National Scholar Updates

Parashat Ki Tavo and Rosh HaShana: A Chance to Renew

Parashat Ki Tavo and Rosh HaShana: A Chance to Renew

By: Jake Nussbaum

(Jake Nussbaum, a student at Yeshiva College, is summer student intern of our Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals.)

Rav Mordechai Machlis, a Rabbi at Yeshivat Lev Hatorah, spoke about the value of renewal in Judaism, particularly within the context of Rosh Hodesh, the beginning of a new month. The word “hodesh” has the root of “hadash,” meaning new. He also spoke of renewal everyday, every week and every year. Each Kabbalat Shabbat,  we chant the words  (Psalms 96:1 and 98:1) “Sing to the Lord a new song.” The question is: what is the new song we sing on Shabbat? We are singing the same songs to the Lord as on every Shabbat of our lives! Rav Machlis explains that we don't sing a new song of different words, rather we sing the same words with a different fervor, a different concentration. The Baal Shem Tov said that if your prayer today is the exact same as your prayer yesterday, then you didn't really pray today. Although the prayers one says are going to have just about all the same words every day, the important thing is to build upon the prayers of the past, or to focus on one aspect that has been lacking. 

This week’s Parasha, Parashat Ki Tavo, opens with the Mitzvah of Bikkurim, the obligation to take the first fruits from the seven species of the Land of Israel and bring them to offer on the altar to Hashem. The Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah 606) writes that the reason for this mitzvah is that it is important for a farmer to be reminded that the success of his crops comes from Hashem, not himself. Every year, when it comes time to bring the bikkurim, the farmer will think of how blessed he was in the past year. The purpose of the mitzvah is to entrench a constant renewal of appreciation for Hashem.

Rabbi Daniel Hartstein, a Rabbi at Lev HaTorah, quoted Rav Avraham Pam Z’l,  who pointed out the contemporary relevance of this Mitzvah even if we are not farmers and even if there is no Beit Hamikdash. The Torah presents the statement the farmer was to make when offering the Bikkurim. This statement reviewed the history of Israel, and how God redeemed us from years of servitude in Egypt. The lesson: review Jewish history, be grateful that we now have a renewed Jewish State of Israel.

Nowadays, we have a tremendous blessing to be able to visit Israel in mere hours, while for generations the journey was long and treacherous. The obvious upside is that so many more Jews have a chance to visit our homeland with little inconvenience. However, the easier something is to achieve, the harder it is to appreciate. The Mitzvah of Bikkurim reminds us of the challenges the Israelites went through to reach the promised land even after being driven out of Egypt. All the more so should we appreciate our return to the land sworn to our forefathers after centuries of exile! What the Mitzvah of Bikkurim offers us each and every year is to renew our inspiration and thankfulness to Hashem for the blessings and opportunities we have been given.

It is no coincidence that this Mitzvah is read in the Torah two weeks before Rosh HaShanah, the special time of renewal. Every year, we are faced with the challenge of finding a new way to bring in the year. This could be picking a Mitzvah to focus on deeply during the coming year; it could be setting out to learn something new. Whether big or small, accepting upon oneself something before Rosh Hashanah can make saying the same selihot and prayers “a new song to the Lord.” With the Mitzvah of Bikkurim on our mind, may we be blessed to renew our inspiration for serving Hashem in the coming year and to make sure to constantly try to “Sing to the Lord a new song".

My life in Rhodes during World War II

 

 

            Rhodes is a Greek Island in the Aegean Sea that was occupied by Italy from 1912 until 1943. Those years of occupation included many of the years of World War II and the reign of Benito Mussolini. I was born in Rhodes on September 23, 1938. My family on my father’s (Daniel Turiel) side had lived in Rhodes for many years as part of the Jewish Sephardic community there. My mother (Mathilde Nahum Turiel) was from the Sephardic community in Izmir, Turkey, where she grew up. She moved to Rhodes when she married, but she maintained her Turkish citizenship. We lived in the Jewish section located in the old city of Rhodes, which is surrounded by medieval walls.

            During my early childhood years Rhodes was occupied by Italy, with a substantial number of soldiers stationed there. As a young child, I was not very aware of the military presence or the existence of a broader war in much of the rest of the world. I recall that I had a regular childhood with my parents and older brother, as well as with friends. I have memories of a bicycle kept in our home that I often rode in the streets.

 

However, I was also aware and made afraid by the regular bombings of the island by the British, usually from ships off the shore of Rhodes. Typically, the air raid sirens would sound, and we would then go to the ground floor of our house that provided some protection and wait for the bombings to end. I do vividly remember an incident that actually saved me from having surgery. Because of an intense stomachache our family doctor came to examine me. He concluded that I had appendicitis and told us to go to the hospital to have my appendix removed. Just then, the air raid sirens sounded, and we had to go directly to the shelter. By the time the air raid was finished, my stomach pain was gone. The doctor concluded that I did not have appendicitis, and to this day I still have my appendix.

 

Events in Rhodes began to change dramatically in January of 1943 when German soldiers and the Gestapo came to Rhodes. By September of 1943, they had displaced the Italians from the island after a brief battle. The number and ferocity of the bombings increased at that time. I recall an attack, coming with no warning, when a bomb hit the house across our house while we were having lunch on the first day of Passover. The bombing caused a great deal of damage to property and life. I recall walking through the streets in the ruble looking for a cousin who had disappeared. His body was never found. Eventually, it was presumed that he had died and been buried deep in the streets.

 

Because of the intensity of the bombings, my parents decided we would move to a farmhouse a few kilometers from the city. We were away from bombings in the few months we lived there. It all ended abruptly one day in July of 1944. On that day, my mother had taken my brother and me shopping at a store near the farm. We returned to learn that German authorities had taken my father away. We did not know why or where he was taken. We went back to town right away to learn that all the Jewish men had been placed into a government building for reasons or fates unknown. The German authorities rapidly announced that all the women and children were required to report to the same building on July 19th. It was also announced that if families did not report, their husbands would be killed.

 

My mother prepared for the three of us to report on that day. As we were on the way, Mr. Selahattin Ulkumen, the young Turkish Counsel on Rhodes, made his presence. He told my mother, as well as other women also holding Turkish citizenship, to return to their homes while he would confront the German authorities.

 

Apparently, he argued with the Germans that all Turkish citizens, as well as their spouses, were under his protection. He insisted that all the Turkish citizens must be allowed to be free and that their husbands too had to be released from detention. The Germans reluctantly agreed to his demands – probably because they wanted Turkey to remain neutral in the war. Mr. Ulkumen presented the Germans a list of persons under his protection that included a number of names of people who were not actually Turkish; the Germans disallowed those names. My father was then released.

 

A total of 42 people, including my family, were saved by the heroic actions of Mr. Ulkumen. The rest of the Jewish people (over 1700) were moved on July 23rd to the port in Rhodes, placed on ships for mainland Greece, and then taken by train to the Auschwitz concentration camp. Many suffered greatly on the way in the boats or trains, and some died. Only a small number survived Auschwitz.

 

After the deportation of the other Jewish people, we remained in Rhodes with the intention to leave for Marmaris as soon as possible since we did not feel safe there. In the Fall of 1944, we attempted to go to Marmaris on a large rowboat. Soon after leaving Rhodes, there was a leak in the boat and we had to return to Rhodes. We were not able to finally leave until January of 1945 when, with some of the other survivors, we took a large motorized boat to Marmaris in winter weather with rough seas and we experienced a good deal of sea sickness.

 

We did arrive safely in Marmaris, where we all slept on cots in a large room. Although it was not very comfortable, we were very glad to finally be in the welcoming confines of Turkish land. Soon after my mother, brother and I, as Turkish citizens, went to Izmir to join my mother’s family. It took two months for my father to obtain the necessary documents to be able to join us in Izmir. We lived in Izmir in happy circumstances until July of 1946 when we took a ship to New York City where we were admitted as immigrants because my father’s brothers had established residency earlier during World War II. My brother and I had our names “Americanized” – his from Boaz to Bernard and mine from Eliachim to Elliot.

 

My father went into business with his brothers. My brother and I went through the public schools in New York, and then went to University. My brother went to Law School and had a long and successful career as a lawyer. I obtained a Ph.D. in psychology and have taught at universities since 1966. I have been a professor at the University of California, Berkeley since 1980.

 

B’nai B’rith in New York and Yad Vashem in Jerusalem have deservedly recognized Mr. Ulkumen’s actions that directly saved those 42 lives. My mother was able to attend both ceremonies and became reconnected with Mr. Ulkumen. I did not have an opportunity to meet him, but I did on more than one occasion meet his son, Mehmet, who for many years was the Chief of Protocol for the United Nations. Turkey is a country I feel I know well, having visited many times since 1962.

Rav Kook and His View on the Modernization Of Judaism

Rabbi Abraham Yitzhak ha-Cohen Kook (1865–1935) is, without doubt, one of the most celebrated rabbis of the twentieth century. He is known to most people simply as Rav Kook, the founder of Religious Zionism, and we frequently overlook the fact that the foundations of his teachings reflect a deep modernization of the Jewish faith itself and of its approach to an array of contemporary problems.

To discuss the religious approach to the role of the Jewish people and the State of Israel in today’s world, we must turn to the ideas of Rav Kook who saw Zionism in a religious light. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, Zionism was not seen as an aspect of Judaism. In fact, it contradicted Judaism in many ways, and occasionally even came into sharp conflict with some of Judaism’s conceptions.

Despite these contradictions, Rav Kook not only “supported” Zionism, as did many rabbis, but he also formulated Zionism in religious terms. Furthermore, he demonstrated Zionism’s importance for the development and deepening of Judaism. We will examine how Rav Kook’s conception of Zionism shaped a more profound form of Judaism.

The central idea of monotheism is that God created humankind in His likeness. The individual is the image of God, and our entire life is a dialogue with Him. All of our actions are the words we speak to God, and everything that happens to us is His answer to us. Rav Kook’s main philosophical concept is that the Jewish understanding of life as a dialogue with God has not one but two central themes: a dialogue on an individual level and a dialogue at the national level, i.e. a dialogue between God and the Nation.

The religious significance of the State of Israel is that its very creation compels the Jewish people to act as a single entity. Zionism and the creation of the State of Israel bring the Jewish people back into a full dialogue with God.

Rav Kook was a poet by nature, not a university professor. Thus, he believed that mysteries are explained only by other mysteries. This approach makes a systematic study of Rav Kook’s philosophy difficult. In the following article, we will attempt to outline Rav Kook’s philosophy in more concrete terms.

1. A Step in the Development of Judaism

According to Rav Kook, one vital step in the evolution of Judaism is the revival of those sparks of Divine light that have hitherto been lost, or that were insufficiently realized in the process of historical development. It must be noted that the outline presented below represents a simplification of Rav Kook’s views. It is described in more detail in his article, “The War of Ideas and Faiths” (Orot, p. 129; see also Shemona Kevatzim 1:16).

The central problem Rav Kook faced was the wave of Jewish souls leaving Judaism for various ideological movements alien to it. This wave was particularly strong in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when many deserted yeshivas closed their doors and Jewish youth turned en mass to secular Zionism, socialism, or other “isms.” According to the mainstream Orthodox view, these departing youths were “lost and mistaken,” the problem was thought to lie

in them—they were not taught correctly, they did not fully understand their traditions, and so forth. Thus, the task of religious leadership was to influence these souls through explanation and teaching so that they would return to Judaism.

It was at this moment that Rav Kook proposed an entirely different approach to the problem. According to him, the reason Jews were rejecting the Torah lay not only in the error of their ways, but also in the flaws of the modern religious world—in Judaism as it existed at the time. In order to bring about the return to Judaism of those who had fled, it was necessary not to drag them back to the Judaism that they had rejected, but to correct the defects within Judaism itself. Then those Jewish souls would gradually return of their own accord to the renewed Judaism of tomorrow. In other words, Rav Kook regarded the exodus of Jews from Judaism as an indicator of the presence of flaws in Judaism; furthermore, he saw it as a sign that the time was ripe for correcting these defects and believed that social/historical circumstances required that we do so without delay.

Basing his approach on Kabbalah, Rav Kook maintained that if a large number of Jews rushed to a particular ideology under the banner of morality and virtue, this meant that despite its apparent distance from Judaism, or even hostility to it, that ideology must contain a spark of Divine light. The anti-religious appearance of this alien ideology would merely be its shell, which fed off the energy of the spark inside. It is that spark, not the shell, that attracts the souls of those who turn away from Judaism, as Jewish souls, on the whole, are drawn to good and reach for it innately. Furthermore, the “breach”—the spontaneous, morally grounded mass movement of the Jewish people—is itself an indicator of the ripeness of the spark, a sign that it is time for its activation.

2. The Teaching of Rav Kook as Torat haKelal, Teaching for the Entire Nation
Of course, Rav Kook did not believe that every Jew is an entirely upright person, who strives for good in every deed. We know perfectly well that among Jews there are plenty of fools and criminals. However, when a large group of Jews leave their tradition for another ideology, we see not the rejection of the Torah by an individual Jew, but a socially significant movement. Such a movement is always accompanied by a sense of moral righteousness declared and subjectively felt by its participants. Without this sense, a social movement cannot develop.

Rav Kook believed that a human sense of morality, which is the manifestation of God in the individual, is the world’s driving force. Therefore, he viewed a spontaneous, morally grounded social movement by the Jewish people as a definitive manifestation of the role of the Jews as the chosen people—even though the form that this manifestation takes might directly contradict the directives of the Torah—and held that we must, in the end, view the situation as “hitgalut Elokim,” the revelation of the Divine.

Thus, Rav Kook’s teaching is a Torat haKelal, a teaching of national unity, viewing the Jewish people as an integral whole, capable only as a single entity of bringing the Torah to the world, and seeing disparate groups within the Jewish people as essential parts of the whole.

3. Flaws in Judaism and the Process of their Correction
Continuing our analysis of the outline for Judaism’s development, it is important to note that the ideas presented so far—that inside every shell are concealed sparks of holiness and Divine light, that the shell feeds off the energy of this spark, and that Jewish souls carry within themselves—the role of the chosen and the attraction to good—do not constitute the unique and truly revolutionary teaching of Rav Kook, as all of these ideas have been stated and discussed many times in Kabbalah and in Chassidism.

The true revolution in thinking put forth by Rav Kook lies in the proposition that this situation arises due not only to the attraction of the sparks, but, above all, to a defect in Judaism as it exists, evidenced in the lack or insufficient activity of a given spark within it.

The process of activating the spark involves several stages. The first step is to extract the sparks from the shell (see Shemona Kevatzim 1:71, also p. 63, passage 9). Guided by our Divine moral intuition, we must explore and determine the precise nature of the Divine spark that is drawing masses of Jewish souls to a particular ideology. To do this, it is necessary not only to approach the views of those who have joined the new ideology or movement with extreme respect and deep attention, but also to demonstrate genuine sympathy for the “ism” itself.

