is coming from.

Student #3: You both have good points. But I can also
understand the rabbi’s anxiety. I feel kind of sick myself at the thought of
seeing this guy back in shul. Certainly
many people in the community are very uncomfortable with a convicted molester
returning to the community. How does Rabbi Smith model teshuva in this painful situation? Also, how does he deal with his
own concerns about finances if key supporters pull out?

Student #4: I’m thinking about the teshuva issue. Shouldn’t Rabbi Smith be
meeting with Dr. Paul to talk about all these things? Should he have visited
Dr. Paul in prison? Has Rabbi Smith developed any rapport with the Paul family?
Has there been any attempt at apology by Dr. Paul or restitution to his former
patients or their families? How are Mrs. Paul and their children doing? Given
the situation, should Mrs. Smith, the rabbi’s wife, be the one to reach out to
Mrs. Paul?

Student #5: This may not be the main point, but
assuming that Dr. Paul stays in the community, does he get any kibbudim (community honors)? Let’s say he used to be a leader in
his synagogue or his son is having a
bar mitzvah in the next few months….

Discussion

All of the points raised by students
in class discussion are valid. Criminal behaviors, especially sexual or violent
offenses, shake the foundations of any community, especially a religious
community. Most of us believe that religious life makes better people, or at
least safeguards us against certain kinds of violations. Integrating an
offender back into community life is a significant challenge. Whether a rabbi
was present throughout the whole episode, or came in new, as in the case of
Rabbi Smith, he needs to meet with key constituents. These include Dr. Paul,
the Paul family, and any other people who request rabbinic counseling. Such
members may have been victimized by Dr. Paul or have other experience with
sexual trauma. Although Rabbi Smith respects the confidentiality of individuals
involved, the overall scenario is known to the larger community.

As
Dr. Paul’s return to the community is sure to elicit discomfort, if not
outright protest as in the case of Max, Rabbi Smith would do well to meet with
several involved synagogue members to anticipate and plan for larger reaction.

The rabbi’s grasp of individual and
group dynamics is key. Rabbi Smith’s understanding of the tensions and
vulnerabilities inherent in the Max/Dr. Paul situation allow him to formulate a
clear plan for which the rabbi can mobilize support.

Building
a comprehensive pastoral counseling program requires commitment of precious
academic time and financial resources. Even more, it calls for flexibility of
mind and tolerance. Today’s Jewish world desperately needs learned rabbis who
can reach kehillot through involvement in the day-to-day challenges of
living. Pastoral counseling is thus a building block in the foundation of Yeshivat Chovevei Torah Rabbinical School. We hope that semikha preparation
elsewhere seeks to prepare graduates for these challenges, and we look forward
to collaborative efforts in the service of all Jewish communities.

            The rabbis depict our forebears Abraham and Sarah spreading the knowledge of Hashem far and wide. Some formulations of this idea actually use the verb gayyer (=to convert).^[2] Moreover, the Talmud ascribes to God, no less, the designation of the partriarchs as “those who first made Me known in the world” and to Israel the claim “we have made Thee known in the world”.^[3] But why marshall texts to demonstrate the obvious: Torah and Talmud mostly^[4] see Israel as having received the Torah that they might be its torch-bearers. Thus in rabbinic tradition welcoming gere sedeq (=righteous converts) into the covenant is deemed to be a misvah.^[5] So giyyoor being a misvah giyyoor was sacrosanct. Or at least so we thought.

            Then early last year news broke of men and women who had converted to Judaism under the auspices of respected Israeli rabbis and were now being declared gentiles. The initial perplexity that greeted the news turned into disbelief as reports began to speak of conversions anulled in the hundreds and thousands by Israel’s supreme rabbinic court. Eventually we managed to procure a copy of that court’s decision that allegedly set in motion the overturning of conversions. The following is the picture as it emerges from the pages of that document.

            It all begins in Ashdod when a couple appears before the local rabbinic court seeking a divorce. The court informs the couple that it is impossible to get divorced unless one was first married. Jewish law, it explains, does not recognize marriage between a Jew and a gentile. And because the woman is a gentile, the court does not look upon them as husband and wife. Having lived in the belief that she was Jewish ever since her conversion many years prior, the woman is flabbergasted. She appeals to the supreme rabbinic court in Jerusalem. On February 2^nd, 2008, that august body issues its reasoned pesaq in a 53 page document that essentially upholds the Ashdod ruling.