In the language of Kabbalah, we must feel the Divine spark locked within the foreign ideology. Clearly, in order to extract the spark from any specific “ism,” it is necessary, while staying within the framework of Judaism, to show sympathy toward the “ism,” as sympathy and empathy are the first steps toward understanding. But any individual religious person may not sympathize with every ideology. Some may simply be too deeply repulsive to him or her. This merely shows that this person is not equipped to extract the spark of Divine light from those particular “isms.” Rather, that person must work with those ideologies that he finds himself naturally in accord with, as only in them he or she will be able to find the spark of Divine light. It is impossible for any one person to sense the sparks in all “isms,” and it is wrong to attempt to spread oneself so thin. Every person must focus on what is genuinely close to his or her Divine soul.
At this stage, those who, in the course of their lives, have spent time near to or even within the foreign ideology being examined may play an especially important role. In particular, when Western values are integrated into Judaism—or, to put it more precisely and formally, when those sparks of Divine light that nourish the values of contemporary Western culture are revived within Judaism—an important role must be played both by Jews from Western countries and by Jews from Russia, who have been educated in the crucible of totalitarianism and communism.

The process of identifying the Divine sparks in secular ideologies is only the beginning of our work since, as stated above, we cannot integrate that spark into Judaism directly. Such a heavy-handed transplant would lead to a rejection of the tissue, which could even result in the death of the entire organism. Therefore, unlike Reform Judaism, which swallows the spark whole from the other teachings and so takes in with it elements of shell that radically contradict the Jewish approach and tradition, the Modern Orthodoxy of Rav Kook strives before all else to find this spark’s native, authentic manifestation in Judaism. Orthodoxy must seek out the spark and its true Jewish form in the fundamental tenets of Judaism—that is, in the complete and ideal Judaism, encompassing all the ideas contained in all of its texts and oral traditions. To do this work, one must not only be an expert in Torah, Halakha, and Aggadah, but one must also have the particular wisdom to sense behind the traditionally expressed formulations the deep contemporary content that accurately reflects their Divine light while resonating in today’s world.

Next, the given spark must be cultivated within a renewed Judaism. The process of the cultivation of sparks is carried out in our model through modern Judaism, as it does not alter the existing, historically formed Judaism, but supplements and corrects it. (See for example, Midot HaRe’aya, Emuna (Faith) 28.) The concept presented here is not Reformism, which is associated with the abolition of ritual commandments, but Modern Orthodoxy, in which a process of development is continually taking place alongside the preservation of tradition. Judaism loses nothing, but only increases.

Rav Yochanan Fried, who studied at Mercaz HaRav in the seventies, gives an example of this complementary kind of learning. He once received a letter which related how two Mercaz HaRav students, Yochanan Fried and Hanan Porat, were invited by Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook to the Ein Harod Kibbutz to participate in a discussion on “What does the youth do in its free time.” When their turn came to speak their mind, they said, “Yeshiva students don’t have free time. Therefore, we don’t have this kind of problem. Yeshiva students are above all this—we study Torah continuously and don’t have time for recreation.” As a result of their words, an hour-and-a-half long discussion evolved, at the end of which a women sitting at the end of the hall stood up and asked, “If you are so great, what can you learn from us?” When Rav Tzvi Yehuda later heard about the question, he asked the students, “What did you answer her?” When they responded that they didn’t answer anything, he criticized them. “Be ashamed of yourselves! You traveled all the way to Ein Harod and didn’t learn anything about love of the land and about hard work? You didn’t learn anything from the wonderful relationships that exist between members of Ein Harod?” This encounter gave rise to a correspondence between Rav Tzvi Yehuda and Hanan Porat, who published his letters in his book Et Ahai Anohi Mevakesh (first published as Et Anat Anohi Mevakesh).

As a result of the activation of the spark, the defect in Judaism is corrected, and Judaism takes a new developmental step. In place of the existing Judaism of today comes the Judaism of tomorrow. Furthermore, because the spark whose light had been attracting the souls who left in process is now restored and active within Judaism, these souls begin to return to Judaism (see Shemona Kevatzim 8:51).

Of course, we do not in any way mean to say that those who will return to Judaism are the very same people who earlier left it. The step in development described here occurs over the course of several decades, and those who have left have left. At the individual level, a return to Judaism is possible at any moment; but the return of a whole generation is impossible without the restoration of that spark that gives life to the new ideology and that triggered the exodus from Judaism in the first place—a process that must ripen over many decades. Finally, people with “kindred souls” to those who left earlier now return, as they are the souls attracted to this particular spark—but this takes place two to four generations. In other words, it is their spiritual grandchildren and great grandchildren.

4. Example 1: The Integration of Sparks from Zionism
We will now use examples to illustrate how this model functions in practice.
For the first example, we will examine a fairly simple “ism,” with regard to which the above model has been fully carried out from beginning to end: secular Zionism.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, “Judaism” and “Zionism” were not only contradictory, but in many ways hostile to one another. The first heralds of Zionism were religious (Rav Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer, Rav Yehuda Ben Shlomo Chai Alkalai, and others) but they did not succeed in creating a mass movement. The Zionist mass movement sprang up in the twentieth century and was mostly secular. At that time, the slogan of secular Zionism was “we will become a nation like all others.” This entailed, in particular, the abandonment of religious principles as a basis for Jewish self-identification in favor of a civil-national identity. Because of this, many rabbis condemned secular Zionism as an attempt to destroy the Torah and traditional Judaism.

Under these circumstances, Rav Kook took an entirely different position. He maintained that we should not berate secular Zionism for being outwardly wrong, that is, for straying from the Jewish heritage, the Torah, and God. His method was not to focus on the outward defects of Zionism, but to seek out its inner truth, to find its Divine spark and then, to correct the existing Judaism accordingly by integrating into it the spark that had attracted Jewish souls to secular Zionism. As Rav Kook writes,
The nefesh [that is, the lower part of the soul in kabbalistic tradition] of sinners of Israel in the “footsteps of Messiah”—those who join lovingly the causes of the Jewish people, Land of Israel and the national revival—is more corrected than the nefesh of the perfect believers of Israel who lack the advantage of the essential feeling for the good of the people and the building of the nation and land. But the ruah [that is, the higher part of the soul] is much more corrected in the God-fearing and Torah observant… The tikkun [correction] will come about through the “Light of Messiah”… Israel should bond together, and the nefesh of the observant will be corrected by the perfection of nefesh of the better transgressors, in regard to communal affairs, and material and spiritual ideals attained to human understanding and perception. Whereas the ruah of these transgressors will be corrected by the influence of the God-fearing, observant and great of faith. And thereby both groups will receive Great Light… The higher tsaddikim, masters of neshama [the third and highest part of soul] will be the uniting conduits, through which the light of the nefesh will flow from left to right, and the light of the ruah from right to left…This will be accomplished through the light of Messiah, who is David himself, who erected the yoke of teshuvah. For the sake of David, Your servant, do not rebuff Your Messiah.” (Arfilei Tohar, § 21, published also in Orot, Orot HaTehiya 51)

The situation was somewhat simplified by the fact that this spark consisted of the desire to resurrect a full and authentic Jewish national life in the land of Israel. Not only does this ideology not contradict Judaism, as many mistakenly believed at the beginning of the twentieth century, but, on the contrary, it is an essential condition for Judaism’s further existence and development. Therefore, Rav Kook focused on the study of those sources in Judaism that address the religious significance of Jews coming back to their Land [See, for example, Orot HaTehiya 8]. In his articles and books, he conducted a thorough and deep analysis of these sources, and he made this analysis the central component of his educational program at the Zionist “world-wide Yeshiva” (Merkaz haRav) that he founded. After his death, Rav Kook’s students, and especially his son, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, brought up a new generation of rabbis and religious activists at that yeshiva, for whom Zionism—the claiming of the Land of Israel and active participation in its government—was an integral part of the living Judaism that they studied, taught, and abided by. Graduates of the yeshiva Merkaz haRav transmitted the same active contemporary Zionist spirit to their students and to the religious circles they influenced.

Since this teaching was in keeping with the times, it began to spread far and wide. All of this took place as an undercurrent over the course of nearly half a century, from the 1920s to the 1970s. And when, after the Six Day War (1967) and especially after the Yom Kippur War (1973), the question of creating Jewish settlements in the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza came up, the tens of thousands of students of Rav Kook’s school, united in the movement Gush Emunim, were the driving force behind the new wave of Zionism.

In other words, in the 1970s and 1980s, the religious Zionists—that is, the adherents of Modern Orthodoxy, Rav Kook’s school—became the leading Zionist group in the country. The perceptions of society were transformed: People’s ideas of “Zionism” and “Judaism” ceased to contradict one another and drew closer. The struggle for the settlement of the Land of Israel by Jews took on a religious character far different from the anti-religious character it had had at the beginning of the twentieth century. As a result, those who had a Zionist soul, who cared about Jewish settlement in Israel, began to draw closer to Judaism, rather than to distance themselves from it. One could say that in the late twentieth century, Zionism “returned” to Judaism the souls that it had “borrowed” at the beginning of the century.

As a result of all of these processes, the right wing of Israeli society (that is, people who seek to settle and claim all of the territory of the Land of Israel) is today significantly closer to religious values than the left wing. This distinction is so strong that the expression “religious right” has become a stock phrase in the Israeli political lexicon. In the 1920s, it was the opposite—those concerned with the settlement of Israel were significantly farther from religion than those who were indifferent to the issue. In this way Judaism has completed a step in its development, having extracted a spark from secular Zionism. A side-effect of drawing “Zionist souls” to religion was, in particular, that hardly any such souls remained on the atheist side; this has led to the fact that today secularism is most often associated with a rejection of Zionism, or “post-Zionism.”

5. Example 2: The Integration of Sparks from Atheism
We will now examine a different example, one that may appear shocking at first, but that nevertheless fits within Rav Kook’s overall model for approaching secular ideologies (see, for example, Orot Hakodesh 3, Musar Hakodesh, pp. 125–127, 129.) Specifically, we will apply the system described above to atheism. We will attempt to carry out the process of extracting a spark of Divine light and furthering the development of Judaism by means of atheism.

Rav Kook writes,

Atheism displays the power of life. Therefore, the real spiritual heroes extract sparks of great kindness from their atheism and turn its bitterness into sweetness. (Arfilei Tohar, § 120)

The destructive wind of disbelief will purify all the filth that gathered in the lower realm of the spirit of faith... all will grow in purity and strength, in supernal holiness, from the firm, pure exalted kernel, which no negativity can affect. Its light will shine as a new light upon Zion with a wondrous greatness. (Shemona Kevatzim 1:476, Orot haTehiyah, ch. 51, p. 199)

Atheism, according to our model, fully qualifies as an outside “ism.” It stands in opposition to Judaism, it displays the banner of rejection of religion, yet Jews join its ranks in significant numbers, proclaiming its morality and worth.

Because in Rav Kook’s time atheism was actively growing and attracting supporters,
Rav Kook devoted a significant amount of attention to its analysis in his works (for example, Midot HaRe’aya, Emuna (Faith), pp. 27–28; Orot Ha’Emuna, Kfira (Heresy), p. 84). As always in his approach to a foreign ideology, Rav Kook did not focus on a critique of atheism’s mistakes, its rejection of God and tradition, and so forth. This would have been trivial, and it was attended to at the time by much of the religious establishment. Rather, he attempted to understand where the deep attraction of atheism lay, what was in it that drew Jewish souls, and how Judaism needed to evolve so that, instead of leaving, souls of this type would find their rightful place in it.
What is the “spiritual core” of atheism, its Divine spark? In order to find this, we can ask the following question: From where do members of this group derive pride? For pride reveals the correlation between our achievements and our Divine spirit. We take pride in those achievements that gladden our Divine spirit, seeing them as truly worthy. In other words, the point of pride of any ideology signals what must be culled from it, as it is the root of the attraction of the Divine soul. This, therefore, is where we must seek out the concealed spark.

In what, then, do atheists take pride, specifically as atheists? Of course, I am not speaking here of those atheists who have never given either religion or atheism a serious thought, and who were simply taught to be atheists. Any movement has fools in plenty; we must not focus on these, but on those who think for themselves. We speak here of real atheists—intelligent, thinking, and active. In what do they take pride as atheists? Based on my own acquaintance with atheists and their books, I believe that the atheist prides himself on being a doubting, critically thinking person. The atheist says: “You, the religious, merely believe. But I doubt. I cannot unquestioningly accept all of this. I am a skeptic.” It is not for nothing that a conversion to atheism in Israel is called hazarah beShe’ela, literally, a “return to the question” (as opposed to coming to religion, which is traditionally known as hazarah beTeshuva, or “return to the return,” which can also be read as “return to the answer.”) With this formulation, atheists establish themselves in opposition: “You, the religious, have the answer (teshuva)—but we have the question (she’ela). This is their source of pride, that they “have the question.” We are not discussing simple questions, of course, such as what is or is not kosher, but the fundamental and eternal questions of existence. The atheist stresses: “You are attracted to answers, we to questions.”

Thus, the true atheist has skepticism as his or her core conviction and declares him or herself to be a critical thinker who has unanswered questions to which no one can have ready answers. Is this core of atheism attractive? Picture two teachers, one who says, “Come to me. I have answers for everything,” and one who says, “Come to me. I have questions and doubts for every problem.” Which of them seems more spiritually advanced? Whose lectures would you wish to attend? The skeptic’s, of course. We know that there are no ready answers to the truly complicated questions. We also know that answers are very often superficial and questions much deeper. Therefore, if one says that he has answers, and the other that he has questions, we will, of course, go to the one who has questions.

By means of this analysis, with the help of our own religious intuition, we have found the spark of Divine light in atheism. Our intuition clearly confirms that questions and doubts are a great thing, and that in them there lies the source of atheism’s spiritual attraction.

Does this component—unanswerable questions—exist within Judaism? Clearly, in Judaism as it existed 100 to 200 years ago, the emphasis was primarily on the “answers.” Today, unfortunately, within the popular, rather primitive Judaism with which certain demagogues try to “capture” the masses, the stress is also frequently placed on the answers. But if we are deeply convinced of the religious importance of unanswerable questions, then let us look to ideal Judaism and try to find out where within it the central questions and doubts lie.

The first thing that comes to mind is the book of Job. Job is a righteous and good man, yet he is showered with misfortunes: the destruction of his possessions, the death of his loved ones. And so, three of his friends come to him, and after the period of silent mourning, they begin to ask: Where is justice in the world? Why does the righteous man suffer? Job’s friends offer highly reasonable explanations, but Job rejects them all, telling his friends that they are wrong, that they understand nothing. The discussion continues for the length of the book, about 40 chapters. At the end of the book a voice rings out from the heavens, saying to the three men, “Ye have not spoken of Me the thing that is right, as My servant Job hath.” (Job 42:7)

In other words, the Book of Job concludes by telling us that there is in principle no answer to these essential questions. The question of justice remains open. It is necessary to seek an answer, but one must never assume one has found it.
Thus, we have an example from a book from Tanakh that clearly states that there can be no answer to this and, apparently, to many other fundamental questions. Another such book is Ecclesiastes (Kohelet). And although this book ends with the words “fear God… for this is the whole man(Ecclesiastes 12:13) which can be seen as an “answer,” the entire book in essence tells us that answers to real existential questions do not exist. This is one more typical instance in Judaism of the “unanswerable question.” One must admit that had the books of Job and Ecclesiastes consisted of a collection of answers about the meaning of life, the Tanakh would have been greatly impoverished.