            The Beth Din’s Pesaq of February 2008 (hereafter BDP) is problematic in at least three areas. First, it makes assertions that are inconsistent with the facts. For example, it states that all the posqeem (=halakhic decisors) throughout the generations have ruled conversion retroactively invalid if the convert fails to live up to his/her commitments. When we consult the posqeem - whether it be Rambam,^[6] Tur,^[7] or Shulhan Arukh^[8] to mention three of the most eminent - we find them saying the exact opposite. Indeed, there seems to be only a single dissenting rishon, namely the author of Hagahot Mordecai.^[9] Now in order to appreciate the Hagahot Mordecai’s position we need to recall the talmudic passage from which he claims to derive the idea of retroactively invalid giyyoor. The Mishnah at Yebamoth 24b reads:

A man who was alleged to have had relations with ... a non-Jewish woman and she later converted he shall not marry [the woman]. If, however, he married her they shall not be separated. If a man was alleged to have had relations with a married woman and she was subsequently divorced, then even if they went ahead and married they shall be separated.

The convert of this Mishnah is one whose motives for conversion cannot help but raise doubts. Nevertheless, in ruling that “if married they shall not be separated”, the Mishnah implies the conversion to be valid. But can this implication be correct when it would seem to contradict another tannaic source? That is what the Gemara wants to know, and it begins by citing the counter source.

Surely we have learnt in a Baraitha: Whether it is a man who converts for the sake of a woman or a woman for the sake of a man; whether the person converts for the sake of the royal table or to be employed by Solomon - none of these are converts according to R. Nehemiah. For R. Nehemiah would say: those who convert for fear of lions; those who convert on the prompting of a dream; those who converted in the days of Mordecai and Esther - none of these are converts ...

Inasmuch as he invalidates conversions undertaken for less than the purest motives, R. Nehemiah is irreconcilable with our Mishnah - or rather with the inference the Gemara had drawn from it. So ought that initial inference to be rejected? No, says the Gemara, because apropos of this very issue R. Yitzhak bar Shemuel bar Marta transmitted in the name of Rav that the law is KE-DIBRE HA-OMER (=according to the one who says) ‘They are all converts’ (Yeb. ibid.).

            Now Rav (d. around 250) having bestraddled the tannaic and amoraic eras, is allowed to dispute a tanna^[10] - a licence not granted other amoraim. However, it is not on the strength of his quasi-tannaic status that Rav rules here at Yeb. 24b, but rather does he side with the anonymous tanna who disagreed with R. Nehemiah and “says ‘They are all converts’”. Hence the Gemara’s original inference is vindicated; for though it places our Mishnah at odds with R. Nehemiah, it keeps it in line with the tanna cited and seconded by Rav. And it is the decision of Rav (which the Gemara identifies as consistent with the Mishnah) that post talmudic halakhists follow almost to a man. But as noted earlier, there is a dissenter: Hagahot Mordecai.

Although the Talmud rules there [at Yeb. 24b] that they are all full proselytes, we could say that it refers only to cases where we see them rectifying their ways even if their initial motive was marriage etc. ...^[11] I prefer this interpretation to the alternative which would posit an amora [i.e. Rav] ruling not in accordance with the baraitha of R. Nehemiah. Moreover, the undisputed baraitha [cited Yeb. ibid.] that says no converts were accepted in the days of David and Solomon [for fear of ulterior motives] supports us.^[12] What I have written here is my own opinion, not what I received from my teachers; and my understanding should not be relied upon.

            One has to wonder whether Hagahot Mordecai had the words KE-DIBRE HA-OMER in his copy of the Talmud. Be that as may, there is nothing anomalous about a halakhist relying upon a variant reading of the Talmud. Similarly, halakhists will occasionally argue for following a da‘at yaheed (=minority opinion). However, what is so disconcerting about BDP is its insistence that the exceptional view of Hagahot Mordecai is shared by all posqeem throughout the generations.^[13]

            The second bone we have to pick with BDP is over its ad hominem slurs. Stooping to the level of personal attacks is usually a sign of desperation. How else to explain its ploy of declaring venerable members of named Israeli judiciaries to be resha‘eem? And classifying people resha‘eem is tantamount to impugning their credentials to act as witnesses - and by analogy also as judges.^[14] The prohibition to accept the testimony of a rasha‘ is derived from Scripture, as explained by the Talmud and conveniently codified by Rambam:

“Resha‘eem [=unjust or guilty persons; felons] are disqualified from giving testimony as it says [Exod 23:1] ‘You shall not make common cause with a rasha‘ to be a witness of hamas. Tradition understands this scripture to be saying ‘Do not let a rasha‘ be a witness’.” (Yad, Edut 10:1)

Proclaiming a dayyan (= judge of a rabbinic court; plural: dayyaneem) a rasha‘ is a grave matter and one would expect to learn which court of law convicted him and on what count. Instead BDP arrogates to itself the authority of ruling fellow dayyaneem resha‘eem without even hearing the men’s defence. If that were not egregious enough, the primary charge it cites against the dayyaneem rests on the following circular reasoning. Conversion requires a beth din (see Yeb.46b). Since they are resha‘eem, their court is no court, and consequently the people they convert remain gentiles. The Torah pronounces a curse on anyone who leads a blind person astray (Deut 27:18 cf. Lev 19:14). In making the people they convert believe themselves to have become Jews when in fact they are still gentiles, they are guilty of the sin of leading the blind astray.^[15] Hence such dayyaneem fall into the category of resha‘eem.

            Additional charges bandied about by BDP include: 1) forgery, 2) heresy and 3) brazenly disparaging Torah. The forgery charge alleges that the rasha‘ judge signed conversion certificates presided over by dayyaneem other than himself. Now these types of certificates begin with the formulaic opening be-mothab telatha ka-hada (= the three of us sat in judgment etc.) - because it is the same three judges who form the converting beth din that also go on to sign the certificate. Needless to say, a judge who did not personally sit on the court cannot lawfully put his name to such a document. But that, alleges BDP, is precisely what the ‘delinquent’ dayyan went and did. If true, nobody would dispute the impropriety of such behavior. However, the Talmud lays down a principle sheluho shel adam ke-motho.^[16] Of course misvot she-begufo i.e. duties that demand personal involvement cannot be deputized; and signing a document that claims its signatories were party to the transaction described in that document is surely such a duty. Yet it is conceivable that a senior judge might, albeit mistakenly, think of his trusted juniors as emissaries. Furthermore, unlike a bill of divorce or even a marriage contract, a giyyoor certificate has no halakhic function whatsoever. It is granted merely to serve the convert as ready proof in the future when facing bureaucracies and the like. All in all then, the forgery indictment seems a stretch.

            The heresy charge (levelled originally by the Ashdod court but cited approvingly by BDP) is even more baffling. The actual term used is epiqoros - which in popular parlance is generic for heretic. The Talmud, however, defines the epithet more narrowly. The tenth chapter of Mishnah Sanhedrin^[17] lists reprobates who forfeit their share in the world to come. One of them is the epiqoros. And it is in the course of expounding the Mishnah that the Gemara records the following definitions.

Rav and R. Haninah both say he [the epiqoros] is somebody who insults a Torah scholar. R. Yohanan and R. Yehoshua b. Levi say he is somebody who insults his fellow in the presence of a Torah scholar. Now those who classify the epiqoros as somebody who insults his fellow in the presence of a Torah scholar, the one who insults the scholar himself they classify as megalleh paneem ba-torah shelo ka-halakhah (= a brazen disparager of Torah). But for those who define epiqoros as one who insults the scholar himself, what kind of person is the megalleh paneem ba-torah? He is somebody like Manasseh son of Hezekiah^[18] (San. 99b).

Since BDP does not elaborate, one cannot be sure which definition of epiqoros it has in mind. On reflection, though, it is probably the vernacular meaning since it would be rich beyond belief for BDP to accuse another of disparaging a Torah scholar! More substantively, what is the point of BDP branding the dayyan of its disfavor an epiqoros?

            It will be recalled that, based on Exodus 23:1, resha‘eem are disqualified from giving testimony. Besides rasha‘, Exodus 23:1 contains another operative word: hamas.^[19] The Talmud (San. 27a) records a dispute between Abayye and Rava as to whether or not hamas modifies rasha‘. Rava holds that the word hamas modifies rasha‘; hence anti-social behavior is prerequisite for witness disqualification. For Abayye, on the other hand, even non-hamas wrongdoing (e.g. ritual delinquency that is a matter between a person and God), is sufficient to lose a witness his credibility. Thus Abbaye would disqualify not only a mumar le-te’avon^[20] but also a mumar le-hakh‘ees. But even according to Abbaye a person is disqualified to testify by virtue of wrong action. Yes; wrong action, not unorthodox thought. Yet Rambam, writes:

“Informers and epiqorseen ... ^[21] the Sages had no need to name in their list of people unfit to give evidence because they listed only Jewish miscreants. But such rebellious infidels are worse than idolaters...” (Yad Edut 11:10)

There is nothing odd about the inclusion of informers because their guilt yesh bo ma‘aseh (=involves action)^[22] and is consequently ascertainable (and where appropriate punishable) by a human tribunal. But the appearance of heretics, whose fate the Mishnah leaves to divine judgment, is striking.^[23] Nevertheless, by means of an ingenious a fortiori argument of Rambam’s own devising, heresy is made a crime for courts to discover and to act upon - in this case invalidating the testimony of such that are found to be heretics.

            By dragging in heretics Rambam breaks new ground. Magistrates on the watch for heresy are a far cry from the Talmud’s standards of objectivity, and, what is more, seem dangerously close to the murky realm of inquisitions and thought police. So the question is, Why would Rambam have introduced this drastic innovation? We know it was not conformity to the Talmud that impelled him, because the Talmud never mentions heretics in connection with testimony. Moreover, as we saw, Rambam makes no secret of the fact that heretics transpired as a result of his own extrapolation. Something other than the Talmud, then, must have impelled Rambam to bring up heretics. In any event, once epiqorseen are blacklisted and Rambam’s ruling is adopted by later codes, declaring someone an epiqoros immediately impugns his eligibility to testify or to adjudicate. Hence, in levelling its heresy charge, BDP aims to undermine the authority of its targeted beth din.

            The related aspersion megalleh paneem ba-torah shelo ka-halakhah (again, borrowed and endorsed by BDP p.4) is meant to inculpate the dayyan in question with insulting scholars (rather than imitating Manasseh - see San. 99b cited above).^[24] If you ask ‘which scholars? What insult?’ BDP has its answer pat. We have already met BDP’s assertion that ‘all the posqeem throughout the generations have ruled conversion retroactively invalid if the convert fails to live up to his/her commitments’. That being BDP’s premise, it follows as night follows day, that to flout such a unanimous ruling of halakhists down the ages is nothing short of brazen effrontery.

            Finally, BDP’s gravest imputation of all: the ‘rogue’ beth din failed to elicit qabbalat misvot^[25] from those it purported to convert. Now qabbalat misvot is an integral component of giyyoor and in the opinion of many posqeem it is also a sine qua non. That any beth din could skip qabbalat misvot seems incredible. Yet that is what happened according to the allegation repeated over and over in BDP.^[26]

POSTSCRIPT

            What are we supposed to make of this document and its extraordinary contentions? Manifestly the 53 page screed is animated by more than sober halakhic logic; dare one say by something akin to polemical zeal? But whereas the written word has a life of its own and must be judged on its merits, people should always be given the benefit of the doubt. Indeed, because of the imperative to judge men charitably,^[27] one wants to try and extenuate that zeal. Clues within BDP suggest that recent tendencies towards a politicization of giyyoor may have raised its authors’ hackles.^[28]

            For there is no denying the attempt in certain quarters to fuse the ideas of nationality and divinity in a manner redolent of the old Baalism. What follows is an example of this phenomenon.      

From the Rambam’s words we learn that candidates for conversion must express their wish to join, simultaneously, both the people of Israel and its Torah. ‘Entering the covenant’ [in Rambam’s formulation, Issure Bi‘ah 13:4] refers to the congregation of Israel that consists of children of the covenant. ‘Taking shelter under the Shekhinah’s wings’ [Rambam’s formulation ibid.] means living as a member of the Jewish religion ... The requirement to express this twofold identification with the Jewish nation as well as with its God and Torah, was learnt by our sages of blessed memory from Ruth the Moabitess. When seeking to impress her mother-in-law Naomi of her [Ruth’s] spiritual and practical preparedness to cast her lot with Judaism, Ruth speaks the words “... Your people is my people and your God is my God”. The equal emphasis on the people and its God as the objects of [the convert’s] adoptive identity clearly demonstrates that the religion and the nationhood are a single indivisible entity in Judaism ... Clearly, then, already in such an early era [as Ruth’s], conversion was conceived of as a procedure simultaneously both religious and national, whose elements are inseperable.” (Mi Hu Yehudi? by Avner Shaki, vol. 2 Jerusalem 1978 p. 343).