However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this aspect of doubt was not a developed area within existing Judaism. Its spiritual leaders considered doubt to be a flaw and discouraged their followers from discussing questions that sowed it. They were to stay inside and never venture out. The leaders feared that one of their flocks might leave—yet many did flee Judaism because those spiritual leaders were unable to reveal its inner potential to address adequately the problems of the times. The leaders discouraged the reading of certain books, but people read them and turned away from Judaism and its lack of tolerance for doubt.

We have found the Divine spark in atheism, and we determined that that spark was not realized in existing Judaism, which feared doubt to the point that the thirst for it became a force for the spread of atheism. Our next steps are to develop within Judaism the spark of doubt that we have discovered in its roots, so strongly that it will shine more brightly there than it does in atheism.

The following conception formulated by Rav Kook provides us with a roadmap for revealing the spark of doubt in Judaism. He tells us that any faith that lacks doubt is not an ideal faith. On the contrary, belief without doubt is primitive and simplistic [See for example, Shemona Kevatzim 1, 36; Orot, Zir’onim 5]: Doubts are an integral part of true faith. As the Divine is by its very essence eternal, and all things human are, by their essence, temporal and finite, including all of our thoughts, ideas, and reasoning about God, our understanding of God cannot, in principle, be correct.

But what are we to do, if we are finite and temporal? How can we at least draw closer to the eternal Divine, come to understand even partially? At the very least, we must doubt everything we think about the Divine, for when the finite being feels his limitations and doubts himself, he becomes “less finite,” some potential of the infinite appears within him. If we are sure of ourselves and do not doubt, then our finite and temporal conceptions of the Divine become “even more finite,” moving further from the eternal Divine. If what is finite wishes to become less finite and to move closer to the infinite, it must be dynamic. That is, we cannot become actually infinite, but we must at least be potentially infinite, if only through doubting the certainty of our understanding and wishing to move forward. Therefore, doubts are an integral, necessary part of true faith, aiding, not impeding, its progress.

When students in a yeshiva or school are taught this concept of faith, an entirely new generation of religious people rises up, whose views can be characterized as “religious post-atheism,” which uses the religious achievements of atheism in the development of Judaism. Unless it activates within it the aspect of doubt, religion will be primitive. Doubt is necessary for its existence. Because the aspect of doubt was not adequately developed in religion over the last centuries, atheism came along, smashed everything, and advanced among people the concept of the value of doubt—and for this, religion owes it a debt of gratitude.

Atheism comes, says Rav Kook, to ridicule the primitive form of religion and destroy it, clearing the ground for the construction of a more exalted religious system. From the point of view of the development of religion, atheism was a historical necessity, as we ourselves—even the religious community and leaders who recognize the importance modernization—would never have decided to destroy that primitive aspect of religion. We simply would not have had the strength and nerve. Therefore, atheism enters and does all of that work for us.

The observant religious person who has grasped the ideas of post-atheism holds a different sort of religious consciousness. He combines Orthodox religiosity with a willingness to doubt his own religious tenets. Such a person emanates this new type of faith, changing the ideas of those around him, opening the way to religion for doubting people. These doubting souls begin to approach Judaism, seeing that post-atheist Judaism contains the spark of doubt, and that the spiritual necessity of doubt is even more developed here than it was in atheism.

The difference between the post-atheist religious consciousness and the classical one is easy to see. The Israeli essayist and philosopher Dr. Daniel Shalit says that one needs to converse with a religious person for no more than ten minutes to determine whether he or she is post-atheist or pre-atheist. Approached this way, atheism is not an enemy of religion. It is an enemy of primitive religion, but an ally in the creation of a more advanced one. If we can make the ideas of atheism the general property of the religious world, we will move religion forward and make it possible for those whose souls instinctively and absolutely correctly thirst for skepticism and doubt to approach this religion.

What Is to Be Doubted?

Thus, according to Modern Orthodoxy and post-atheism, doubt is critical for the growth of faith; without it a person cannot believe truly. If people, limited by nature, do not doubt their own limited religious ideas, they will remain much farther from God in their understanding than those who, though limited, at least doubt.
When we frame the problem this way, we frequently encounter the following question: “Should one doubt everything? There must be something, from the religious perspective, that is absolutely beyond question. God’s existence is certain—how can that be doubted?” The answer, from the point of view of religious post-atheism, is that everything can and must be doubted. To doubt is not to deny, but to subject to criticism and analysis. This applies even to the tenet that God exists. What is to be doubted is not the words themselves, but our interpretation and understanding of them. Since doubt is not denial but analysis and clarification, it is necessary for our religious understanding. It would be incorrect to see doubt in the existence of God as a choice between the statements “God exists” and “God does not exist.” This is a different kind of doubt entirely. What we must doubt is the meaning that we give to the word “existence” as it relates to God.

Rav Kook proposes a completely radical approach to this problem. He explains that there is a faith that is not faith. And there is a lack of faith, or atheism, that is, in its essence, faith (see Shemona Kevatzim 1, 633). What does he mean by faith that is not faith? He refers to the person who believes in God, but whose belief is so primitive that his image of God is closer to a caricature than to what God is. And what is lack of faith that is faith? This is the situation when a person says that he does not believe in God, but he says that because religious groups have pictured God in such a primitive form that he is unable to believe in such a God. This unbelief reflects not a lack of faith, but a high level of religious feeling.

The words “I believe in God” or “I do not believe in God” do not reflect true faith or lack of faith. We must hone the meaning of these words during our whole lives—not just our individual lives, but over the course of all human life. We can and must doubt these meanings in every way, for doubt is not denial; doubt is dissatisfaction with simple answers and a thirst for more precise understanding.

6. The Concept of Continuing Revelation

The religious concept of the continuing Revelation of God asserts that the Divine Revelation did not stop at Mount Sinai, but continued throughout time and continues still, manifested not in miracles, but in the course of human history, above all of Jewish history. Therefore, this Revelation can and must be listened to, and to do this we must see history as a dialogue with God.

There is no doubt that the very idea of monotheism as a religion of dialogue implies a continuing interaction between humans and God throughout all of human history. What is more, Jewish monotheism, as Rav Kook’s concept emphasizes, is characterized by the idea that not only does every individual carry on a dialogue with God, but the nation as a whole, and all of humankind do the same. It would be natural to suppose that through this dialogue, God continues to speak. Of course, God does not say anything to contradict God’s earlier words; God’s word cannot be revoked. The earlier Revelation is never rescinded, but it must be continually developed and added to. Thus, the idea of a national dialogue with God leads to the principle of continuing (or ongoing) Revelation, and that, in its turn, to Modern Orthodoxy.

The view of history as a dialogue between humans and God means that God is continually speaking to us, and all innovations that bring forth progress in culture, society, and religion are not simply human invention, but also Divine Revelation. Therefore, they must be integrated into our religious ideas and not discarded. In other words, the need for progress and modernization, even in the area of religion, is not merely a human trait; it is a manifestation of our Divine nature. Religion, therefore, must develop—not in order to make it easier and more convenient for us humans, but because without development religion will not adequately reflect God (see Shemona Kevatzim 8:43, as well as many other sources.)

It stands to reason that not everything that has occurred in the course of history is Divine. Many developments can and should be criticized, changed, repaired. However, it would be categorically wrong to cast away historical development as a whole, as we would be discarding with it essential elements of the Revelation. According to this conception, we do not have the right to reject historical change—not because we must protect human creative activity from primordial religious dogma, but on the contrary, because we adhere to a religious viewpoint.

7. 1. The Spiritual-Religious Value of Science and Technology

Science and technology play a big role in society, but do they have a spiritual-religious value in and of themselves? The general opinion is that they don’t. However, already in the first chapter of Genesis, immediately following the creation of Adam and Chava, God commands them, “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it” (Genesis 1:28). This verse contains a commandment to conquer the earth, which means to build a civilization. This building is impossible without the development of science and technology. Conquering the earth means gaining control over nature. It means using power and knowledge to improve the conditions of human existence despite nature’s limitations: being able to turn on the light when it is dark outside, to heat your house when it is raining and cold, to move at great speed, to transmit sound over long distances. All this is included in the concept of “conquering,” and technological development needs to be seen as the fulfillment of this commandment. Why then is the “commandment of conquering,” i.e., constructing of civilization, not enumerated among the 613 commandments? The reason is that it pertains to humanity as a whole and does not address any individual or even any nation—and commandments that are intended for the human race are not counted among the commandments. There are those who interpret this verse as a blessing and not as a commandment; however, the grammar of the verse suggests the formulation of a commandment. Additionally, “be fruitful and multiply” is understood as a commandment. Therefore, if the first half of the verse is a commandment, it stands to reason that the second half is also a commandment. See also Orot Hakodesh 2, Hamegama Haelyona 33, page 563; Orot Hatechiya sections 16 and 30. According to Rav Soloveitchik as well (in The Lonely Man of Faith), the ambition to develop technology is engrained in humans, who are created in God’s image, and therefore, it is clearly a spiritual value. It follows, then, that science has religious worth. We must see those who advance science and technology as performing a commandment and feel national and religious pride towards Israelis who receive the Nobel Prize. Moreover, in order return those souls who are attracted to “Americanism” as expressed in the desire to conquer and develop nature, we must create a positive religious image of scientific and technological development; to do so we need the explicit support of our religious leaders. Many of them are focused on finding halachic solutions to the halachic problems that arise from technology. But unfortunately, very few of them see the religious significance of science and connect it with Torah.

7. 2. The Spiritual-Religious Value of Art

In ancient times, the sole purpose of art was decoration and beauty. In both secular and religious life, decoration and beauty were used to convey a divine message to the people. Judaism did not have a problem assimilating this view of beauty: there are numerous Jewish sources that emphasize its importance. For example, Ten measures of beauty came down to this world - nine of them were received by Jerusalem and the rest by the entire world (Kidushin 49b) and, “whoever did not see the Beit haMikdash that Herod built, never saw a beautiful building in his life” (Bava Batra 4a).

In the Renaissance period, the perception or art underwent a metamorphosis: art became an expression of the innermost world of the artist, and was no longer a means of transmitting a religious message. In the modern age, a new phenomenon that facilitates this newly gained purpose appeared: all of society began promoting and encouraging creativity.

During the course of history, art lost its association with religion, and became a secular, universal phenomenon. Religion did not comprehend this new kind of art, which exists in and of itself and expresses the inner world of the artist; religion surely did not see any religious value in it and therefore limited its interaction with art by using strictly halachic terminology, defining what is permitted and what is forbidden. The tension between religion and art intensified until they reached a point where each one saw the other as hostile and dangerous.

Rav Kook changed religion’s perception of art. He taught that there is religious value in the expression of a person’s inner world. (See introduction to Shir Hashirim (Song of Songs) in Olat Hara’ayah; Rav Kook’s letter to the Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design; Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook, Mizmor 19 (Eretz HaTzvi in Ma’amarey HaRav Tzvi Yehuda.)
A person is created in the image of God, and the more a person comes closer to Him, the more he realizes himself as a human being and makes himself complete. The Torah opens with a description of the creation of the world—God creates the world and humans. Creation is the first act; thus, a person’s ability to create brings him closer to God. [In The Lonely Man of Faith, Rav Soloveitchik speaks a lot about how a man resembles God through creative action.] Therefore, art, which gives expression to human creativity and teaches society about creativity, opens before mankind a new way to draw nearer to God.

It should be emphasized that art’s religious significance becomes clearer when we contemplate art’s role in history rather than the lives of individual artists.

8. The Embedded Implication that Judaism Must Lag Behind Culture in Its Development
Looking at this model for the development of Judaism by means of sparks from “isms,” we are obliged to make note of one critical feature, which from a religious point of view might well be seen as an embedded “flaw.” Namely, the model presupposes that Judaism lags behind culture in its development. The “ism” appears first, arising in relation to progress in the larger society. As a result of this, people become dissatisfied with flaws in Judaism that earlier generations accepted (see Arfilei Tohar, 2 and 68); they leave and build a new ideology; and only two or three generations later does a segment of the religion adopt, develop, and realize the essence of these new ideas to create.

But if it is always thus, how will religion ever be able to lead? How will it accomplish what it is called upon to do?

The answer to this problem comes in two complementary parts.

The first is the fact that, indeed, within the structure of assimilating sparks from various ideologies and movements, Judaism will never be in a position to overtake those “isms.” However, Rav Kook explains that Judaism has “in reserve” another most important concept, namely, that of God’s dialogue not only with the individual, but also with the nation as a whole. Christianity or Western society never adopted this idea, inherent to Judaism from the start; humankind has only today begun to explore it. Therefore, Judaism will be able to lead civilization by means of this idea, rather than through its assimilation of sparks, which, as important as it is, merely serves to correct accumulated flaws that occur in the process of transition from Judaism of Diaspora to a Judaism of the Nation of Israel. Until we have adequately corrected these flaws, we will continue to fall behind and so will be unable to make ourselves heard by the world. We must continue to correct them, while at the same time developing that concept of national dialogue with God that is uniquely ours. We would later bequeath this concept to humankind, thereby making an essential contribution to the development of civilization.

This is the first part of the answer. However, the problem has another aspect. The second part of the explanation as to why Judaism lags behind culture in its development is that, as Kabbalah explains, our entire world is “tikkun olam”—“a world of correction.” Godliness is infinite and therefore human perception cannot fully grasp it. Similarly, no traditional movement can reflect Divine perception in its entirety because it is limited by time and wording. (Orot HaEmuna, p. 64) In kabalistic terms, God’s light cannot appear in our world immediately in its true form. At the beginning of Creation and again in every new stage of development, there is shevirat kelim, the breaking of the vessels, and the sparks of Divine light become enveloped by shells. Judaism’s “lag” is grounded in the very foundations of existence. Every idea first appears in a wrong form, in the context of the “ism.” And only afterward, as a result of our efforts to improve the world, it appears in a purer and more correct form.

This arrangement of things is, of course, not accidental. It is related to God’s desire to allow us to become God’s “companions,” God’s co-creators in the universe.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rabbi Yaacov Huli: Author of the Me'am Lo'ez

(These are exerpts from Rabbi Marc D. Angel's book, Voices in Exile, pp. 103-110).   

 

 Rabbi Yaacov Huli (1689-1732) was born and raised in Jerusalem, where he received an excellent rabbinic education. When he went to Istanbul in 1714, his profound and expansive rabbinic knowledge won him the respect of the great scholars of that city. Rabbi Yehudah Rosanes, chief rabbi of the community and a world-renowned scholar, appointed the young Rabbi Huli to his rabbinical court. When Rabbi Rosanes died some years later, it was Yaacov Huli who compiled and edited his master's classic commentary on Maimonides' Mishneh Torah, known as Mishneh leMelekh.

     Rabbi Huli was disturbed by the low level of Jewish instruction available to the working class and the poor. If they had no access to the Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts, how were they to be fully observant Jews? How were they to know what the Torah required of them? The proliferation of scholarly rabbinic texts in Hebrw did nothing to improve the spiritual condition of those whose academic training was deficient.

     Rabbi Huli conceived the idea of producing a comprehensive work in Judeo-Spanish for the benefit of the Sephardic public. Entitled Me'am Lo'ez, it was framed as a commentary on the Torah. The first volume, published in 1730, dealt with the Book of Genesis. In this work, Rabbi Huli provided classic rabbinic interpretations and commentaries on the biblical verses. Laws and customs, rabbinic homilies, and ethical lessons were interspersed throughout the work.  The book was written in a popular, engaging style. Indeed, Rabbi Huli worried that it would be used merely for entertainment rather than for serious Torah study. As a work in the vernacular, it was available to a wide audience. It was written in a language and style which they could understand, appreciate, and enjoy.  The Me'am Lo'ez was something of an encyclopedia of biblical and rabbinic learning, so that those who studied it derived a wide array of information and inspiration.

     Rabbi Huli intended to publish similar volumes for all the books of the Torah. He did complete Genesis and much of Exodus. After his untimely death at the age of forty-three, other rabbis continued the work in the spirit of Rabbi Huli, comleting the Five Books of Moses and other biblical books as well.

     The Me'am Lo'ez was an immediate success. It went into numerous editions and was read enthusiastically by a large audience. Rabbi Huli had constructed the work so that people would be able to study the weekly Torah portion from it. The book was used in this manner by families and study groups, and in synagogues.....

     Rabbi Huli did not think of the Me'am Lo'ez as an original work. Rather, he viewed himself as a compiler of many and diverse classic Jewish sources. He was pleased to be a popularizer, bringing comprehensive knowledge to the public in a lucid and pleasant style. But his approach was indeed original. It was he who decided what material to include and what to exclude; how to present it in a lively manner; how to capture the interest of his readers and speak to their everyday needs. In many wasy, the Me'am Lo'ez mirrored the spiritual life of the Judeo-Spanish speaking world of the time....

     The Me'am Lo'ez appealed to the masses because it was sympathetic to the poor and downtrodden. Rabbi Huli drew on traditional sources which extolled humility and honest labor. Rabbi Huli explained that there was no shame in working for an honest living. One should not think it beneath his dignity to work at a craft or any other honest occupation, and should not attempt to live in a style beyond his means (Genesis 12:4). When our forefather Jacob prayed, he asked only for bread and clothing, not for any luxuries. Truly pious people did not seek superfluous things, but were happy with the basic necessities which God provided them (Genesis 28:22).

     God created Adam from dust, not from gold (Genesis 1:1). He created a vast universe. One who looks at the sky at night and contemplates the countless stars cannot help but be overwhelmed by the grandeur and power of God. He is humbled by his own smallness in the universe. This feeling of humility leads one to serve God with devotion and purity (Genesis 2:7).

     A facet of humility is that one should not try to show off his piety and righteousness. On the contrary, one should walk humbly with God, keeping his piety as private as possible. Rabbi Huli reminded his readers that one is allowed to bow only in designated places during the silent devotion, the Amidah. To bow more frequently would be a sign of presumptuousness and false piety. One should not do things which will make him appear to be more pious than other worshippers (Genesis 12:4).

     The work of Rabbi Huli reflected the midrashic/kabbalist view of life which then predominated among the Sephardim in Moslem lands. Philosophic inquiry was no longer a vital part of the intellectual life of the community. The emphasis was on an absolute commitment to observing the halakhah in all its details. Kabbalah was recognized to have inestimable value and was a necessary ingredient in religious life. The willing acceptance of God's decrees with equanimity was encouraged, engendering a relative passivity. The predominant worldview emphasized loyalty to rabbis and the rabbinic tradition. The messianic hope was expressed longingly, wishfully.

(NOTE:  Rabbi Huli's last name is sometimes presented as Culi, rather than Huli. But the name Huli is the correct way the name was pronounced by Sephardim. Indeed, Rabbi Huli himself alluded to his name when he entitled his work Me'am Lo'ez, drawn from Psalm 114.  The word "lo'ez" refers to a foreign language, in this case Ladino.  Toward the end of the Psalm, the verse reads: milifnei adon HULI arets, milifnei Elo-kei YAACOV, a clear allusion to his own name, Yaacov Huli.)

What is the Mitzvah?

 

 

 

Judaism as we know it is a way of life punctuated with sacred obligations, what we commonly refer to as mitzvot, or commands.

 

There is lots of "do-ing" in Judaism. Do this, do that, do many things.

 

Most of the mitzvot are generally well known. They include the Kosher obligations - what one may eat and what one may not eat, the holy days, such as Shabbat, High Holy Days, Pesah, Shavuot, Sukkot, etc., the obligations surrounding prayer, including donning of tefilin, recitation of the faith affirmation known as Shema, and a full array of person-to-person obligations.

 

In some instances, the obligation is clear cut, and the requirements needed to accurately fulfill the obligation are well defined. This does not mean that fulfilling the mandate is easy, just that it clear what exactly the requirements are.

 

II

 

Ironically, the most challenging obligations are the person-to-person obligations, because even though the obligation is one-sided, resting only on the do-er, the fulfilment is not; it goes beyond the do-er.

 

To be more precise, it incumbent upon us to give charity to the needy, but it is not necessarily true that merely by giving alms to the poor we have fulfilled the mitzvah.

 

Arguably, most of the charity that we dispense is to institutions - synagogues, schools, old age homes, hospitals, etc. The charity benefits people, but the charity is not given to a person. It is given to an institution.

 

Less frequent are the times when the charity is transmitted from hand to hand. The poor who knock on the door or who visit the synagogue are the exceptions. And it is this type of hand-to-hand charity that is more challenging.

 

We are told that "you must surely open your hand to that person" (the poor) (Deuteronomy, 15:8).

 

The wording of this directive seems odd. After all, it is hardly possible to handle anything with a closed hand. Sefer Haredim, the wonderful but not very well known compilation of the mitzvot authored by Rabbi Elazar Azikri, a contemporary of Rabbi Yosef Karo and Rabbi Yitzhak Luria, makes a fascinating observation regarding this wording. He states that the "open your hand" term is a metaphor for the obligation to give charity with "a good heart and with joy" (Sefer Haredim, Jerusalem:  5750, p. 87, no. 23).

 

Giving in a tight fisted manner conveys the attitude that one would preferably not give anything, but there is no choice because one is obligated.Giving with an open hand, with a hand that reflects the open heart, is given with joy, the joy of the opportunity to help.

 

The poor are already downtrodden. Helping them in a miserly fashion will give them the resources they need, but will make them feel miserable in the process. By conveying joy at being able to help, the poor are made to feel good even in a most unpleasant circumstance.

 

III

 

So, the mitzvah of tsedaka, properly fulfilled addresses both the financial and emotional situations of the poor.  We are asked to uplift the poor in the very process of helping them. Tsedaka is far from a perfunctory mitzvah. It can hardly be actualized without heart and soul.  

And most important, it establishes a key component in person-to-person mitzvah fulfillment - the impact of one's actions on the other.

 

This is admittedly a bit tricky, since it is entirely possible that someone approaches the tsedaka opportunity in exactly the right way - with sensitivity to the poor person, and giving joyfully, with a full heart. Yet, try as the person may, the poor person reacts very negatively, with no gratitude, even with complaints.

 

The hope is that by being charitable with a full heart, the poor will feel that, and will be uplifted. But there are no guarantees this will actually transpire. The Torah does not ask the impossible of us. It just asks that we approach the tsedaka situation in a caring manner. The rest is not always in the hands of the tsedaka actualizer.

 

IV

 

The mitzva of tsedaka is one among many obligations of the person-to-person genre that are two way streets. The obligation to honor one's parents, to assure the happiness of one's spouse, to love one's fellow, are other classic examples of this mitzva category.

 

Proffering kindness, though not immediately recognized as a mitzva obligation, is actually a mitzva (Exodus, 18:20; Sefer Haredim, p. 88, #31).Thus, visiting the sick, burying the dead (Sefer Haredim, p. 88, #32), escorting a guest who is departing on a journey (Sefer Haredim, p. 96, #10), accompanying the deceased to burial (see Sefer Haredim, p. 97, #11), are all under the umbrella of extending kindness.

 

Interestingly, all the aspects of kindness that we are called upon to fulfill fall under the mitzva to emulate God (Deuteronomy 28:9; Talmud, Sotah 14a; Sefer Haredim, p. 88, #31).

 

Being nice and caring is more than a social nicety. It is the way that we reach the pinnacle of humaneness - emulating God, doing the Godly, raising ourselves into the sphere of holiness.

 

There are many ways that seekers of holiness go about realizing this lofty goal. The fact that one can realize this through how one treats other human beings in all sorts of human interactions, sometimes gets lost in the search.What exactly differentiates a person-to-person mitzva obligation done perfunctorily, from one that is done correctly, as a true emulation of God?

 

At the risk of over-generalizing, the difference may be in whether the mitzvah is expressed as self-actualization, or is expressed as an expression of self-transcendence.

 

V

 

To more fully appreciate this, it helps to understand the parameters of two mitzvot that fall under the heading of loving your fellow as one would love one's self (Leviticus, 19:18).

 

These are 1. visiting the sick, and 2. comforting the bereaved.

 

Even though Maimonides considers these as Rabbinic obligations, he clearly states that fulfilling these obligations falls under the Biblical heading of "...love your fellow as you would love yourself." (Maimonides, Mishnah Torah, Laws of Mourning, 14:4).

 

Others, including Rabbenu Yonah, consider visiting the sick and comforting the bereaved to be biblically mandated directives. The bottom line common denominator is that though there are differences of opinion on the source for these obligations, the fulfillments are biblical in nature.

 

Further concerning visiting the sick, consider the profound statement by Rabbi Elazar Azikri, that the obligation to visit the sick has not been completely fulfilled if the visitor does not pray for the sick person (Sefer Haredim, pp. 64-65, #39).Undoubtedly, simply visiting the sick is a commendable act. But when one senses the pain of one's fellow, that pain should be felt in one's heart, to the point that one prays earnestly to God to have compassion on the person in pain.

In order to really feel the pain of the one who is not well, it is usually necessary to converse with the person who is in pain, to hear what the sick person is going through both physically and emotionally (Sefer Haredim, p. 76, #47).

 

There are many ways to manifest true caring, including spending appropriate time with the unwell person, addressing their needs when possible, as well as offering encouragement and hope. But the ultimate caring inheres in approaching the Ultimate, in entreating God. That prayer shows the true depths of genuine concern, and is the pivotal ingredient in the fulfillment of the mitzvah. 

 

All this is by way of stressing that merely visiting a person who is not well is not the complete mitzva.  Merely showing up and being there is laudable presuming it is not simply a thing "I have to do," and is rather something "I want to do."

 

For the mitzva to be complete, it must go beyond self expression, beyond crossing it off the bucket list, into the sphere of self-transcendence, going beyond one's self into the sphere of true caring for the other.

 

VI

 

Another mitzva that is not as simple as it seems is to comfort mourners.

 

Generally, we visit mourners almost reflexively, with little thought as to how exactly the mitzva is fulfilled. This is not done with bad intentions. Perhaps it is just assumed that the purpose is so obvious, that all one needs is to just do it.

 

It is a natural instinct of well-meaning people to feel bad for those who have suffered a loss, followed by a strong desire to help them. Help in this regard comes in many forms. It can take the form of being there to take care of needs that arise. It can take the form of sending food to the mourners. It can take the form of visitation, taking time to be with the mourners. All these are surely quite commendable.

 

But it would be helpful to ask ourselves the following deceptively simple question - what exactly should be the goal when comforting mourners? Toward what should we be aiming?

 

The simple answer is that we should be aiming to comfort the mourners. That is undoubtedly true. But the question that follows is - how exactly do we go about comforting mourners?

 

The answer here too seems simple - by saying the right things. But what are the right things? What are the right words? Are there formulaic words when visiting the bereaved?

 

Again, the simple answer is yes, there is a formula. Among Ashkenazim it is - HaMakom Yenahem Et'hem B'Tokh She'ar Avaylay Ziyyon v'Yerushalayim, meaning - May God comfort you among the other mourners for Zion & Jerusalem. Among Sephardim, it is—Min haShamayim Tenuhamu—may you be comforted from Heaven.

 

That fulfills the bottom line obligation. But there is more. There are things to avoid when comforting mourners, as there are when visiting the sick, including not overstaying the visit, and most critically, not resorting to cliches that are at best meaningless, and at worst, quite harmful.

 

For example, never say to someone who has lost a parent who lived into their 90's - well, he or she had a long life anyway. It is one thing for mourners to be grateful for having parents who lived a long and wonderful life. It is quite another for comforters to trivialize the impact of the passing with an "oh, well, it is really not that tragic." These are painful words for any mourner to hear.

 

Never say to an aspiring father and mother who have lost their child - well, you are young, and you will have so much more opportunity to have children.That may be true, but the parents are lamenting the immediate loss, and are feeling real anguish. Downplaying the severity of the loss is most unhelpful.

 

There are a host of too often employed thoughtless phrases that need to be removed from one's vocabulary when comforting the bereaved.

 

VII

 

But what should be the intent when visiting the bereaved? Just to be there? That is usually better than nothing.

 

But there is better, a somewhat surprising better. A few helpful suggestions in this regard are presented in Minhat Shmuel, by Rabbi Shmuel Khoshkrman (2016, Vol. 1, p. 390).

 

He cites the view of Hafetz Hayyim that the key is to help alleviate the pain of the mourner through heartfelt conversation. He then cites the view of SheLaH that one should relate good things to the mourner to the point of actually making the mourner happy, with a more pleasant face.  And then, he quotes from Shevet Levi, based on the Zohar, that one must prepare one's self, before the visit, with the right words to achieve that goal.

 

Visiting the bereaved just became much more complicated. Or, to put it more accurately, much more precise, much more focussed, much less self-centered and much more outer directed.

 

To think about what words will comfort the mourner, and then to share those words - this is the true actualization of the mitzva.

 

But what if one cannot come up with such words. Then, silence is better, coupled with the standard formula.

 

But putting one's self into the situation of others, and asking what would they like to hear that will be helpful - that is how we show our love for others as we would love ourselves.

 

A few helpful ideas include sharing stories about the deceased that bring a smile to the mourners, or words of praise to the mourner for the care they offered, assuming of course that this is truly the case.

 

VIII

 

The examples of charity, visiting the sick, and comforting mourners, all point to a vital ingredient when approaching person-to-person responsibilities - the intended recipient of our kindness and concern.

 

It is not enough to exhibit concern. This must be coupled with going the extra mile to assure that the recipient of the concern is uplifted, encouraged, and made to feel better by our actions.