Shaki’s enunciation of the nation-divinity amalgam would not merit citation were it not that he invokes Scripture, Sages and Maimonides in support. But seeing that he does, it behooves us to examine these sources’ alleged espousal of ‘Shakian dualism’. Ruth’s “Your people” we shall consider shortly. As for the unsubstantiated claim that the sages deduced from Ruth “a twofold identification with the Jewish nation as well as with its God and Torah” we are unable to comment upon, since no source is indicated.^[29] Rambam certainly mentions covenant: “Similarly throughout the generations, when a non-Jew wishes to enter the covenant and take shelter under the Shekhinah’s wings...”. The only question is whether Rambam was using the phrase ‘entering the covenant’ as shorthand for joining the polity of the children of the covenant. Rambam’s classic commentators refer us to a baraitha in Keritot that mandates all subsequent conversions to reenact, as it were, the conversion leading up to the Sinai/Horeb covenant.^[30]

Ribbi [Judah the Partriach] says as with your forefathers so with [proselytes] throughout your generations. Just as your forefathers did not enter into the [Sinaitic] covenant except through circumcision, immersion and propitiation by means of blood [sacrifice] neither shall they enter the covenant except through circumcision, immersion and propitiation by means of blood [sacrifice] (Ker. 9a).

            The covenant Rambam alludes to is the very one under discussion in Keritot; which, in turn, is the Torah’s covenant mediated by Moses between God and the people who were to become the covenantal community. In other words, the pledge made at Sinai as understood by tradition was to God rather than to a group of human beings. Hence, the proselyte’s entering into the covenant, modelled on the Sinai prototype, is about the neophyte’s commitment to God rather than to a group that Shaki calls ‘children of the covenant’.

            Needless to say, among Jews who take their faith seriously, equating a person’s political choices with his/her choice to ‘enter under the shekhinah’s wings’ must seem to border on the sacriligious. Without belittling one iota tribal and national allegiances, they are surely of a different order from the plighting of one’s troth to Hashem. Moreover, the Talmud categorically forbids associating the Name of Heaven with anything else.^[31] Hence the extreme unease that attempts such as Shaki’s to politicize giyyoor engender in the bosom of many a Torah-oriented Jew who ponders Scriptures such as 2Kgs 17:26-28.

It was reported to the king of Assyria saying ‘The peoples that you deported and settled in the cities of Samaria do not know the law of the god of the land and he sent among them lions that are devouring them because they know not the law of the god of the land’. The king of Assyria gave orders that one of the priests who had been deported from there should be sent back in order to teach them the law of the god of the land. So one of the priests who had been exiled from Samaria came back and dwelt in Bethel and taught them how to fear Hashem.

Two irreconcilable voices speak to us in these verses. The first is the voice of paganism whose gods are territorial, each presiding over his/her national borders. Then in verse 28 we hear the Torah’s voice, that instead of the idolatrous ‘god of the land’, speaks of fearing Hashem. A closely related pagan concept to the territorial, is the national god that is essentially an apotheosis of a people and its collective identity and aspirations. Naomi recognizes the nation-god nexus of Moabite religion when she says to Ruth ‘Behold your sister-in-law has gone back to her people and to her gods’ (Ruth 1:15). Perhaps Ruth was projecting some such Moabite territorial theology onto Hashem when she responded ‘Your people shall be my people and your God my God’ (v. 16).^[32]

            But even if one shares BDP’s dismay at the way politics has come to invade and dilute giyyoor (and other aspects of religion), it is quite another proposition to condone the methodology it employs to counter the lamentable trend (assuming such trends to be BDP’s driving gripe). Besides, even a cause worthy in the abstract, has to yield if it leads to real people suffering. This was the way of our Sages who opened a back-door for gereem gerureem when conventional giyyoor was inapplicable.^[33] They even offered a halfway conversion whereby a person attained the status of ger toshav (as distinct from ger sedeq). Ger toshav is not a mere synonym for Noahide. No. The ger toshav formally forswore idolatry and accepted faith in Hashem and belief in revelation.^[34] Withal, never did the Sages say let idolaters stew in their idolatry. Today, when the ger toshav option has fallen into desuetude, extra vigilance is called for. Not so much in order to catch and keep out ‘rotten apples’ (though that too), but to ensure that no seeker after Hashem is left out in the cold.

[1]      See Job 31:32, and especially its midrashic interpretations (e.g. Exod. Rab. 19:4).

[2]      See, for example, Targum Yonathan to Gen 12:5.