 

These mitzva fulfillments may have thus become a bit more challenging. But, at the same time, they have become much more rewarding. And ultimately, much more of what God wants from us - to establish a community that truly and meaningfully cares. That is the mitzva.

 

Judaism, as we began, is much about do-ing. But it is about much more than do-ing. It is do-ing plus. It is do-ing with care, it is do-ing with kindness, it is do-ing in a transcending manner; in a word - do-ing with heart and soul.

    

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

Modern Orthodoxy and Halakha: An Inquiry

In his book, The Perspective of Civilization, Fernand Braudel utilizes a concept that he calls “world-time.” Braudel notes that at any given point in history, all societies are not at the same level of advancement. The leading countries exist in world-time; that is, their level of advancement is correlated to the actual date in history. However, there also are countries and civilizations which are far behind world-time, whose way of life may be centuries or even millennia behind the advanced societies. In this year of 5745, for example, the advanced technological countries exist in world-time while underdeveloped countries lag generations behind; some societies are still living as their ancestors did centuries ago. In short, everyone in the world may be living at the same chronological date, but different societies may be far from each other in terms of world-time.

Braudel's analysis also can be extended to the way people think. Even though people may be alive at the same time, their patterns of thinking may be separated by generations or even centuries.

The characteristic of Modern Orthodoxy is that it is modern, that it is correlated to the contemporary world-time. Being part of contemporary world-time, it draws on the teachings of modern scholarship, it is open to modern philosophy and literature, and it relates Jewish law to contemporary world realities. On the other hand, “non-modern” Orthodoxy does not operate in the present world-time. Its way of thinking and dealing with contemporary reality are pre-modern, generations behind contemporary world-time. Thus, there are deep mental gulfs of time between such Orthodox people as Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik and the Satmar Rebbe, or between many members of the Rabbinical Council of America and many members of the Agudath haRabbanim. It is not that one is more Orthodox than the other: their belief in God, Torah min haShamayim (divine revelation of the Torah) and the sanctity of the Written and Oral Law are shared commitments. The differences between so-called right-wing Orthodoxy and Modern Orthodoxy are not differences in sincerity or in authentic commitment. Rather, the differences stem from different world views, from living in different world-times.

A Modern Orthodox rabbi does not wish to think like a medieval rabbi, even though he wishes to fully understand what the medieval rabbi wrote and believed. The Modern Orthodox halakhist wishes to draw on the wisdom of the past, not to be part of the past.

The philosophy of Modern Orthodoxy is not at all new. Rather, it is a basic feature of Jewish thought throughout the centuries. In matters of halakha, for example, it is axiomatic that contemporary authorities are obligated to evaluate halakhic questions from their own immediate perspective, rather than to rely exclusively on the opinions of rabbis of previous generations. Rambam (Hilkhot Mamrim 2: 1) writes: “A great court—bet din gadol—when interpreting the Torah with one of the hermeneutic principles, found that the law on a certain matter was such-and-such, and then another court came afterward and found a reason to reject the ruling of the first court—the second bet din rejects the ruling of the first bet din and rules according to what it deems correct. As it is said (Devarim17:9) 'To the judge who will be in office at that time'—you are not obligated to go except to the bet din of your generation.” The well-known phrase that “Yiftah in his generation is like Shemuel in his generation” (Rosh haShanah 25b) expresses the need to rely on contemporary authorities, even if they are not of the stature of the authorities of previous generations. We are obligated to be “Modern Orthodox,” to recognize present reality and to participate in contemporary world-time.

Rabbi Haim David Halevy (Aseh Lekha Rav, 2:61) deals with the case of a judge who had reached a certain halakhic conclusion and gave a ruling on it. The judge then learned that another judge greater than he ruled on the same case but came to another conclusion. Should the first judge change his decision and rely on the authority of the greater one, or is he obligated to maintain his own position if he truly believes it to be correct? Rabbi Halevy quotes Rambam (Hilkhot Sanhedrin 23:9), who states the principle that En leDayan ella mah sheEnav ro’ot—a judge has only what his eyes see. Rabbi Halevy states that the decision of a judge must be based solely on his own understanding of the case he is considering. “And no legal precedent obligates him, even if it is a decision of courts greater than he, even of his own teachers.” Later in the same responsum, Rabbi Halevy writes: “Not only does a judge have the right to rule against his rabbis; he also has an obligation to do so (if he believes their decision to be incorrect, and he has strong proofs to support his own position). If the decision of those greater than he does not seem right to him, and he is not comfortable following it, and yet he follows that decision (in deference to their authority), then it is almost certain that he has rendered a false judgment (din sheker).”

The key principle here is that each judge must make a decision based on what his own eyes see. Obviously, a judge will want to understand the reasons why the greater rabbis and courts came to their conclusions. Perhaps by studying them, he will realize that he has erred and subsequently change his opinion. However, if after all his studying and analyzing the previous decisions he still maintains that his opinion is the correct one, he is then obligated to rule according to his own conclusion. He is not bound by precedent or by the weight of greater authorities.
One of the weaknesses of contemporary Orthodoxy is that it is not “modern” in the sense just discussed. There is a prevailing attitude that teaches us to revere the opinions of the sages of previous generations, and to defer to those contemporary sages who occupy a world-time contemporary with those sages. Who is addressing halakhic questions today on the basis of what his own eyes see? Who are the sages of the present world-time, who absorb the contemporary reality, the contemporary ways of thinking and analyzing?

It is a common lament among Modern Orthodox Jews that Modern Orthodoxy lacks courage. Modern Orthodoxy is intimidated by the so-called right-wing, by the group of Jews that is pre-modern. Modern Orthodox scholars are reluctant to express their opinions and rulings for fear of losing religious stature in the eyes of the more fundamentalistic Orthodox Jews. When a Modern Orthodox scholar does express his own opinion, he often is criticized sharply by the pre-Modern Orthodox, and he is not adequately supported by the Modern Orthodox. The spiritual climate of today makes it very easy to remain quiet rather than risk lonely spiritual battle against forces that are more militant and more vocal.

We need to understand that the difference between Modern Orthodoxy and pre-Modern Orthodoxy is not one of religious validity. And we also must understand that being Modern Orthodox or pre-Modern Orthodox does not make our decisions necessarily right or wrong. To be Modern Orthodox Jews means to accept our limitations, but it also means that we must accept our responsibility to judge according to what our own eyes see, according to our own understanding. It means to have the self-respect to accept that responsibility.
Modern Orthodoxy and pre-Modern Orthodoxy do not engage in intelligent dialogue because they operate on separate time waves. They follow different assumptions.

In a recent discussion concerning the adoption of a pre-nuptial agreement to avoid the agunah (abandoned wife) problem, a pre-modern opinion has been expressed that we should not initiate a new procedure, since this would seem to imply that we are more sensitive and creative than the sages of previous generations who did not initiate such a procedure. This kind of argument cannot be countered with a reasonable discussion. This is an argument from a different world-time. The argument, which is fairly widespread, is essentially ludicrous. Throughout the centuries, our sages have initiated takanot (corrective decrees) in their communities to meet the contemporary needs of their people. Did they think it was an insult to their predecessors to be responsive to contemporary needs? Did Rabbenu Gershom slander all previous generations of rabbis by instituting his takanot?

The fact is that rabbis in all generations have had to face the serious responsibility of leading their communities in the ways of Torah. They have drawn on the wisdom and holiness of our sages of previous generations, but they ultimately have had to rely on their own judgment and on what their own eyes saw. The sages of each generation are influenced by the social and political realities of their time. If many of our sages believed in demons and witches, if they thought that the sun revolved around the earth, or if they assigned inferior status to women and slaves—we can understand that they were part of a world that accepted these notions. We do not show disrespect for them by understanding the context in which they lived and thought. On the contrary, we are able to understand their words better, and thus we may determine how they may or may not be applied to our own contemporary situation It is not disrespectful to our sages if we disagree with their understanding of physics, psychology, sociology, or politics. On the contrary, it would be foolish not to draw on the advances in these fields that have been made throughout the generations, including those of our own time.

There is no sense in forcing ourselves into an earlier world-time in order to mold our ways of thinking into harmony with modes of thought of sages who lived several hundred or even several thousand years ago.

Modern Orthodoxy requires us to live in the present world-time, knowing full well that many of the notions which we consider true and basic may become discredited in future centuries. We do not want those future generations of rabbis to be limited in their thinking to what we are thinking and teaching today. We want them to be respectful of our teachings and to consider our words seriously; but it is they who must lead their generation. Our time is now, and only now. The Torah, which is eternal, requires Jews to go to the judge living and serving in their own time.

Specific Examples

If we take Modern Orthodoxy seriously, then we will study talmudic passages and halakhic sources with an eye to understanding their historical and intellectual context. Sometimes we will come across texts that have broad halakhic implications but whose application to the contemporary situation is problematic. The following are several specific examples of the conflict that arises.

Shabbat Desecrators

There is a well-known rabbinic dictum: “One who desecrates the Shabbat in public is as an idol worshipper” (Hullin 5a). This statement underscores the importance of Shabbat in Jewish thought and practice. To desecrate Shabbat publicly is an open statement that one denies that God created the world in six days and ceased working on the seventh. By extension, one who blasphemes God as Creator by desecrating Shabbat is indeed like an idol worshipper, i.e., he does not recognize the one true God, Creator of heaven and earth (see Rashi, ad loc.).

Flowing from this statement are a host of halakhot. A mehallel Shabbat (Shabbat desecrator) is disqualified from serving as a shohet (ritual slaughterer). Even if he slaughters an animal entirely in accordance with Jewish law, the meat may not be eaten by Jews (Rambam, Hilkhot Shehitah 4:14). A mehallel Shabbat may not serve as a witness, since he is in the category of rasha (evildoer). If he touches wine, we may not drink it, just as if the wine were touched by an idol worshipper. Rabbi Haim David Halevy (Aseh Lekha Rav, 5: 1) discusses whether a mehallel Shabbat may be counted as part of a minyan. He quotes the Peri Megadim, who stated that “a mumar (willful transgressor) to avodah zarah (idol worship), one who desecrates Shabbat, or one who violates any commandment lehakhis (willfully), behold he is as an idolater and is not included (in the minyan).” Moreover, following this principle to its conclusion, a mehallel Shahbat may not be given an aliya to the Torah, just as we may not call an idolater to the Torah.
There are several options available to us on how to deal with this set of halakhot and the principle on which they are based.

We may accept the statement at face value that in fact a mehallel Shabbat is like an idolater, and is subject to the aforementioned disqualifications. To hold this position, we must posit that the talmudic statement and the halakhic development of that statement transcend all generations, and are as applicable now as when first stated. Consequently, we should maintain the ancient standard without compromise, regardless of ramifications. If the talmudic characterization of a mehallel Shabhat is equally applicable to our time, then we should fight heroically to defend the principle and the laws based on it. This is essentially the opinion of the “pre-modern” Orthodox.

The Modern Orthodox position is that this statement simply cannot be taken at face value in our time. The number of Jews who violate Shabbat far exceeds the number of those who observe Shabbat.

One approach is to express loyalty to the original statement while finding extenuating circumstances so that the implications of the original statement need not be fully applied. For example, Rabbi Haim David Halevy was asked a question (Aseh Lekha Rav. 5:1) that posed the problem of a small synagogue that had a minyan only if Shabbat desecrators were included. Should the Shabbat desecrators be counted for minyan, even though this would be against the basic law? Or should the synagogue be closed due to a lack of a proper minyan? Rabbi Halevy writes. “It is incumbent upon us to find a way of being lenient.” It bothers him that a synagogue should have to close because of the technicality of the mehallel Shabbat. He offers several arguments to justify his position. As an extra point, he gives the following analysis:

A mehallel Shabbat in public who is disqualified from being counted into a minyan of ten—this refers only to those early days when they understood and valued the seriousness of the prohibition [of Shabbat] and also nearly everyone was scrupulous in observing Shabbat according to the law, so that one who ‘breaches the fence’ was disqualified. But this is not true in our time. Our eyes see a multitude of Shabbat desecrators, and the overwhelming majority do not understand and do not realize the seriousness of the prohibition. Behold: they come to the synagogue and pray and read in the Torah, and do not understand and do not realize—they walk in darkness—and afterwards they desecrate the Shabbat. And perhaps such as these are as a tinok sheNishbah (a child who was captured and then grew up among heathens, and is not held accountable for his transgressions, for he never knew any differently).

In another responsum (Aseh Lekha Rav, 3:16) Rabbi Halevy deals with the question whether a Bar Mitzvah and his family may be called to the Torah, if they come to the synagogue on Shabbat in a car. His answer is that we must try to bring the young boy and his family closer to the Torah, and not reject them. He quotes his own earlier work, Mekor Hayyim haShalem, (vol. 3, 122:20), where he wrote that according to the technicality of the law, those who desecrate Shabbat in public should not be called to the Torah; yet, if there is a fear that this will cause bad feelings, then such people should be called to the Torah as hosafot (those called to the Torah beyond the required seven). This is so “since in our generation, an orphan generation, it is proper to be lenient in such circumstances, and it is our obligation to bring them closer and not to push them further away, and God in His goodness will have mercy on us.”

Rabbi David Tzevi Hoffmann (Melammed Leho'il, no. 29) deals with the question of whether a mehallel Shabbat in public may be counted in a minyan. He first lists sources that forbid such a man from being counted. Then he goes on to say: “In our time it is customary to be lenient in this, even in Hungary, and certainly in Germany.” He mentions the case of a man who kept his business open on Shabbat who wanted to serve as the sheli'ah tsibbur (leader of public prayer services) during his period of mourning. He was allowed to do this in a synagogue even though the gabbai (one in charge of delegating responsibilities during services) who let him lead the service was a learned and God-fearing man. Rabbi Hoffmann asked the gabbai why he did not prevent the man from leading the service. The gabbai answered that it had long been the custom not to prevent such people from leading services. Since the rabbis of that synagogue were outstanding scholars and they allowed this practice, Rabbi Hoffmann concludes that they must have had a good reason. He suggests that perhaps they relied on a responsum of Binyan Tziyyon haHadashot, no. 23,which stated that “Mehallelei Shabbat in our time are considered somewhat like a tinok sheNishbah, since—due to our great iniquities—the majority of Jews in our country are mehallelei Shabbat, and it is not their intention to deny the basic tenets of our faith.”

Rabbi Hoffmann then writes that he was told by Rabbi Meshulam Zalman Hakohen in the name of the author of Sho'el uMeshiv, who wrote: “The people in America are not disqualified because of their hillul Shabbat, since they are as tinok sheNishbah.” Although it would be better to pray among Jews who were all Shabbat-observant, there is enough precedent to be lenient in this matter.

Rabbi Hoffmann concludes by offering the following analysis:

In our time, such people are not called mehallel Shabbat in public, because the majority of Jews violate the laws of Shabbat. If the majority of Jews were observant and a few of them were arrogant enough to violate Shabbat, then this minority would be guilty of denying the Torah and of committing a disgraceful act and of removing themselves from the community of Israel. [This is obviously the original context of the talmudic statement.] However, since the contemporary reality is that the majority of Jews violate Shabbat, the individual does not think that violating Shabbat is such a terrible crime. His public transgression today is equated to beTsinah (transgressions of the Shabbat done in private).

Rabbi Hoffmann concludes by lamenting that in our times, those who observe Shabbat are considered separatists, while the transgressors are considered to be following the normal pattern.

Rabbi Hoffmann's concluding discussion makes it clear that the original context of the talmudic statement equating a Shabbat violator with an idolater cannot be applied to the contemporary situation. We cannot judge someone to be a desecrator of Shabbat if he does not realize the true sanctity of the day. There are a great many Jews who transgress Shabbat laws, but who consider themselves to be perfectly upright Jews. They do not view themselves as denying God as Creator or as repudiating the basic principles of our faith.

The challenge of Modern Orthodoxy is to review the true status of Jews who violate Shabbat today. If someone had been religious and had studied the laws of Shabbat—and then consciously decided to violate Shabbat as a sign of rebellion against the Torah—then such a person may fit into the talmudic category and should be penalized accordingly. If, however, a person never understood the sanctity of Shabbat, his violation of the laws of Shabbat does not reflect heresy or hatred of Torah. On the contrary, it reflects his ignorance and his being part of a Jewish community that largely does not observe Shabbat properly. Such a person is like a tinok sheNishbah, and should not be subject to the penalties accorded to a true mehallel Shabbat in public. This position is stated not as a compromise with the authentic halakha; this is the actual halakha. The Talmud simply was not referring to the situation we have today. And we must judge according to the present world-time, according to what our own eyes see.

Another insight into this question may be drawn from the laws of shehitah. Rambam (Hilkhot Shehitah 4:14) rules that a mehallel Shabbat is disqualified from serving as a shohet. Even if he performs the shehitah perfectly in accordance with halakha, and even if there are reliable religious Jews overseeing his shehitah, the meat is still not considered to be kasher. In halakha 4:16, though, Rambam rules that a Sadducee or another person who denies the Oral Torah may not serve as a shohet; but if he does slaughter an animal in the presence of a trustworthy Jew, then the meat may be eaten. The Sadducee is not totally disqualified from performing shehitah. Yet, a problem arises. According to us, a Sadducee is definitely a mehallel Shabbat. Sadducees do not accept the Oral Torah; since many of the laws of Shabbat are known only from the Torah sheBe’al peh, it is inevitable that a Sadducee will not observe Shabbat as we do. He will be transgressing rules that we consider basic to Shabbat observance.

It seems, then, that a Sadducee—though he violates the laws of Shabbat in public—does not become disqualified as a desecrator of Shabbat. His lack of observance is based on a lack of knowledge, or on misguided teachings he has received. But he does not perceive himself at all as one who desecrates the Shabbat, even though from our point of view he is violating many laws. The rulings pertaining to a mehallel Shabbat are applied only to an individual who recognizes the severity of his actions and who desecrates Shabbat as a sign of his rejection of God and Torah.

The Status of Women

Let us move on to another area of discussion. In several places (Kiddushin 80b, Shabbat 33b) we find the statement that Nashim da 'atan kalah. Generally, this statement is translated to mean that women are temperamentally lightheaded or that women's understanding is light. We also have the remarkable statement of Rabbi Eliezer (Sotah 20a) that whoever teaches his daughter Torah teaches her tiflut (foolishness or obscenity). These statements reflect a cultural bias against women that was pervasive in ancient society, and which still can be found in less-advanced societies today. These statements reflect the world-time of their authors. From a literary or historical standpoint, it would be fairly easy to dismiss these and similar comments by arguing that they belong to a particular time and a certain way of thought.

The problem arises, though, in that these sentiments were not left merely as opinions of rabbis on the nature of women; they were incorporated into practical halakha. The following is a quotation from Rambam, Hilkhot Talmud Torah (I:13):

A woman who learns Torah receives a reward, but not the same reward as a man, since she was not commanded (to study Torah); and anyone who does something for which he [she] was not commanded does not receive reward on the same level as someone who was commanded and who performed it, but rather receives less. And although she does have a reward, our sages commanded that a man must not teach his daughter Torah since the intelligence of the majority of women is not geared to be instructed; rather, they reduce the words of Torah to matters of foolishness according to the poverty of their understanding. Our sages said: one who teaches his daughter Torah is as though he taught her foolishness. To what does this refer? To the Oral Torah; but as for the Written Torah, he should not teach her. If he did teach her it is not as though he taught her foolishness.

Once talmudic statements are incorporated into halakhic codes, they transcend their own original world-time and become a factor in the thinking of all later generations. The modern sensibility that accords women equal intellect with men comes into conflict not only with ancient talmudic statements, but also with practical halakha. How are we to deal with this dilemma?

We may submit ourselves to the talmudic world-time. We may argue that the statements of our sages are true and binding on all future generations. Since Rambam rules that women may not be taught Torah and that their ability to learn is poor, we should see to it that our daughters receive no formal Torah education, except in the mitzvoth that concern them directly. Moreover, when we teach girls, we should treat them as being intellectually inferior compared to boys, and therefore we should have different curricula for girls and for boys. This point of view is adopted by pre-modern Orthodox.

There are schools for girls where the girls do not learn Talmud and where their curriculum is different from that in boys' schools. There is no yeshiva for girls in the same sense as there are yeshivot for boys who wish to devote their days and nights to the study of Torah.

Among the Modern Orthodox, though, there is a general recognition that our social situation is radically different from that of previous generations. The need to educate our daughters in Torah has been widely recognized, even though there is still great difference of opinion as to how they should be educated. Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef wrote a responsum (Shanah beShanah, 5743, pp. 157–161) in which he permitted the celebration of Bat Mitzvah for girls who have reached the age of twelve. In the course of the responsum, he quotes Rabbi Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg (Seridei Esh, 3:93), who wrote that it was perfectly proper to celebrate a Bat Mitzvah.

And concerning those who argue against this because this was not practiced in previous generations: this is no argument at all, since in the generations before us they did not have to engage in the education of their daughters because every Jew was filled with Torah and fear of God, and the entire environment was filled with a pure spirit and the holiness of Judaism….But now, due to our many sins, the generations have undergone a very great change. The influence of the street destroys and uproots all attachment to Judaism from the hearts of Jewish girls. It is incumbent upon us to rally all our strength for the education of girls; and to our joy, the sages of the previous generation already took a stand and established educational institutions of Torah and understanding for Jewish girls….And if the distinction that is made between boys and girls [in terms of Bar or Bat Mitzvah] severely damages the human sensibility of the girl, it is permissible to have a party and celebration at home for girls who celebrate their Bat Mitzvah.

Since times and conditions have changed, we must adapt to the new realities.

The Modern Orthodox approach calls on us to re-evaluate the original sources and the halakhot based on those sources. We need to determine whether those statements refer to us at all. If they do then we must follow them regardless of the social consequences and implications. If they do not, then we have the freedom to deal with the reality before us without having to apologize.

The idea that women's intelligence is inferior, that girls should not learn Torah because it is too complicated for them—this is a notion that generally is discredited among intelligent people in our world-time. What possible value can there be in arguing in defense of untenable attitudes?

General evidence in modern education shows that girls are perfectly able to learn and to make great intellectual achievements. If women can win Nobel Prizes, if they can become doctors and lawyers and judges and engineers—why should they be unable to tackle the complexities of Talmud and halakha? Our eyes see that the understanding of women is not any lighter than that of men. We can understand why ancient and medieval rabbis wrote the way they did, because they lived in an environment where women generally were relegated to inferior status. But we cannot apply those outgrown attitudes to our contemporary life. We need to say: We are not “compromising” on halakha by educating our daughters in Torah; rather, we are establishing the halakha that women and girls must learn Torah commensurate with their abilities, which are equal to those of men and boys. (See R. Haim David Halevy, Aseh Lekha Rav, 2:52.)

It is difficult for Modern Orthodoxy to muster the courage to deal with such cases in a straightforward way. It is easier to surrender to an earlier world-time; or even to work out gradual compromises, which take a long time and which create much dissatisfaction. It is easier not to assume the responsibility for our generation. Because of the extreme caution of Orthodoxy not to “insult” the rabbis of previous generations, there is a reluctance to make any changes or to move in new directions.

This paralysis may be exemplified by the well-known blessing in our Siddur “shelo assani isha.” Based on a Talmudic statement (Menahot 43b), a man is obligated to bless God each day “for not having made me a woman.” This statement has been subject to much commentary, apologetics, controversy. In trying to explicate the real meaning of the statement, we can state that the blessing is not supposed to be anti-woman; rather, it is a way of thanking God for having given men extra mitzvoth that are not incumbent upon women. Granted that this statement was made with this meaning and that it intended no harm, the reality is that the statement in its present form is offensive to modern sensibilities. Trying to explain this blessing to daughters, to girls in religious school and day school, is not the easiest of tasks. In spite of all our apologetics, girls and women—if they are encouraged to think independently—resent the formulation of the blessing. Moreover, boys and men who recite the text may absorb, consciously or unconsciously, anti-female attitudes.

But once the text is in the Siddur—and has been there for centuries—who is willing to take responsibility to change it or to eliminate it? The right-wing Orthodox may believe that the statement is perfectly innocuous and reflects a genuine truth. Others may offer interpretations of the blessing to try to make it more acceptable to the modern sensibility. But isn’t it ludicrous for intelligent people today to argue in defense of a statement that is quite problematic, to say the least? A true modern Orthodox position would be to change the blessing to a more suitable formula, one that does not cast negative aspersions on women. Making such a change does not imply that we are more sensitive or more intelligent than our predecessors; it only reflects the fact that we are living in a different world-time and tha we are responding to the needs of our generation. “Yiftah bedoro kiShmuel bedoro.” We should not be hampered by the fact that the Conservative movment has made a change in the blessing’s formulation. We should be concerned with the situation, not with labels.

The Nahem Prayer

Let us consider one further example of the dissonance between ancient texts and contemporary reality. Rabbi Haim David Halevy initiated a change in a text of a prayer for Tisha b'Av— a change that was eminently intelligent. Yet he was criticized sharply by many people. On Tisha b'Av, we have the prayer that begins Nahem, which describes Jerusalem as a destroyed, and desolate city without its children. Rabbi Halevy said that the statement is no longer true. Jerusalem is filled with Jews, and is definitely not destroyed, humiliated, and desolate. How, therefore, can someone recite the traditional prayer when in fact the prayer is false? To recite this text would make us guilty of reciting falsehoods before God. Therefore, Rabbi Halevy changed parts of the Nahem text to the past tense, asking God to console the city that was destroyed, humiliated, and desolate (Aseh Lehha Rav, 1: 14). Rabbi Halevy defends his position eloquently (Aseh Lekha Rav,2:36-39). It is indeed amazing that his position should have been criticized at all, since it is so perfectly sensible and understandable. Yet, such is the fear of change, that many were ready to criticize this ruling.

The same critics have no problem reciting a prayer to God that in fact includes an obvious lie: Jerusalem is not destroyed, humiliated, nor desolate of its children.

For Modern Orthodoxy to succeed in meeting its responsibility, it will be necessary for us to recognize that we are part of the contemporary world-time. We should have a blue ribbon panel composed of Modern Orthodox rabbinic scholars who will be willing to evaluate the above examples as well as so many others, and to come up with specific halakhic rulings for our generation. If we have the confidence and good sense to lead, we may be surprised to find that many people are ready to follow. It is up to us to bring Orthodoxy into the modern generation and world-time.

A Balanced Approach: Thoughts on Parashat Va'et'hanan

A Balanced Approach: Thoughts on Parashat Va'et'hanan

by Jake Nussbam

(Jake Nussbaum, a student at Yeshiva University, is a summer intern of our Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals.)   

 

  In Hilkhot De’ot, the Rambam differed from other standard books of Jewish law, spending the first three chapters dealing with the importance of having a balanced perspective when it comes to character traits and development. In chapter 1, he explains how each character trait exists on a scale, with an extreme on both sides. For example, the trait of giving has one extreme of someone who never gives a penny to charity. The other extreme is someone who gives so much charity that he has no money left for himself. Rambam stresses that either extreme is not correct. Generally, we should be strive for the “middle path.” In the case of charity, one should give sufficiently, while being sure to have enough for one’s own needs. 

     In chapter 3, Rambam addresses an issue that can be all too common. There are those who seek to avoid overindulgence and over-involvement in worldly pleasures by going to the opposite extreme, e.g. swearing off meat and wine, not wanting to get married, and wearing clothes of a mourner all the time. Rambam says that this individual is a sinner just as one would be for overindulging. He cites proof from a Nazir, who is someone who swears off wine, among other restrictions, for a designated amount of time. The Torah (Bemidbar 6:8) defines a Nazir as “holy to Hashem.” Rashi comments that this is because he abstains from wine and stays away from impurity, thereby “sanctifying” his body. However in verse 16, the Torah writes that after the designated period as a Nazir, he must bring a sin offering. Why would a sin offering follow a period of extra sanctity? The explanation seems to be that it is not necessary to fully swear off pleasurable activities such as drinking wine in order to be pious. On the contrary, over-ascetic behavior is sinful.

     In Hilkhot De’ot (chapter 5, halakha 3) Rambam describes a person who gets drunk as “a sinner,” “disgusting;” getting drunk in public is a desecration of the name of God.  Rambam criticizes both the Nazir and the drunkard, since both go to extremes

In Parashat Ve’et’hhanan, there are two consecutive verses which seem to have no relation to one another (Devarim chapter 4, verses 2-3) 

2. You shall not add anything to what I command you or take anything away from it, but keep the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon you. 

3. You saw with your own eyes what the Lord did in the matter of Baal-peor, that the Lord your God wiped out from among you every person who followed Baal-peor;

     Verse 2 is the prohibition of adding or subtracting to the commandments of God. The classic examples are that there are four sections of the Torah in the head tefillin, four corners to a tzitzit garment, and four species to be shaken on Succot. One may think that three would be sufficient, or that it would be extra pious to have five. This verse teaches us that is not the case. Verse 3 is referring to chapter 25 of Sefer Bemidbar, where Moabite women enticed Israelite men to have immoral relations with them, and convinced them to worship idols. This idol was known as Baal-peor. 

     Rabbi Moshe Alsheikh, a prominent 16th century Kabbalist from Tzefat, suggested a fascinating idea to connect the verses. He writes that there were actually two groups of Israelites who sinned at Baal-peor. The first was the aforementioned group who were enticed into idolatry by way of sexual immorality. However, there were others who wanted to be zealous and defame the idol worship by casting excrement on the idols. But the actual mitzvah calls for the destruction of idols. The zealots wanted to sanctify the name of God by disgracing the idols and their worshippers; but they sinned through their extremism in adding to the commandment to destroy idols.

     None of this is to say that there is no role for stringencies and fences to guide us to proper observance of the Torah. Rather, there is a place for strictness while not going into extremism. Rambam’s insistence on the “middle path” is to be sought.

     May we all achieve a balanced perspective in our character traits and in our lives. Shabbat Shalom.