[3]      Men.53a.

[4]      The word ‘mostly’ is used advisedly because some - notably priests whose status was inherited - seem to have conceived of Jewishness as also being hereditary. The Talmud suggests that there were priests who looked askance upon both converts and conversion (see Mihnah Rosh Hash. 1:7; Yom. 71b et al).

[5]      Yeb. 47b.

[6]      Issure Bi‘ah 13:17.

[7]      Yore De‘ah 268 end.

[8]      Yore De‘ah 268:12.

[9]      The author of the glosses known as Hagahot Mordecai remains elusive. R. Hayim Yoseph Daveed Azulai (HYDA d.1806) surmizes that he lived a century or so after R. Mordecai b. Hillel ha-Kohen (d. 1298) whose work he glossates.

[10]    See Erub. 50b, Ket. 8a, Git. 38b, San. 83b.

[11]    These words of the Hagahot imply that if the convert’s subsequent behavior does not exhibit “rectitude of ways”, then the conversion is retroactively null and void.

[12]    Since it does not address the be-de‘abad (=post factum) situation, it is unclear how the David-Solomon baraitha supports R. Nehemia. On the contrary, had the David-Solomon baraitha emanated from the school of R. Nehemiah we know how it would have been worded. For at Yeb. 76a-b we learn the reason converts were not accepted in the halcyon days of David and his son “because their motive is likely to have been the royal table”. And conversion undertaken with an eye on the royal board is invalidated by R. Nehemia even be-de‘abad : “whether the person converts for the sake of the royal table or to be employed by Solomon - none of these are converts”.

[13]    More than a century ago when R. Yitzhak Schmelkes chose to follow the Hagahot Mordecai he did not dissimulate his own predilection for the tentative proposal of Hagahot Mordecai. Rather did R. Schmelkes opt for full disclosure: “Although he [Hagahot Mordecai] wrote that his understanding was not to be relied on, we rely upon his understanding” (Beth Yitzhak vol. Yore De‘ah responsum 100 [p.86]).

[14]    Actually a judge’s moral qualifications are spelled out in the Torah (see Exod 18:21; Deut 1:13, 16:18). Nevertheless for a ruling to be anulled on grounds of the judge’s unfitness, there would have to be evidence of resha‘ .

[15]    BDP devotes five pages (7-12) to lifne ivver (= the sin of misleading the blind).

[16]    Literally ‘one’s proxy is like oneself’. As a legal concept it means that a person can appoint a shaliah (=proxy) to deputize on his/her behalf in carrying out non-personal duties. The Talmud provides numerous examples such as priests offering sacrifices on behalf of the laity; tithing; effecting betrothal by conveying the medium of betrothal from a man to his destined bride; most familiar, perhaps, is the shaliah sibboor or precentor who recites the prayers on behalf of the congregation (see Qid. 41b-42a et al.).

[17]    In many editions it appears as the eleventh chapter.

[18]    Described earlier on San. 99b as a man who would use his sermons to mock Torah: Did Moses have nothing better to write than ‘Lotan’s sister was Timna’ (Gen 36:22)? or ‘Timna was a concubine to Eliphaz’ (Gen 36:12)? or ‘Reuben went in harvest time and found mandrakes’ (Gen 30:14)?

[19]    Hamas is often translated violence. Rabbinic sources render some occurrences of hamas ‘robbery’ or ‘armed robbery’ (see Targums and Rashi to Gen 6:13). At San. 27a the rasha‘ of hamas is defined as someone who in the act of transgressing misvot causes material harm also to fellow humans - which definition embraces also venal folks who will do anything for lucre.

[20]    Literally ‘a renegade out of expediency [or for pleasure]’ e.g. a person who eats non-kosher food because it is cheaper than kosher (see Rashi San. 27a s.v. h”g mumar okhel nevelot le-te’avon).

[21]    In many printed editions the text continues “and mumars”. Others omit mumars (see Lehem Mishneh ad loc.). The editio princeps (Rome 1480) instead of mumars has “sectarians (minin) and apostates (meshumadin).

[22]    Or at least treacherous speech. While some reckon speech as ‘action’, according to all tannaim wrong thought is outside the purview of the courts (see San. 65a-b et al).