 

 

    

Controversies over the Historicity of Biblical Passages in Traditional Commentary

By Rabbi Hayyim Angel

 

Tanakh lies at the heart of Jewish faith, and comprises God’s revealed word. Tanakh represents the truth for believing Jews. However, must or should every word be understood literally?

            Do believing Jews need to insist that the world was created in seven 24-hour days? Is all humanity biologically descended from one couple that lived some 6,000 years ago?

God does not have hands or nostrils, despite many verses whose literal reading suggest otherwise. How are we to understand stories of angels who eat (Genesis 18) or wrestle (Genesis 32)?

            Some also ask whether it is possible that King David really committed adultery and orchestrated murder as suggested by the literal biblical text (II Samuel 11), or whether King Solomon really worshipped idols (I Kings 11).

            Rabbi Saadiah Gaon (882–942) maintained that biblical texts should be taken literally, unless one of four criteria is met:

 

And I so declare, first of all, that it is a well-known fact that every statement in the Bible is to be understood in its literal sense except for those that cannot be so construed for one of the following four reasons: It may, for example, either be rejected by the observation of the senses…Or else the literal sense may be negated by reason…. Again [the literal meaning of a biblical statement may be rendered impossible] by an explicit text of a contradictory nature, in which case it would become necessary to interpret the first statement in a non-literal nature…. Finally, any biblical statement to the meaning of which rabbinical tradition has attached a certain reservation is to be interpreted by us in keeping with this authentic tradition. (Emunot VeDe’ot Book VII)[1]

 

If the literal reading of a biblical text contradicts empirical observation, logic, another biblical text, or rabbinic tradition, then it must be reinterpreted.

Following in Rabbi Saadiah’s footsteps, Rambam agreed that if logic or scientific knowledge contradicts the literal sense of a biblical text, that text must not be taken literally[2]:

 

I believe every possible happening that is supported by a prophetic statement and do not strip it of its plain meaning. I fall back on interpreting a statement only when its literal sense is impossible, like the corporeality of God: The possible however remains as stated. (Treatise on Resurrection)[3]

 

Rambam included considerably more than God’s corporeality among the impossible, and therefore allegorized many biblical passages. Other rabbinic thinkers adamantly opposed this method of interpretation, protesting that it imposed foreign ideas onto the biblical text. Additionally, it created a dangerous slippery slope for interpreters to allegorize far too many passages.[4]

In this essay, I will consider several debates as they pertain to the interface between Torah and science, Torah and logic, and Torah and other religious concerns such the sins of biblical heroes. Although the two sides of the debate often vigorously disagree, it is possible to chart a path that hears the voices of both sides.

 

Torah and Science

 

            Some believe that there are conflicts between Torah and science. Science states that the world is billions of years old; there was a process of evolution; and it is unlikely in the extreme that all humans biologically descend from the same couple that lived only 6,000 years ago. The literal reading of the early chapters in Genesis does not seem to match the scientific account.

            However, there need not be any conflict between Torah and science. As noted above, Rabbi Saadiah Gaon and Rambam maintain that whenever the literal reading of the Torah contradicts empirical evidence, the Torah should not be taken literally. In his discussion of Aristotle’s theory of the eternality of the world, Rambam rejects it because Aristotle was unable to prove his theory. However, were Aristotle able to prove it, Rambam would reinterpret Genesis chapter 1 (Guide of the Perplexed II:25). Rambam did not believe that the entire creation account was intended as literal, either (Guide of the Perplexed II:29).

More recently, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch wrote that as long as one believes that God created the world, the length or process of the creation is not a binding article of faith:

 

Judaism is not frightened even by the hundreds of thousands and millions of years which the geological theory of the earth’s development bandies about so freely…. The Rabbis have never made the acceptance or rejection of this and similar possibilities an article of faith binding on all Jews. They were willing to live with any theory that did not reject the basic truth that “every beginning is from God.” (The Educational Value of Judaism, in Collected Writings, vol. VII, p. 265)[5]

 

Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook made a similar point regarding the Theory of Evolution:

 

Even if it were to become clear to us that the world came into being by way of the evolution of the species, still there would be no contradiction, for our count follows the plain sense of the biblical verses, which is far more relevant to us than knowledge about the past, which carries little value for us. Without question, the Torah concealed much about creation, speaking in allusions and parables. For everyone knows that the creation story is included among the secrets of the Torah, and if everything followed the plain sense [of the verses], what secret would there be here?...The main thing is what arises from the entire story—knowing God and [living] a truly moral life. (Iggerot Ra’ayah I, letters 91, p. 105)[6]

 

Instead of reinterpreting the Torah to match science, one could argue that the Torah does not teach scientific truth, but rather religious truth. From this perspective, a believing Jew accepts the religious messages of the Torah, while accepting science from scientists. In his introduction to the Torah, Rabbi Samuel David Luzzatto espoused this position:

 

Intelligent people understand that the goal of the Torah is not to inform us about natural sciences; rather it was given in order to create a straight path for people in the way of righteousness and law, to sustain in their minds the belief in the Unity of God and His Providence.

 

            Commenting on Psalm 19:6–7, which describes the sun moving across the sky, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch similarly remarks:

 

David, as do all the Holy Scriptures, talks in the language of men. His language is the same as that of Copernicus, Kepler and Newton, and as that which we use today…. This language will remain the same even when the assumption that the sun is static and that the earth revolves around it—and not the sun around the earth—will have been proven to be irrefutable certainty. For it is not the aim of the Holy Scriptures to teach us astronomy, cosmogony or physics, but only to guide man to the fulfillment of his life’s task within the framework of the constellation of his existence. For this purpose it is quite irrelevant whether the course of days and years is determined by the earth’s revolution around the sun, or by the latter’s orbit around the former.[7]

 

            In his inaugural address as the second president of Yeshiva College and the Rabbi Isaac Elhanan Theological Seminary delivered on May 23, 1944, Rabbi Dr. Samuel Belkin expressed similar sentiments:

 

It is not our intention to make science the handmaiden of religion nor religion the handmaiden of science. We do not believe in a scientific religion nor in a pseudo-science. We prefer to look upon science and religion as separate domains which need not be in serious conflict and therefore need no reconciliation.[8]

 

In a more pointed manner, Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz dismissed the possibility of reading the Torah as a history or science textbook:

 

If the Holy Scriptures were sources of information, it would be difficult to see where their sacredness resided…. The idea that the Shekhinah (God’s Presence) descended on Mount Sinai in order to compete with the professor who teaches history or physics is ludicrous, if not blasphemous.[9]

 

            To summarize, there is ample room within tradition to avoid faith-science conflicts. One may reinterpret passages in the Torah, or one may study the Torah for its religious messages while accepting science as science. In an age where science is vastly more empirical than it was in the times of Rabbi Saadiah Gaon and Rambam, it is particularly valuable that these rabbinic thinkers paved a path for belief in the Torah without any conflict with scientific knowledge.[10] Their guidance helps us focus on what truly matters—the religious messages that the Torah wishes to teach.

 

Torah and Logic[11]

 

1. Angelic encounters

Rambam maintained that all angelic encounters were experienced in prophetic visions, not in actual reality (Guide of the Perplexed II:41–42). There are occasions where this principle helps explain difficult texts. For example, when Joshua encountered an angel “in Jericho” (Joshua 5:13–15), that city had yet to be captured. Rambam’s assumption, that Joshua was experiencing a prophetic vision, eliminates this difficulty. In a prophetic vision, Joshua could have been standing inside of Jericho.[12]

            On other occasions, however, Rambam’s assumption appears to contradict or stretch the literal reading of the biblical text. For example, Rambam maintained that Abraham’s encounter with the three angels in Genesis 18 must have occurred in a prophetic vision (Guide of the Perplexed II:32). Ramban (on Genesis 18:1) censured this position. If this were only a vision, why does the Torah provide so many details with regard to Sarah’s preparation of food? Did Lot and the wicked people of Sodom experience prophetic revelation when they encountered the angels in Genesis 19? If they were experiencing prophecy, then Lot would still have remained in Sodom, since the entire destruction was experienced only in prophecy! Ramban believed that Rambam’s position is incompatible with the Torah.[13]

Rambam’s premise about angels also became a potentially dangerous precedent. Abarbanel (on Genesis 22:13) expressed chagrin that some writers applied Rambam’s principle to argue that the Binding of Isaac occurred only in Abraham’s prophetic vision, since an angel stopped Abraham from sacrificing Isaac.[14] Abarbanel considered this view a terrible misapplication of Rambam’s teachings, and stated that it was wrong to deny the historicity of the Binding of Isaac.

 

2. God’s unusual instructions to prophets

Throughout Tanakh, God ordered prophets to perform symbolic actions, including several that appear shocking. For example, God instructed Hosea to marry an eshet zenunim (commonly translated as “prostitute”[15]) to illustrate Israel’s infidelity to God. The ensuing narrative reports that Hosea did so, and fathered three children with her (Hosea 1:2–9). Similarly, God commanded Isaiah to “untie the sackcloth from his loins” to foretell that the Assyrians would lead the Egyptians and Ethiopians away as naked captives. Isaiah faithfully obeyed, and walked around arom (literally, “naked”) and barefoot (Isaiah 20:2–6).

Rambam insisted that God never would order a prophet to do anything foolish or irrational. Therefore, Hosea and Isaiah performed these actions only in prophetic visions:

 

God is too exalted than that He should turn His prophets into a laughingstock and a mockery for fools by ordering them to commit acts of disobedience. In the same way when He says, Like as My servant Isaiah hath walked naked and barefoot, this only happened in the visions of God. The position is similar with regard to the words addressed to Hosea: Take unto thee a wife of harlotry and children of harlotry. All this story concerning the birth of the children and their having been named so and so happened in its entirety in a vision of prophecy. This is a thing that can only be doubted or not known by him who confuses the possible things with the impossible ones. (Guide of the Perplexed II:46)[16]

 

According to Rambam, Hosea did not actually marry a prostitute,[17] nor did Isaiah walk around naked in public.[18] When a conflict arises between the personal perfection of a prophet and his mission to the people, Rambam favored the element of personal perfection.

Abarbanel criticized Rambam (and Ibn Ezra) for contradicting biblical texts, which state explicitly that Hosea and Isaiah performed these actions:

 

One must be extremely astonished at these learned authors (i.e., Ibn Ezra and Rambam)—how could they advance this kind of sweeping principle in prophetic narrative? If the text testifies that the action occurred, we have no right to depart from its plain sense, lest we interpret the verses incorrectly. Indeed, it is infidelity and a grave sin (zimmah va-avon pelili) to contradict the plain sense of the verses; if this is what we do to them, this disease (tzara’at) will spread over all verses and reveal interpretations that contradict their veracity. (commentary on Hosea 1)

 

Abarbanel insisted that a prophet’s mission to the people is more important than the prophet’s personal perfection and dignity. Therefore, according to Abarbanel, if God decides that these shocking symbolic actions could have a positive religious effect on the people, God will order prophets to perform them.

 

3. Messianic visions

 

The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, the leopard lie down with the kid. In all of My sacred mount nothing evil or vile shall be done; for the land shall be filled with devotion to the Lord as water covers the sea. (Isaiah 11:6, 9)

 

Believing that the natural order will not be altered in the messianic era, Rambam adopted Ibn Ezra’s reading of this prophecy and interpreted it as a poetic way to express that all nations will live together in peace (Laws of Kings 12:1; Guide of the Perplexed II:29).

            Unlike the previous examples, however, Rambam entertained the literal reading of Isaiah 11:6–9 as a possible meaning:

 

You must realize that I am not at all positive that all the promises and the like of them are metaphorical. No revelation from God has come to teach me they are parables. I will only explain to you what impels me to speak this way. I try to reconcile the Law and reason, and wherever possible consider all things as of the natural order. Only when something is explicitly identified as a miracle, and reinterpretation of it cannot be accommodated, only then I feel forced to grant that this is a miracle. (Treatise on Resurrection)[19]

 

Although there were issues that Rambam considered irrational and impossible, there were others where he allegorized because he thought this to be the most plausible way of explaining a text. In those latter instances, he was willing to entertain the more literal reading.

 

 

Torah and Talmudic Values[20]

 

In the above cases, literalism is associated with piety and non-literalism with rationalism. But sometimes it goes the other way. Some, following one strand of talmudic thinking, hold that King David didn’t really commit adultery and orchestrate murder in spite of the literal biblical text (II Samuel 11), or that King Solomon didn’t really worship idols (I Kings 11).

            In II Samuel chapter 11, David commits adultery with Bathsheba, and then has her husband Uriah killed off so that David can marry Bathsheba. The prophet Nathan excoriates him in chapter 12, and David expresses profound remorse for his sins before embarking on a remarkable process of repentance.[21]

Adopting the literal reading of the text, Abarbanel enumerates five sins committed by David: (1) adultery; (2) being prepared to abandon his biological child by asking Uriah to return to Bathsheba; (3) having Uriah—a loyal subject—killed; (4) having Uriah killed specifically by enemies; (5) insensitively marrying Bathsheba soon after Uriah’s demise.

Abarbanel then cites the Gemara: “whoever says that David sinned is merely erring” (Shabbat 56a). That talmudic passage suggests that Uriah had given a bill of divorce to Bathsheba prior to going to battle, and therefore David did not commit technical adultery. Uriah should be deemed a rebel against David for slighting the king, and therefore David was halakhically justified in having him killed (commentators debate what the precise problem was, within this talmudic reading). Although David’s actions were unbecoming, he is not guilty of the most egregious sins according to this passage.

However, retorts Abarbanel, the textual proofs adduced in David’s defense are uncompelling, whereas the prophet Nathan explicitly accuses David of sinning—and David confesses and repents. Moreover, Rav, the leading disciple of Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi (known simply as “Rabbi”), dismisses his teacher’s defense of David on the spot: “Rabbi, who is descended from David, seeks to defend him and expounds [the verse] in David’s favor.” Therefore, concludes Abarbanel, “these words of our Sages are the ways of derash, and I have no need to respond to them.… I prefer to say that [David] sinned greatly and confessed greatly and repented fully and accepted his punishment, and in this manner he attained atonement for his sins.”[22]

Although Abarbanel presents himself as an independent pashtan in this instance, he has not broken with rabbinic tradition. A number of rabbinic sources do not exonerate David. For example, there are opinions that Bathsheba was possibly a married woman or certainly a married woman;[23] that Bathsheba’s consent still might be viewed halakhically as a form of rape of a married woman since she was not in a position to decline;[24] that David was culpable for the death of Uriah;[25] that Joab bears guilt for failing to defy David’s immoral orders regarding Uriah.[26] The unambiguous textual evidence against David, including his own admission of guilt and wholehearted repentance, seems to have convinced Abarbanel that it was unnecessary to cite additional sources beyond Rav’s dismissal of his teacher’s defense of David.[27]

Despite these protests, many other commentators, including Rashi, Radak, Ralbag, and Malbim, accept the talmudic defense of David in Shabbat 56a. There is a religious balance between viewing biblical heroes with proper reverence and simultaneously listening to the the biblical text.[28]

           

Navigating a Path that Hears Both Sides of the Debate

 

            Once we recognize that the most critical component of learning Tanakh is to hear God’s revealed word and learn the prophetic messages of the text, we can address the issue of taking each text literally.