[23]    Especially when we recall Rambam’s own definitions of epiqorseen as persons guilty not of wrong speech but of heterodox opinions (even if they happen to verbalize those opinions). “There are three that are called epiqorseen: 1) the person who denies prophecy and the possibility of knowledge reaching the human heart from the Creator; 2) one who denies the prophecy of Moses our teacher; 3) one who says the Creator has no knowledge of the affairs of man. Each of these is an epiqoros” (Yad, Teshubah 3:8 and see Kesef Mishneh’s comment ad loc.).

[24]    Both the long form megalleh paneem ba-torah shelo ka-halakhah and the short megalleh paneem ba-torah occur at San. 99b and are used there interchangeably, as we saw. At Avot 3:11 most MSS have the short form whereas printed editions typically the long. Incidentally, the dispute over the definition of megalleh paneem seems not to have been resolved; hardly surprising seeing that there are no ramifications for earthly bate din. Thus Rashi explains the megalleh paneem of Avot with reference to Manasseh, while Rambam identifies the megalleh as one who brazenly and ostentatiously defies Torah.

[25]    Literally: acceptance of misvot. The requirement for the prospective ger to express his/her acceptance after being apprised of the liabilities as well as the privileges inherent in Judaism is laid down in the baraitha.“They acquaint him with some of the easier misvot and some of the heavier misvot; they acquaint him with the sin of [neglecting] to leave behind for the poor fallen or forgotten sheaves or the ‘corner’ and of [neglecting] to give the tithe of the poor. Furthermore... they say to him ‘hitherto if you ate suet you were not liable for kareth; if you desecrated the Sabbath you were not liable for seqilah but henceforth you will be liable’... And just as they acquaint him with the punishments for [breaking] misvot similarly do they acquaint him with their [the misvot’s] rewards. They say to him ‘Know that the world-to-come is reserved for the righteous, but Israel at present is unable to receive (le-qabbel) either great good or great travail’. They do not burden him with more [words] or with stringencies. If he ACCEPTS, he is circumcised forthwith...” (Yeb. 47a-b).

[26]    “The woman bringing the appeal did not accept observance of misvot” (p.1); “qabbalat misvot did not occur in the case of the appellant” (p.3); “an additional transgression is their declaring a non-Jew who did not accept to observe the misvot of Hashem’s Torah... to be a Jew” (p.7) etc.

[27]    Avot 1:6.

[28]    E.g. “The conversion of [a certain] deaf-mute will not bring her to a state of misvah observance... The only possible consequence of the conversion would be a social one - something that neither constitutes conversion nor bestows any zekhut (=spiritual advantage)...” ( p.19); “There is certainly no misvah upon a beth din or any other Israelite to make efforts to bring non-Jews into the Israelite fold [sic] - a fortiori when the person’s only attachment will be of a national kind and not an attachment to the God of Israel and the Torah of Israel.” (p.20); “Despite what was said, national or social goals must not be recognized ... they see themselves belonging to the Jewish people only in the national-social sense without any inward religious connection ...” (p.21) etc.

[29]    If anything, the Talmud would seem to invest Ruth’s ostensibly national ‘Your people' clause with religious significance. “She [Naomi] said to her ...‘We have 613 commandments’. She [Ruth] replied ‘Your people is my people...’” (Yeb. 47b).

[30]    Rabbinic sources typically consider the Hebrews to have had the status of Noahides prior to the giving of the Torah (see, for example, Rashi at San. 82a “It was prior to Sinai that Moses had married Jethro’s daughter, all at that time having the status of Noahides. When the Torah was given they all, she [Jethro’s daughter] as well as proselytes of the mixed multitude included, entered into full misvah-hood”).

[31]    Suk. 45b, San. 63a.

[32]    Boaz, while applauding both, separates her commitment to God (Ruth 2:12) from her national and familial loyalties (v. 11). Moreover, the distinctive phrase la-hasot tahat kenafaim (taking refuge or shelter under wings) Scripture uses exclusively of the relationship between an individual and Hashem (cf. Ps 36:8, 57:2, 91:4).

[33]    See Yeb. 79a, Avod Zar. 3b, 24a; Yerushalmi Qid. 65c, San. 23d.

[34]    “The person who accepts them [the seven misvot] is called a ger toshav; but the acceptance must be solemnized in the presence of three haberim [that constitute a beth din]. Whoever accepts the seven misvot and is careful to keep them behold he is of the pious among the nations and has a share in the world-to-come. That is provided he accepts them and does them because Hashem commanded them in the Torah...” (Yad, Melakim 8:10-11; cf. Issure Bi‘ah 14:7).