            If we take the texts literally but not as dogmatically literal when there are conflicts, we can make much headway in navigating the debates. For example, the Sages debate whether the story in the Book of Job occurred. Rambam believed that the story did not occur, but stressed that we must focus on the religious messages of the narrative:

 

To sum up: whether he has existed or not, with regard to cases like his, which always exist, all reflecting people become perplexed; and in consequence such things as I have already mentioned to you are said about God’s knowledge and His providence. (Guide of the Perplexed III:22)[29]

 

            Similarly, the Torah states that God created the world in seven days, thereby teaching that God created the world, and that Shabbat is of vital importance in the God-Israel relationship. If the world is billions of years old, this scientific reality in no way detracts from the religious values of God as Creator above nature or in the importance of Shabbat.

            The Torah teaches that all of humanity is descended from one couple, and therefore there is no room for racism (Sanhedrin 37a). If geneticists demonstrate the extreme unlikelihood of all people descending from one couple that lived 6,000 years ago,  this scientific reality in no way diminishes God’s message in the Torah against racism.

            The sins of King David teach the dangers of lust (Rabbi Judah HeHasid), the power of repentance (Abarbanel), and the incredible integrity of prophecy in its willingness to condemn Israel’s most beloved leader when he violates the Torah. If Uriah gave Bathsheba abill of divorce, that would in no way compromise the prophetic messages of the text.

            Tanakh is not a systematic theology, science, or history. We treat nearly all of Tanakh as historical, but God did not reveal prophecies to the prophets in order to teach science or history. God is speaking to us, and it is our religious obligation to hear, understand, and listen to that voice. We take all of the texts seriously, even if some of them may be understood as non-literal. Where there are debates among our commentators, we may navigate the path of taking the texts literally to learn their prophetic messages, while remaining open to science, reason, and other religious values from within tradition.[30]

 

 

[1] Translation from R. Natan Slifkin, The Challenge of Creation: Judaism’s Encounter with Science, Cosmology, and Evolution (Brooklyn, NY: Yashar, 2006), p. 107.

[2] See Menachem Kellner, “Maimonides’ Commentary on Mishnah Hagigah II.1, Translation and Commentary,” in From Strength to Strength, ed. Marc D. Angel (Brooklyn: Sefer Hermon Press, 1998), pp. 101–111.

[3] Translation from Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Rambam, Abraham S. Halkin, trans. and D. Hartman (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985), p. 228.

[4] See R. Natan Slifkin, The Challenge of Creation, pp. 116119, for discussion of the opposition of Ralbag and Abarbanel to over-allegorization.

[5] In R. Natan Slifkin, The Challenge of Creation, p. 119.

[6] In R. Chaim Navon, Genesis and Jewish Thought, trans. David Strauss (Jersey City, NJ: Ktav, 2008), pp. 36–37.

[7] The Hirsch Tehillim, Extensively Revised Edition, originally translated by Gertrude Hirschler (Jerusalem: Feldheim, 2014), p. 167.

[8] In Zev Eleff, Modern Orthodox Judaism: A Documentary History (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 2016), p. 208.

[9] Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State, ed. Eliezer Goldman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) p. 140.

[10] For a detailed discussion of this religious position, extensive sources, and applications to  contemporary scienctific knowledge, see R. Natan Slifkin, The Challenge of Creation.

[11] Some of this section is adapted from Hayyim Angel, “Rambam’s Continued Impact on Underlying Issues in Tanakh Study,” in The Legacy of Maimonides: Religion, Reason and Community, ed. Yamin Levy and Shalom Carmy (Brooklyn: Yashar Books, 2006), pp. 148–164; reprinted in Angel, Through an Opaque Lens (New York: Sephardic Publication Foundation, 2006), pp. 35–55; revised second edition (New York: Kodesh Press, 2013), pp. 19–38; Peshat Isn’t So Simple: Essays on Developing a Religious Methodology to Bible Study (New York: Kodesh Press, 2014), pp. 58–79.

[12] Ralbag adopted Rambam’s view on these verses. Alternatively, Joshua may have been standing in the Jericho area, not inside the walled city (Rashi, Radak).

[13] See further discussion of this debate in Shalom Rosenberg, “On Biblical Exegesis in the Guide” (Hebrew), Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 1 (1981), pp. 113–120.

[14] See discussion in Abraham Nuriel, “Parables Not Designated Parables in the Guide to the Perplexed” (Hebrew), Da’at 25 (1990), pp. 85–91.

[15] See, for example, Pesahim 87a–b, Kara, Ibn Ezra, Radak, Abarbanel, Malbim. Yehudah Kiel (Da’at Mikra: Twelve Prophets vol. 1 [Jerusalem: Mosad HaRav Kook, 1990], p. 3, n. 6) suggests the alternative that the woman was not yet promiscuous, but would cheat on Hosea after they were married.

[16] Translation from The Guide of the Perplexed, Shlomo Pines, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 404–406.

[17] On this issue, Rambam followed Ibn Ezra (Hosea 1:1). Radak accepted Rambam’s view in both cases.

[18] Several commentators who understood Isaiah’s actions as having occurred in a waking state explained that “arom” can mean “with torn clothing,” or “scantily clad,” rather than outright “naked.” See, for example, Targum, Rashi, R. Eliezer of Beaugency, Ibn Caspi. For further discussion of classical rabbinic views, and the meaning of Isaiah’s symbolic action in light of his historical setting, see Shemuel Vargon, “Isaiah’s Prophecy Against the Background of Ashdod’s Revolt Against Sargon II and Its Suppression” (Hebrew), in Vargon, BeArtzot HaMikra: Mehkarim BeNevuah, BeHistoriah, UbeHistorigraphiah Nevuit (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 2015), pp. 104–122.

[19] Translation from Crisis and Leadership, Abraham S. Halkin, p. 223.

[20] Some of this section is adapted from Hayyim Angel, “Abarbanel: Commentator and Teacher: Celebrating 500 Years of his Influence on Tanakh Study,” Tradition 42:3 (Fall 2009), pp. 9–26; reprinted in Angel, Creating Space between Peshat and Derash: A Collection of Studies on Tanakh (Jersey City, NJ: Ktav-Sephardic Publication Foundation, 2011), pp. 1–24; Peshat Isn’t So Simple: Essays on Developing a Religious Methodology to Bible Study (New York: Kodesh Press, 2014), pp. 80–104.

[21] See further in Hayyim Angel,“The Yoke of Repentance: David’s Post-Sin Conduct in the Book of Samuel and Psalm 51,” at http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/818982/Rabbi_Hayyim_Angel/The_Yoke_of_Repentance:_David%E2%80%99s_Post-Sin_Conduct_in_Sefer_Shemuel….

[22] Samuel, pp. 342–343.

[23] Bava Metzia 59a; Sanhedrin 107a; Midrash Psalms 3:4.

[24] Ketuvot 9a.

[25] Yoma 22b; Kiddushin 43a.

[26] Sanhedrin 49a.

[27] Abarbanel was not the first medieval interpreter to assert David’s guilt, either. Rabbi Judah b. Natan (Rashi’s son-in-law, in Teshuvot Hakhmei Provencia, vol. 1 no. 71), Rabbi Isaiah de Trani (on Psalms 51:1), and Ibn Caspi (on II Samuel 11:6) preceded him. For a survey of rabbinic sources, see R. Yaakov Medan, David U-Bat Sheva (Hebrew) (Alon Shevut: Tevunot, 2002), especially pp. 7–26.

[28] For discussions of this balance, see R. Amnon Bazak, Ad HaYom HaZeh: Until This Day: Fundamental Questions in Bible Teaching (Hebrew), ed. Yoshi Farajun (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2013), pp. 432-470; R. Shalom Carmy, “To Get the Better of Words: An Apology for Yir’at Shamayim in Academic Jewish Studies,” Torah U-Madda Journal 2 (1990), pp. 7–24; R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “A Living Torah” (Hebrew), in Hi Sihati: Al Derekh Limmud HaTanakh, ed. Yehoshua Reiss (Jerusalem: Maggid, 2013), pp. 17–30; R. Yaakov Medan, David UBat Sheva: HaHet, HaOnesh, VeHaTikkun (Hebrew) (Alon Shevut: Tevunot, 2002), pp. 7–24; R. Joel B. Wolowelsky, “Kibbud Av and Kibbud Avot: Moral Education and Patriarchal Critiques,” Tradition 33:4 (Summer 1999), pp. 35–44; R. Joel B. Wolowelsky, “Abraham’s Stories,” in Rav Shalom Banayikh: Essays Presented to Rabbi Shalom Carmy by Friends and Students in Celebration of Forty Years of Teaching, ed. Hayyim Angel and Yitzchak Blau (Jersey City, NJ: Ktav, 2012), pp. 385–401.

[29] Translation from The Guide of the Perplexed, Shlomo Pines, p. 486.

[30] For an effort to define the parameters of what is traditionally acceptable within the allegorization of biblical passages, see Joshua L. Golding, “On the Limits of Non-Literal Interpretation of Scripture from an Orthodox Perspective,” Torah U-Madda Journal 10 (2001), pp. 37–59.

Sephardim and the Holocaust

Bringing the Sephardi into a Reset Shoah Narrative

By Arthur Shostak

 

 

Holocaust scholarship is finally making up for nearly eight decades of inadequate attention to the impact of the Shoah (1933 - ’45) on approximately 430,000 Sephardi Jews from Europe, Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, and Libya, etc., over 160,000 of whom perished in the catastrophe.

 

While a few path-setting academic histories came out since 1945 the publication in 2020 of a heartfelt analysis, The Sephardim in the Holocaust: A Forgotten People, by Isaac and Rosemary Levy, raises the bar. It will for decades be regarded as seminal.

 

The 262-page book draws on more than 170 interviews conducted with Auschwitz survivors in Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, the former Yugoslavia, and the United States. We hear from Sephardim in Athens, Corfu, Cos, Macedonia, Rhodes, Salonika, and the former Yugoslavia.

 

Especially valuable are three features: First, clarification of unique challenges Sephardim faced when in the grips of the Third Reich, as differences in language (24 occupied countries), physical appearance, and Hebrew pronunciation set them apart from the Ashkenazim (the dominant bloc). Second, documentation of brave high-risk secret efforts at revolt in the camps, complicated by the need for Sephardi cooperation with Ashkenazi fellow prisoners. Third, attention to survivors who owe their lives to altruistic sanctuary provided in Albania by Christian and Muslim Upstanders.

 

Hopefully, the Levy book will soon be followed by new Sephardic-focused scholarship that recognizes  there are two stories, not one, that learners ought to take from study of the Shoah: The Horror Story, or what perpetrators did To their victims, AND the Help Story, or  what victims did FOR one another.

 

The well-known first story is unforgivable, while the neglected second story is inspiring, It  tells of high-risk secret non-militant efforts made by victims to relieve suffering and increase the survival chances of less fortunate others … even at risk of life. The first story has gotten far more museum wall space than the second, far more library shelf space than the second, far more movie screen coverage than the second, and far more classroom podium and blackboard attention, along with Covid-19 based zoom attention, than the second. This makes the least of memorialization possibilities.

 

It is past time to think critically about this costly imbalance, and act to remedy it, as it is historically incorrect, grievously misleads, negatively stigmatizes the subject, and explains much of so-called Holocaust Fatigue. The mainstream Narrative needs a constructive reset that would arrest Horror Centrism and advance a new ratio, say, 55/45, Horror/Help, and thereby improve the Legacy and better honor the Six Million (over 160,000 of whom are Sephardic).

 

To this end I offer the example of my 2017 book, Stealth Altruism: Forbidden Care as Jewish Resistance in the Holocaust, my website of related short published articles (www.stealthaltruism.com), and my podcast ( https://www.practicalreasonpodcast.com/help-story). As well, I offer to assist any reader willing to take this perspective and apply it to the Sephardic Shoah experience.

 

What was the Sephardic counterpart of the Ashkenazi forest partisan units that in addition to harassing German troops also sheltered young and old Jewish refugees? Who was  a Sephardic counterpart for Dr. Janusz Korczak, a world-renowned Polish Jew possibly the greatest child specialist and educational reformer in all of Europe. How did Sephardic communities treat alleged Nazi collaborationists after 1945? How have Sephardic survivors sought to improve Shoah memorialization efforts and the educational transfer of the Legacy, much as do scores of Ashkenazi organizations?

 

With the rapid coming of an advent in which there are no direct survivors to tell youngsters (and scholars) their story, all of Shoah memorialization is at risk. The sooner Ashkenazi and Sephardic join hands, hearts, and minds in a creative effort to reset and thereby rehabilitate  the Narrative, the better off will be Jewry, Judaism, and thereby, humanity. The stakes are high,

 

Sensitivity: Thoughts for Parashat Ki Tetsei

Thoughts on Parashat Ki Tetsei

by Max Nussbaum

(Max Nussbaum is beginning Shana Bet studies at Yeshivat Reishit in Beit Shemesh. He plans to attend Baruch College upon his return to New York.)

 

Throughout the Torah, there are numerous mitzvot that don’t appear to have a clear reason. The commandment of Shatnez (not mixing wool and linen), for example, seems very random. However, there are also many mitzvot that make perfect sense such as the commandment to respect our parents. To an ethical person, respecting our parents is the least we can do for them because they bring us into the world and give us everything we need. 

In this week's Parasha, Ki Teitzei, there are 74 mitzvot listed. I’d like to focus on the commandment that one may not plow with an ox and a donkey together (Deuteronomy 22:10). At first glance, this looks puzzling. What’s the reason one can’t use these two particular animals while plowing a field?

The Sefer HaChinuch points out that the reason for this commandment is to prevent these two animals from mating. There is a concept of forbidden mixtures (Kilayim) and cross-breeding falls under that category. Nonetheless, we still have the same problem as before. Forbidden mixtures, such as Shatnez, are still unclear to us as to why they were forbidden.

Earlier this week, I was listening to a shiur by R’ Aryeh Leibowitz in which he quoted an article about sensitivity written by R’ Benjamin Yudin. R’ Leibowitz pointed out in the shiur that a person's view on Torah is often correlated with his or her personality. R’ Yudin, being a sensitive person, has an incredible insight to further understand the mitzvah that one may not plow with an ox and a donkey together. 

The owner of these animals would make sure that these animals are well fed before doing this work. Oxen chew their cud, which would indicate to the donkey that the ox has more food than it has, which would make the donkey upset. Another reason is that an ox is a much stronger animal than a donkey, therefore a donkey wouldn’t be able to keep up with the workload of an ox, which would make the donkey tired and weak. 

From both of these reasons, we now have a distinguishable way of looking at this commandment. What presents itself to be an easy mitzvah from Hashem, is really teaching us about sensitivity. Not only to people, but to animals as well.